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Abstract
Land policy and law are fundamental to the development of the State of Queensland; 
and instrumental in wreaking disastrous environmental consequences on privately held 
rural land. Such policy and laws have been indelibly shaped by prolonged political 
cycles and ideologies of successive State administrations. In the second half of the 
1950s, a non-Labor government took office and held power for 32 years. This era 
encouraged, and often legally required, unsustainable land management practices. The 
demise of this conservative regime came in 1989: Queensland Labor took office and 
enacted a raft of environmental laws as part of a general shift towards biodiversity 
conservation. This research was undertaken primarily during this latest Queensland 
Labor administration. Two environmental statutes were examined. The Vegetation 
Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA) was a new statute enacted to redress the effects of 
broadscale land clearing on freehold land. The Land Act 1994 (Qld) (LA) was an 
existing statute upon which requirements for sustainable management on leasehold land 
were grafted.
The aim of this thesis has been to advance understanding of natural resource legislation 
and contribute to the body of knowledge on State environmental laws. Each law is 
examined in the traditional doctrinal manner, adopting a conventional positivist 
approach and accompanied by socio-legal research. This methodology brings an insight 
into environmental law and the reality of the Queensland legislature and legal practice. 
This is achieved by analysing the circumstances which led to the creation of each law, 
including the political and parliamentary setting within which the laws were made; and 
by exploring the process of implementation. To assist the focus of this study, the thesis 
explores a series of research questions. Each designed to elicit an understanding of the 
making and implementation of environmental laws and to effectively link each 
component of the thesis to provide an integrated work.
Both environmental laws aimed to rectify the degradation of rural land caused by 
unsustainable policy and law. Notwithstanding this common environmental endeavour, 
the making and implementation of each statute differed. The VMA has been one of the
ix
most controversial pieces of legislation to be made and implemented in the last decade 
of the Queensland parliament; conversely, amendments to the LA, never reached the 
same level of controversy. This thesis ultimately asks why the statutes differed and 
advances a range of explanatory reasons. By exploring this question, the thesis aims to 
show that the public environmental good, and long-term sustainability of rural land, can 
be more readily achieved with leasehold title. The concern, as discussed in the 
concluding chapter, is that leasehold tenure might be facing its own expiry in 
Queensland.
List of Figures
Figure 2.1: The extent o f leasehold tenure within Queensland Page 52
Figure 2.2: How land is divided within Queensland Page 54
Figure 2.3: Leasehold tenures as a percentage o f the State Page 54
Figure 3.1: Trends in referrals and decisions made in agriculture and Page 77
forestry category under the EPBC Act 1999 (Cth)
Figure 3.2: Trends in decisions made in agriculture and forestry Page 78
categoryt under the EPBC Act 1999 (Cth)
Figure 5.1: Trends in optional preferential voting in recent Queensland Page 129 
elections
Figure 5.2: A comparison o f the votes allocated to the Australian Labor Page 134 
Party (ALP), the Liberal National Party and the Green parties in the 14 
seats in which the Greens directed preferences to the ALP in the 2009 
State election
Figure 6.1: Number o f compliance notices issued by region Page 171
Figure 7.1: Finalised prosecutions by the Department o f Environment Page 193
and Resource Management
Figure 8.1: Land condition assessments Page 264
Figure 8.2: Regional breakdown o f land condition assessments Page 265
Figure 8.3: Regional breakdown o f land in good or not in good Page 266
condition
Figure 8.4: Finalised land management agreements Page 267
Figure 8.5: Number o f leases renewed Page 267
Figure 8.6: Terms granted for renewed leases Page 268
Publications from the thesis
Parts of the following chapters have been published as follows:
Chapter 3 -  Kehoe J, The legacy of land tenure in Queensland Australia: the search for 
a cooperative approach' in Hillerbrand R and Karlsson R (ed) Beyond the Global 
Village: Environmental Challenges inspiring Global Citizenship, (Inter-Disciplinary 
Press, Oxford, 2008).
Chapter 4 -  Kehoe J, ‘Environmental law making in Queensland: the Vegetation 
Management Act 1999 (Qld)’ (2009) 26 (5) Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 
NSW, Lawbook Co.
Chapter 5 -  Kehoe J, ‘Rural landholders in Queensland Australia and the politics of 
environmental law’ Techera E (ed) Environmental Law, Ethics and Governance, (Inter- 
Disciplinary Press, Oxford, 2010).
Chapter 6 -  Kehoe J, ‘The rural community in Queensland Australia: political systems 
and the politicization of environmental law’ Cotton M and Motta B H, (ed) Engaging 
with environmental justice: governance, education and citizenship, (Inter-Disciplinary 
Press, Oxford, 2011).
Chapter 7 -  Kehoe J, ‘Rural landholders in Queensland Australia: legislation, litigation 
and litigants’, Cotton M and Motta B H, (ed) Engaging with environmental justice: 
governance, education and citizenship, (Inter-Disciplinary Press, Oxford, 2011).
xii
Chapter One: Introduction to the thesis
Introduction
Early land policy and law in Queensland may well have failed the environment, but it 
reflected the ideology of incumbent governments and the preoccupation of the times.
The State has been characterised by long periods of conservative or Labor Party 
dominance. During these periods, fundamental and far reaching changes in rural land 
policy and law have been engendered. In the second half of the 1950s, a conservative 
administration returned to power following a 25 year hiatus. For the next 32 years a 
range of National and Liberal Party coalitions ruled the State. Rural freeholders 
generally engaged with an empathetic government and had the benefit of unfettered 
property rights. Rural leaseholders were regarded as land owners: their property rights 
were extended and entrenched. The overarching goal for Queensland during this period 
was development and land policy and law played a pivotal role. But the drive for 
growth, coupled with white settler yeomanry, fostered policy and laws which in due 
course proved devastating in a harsh and variable climate. Promotion of detrimental and 
unsustainable land management practices, not least the misguided closer settlement 
policy, ultimately left a legacy of degraded rural land.
In 1989 the power base shifted, Queensland Labor returned to govern and embarked 
upon a prolonged period of administration. Land policy and law were reviewed and 
revised amid a plethora of statutory change. Acknowledging the devastating 
environmental consequences of land degradation meant that recognition was at last 
given to the importance of sustainable land management. For Crown leasehold title new 
legislation was introduced that included a duty of care for rural land. Any further 
environmental legislation was stymied, however, by the abrupt demise of the Labor 
government in 1996. Dominance by the Queensland Labor Party was interrupted by a 
two year conservative coalition government. This period witnessed the introduction of a 
Broadscale Tree Clearing policy for leasehold land but it did little to curb clearing.
Rural landholders with freehold tenure remained unaffected by legislative restrictions 
until Queensland Labor returned to govern which, aside from a two year period, was 
from 1989 to 2012.
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This thesis aims to analyse the making and implementation of environmental legislation 
during this latest Labor administration. To do this two laws are examined in traditional 
doctrinal fashion, accompanied by socio-legal research. This approach enhances 
understanding of environmental laws, the Queensland legislature and legal practice.
This is achieved by analysing the circumstances which led to the creation of each law, 
including the political setting and parliamentary processes within which the laws were 
made; and by exploring the process of implementation. The catalyst for each statute was 
widespread degradation of rural land. There was a manifest need for significant change 
and a suite of environmental laws were enacted by the Queensland Labor Party as part 
of a general move towards biodiversity conservation on privately held rural land. The 
Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA) introduced the first vegetation 
management regulations on freehold land in 1999. The regulatory system for leasehold 
land was changed substantially by amendments to the Land Act 1994 (Qld) (LA), which 
put into practice the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy in 2008. The VMA proved to be 
one of the most controversial statutes to be made and implemented in the last decade of 
the Queensland parliament. Conversely, amendments to the LA never reached the same 
level of controversy. As environmental laws, both the VMA and the LA have the 
potential to promote the conservation of biodiversity on rural land, yet despite this 
commonality there is much divergence between these statutes. There are a range of 
reasons for the variance between the Acts, investigated throughout this thesis and 
brought together in its final part. This introductory chapter begins by establishing the 
origins and scope of this thesis and then sets down the methodology employed. The 
research problem is identified and a series of research questions are introduced. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the structure of this study.
Origins and scope of the research topic
The impetus for this research came from coursework undertaken in the Master of Laws 
specializing in environmental law at the Australian National University (ANU) and, 
more particularly, the topic undertaken for the Graduate Research Unit. This unit 
examined voluntary agreements that are the result of direct bargaining between private 
landholders and public government agencies in Queensland.1 Voluntary agreements can
1 This research unit led to a conference paper: Kehoe J, 'Utilisation o f voluntary conservation agreements in 
Australia: a perspective on Queensland ' paper presented to 5th Environmental Justice and Global Citizenship 
Conference, Mansfield College, Oxford. 3rd - 6th July, 2006: and subsequent publication: Kehoe J. ‘Voluntarv
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encompass various types of arrangements: the most extensive being a covenant in 
perpetuity registered on the land title, the least extensive being a one-off payment to a 
landholder for a particular task such as fencing. In between this broad range lie various 
contractual and non-contractual arrangements, including combinations of both 
covenants and contracts. For example, a covenant might run in perpetuity alongside a 
contractual management plan for a five-year period with annual payments. Sustainable 
natural resource management evidently requires long-term solutions which, in terms of 
voluntary agreements, are best suited to perpetual statutory covenants. The advantage of 
a covenant compared to a contract, is that covenants run with the land and bind 
successors in title. Such instruments however have tended to include very limiting land 
use restrictions and are less likely to be taken up by rural landholders. Research on the 
implementation of the Vegetation Incentive Program (VIP) administered by the 
Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM) found that the 
proposed strict covenant contributed to a low participation rate.* 2
There are also limitations with contractual agreements: because of the doctrine of 
privity, a contract only binds the original parties. Agreements may contain provision for 
the landholder to encourage a successor in title to take over the contract; but the 
drawback of this type of contractual arrangement is that it is directly linked to the 
current owner of the land. On the transfer of land, the contract ends and any 
environmental benefit may potentially end. As both covenants and contracts therefore 
have intrinsic problems, a long-term and potentially more widespread solution would be 
to incorporate sustainable land management practices into legislation such as the VMA 
and the LA.
The scope of this thesis primarily includes an analysis of the two Acts during the latest 
Labor administration. This includes: the introduction of the LA in 1994; the 
amendments in 2007 that brought in the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy; and the 
introduction of the VMA in 1999 including the many amendments this Act has
agreements in Queensland Australia: contributing factors and current incentive schemes', in S Wilkes (ed) Seeking 
Environmental Justice, (Rodopi. Amsterdam -  New York, 2008).
2 Commerford E & Binney J, 'Lessons learned to date from the Queensland Vegetation Incentives Program in 
moving from a conceptual ideal to practical reality,' paper presented to the Sustainable Agriculture State Level 
Investment Program, Resource Economics Workshop. Department o f Primary Industries, Rockhampton. Queensland 
28 October 2005. As noted in Chapter Three. Agforce. in promoting voluntary environmental programs support their 
parent body, the National Lanners Lederation. As examined in Chapter Eight, since 2007 Agforce have been in 
receipt o f  State government funding and have actively promoted the Nature Refuge program - as a result the number 
o f  refuges within the State has grown.
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undergone. The time period for this research concludes with the end of the Labor 
administration in Queensland in March 2012. For the purposes of completeness and 
context however, and to exemplify the divergence in policy and law between different 
administrations, the thesis includes detail on government changes and the implications 
for policy and law on rural land. Chapter Two examines land policy and law from the 
start of conservative government in 1957 when a non-Labor government took office and 
embarked upon significant change. Chapter Nine incorporates detail on the 2012 Liberal 
National Party (LNP) shift in government and proposed changes to the VMA and the 
LA. A timeline of the thesis including: significant dates for legislation and policy, a 
brief summary of the change made, and the attendant government and leader is 
provided.3
Research methodology
The doctrinal method adopted follows the conventional positivist approach and reflects 
the long standing influence of jurists closely associated with utilitarian theory, such as 
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, in which a distinct separation is perceived between 
law and morality.4 Austin regarded law as a command given by a superior or sovereign 
power and. being enforced by sanctions, the bulk of society is in the habit of obedience.5 6
In effect, command and control legislation familiar to environmental law. Positivism 
promotes a legal theory which centres on ‘posited law’ as laid down by the institutions 
of parliament and the courts/' Positivist legal theory explains what the law is; but this 
analysis alone would not realize the aim of this thesis, indeed:
The view that the law is an independent, objective and coherent system of state- 
sanctioned rules hardly captures the complexity of law in action within modern 
society as a form of administrative governance and device for exercising political 
power.7
The traditional doctrinal use of case law and legislation is expanded and accompanied 
by a modified case study to provide a perspective on what was happening in practice. 
The research aim is to provide a general understanding of the making and
3 In Appendix One: Timeline.
4 Gaze B & Jones M. Law, Liberty and Australian Democracy, (Lawbook Co. Australia. 1990) 28. And generally, 
Bums J H & Hart H L A, An Introduction to the principles of Morals and Legislation, (London. Athlone Press, 1977).
5 See generally, Austin J, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Prometheus Books, New York, 2000).
6 Leiboff M, & Thomas M, Legal Theories in Principle, (Lawbook Co, Australia, 2004) 135.
7 Salter M & Mason J, Writing law dissertations: An introduction and guide to the conduct o f legal research, 
(Pearson, Longman, UK. 2007) 113.
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implementation of two pieces of environmental legislation in Queensland. Insight into 
the social context of these laws is imperative to an understanding of how they operate 
within a given situation, and to acknowledge laws do not operate in ‘an objective 
doctrinal vacuum’.* A purely doctrinal study would disregard the lower courts, in which 
the more mundane fact-finding and fact-disputing activities are pivotal, and where 
elaborate points of law are rarely central. 9 Yet, as discussed in Chapter Seven, it is 
within the lower courts that much of the land clearing litigation is undertaken.
Case study research is typically used within the social sciences. In this sphere of study 
research primarily divides into quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative 
methods concentrate on facts and the production of statistics and operate within very 
defined and rigid parameters. At times throughout this study quantitative research was 
appropriate: particularly in answering the research questions that asked how each piece 
of legislation was implemented. For example, regulatory statistics were analysed to: 
determine trends in compliance notices in Chapter Six; examine finalised prosecutions 
in Chapter Seven; and assess implementation of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy in 
Chapter Eight.
Qualitative methods take an in-depth look at situations and consider examples rather 
than samples. This type of methodology is suited to asking qualitative ‘how' questions 
rather than quantitative ‘how many’ questions. 10 Though case studies may be based on 
any combination of quantitative and qualitative data, this thesis is suited, for the most 
part, to a qualitative approach. Utilising qualitative data with a modified case study as a 
research strategy facilitates the overarching aim, which is to ‘illuminate the general by 
looking at the particular’ and, as such, lends more readily to small-scale and in-depth
* Hutchinson T, Researching and Writing in Law. (Lawbook Co. Australia, 2002) 85.
9 Salter M & Mason J. Writing law dissertations: An introduction and guide to the conduct o f legal research, 
(Pearson, Longman. UK, 2007) 79.
10 Indeed case study research is ‘the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context’ Yin R K, Case Study Research (Sage Publications, 1984) 13; and also Silverman D, Doing Qualitative 
Research (Sage Publications, 2010) 118. Case study research is not sampling research but lends more readily to 
qualitative method, see further: Stake R E. The Art of Case Study Research. (Sage Publications, 1995) 4; and Stake R 
E, ‘Case Studies’ in Denzin N and Lincoln Y,(ed) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications, 2003) 134- 
164. This type of research is ‘inherently multi-method in focus, this use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects 
an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding ofthe phenomenon in question’. Denzin N and Lincoln Y, The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 2005) 5. Because qualitative study seeks to describe in detail 
what is happening to a particular group or community this can then be utilised to generate further quantitative 
research to establish further issues or themes. Bouma G D The Research Process (Oxford University Press. 2000) 
173. For example, following this qualitative study one of the recommended areas for future research included in 
Chapter Nine is a longitudinal quantitative study.
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investigations in a pre-existing situation." The advantage of using a case study as a 
research strategy therefore is that it generates analysis and promotes ‘a contextual 
approach to the situation especially in regard to “time slices” -  situations can be viewed 
before and after major events or changes. ’ 12 The Time slices' to be explored in this 
thesis are centered on the significant changes to vegetation management law evidenced 
by the introduction of the VMA and subsequent amendments; together with major 
change in leasehold tenure with the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy and attendant 
amendments to the LA.
All research methods have disadvantages. Case study methodology is criticised for a 
Tack of rigor’, which is related to the ‘problem of bias' and Tack of representativeness,’ 
critiques familiar to most types of qualitative research. 13 The very essence of the 
qualitative research process acknowledges that ‘every researcher speaks from within a 
distinct interpretative community’ that ‘incorporates its own historical research 
traditions into a distinct point of view’ . 14 The disadvantages of the case study method 
therefore presuppose that it is not possible to generalise from one set of circumstances; 
and there are ‘strict limits on what can be generalised’ . 15 Moreover analysis of a ‘few 
cases are poor representation of a population of cases and questionable grounds for 
advancing grand generalisation’; that being said the purpose of a case study is ‘not to 
represent the world, but to represent the case' . 16
In utilising a modified case study, this thesis operates within the domain of socio-legal 
research. Socio-legal study does not have a universal definition, but is aptly described as 
legal research that is:
... distinguished from doctrinal research through the deployment of one or more 
research methodologies drawn largely but not exclusively from the social sciences.
These methodologies are applied to a wider range of materials that provide
11 Denscombe M, The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (Open University Press, 
Buckingham, UK, 1998) 30-31.
12 Hutchinson T, Researching and Writing in Law. (Lawbook Co, Australia, 2002) 100.
13 Yin R K, Case Study Research (Sage Publications, 1984) 10-11, Hamel J, Case Study Methods (Sage 
Publications, 1993) 23 -28. Hutchinson T, n 12, 100 and Flyvbjerg B, ‘Case Study’ in Denzin N and Lincoln Y, 
Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications, 2011) 195.
14 Denzin N and Lincoln Y, The Landscape o f Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues (Sage Publications, 1998) 
23.
15 Ritchie J and Lewis J, Qualitative Research Practice (Sage Publications, 2012) 277.
16 Stake R E, ‘Case Studies’ in Denzin N and Lincoln Y,(ed) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Sage Publications, 
2003)156.
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evidence of the underlying public policy dimension underpinning doctrinal law, 
including interview data.... government reports and policy documents. 17
This type of research distinguishes between law in books and law in action. 18 It 
facilitates novel combinations of methodologies and approaches to the subject matter of 
a thesis. 19 Environmental law was one of the original topics of socio-legal study, an 
initial focus being regulation at a local level and particularly from the perspective of 
enforcement. 20 The work undertaken here includes State regulation to understand the 
political processes That bring law about and shape its form and content’ . 21 Queensland 
has received little academic attention in this area. It is the aim of this thesis to fill this
gap-
Case study research may be supported by other research strategies, such as interviews 
and discussions with individuals involved in the area to be explored. 22 Establishing a 
rapport with regulatory employees was imperative. This was not a straightforward task, 
it was hampered by the usual vagaries of working life - some employees left the 
department or moved to other divisions. The regulatory department was frequently re­
organised. At the beginning of this research the relevant regulatory department was 
Natural Resources and Mines, but for the bulk of this thesis it was the Department of
17 Salter M & Mason J, Writing law dissertations: An introduction and guide to the conduct o f legal research, 
(Pearson. Longman, UK, 2007) 132. Socio-legal research has evolved in some academic institutions and is now 
named empirical legal research: essentially each type of research has the common aim of incorporating law with 
social science research methods. Some research centers have retained the socio-legal label, for example, the 
University of Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies which was established in 1972, available at: 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/ (viewed 10 January 2012); and the Socio-legal Research Centre at Griffith University, 
available at http://www.griffith.cdu.au/criminologv-law7socio-leual-research-centrc (viewed 10 January 2012).
Others, following the American example, have changed to adopt the title empirical legal studies, for example, the 
University College London Centre for Empirical Legal Studies evolved from the Centre for Socio- Legal studies in 
2007. Available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/lavvs/socio-legal/ (viewed 10 January' 2012). One of the prime journals in 
this field is the Journal o f Empirical Legal Study established in 2004 by the Society for Empirical Legal Studies, 
based at Cornell University Law' School. Because ‘many legal and policy debates hinge on assumptions about the 
operation of the legal system' this Journal seeks to analytically test these assumptions and address the ‘gap in legal 
and social science literature that has often left scholars, lawyers and policymakers without basic knowledge of legal 
systems or with false or distorted impressions. Even simple descriptive data about the functioning of courts and the 
legal systems are often lacking’. Cornell University Law School, available at:
http://www.lawsehool.eornell.edu/SELS/ (viewed 10 January 2012) and the Journal o f Empirical Legal Study 
available at: http://onlinclibrarv.wilcw.com/ioumal/IO. 1111/(ISSN )1740-461/homepaae/Productlnformation.html 
(viewed 10 January 2012).
18 Cotterell R. The Sociology o f Law, (2nd Edition, Butterworths, 1992) vii.
17 Cotterell R, ‘Subverting orthodoxy, making law central: a view of sociolegal studies' (2002) 29 Journal o f Legal 
Studies, 635.
20 Hutter B M, ‘Socio-legal perspectives on environmental law: an overview" in Hutter B M (edj /( Reader in 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 3-4.
21 Hutter B M. n 20. 4.
Denscombe M. The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (Open University Press. 
Buckingham, UK, 1998) 31. Prior to the start of this research, and in an attempt to establish a viable research topic, 
preliminary informal discussions were conducted with regulatory staff in Rockhampton, Emerald and Brisbane. 
Contact was made with key individuals such as managers and senior policy officers, compliance officers and lawyers 
within the litigation unit.
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Environment and Resource Management (DERM). For simplicity this latter description 
will be employed. 23 Ultimately, following discussion with regulatory employees in 
Rockhampton and Emerald, contact was maintained with the Brisbane office as this 
housed senior management and has remained the centre of operations. Communication 
with regulatory staff though courteous was extremely guarded, as evidenced by the 
examination of compliance and enforcement in Chapter Seven; and the implementation 
of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy in Chapter Eight.
A form of snowball or referral sampling was employed. In this way individuals were 
interviewed and asked to refer to others who might have relevant experience within the 
regulatory environment or, in the case of rural landholders, who had been affected by 
the compliance and enforcement provisions of the vegetation management regulations. 
This method of sampling is claimed to ‘generate a unique type of social knowledge' . 24 It 
is particularly useful in situations where individuals, such as rural landholders, may be 
difficult to locate; and in locating individuals, such as lawyers, with expertise in the 
relevant area: for example in land clearing litigation. 25 A strict adherence to snowball 
sampling multiplies the referrals at each interview. This was not practical for the 
purposes of this thesis in which referrals were requested in an attempt to place the laws 
within a social context and as a means of connecting with the relevant individuals or 
organisations. The initial research began with contacts already known. 26 In keeping with 
the snowball sampling technique, not all referrals, or information elicited following an 
interview, were used.
An obvious problem with snowball or referral sampling is bias. 27 Snowball sampling 
might exclude individuals and has the potential for personal involvement of the
23 Following the Queensland State election and shift to an LNP government in March 2012 the Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines (DNRM) was established, this comprises the former Department of Environment and Resource 
Management (DERM) and the former Department of Employment Economic Development and Innovation (DEEDI).
24 Chaim N, ‘Sampling Knowledge: the hermeneutics of snowball sampling in qualitative research’ (2008) 11 (4) 
International Journal o f Social Research Methodology, 327.
25 Goodman L A, "Snowball sampling’ (1961)132 (1) Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 148-170; Ove F & Snijders 
T Estimating the size of hidden populations using snowball sampling, (1994) 10(1) Journal o f Official Statistics, 
53-67; Heckathom D, (2002) ‘Respondent-driven sampling II; deriving valid estimates from chain-referral samples 
of hidden populations’(2002) 49 Social Problems, 11-34.
26 In this regard I am grateful to my local supervisor Prof John Rolf: it was at his instigation that I was introduced to 
regulatory staff at DERM’s Rockhampton and Emerald offices and also the Chairman of Property Rights Australia at 
the time Ron Bahnisch. The chairman then introduced me to their lawyer who had acted in a number of land clearing 
cases. In addition, contact I already had within the local legal profession proved an invaluable source of information 
and led on to interviews with lawyers who had acted in land clearing investigations and litigation and their respective 
clients.
27 Welch S. ‘Sampling by referral in a dispersed population' (1977) 39 (2) Public Opinion Quarterly, 238.
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researcher’s own social networks.28 It is likely for example that the referrals from and 
within Property Rights Australia (PRA) would draw out individuals with similar 
attitudes, values and beliefs. Whilst recognizing these possible limitations, contact with 
rural landholders was nonetheless limited to individuals who had been investigated or 
prosecuted. Moreover the researcher’s own social network was utilised in order to 
interview lawyers, but this was again limited to lawyers who had acted in land clearing 
cases and included lawyers previously unknown to the researcher.
The litigation of land clearing cases will be considered in Chapter Seven. The 
regulator's prosecution record has been variable and the conduct of DERM employees, 
following the case of Ashley McKay, was subject to investigation by the Crime and 
Misconduct Commission. As noted in this chapter, the regulators also announced that an 
independent investigator would be appointed to examine the conduct of some 
employees but the outcome of this investigation was never released. Obtaining statistics 
and a detailed insight into regulatory compliance policy proved to be a challenging and 
time consuming exercise which is documented in Chapter Seven. There was a 
regulatory commitment to transparency, included in DERM’s compliance strategy, but 
this was not evident in practice. The vegetation clearing cases examined were identified 
not by the list of finalized prosecutions provided by DERM, as this list had removed the 
names of all relevant parties. Rather the land clearing cases included in this thesis were 
identified from the rural media, and during interviews with rural bodies such as PRA, 
which in turn led on to contact with investigated and prosecuted rural landholders and 
their representing lawyers.
Instances occurred during the research, for example in Chapters Seven and Eight, when 
a request for access to information could have been pursued under the Freedom o f 
Information Act 1992 (Qld) (FOI).w In Chapter Seven the regulators were reluctant to 
provide a comprehensive picture of vegetation management investigations and cases. A 
decision was made not to pursue FOI: the information eventually provided by the 
regulators involved a delay approaching 18 months and a great deal of persistence. An 
FOI application, with its attendant procedures, costs and inevitable delays, would have 
impeded the completion of this thesis. Ultimately the compliance and enforcement
~s Browne K, ‘Snowball sampling: using social networks to research non-heterosexual woman' (2005) 8 (1) 
International Journal o f Social Research Methodology. 57.
2V Freedom o f Information Act 1992 (Qld). Part 3 covers access to government documents.
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chapters provide an insight into the implementation of the vegetation management 
regulation on some rural landholders throughout the research period. 30
Chapter Eight examines the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy, in this instance (and to 
ascertain if such an approach would make a difference) an LOI application was 
submitted following reluctance of the regulators to produce, for example, the 
submissions made by interested parties as part of the consultation phase. An account is 
provided in Chapter Eight of a meeting with the State Land Asset manager and two 
senior policy officers; and subsequent dealings with regulatory staff to obtain statistics 
on implementation of the strategy. 31 Ultimately regulatory statistics were supplied but 
the submissions were not produced. As negotiations with the regulators had taken the 
better part a year, the LOI application was not pursued further for the same reasons as 
elucidated above.
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the 
ANU. 32 Approaches to potential interviewees were generally instigated by e-mail and 
included a description and explanation of the purposes of the research along with an 
information sheet and consent form. An adequate time period was given for the 
individual to absorb the contents of the research information sheet and consent form 
before arranging a suitable appointment that was convenient for the interviewee. A 
response was not forthcoming from all requests. 33 Depending on the wishes of the 
individual, discussions were conducted face-to-face, by telephone or e-mail and 
sometimes by a combination of all three. 34 Interviews with rural landholders and their 
lawyers and bodies such as PRA were primarily undertaken for the compliance and 
enforcement chapters, being Chapters Six and Seven. 35
30 Denscombe M. The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (Open University Press, 
Buckingham, UK, 1998) 30.
31 Regulatory statistics were ultimately supplied and, in fairness to the regulators, my requests for these spanned 
several months because of other work commitments.
32 Appendix Two: Research Protocol: 2009/607.
33 For example of the five Members of the Queensland Parliament contacted, only two responded. Equally it became 
increasingly difficult to elicit contact with or get a response from Agforce toward the end of the research period. At 
the beginning of this study contact with Agforce staff was straightforward as their contact details were easily acquired 
from the organization’s web site. More recently it is only possible to gain contact with most Agforce staff by being a 
member of Agforce.
34 A particularly insightful interview took place when a prosecuted landholder had provided a mobile phone number 
and asked to be contacted at a particular time, it transpired he was driving a tractor and welcomed the break. This was 
Gary Dore (for example Dore & Ors v Penny [2004] QDC 364 and other cases).
35 Some hand written notes of each interview were taken and securely tiled. It was not felt necessary to record 
discussions. Rather the preferred course was to follow an unstructured and infonnal format. Direct quotes included in 
this thesis were not taken from the unstructured interview, rather individuals were asked to clarify information in 
their own words in a follow up e-mail. Generally this approach proved successful, only one landholder was not 
ultimately interviewed. In addition to regulatory personnel of the Queensland government, interviews were conducted
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Case study research may also be supported by documentary analysis. 36 An examination 
of DERM materials within the public domain was made, this included annual reports, 
policy documents, information material and application forms - for example on the 
mechanics of applying for a property map of assessable vegetation or a lease renewal. 
Access to information not within the public domain was, as mentioned earlier, 
problematic. Some of the lawyers interviewed were prepared to disclose file details.
Such disclosure was always with client consent, observing lawyer-client privilege and 
adhering to the obligations to respect confidentiality within the ambit of the human 
research protocol. Sometimes complete files were obtained, such as those collated by 
the Chairman of the Vegetation Management Advisory Committee (discussed in 
Chapter Four), or counsel's file on the case of Christopher Holmes (discussed in 
Chapter Seven).
Documentary analysis for the doctrinal aspects of this research included statutes and 
accompanying explanatory notes. Examination of the making of the VMA and the LA 
took in all relevant parliamentary stages recorded in Queensland Parliamentary 
Hansard, together with the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC) Alert Digest 
reports and other primary source data available on the Queensland government web site. 
Cases include those which were reported and also, in Chapter Seven, transcripts of 
vegetation management hearings from the District and Magistrates Courts.
Research problem and the significance of and justification for the 
thesis
The research problem in this thesis concerns the need for and the legal mechanisms by 
which environmentally sustainable land management practices have been implemented 
on privately held rural land in Queensland. Land management practices fostered by 
earlier government policy and law encouraged broadscale land clearing with devastating 
consequences for the environment. The detrimental impacts of such clearing include the 
loss of biodiversity, destruction of habitat and native species, together with significant
with: rural landholders who had been investigated or prosecuted under the vegetation management regulations and 
their representative bodies such as Property Rights Australia: spokespersons for the Green Party and conservation 
groups such as Queensland Conservation, the Wildlife Preservation Society o f Queensland and Greening Australia; 
Local Rockhampton and Brisbane based lawyers, who had acted for rural landholders, generously provided an 
invaluable insight into investigations and prosecutions under the vegetation management regulatory scheme.
36 Stark S and Torrance H, ‘Case Study’ in Somekh B and Lewin C (ed) Research Methods in the Social Sciences 
(Sage Publications, London, 2005) 35.
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impacts on salinity, acidity, and greenhouse gases . 37 Environmentally sustainable natural 
resources require land management practices which meet the needs o f society both now 
and in the future. As noted by Bates:
...the management of land is crucial to its ability to sustain long-term productive 
activity as well as protect natural ecosystems. For example, a farm is used for 
agricultural and pastoral purposes, but the way in which it is used will have a 
significant effect not only on productivity but also on the environment. The 
clearing of native vegetation, use of chemical fertilisers, application of pesticide 
and herbicides, and failure to attend to erosion and salinity problems may all have a 
marked environmental effect on that property, on watercourses which flow through
38it, and on the biodiversity that inhabits it, as well as on neighbouring land.
As agriculture and regional Queensland remain inextricably linked, there was a manifest 
need for fundamental and far-reaching change.
The initial research question was deliberately broad since the purpose o f this question 
was to guide an examination o f both statutes. This question asked how the VMA and 
the LA were made and implemented in Queensland. The significance o f the research 
which flows from this question is that it illuminates the history o f Queensland land 
regulation in general and two key legislative regimes in particular. There are 
implications for the long-term sustainability o f the environment in addressing this initial 
question. For example, with regard to the implementation o f laws, Chapter Two argues 
that legislative restrictions such as those contained in the LA, are less contentious and 
more readily imposed on leasehold tenure. It is possible with leasehold, as compared to 
freehold, to impose legislative restrictions with less resistance and less controversy and 
without calls for compensation. This thesis looks at the old issue o f State held leasehold 
land in a new way, by explaining it is tenure within Queensland that has proved to be 
flexible rather than the statutory lease instruments that derive from it. Rural lease tenure 
has witnessed static lease covenants and conditions and changing regulations.
37 Australian Conservation Foundation, ‘Land clearing in Queensland: the problem and the solution.’ Krockenberger 
A K. Kitching R L, and Turton S M, ‘Environmental Crisis: Climate change and terrestrial biodiversity in 
Queensland,' (2003) Cooperative Research Centre for Tropical Rainforest Ecology and Management, Rainforest 
CRC, Cairns. Cogger H et al, ‘Impacts o f Land Clearing on Australian Wildlife in Queensland ‘(2003) World 
Wildlife Fund Australia Report in which clearing rates between 1997 and 1999 were used to calculate that 
approximately 100 million native mammals, birds and reptiles have died each year as a result o f broadscale clearing 
o f remnant vegetation. Available at: http://wAvf.ora.au/publications/qld landclcarina / (viewed May 2012).
38 Bates G, Environmental law in Australia (7th Edition. LexisNexis, Butterworths. 2010).
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Regulatory variation has been imposed from outside and not within the lease 
instrument.
In seeking to address long term conservation issues with legislation, Queensland and 
other comparable jurisdictions should draw upon accumulated knowledge and 
experience. The significance of this thesis is that it provides the historical analysis to 
support this process. Environmental laws have the potential to promote the progress of 
sustainable land management. The environmental value of improving management 
practices on rural land is augmented by the substantial extent and range of agricultural 
land within Queensland. The greater part of this land is privately held and has 
significant implications for the environment within the State, within Australia and 
globally. The current division of land by tenure is introduced in Chapter Two and 
expanded upon in Chapter Three in which the environmental consequences of 
agriculture are examined and it is contended that the VMA and the LA are part of the 
solution to widespread land degradation. Each statute has played a part in the move 
towards biodiversity conservation, but this shift in policy - especially that generated by 
the VMA - came at considerable cost to the relationship between the regulators and the 
regulated.
Detailed research into the making of environmental laws is justified not least by the 
dearth of other socio-legal research in this area. This offers the opportunity to make a 
valuable contribution to the literature. As the research topic unfolded it became apparent 
that the VMA, in particular, did not follow an archetypal parliamentary route. This was 
apparent in both the legislative process and the frequency of retrospectivity. There are 
underlying assumptions that laws are fashioned in a manner that adheres to a standard 
process, in effect a positivist legal approach that accepts the legitimacy of a law. Martin 
et al cite Queensland as a good example of sound regulatory principles and 
parliamentary procedure in law making.39 Yet this thesis demonstrates a significant gap 
between the requirements of statutory instruments (such as the Legislative Standards 
Act 1992 (Qld)) and parliamentary drafting requirements (such as the Queensland 
Legislation Handbook) and the process by which controversial laws, such as the VMA, 
have been made within Queensland. Similarly, an account of this State’s environmental
39 Martin P, Bartel R, Sinden J, Gunningham N and Hannam I, ‘Developing a Good Regulatory Practice Model for 
Environmental Regulations Impacting on Farmers ’(2007) Research Report, Australian Farm Institute and 
Commonwealth government. Land and Water Australia, 27.
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regulation by Maguire and Philips, maintains such legislation is able ‘to promote 
transparency of procedures, accountability of authorities, and public participation’.4" 
Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrate however that while there is transparency in 
parliamentary procedure in the making of laws, transparency and accountability of 
regulatory authorities throughout the period of research was considerably lacking. As 
for public participation, Chapter Four notes the consultation process under the 
Vegetation Management Advisory Committee, and the extensive work of many regional 
committees, was thwarted and discarded by the hasty introduction of the VMA.
The conventional course for law making was further abandoned as a consequence of the 
Queensland Labor government’s propensity to create retrospective amendments to the 
VMA. The extent and particular characteristics of these retrospective amendments is 
examined in Chapters Four and Five. Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
parliaments within Australia have a general power to make retrospective legislation. 
There is a long-established legal presumption, however, that laws should be prospective 
not retrospective.41 In Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 Dixon CJ clarified the rule
.. .that a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with 
reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have 
already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or 
liabilities which the law had defined by reference to past events.42
This legal presumption is not relevant to the VMA retrospective amendments: the 
intention of the Queensland Labor government to make retrospective laws was clear and 
certain.
Together with Palmer, Sampford undertook an examination of retrospective legislation 
within Australian parliaments and concluded such statues are ‘relatively common’ and
40 Maguire R and Phillips A, "The Role of Property Law in Environmental Management: An Examination of 
Environmental Markets’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 215-216. This reference to 
conventional regulation within Queensland cites the large body of natural resource management legislation and 
includes the VMA.
41 The traditional presumption and fundamental rule of English law nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, 
non praeteritis meaning a new law should be prospective not retrospective is expounded in Granville Sharpe G and 
Galpin B, Maxwell on The Interpretation o f Statutes (10th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1953) 213-215. The 
general legal presumption that parliament is presumed to legislate prospectively is considered in Maher F KH,
Waller P L and Derham D P, Cases and Materials on the Legal Process (Law Book Co, Australia, 1966) 372-381 and 
Bennion FAR,  Statutory’ Interpretation (3rd ed, Butterworths, 1997)A general coverage of retrospectivity in 
Australia is provided in: MacAdam A I & Smith T M, Statutes (3rd ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1993) 120-137 and 
Pearce D C and Geddes R S, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th ed. Butterworths. 2011) Chapter 10.
42 Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 at 267.
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‘usually deservedly uncontroversial’ . 43 In support of this argument Sampford divided 
retrospective legislation into a number of categories to illustrate the various forms 
retrospective law might take. These included less controversial laws, such as curative 
legislation or routine revision and extended to more controversial laws, such as 
retrospective criminal and taxation law and ‘legislation by press release’ . 44 This thesis 
details instances of controversial retrospective amendments to the VMA including, for 
example in Chapter Five, legislative change being backdated to the date of a ministerial 
media release and announced two weeks before a new parliamentary session. The VMA 
might well be what Sampford would describe as an ‘unrepresentative archetype’ . 45 
However, in the absence of comparison with other environmental laws within 
Queensland, it is impossible to conclude that the VMA was representative of other 
environmental laws. It is possible however to compare the two statutes relevant to this 
thesis and conclude that the VMA was frequently controversial, and often amended 
retrospectively, prompting the condemnation which often accompanied the 
amendments; the LA, conversely, did not reach the same level of controversy and was 
not amended retrospectively.
The readiness of legal practitioners to work with retrospective legislation is apparent in 
this thesis. Yet Martin and Gunningham warn that lawyers need to remember our 
‘commitment to social justice' within the law and the importance of being more than 
‘technical functionaries implementing policies’.4f’Operating as ‘technical functionaries' 
nonetheless reflects the reality, demands and requirements of the law within private 
practice. 47 The opportunity to analyse the specific making and implementation of two
43 Palmer A and Sampford C, ‘Retrospective legislation in Australia: looking back at the 1980s' (1994) 22 Federal 
Law Review 218.
44 Sampford C. Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 103-104. Sampford observed 
the growth in retrospective legislation since the 1970s. with the most frequent use o f press release being made in 
taxation law. He lists a series o f objections to legislation by press release to include: a lack o f precision; the 
undermining o f parliament, respect for the law and the rule o f law and excessive delay. 156 -158.
45 Sampford C. Retrospectivity and the Rule o f Law, (Oxford University Press, 2006) 257.
46 Martin P and Gunningham N, ‘Leading reform of natural resource management law: core principles' (2011) 28 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 157-158.
47 There are perspectives on vegetation management regulations that encompass practicing and academic lawyers. 
From the practicing lawyers the VMA and amendments are presented by explaining what the law is. For example: in 
2009, following further retrospective amendments to the Act, a seminar for lawyers was held by the Queensland 
Environmental Law Association in Brisbane. Two papers were presented outlining the latest legislative changes: 
Simmonds M, ‘Recent Amendments to the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) and Devlin R, ‘Vegetation 
Clearing Offences under Integrated Planning Act 2009 (Qld)’ (2009).This paper was presented prior to the passing o f  
the Sustainable Planning Act (Qld) 2009. This seminar is indicative o f  the reality o f private practice: keeping abreast 
o f the many changes in vegetation management law was an all encompassing and continuous task. A further paper 
was written by a practicing solicitor: Bredhauer J, ‘Can't See the Scrub for the Trees' Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal, (2004) 21. and an academic perspective provided in: McGrath C, ‘End ofbroadscale land clearing in 
Queensland' (2007) 24 (1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal and Bell J. ‘Tree clearing, hunger strikes and 
Kyoto targets -  the need for a middle ground' (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal. None o f these
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environmental laws lends more readily to an academic setting and forms the basis of 
this thesis.
Research questions
In examining State legislative responses to rural land degradation, further questions 
emerged. The answers to these questions form the foundation of this thesis and align 
with the research methodology employed.48 These questions have not previously been 
asked and the research undertaken is the first attempt to provide answers. The initial 
question, explored in Chapter Four, asked: how was the VMA made, implemented and 
amended from the introduction o f the legislation in 1999 to 2008? In December 1999, 
Premier Peter Beattie, adhered to a pre-election promise and introduced legislation to 
bring an end to broadscale land clearing. As an environmental law, the VMA became an 
electoral asset utilised as required to meet the Queensland Labor Party’s desire for a 
further term in office. Controversial laws are much more than a procedural 
implementation and legislative exercise - they are a consequence of the political context 
and reality of the parliamentary processes in which they are made. This prompted a 
further research question: what were the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland 
parliament and the political context under which the VMA was made and implemented? 
The making of the VMA paid little heed to parliamentary due process or the 
requirements of statutory guidelines or drafting procedures. Scrutiny of legislation is a 
fundamental function of government and the Queensland Labor Party demonstrated a 
manifest failure to perform its legislative role. Chapter Four ends in 2008, prior to the 
2009 State election, an election that engendered a controversial and retrospective 
amendment to vegetation management regulations.
The VMA was characterised by pre-election promises from Queensland Labor followed 
by post election changes to the law. This was the case in 1999 and 2004, as examined in 
Chapter Four, and again in 2009 as examined in Chapter Five. This prompted a further 
research question: how the VMA was made and implemented in 2009 and what were the
papers (which are included in Chapter Seven) include any reference to the frequency of retrospective amendments to 
the Act.
48 The research questions asked play a significant function in assisting the focus of the study and to guide how the 
research is conducted. The questions were designed to elicit an understanding of the making and implementation of 
environmental laws and to effectively link each component of the thesis to provide an integrated work. The 
significance of designing research questions is examined in: Maxwell J A, Qualitative Research Design: An 
Interactive Approach (Sage Publications, 2013) 73 -86.
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parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament and the political context within 
which the amendments were made? The Queensland electoral system was, in 2009, 
pivotal to a pre-election political deal which led to the VMA amendments in that year. 
Optional preferential voting, the method adopted within the State, has the potential to 
generate dominant single party government as evidenced in Queensland; and pre­
election horse-trading for preferences as witnessed in this election. As noted in Chapter 
Five, in utilising a preference strategy at a time of electoral weakness, Queensland 
Labor adopted a similar tactic to that employed by Federal Labor in the 1990 election. 
The ability of minority parties to influence and shape law prompted the following 
question: which groups influenced the political processes and the law that was 
ultimately made? It transpired the Green Party had the ear of government in 2009 and, 
under the optional preferential voting system, worked with a moribund Labor 
Government reliant on preference votes. In this State election year Labor's power was 
in decline and needed support from the Queensland Greens.
Chapters Six and Seven include both the VMA and the LA as both Acts were amended 
in 2003 for the purposes of compliance and enforcement. The amending legislation was 
again contentious and Chapter Six provides an investigation of environmental crime, 
criminal law and criminal responsibility as a background from which to consider the 
legislative scheme for compliance and enforcement of vegetation management. The 
following question was pertinent: how were the enforcement and compliance provisions 
o f the VMA made and what were the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland 
parliament within which the amendments were made?49 The compliance and 
enforcement amendments were especially controversial and far-reaching. They 
included: the removal of the defence of honest and reasonable mistake; an extension of 
regulatory powers to issue a compliance notice, enter private property, and obtain a 
criminal history; together with further regulatory advantages in an extension of statutory 
time limits, a reversal of the onus of proof and denial of the privilege against self­
incrimination. Parliamentary process followed the customary law making course for a 
contentious statute in Queensland. A further Labor Party tactic was to assign Stephen 
Robertson as Minister. Robertson was a long-serving parliamentarian customarily 
appointed during the more controversial periods of the VMA, for example the 2004 and 
2009 VMA amendments.
49 Political processes have typically been considered together with political context in this thesis but this was 
examined in Chapter Four.
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An essential part of regulatory compliance lies in the decision to prosecute. The 
following question was accordingly explored: how did the regulators decide to 
prosecute? Lack of enforcement is a familiar criticism of environmental laws. Yet 
effective laws require an effective deterrent. This chapter argues that deterrence should 
be just and fair. Much of the contention surrounding the VMA emanated from the 
vigorous prosecutorial stance taken at times by DERM. Regulatory claims to 
transparency were not evident in practice: DERM was not prepared to divulge 
information beyond the general compliance strategy and enforcement guidelines 
available within the public domain.
This lack of regulatory transparency remained apparent in Chapter Seven. The focus of 
this chapter is land clearing litigation, the research question examined: how were the 
compliance and enforcement provisions o f the vegetation management regulations 
implemented? This thesis documents the impenetrable nature of DERM’s compliance 
and enforcement procedure and the difficulty in determining a comprehensive list of 
illegal land clearing investigations and cases. There are fundamental and ubiquitous 
failings in all criminal justice systems but some of the cases examined bring to the fore 
particular inequities of land clearing litigation in Queensland. This gave rise to a further 
question: what wider issues did the compliance and enforcement provisions raise in 
terms o f procedural fairness and access to justice? Regulatory agencies should act and 
be seen to act with reason and fairness in the implementation of laws. They should 
adhere to their compliance strategy and enforcement guidelines and adopt a consistent 
and proportionate response. This chapter contends that the basic objects of 
environmental law are often far removed from the minutiae of litigation. The objects of 
the VMA include the conservation of remnant vegetation but, as evidenced in the case 
transcripts, this statutory purpose is unlikely to be achieved if a case is dismissed 
because of evidential deficiencies and legal technicalities.
The thesis then moves to address the same question of the LA that has been asked of the 
VMA: how were the LA and the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy made and implemented 
and what were the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament within which 
the amendments were made? The strategy was made following a prolonged consultation 
phase which began with a discussion paper in 2001 and a draft strategy in 2003. The 
law was amended in 2007 and included clarification of the statutory duty of care
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provision. Implementation of the lease renewal process began in 2008 and comprises a 
comprehensive and extensive land condition assessment and, on the basis of this 
assessment, a complex and lengthy land management agreement and a renewed lease. 
Land management agreements are contractual and take effect once registered, along 
with the other title documents, at the Land Registry. The length of the renewed lease is 
determined by the condition of the land. Under the strategy, regulators now have more 
extensive duties on lease renewal. Equally the regulated undergo a more protracted 
process and ultimately have more widespread duties and obligations to meet the 
conditions of their lease and land management agreement.
The structure of the thesis
Literature is reviewed at appropriate stages in each chapter and the thesis is developed 
in the following way:
Chapter One establishes the thesis methodology, which has utilised a broad approach 
incorporating traditional doctrinal study with socio-legal research. The origins and 
scope of research are set down and justification is provided for the thesis. The research 
problem is introduced along with the research questions to be addressed. The structure 
of the research is set down by a delineation and summary of each chapter.
In Chapter Two the significance of land tenure is explained and the basic principles of 
tenure are set down. The chapter also examines the evolution, advantages and 
prevalence of leasehold land within Queensland. Because of the extent of leasehold 
tenure, there is a utility in this land which has the potential to enhance general 
environmental values and biodiversity conservation.
Chapter Three examines the environmental impact of agriculture, the inherent problems 
of regulating the agricultural community and the critical role of rural organisations in 
facilitating the transition to ever-increasing legislation during the Labor period of 
government. The two pieces of legislation central to this thesis, the VMA and the LA, 
are introduced and placed within the context of State and Commonwealth laws which 
make provision for the management of rural land. Consideration is given to regulatory
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evaluation and assessment criteria in respect of environmental laws in Queensland 
generally; and specifically for the two pertinent Acts.
In Chapter Four the making and implementation of the VMA is explored, from the time 
the Act was introduced to the 2008 amendments. The Queensland Labor government 
persistently assured rural landholders that the VMA would bring certainty and protect 
the unique biodiversity of the State. This chapter reveals that the political manoeuvring 
underlying the VMA led to extensive uncertainty; and perversely, delay in proclaiming 
the VMA, caused a peak phase of land clearing. Parliamentary processes attendant upon 
this controversial law are examined and found deficient.
The making and implementation of the vegetation management regrowth provisions to 
the VMA are examined in Chapter Five. The year was 2009, an election year and the 
last time Labor secured office in the State. Controversial retrospective amendments 
brought about a six-month moratorium on clearing regrowth vegetation. The 
moratorium began in April with the Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing 
Moratorium) Act 2009 (Qld) and ended in October with the Vegetation Management 
and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Qld). The regrowth amendments brought 
uncertainty, disruption and marginalisation to affected landholders. This was 
exacerbated during the moratorium period by inaccuracies in the mapping system and 
the potential effects of a loss of productivity and fall in rural land values.
Chapter Six centres on the making of compliance and enforcement provisions under the 
vegetation management regulations, and includes the widespread and contentious 
amendments to investigatory and prosecution powers of the regulators. This and the 
following chapter include both the VMA and the LA as the Acts were aligned for the 
purposes of compliance and enforcement in 2003. Parliamentary procedure followed the 
practice established in previous chapters. Many of the difficulties inherent to 
environmental crime persisted and are further complicated by the particular 
circumstances of Queensland. For rural landholders, conduct which was once legal, and 
for leasehold title a covenanted requirement, is now illegal and an environmental crime. 
Equally, clearing is generally undertaken within a rural landholder's home environment, 
inevitably bringing into play issues of property rights and resentment at regulatory
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intrusion. The legislative arrangement for compliance and enforcement remained 
multifaceted and contentious during the Labor period of government.
The implementation of the compliance and enforcement provisions of the VMA is 
explored in Chapter Seven. This begins with discussion of regulatory transparency and 
the difficulties of establishing a comprehensive list of investigations and prosecutions. 
An analysis of sentencing is undertaken; and the statutory procedural guidelines relied 
upon by the courts in implementing the Act are examined. Cases are categorized into: a 
withdrawn action, a quashed compliance order, a bundle of cases that highlight the 
difficulties inherent to successful implementation; and a further bundle of cases which 
proved more successful for the regulators. Some of the cases explored draw attention to 
particular inequities of the land clearing litigation investigated.
In Chapter Eight it is noted that a policy change to advance biodiversity conservation on 
State leasehold land was only to be expected: rural land had endured widespread and 
prolonged degradation and pastoral lease terms were nearing expiry. This chapter 
examines the making and implementation of the necessary amendments to the LA to 
implement the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. The aim of the strategy was to establish 
a link between security of tenure and sustainable land management practices - additional 
lease periods would be granted on top of the basic 30 years as an incentive for 
environmental performance. The revised legislation did not generate the intense 
controversy experienced with the VMA. The law was made in a single amending 
statute, prospective not retrospective and following proper parliamentary procedure -  it 
was unopposed and praised by the opposition.
The concluding chapter returns to the research questions and consolidates the main 
findings of the thesis. An additional question examines why the making and 
implementation of the two Acts differ despite a shared environmental goal. 
Recommendations for changes in policy and law are included and followed by 
suggestions for further research. The chapter ends with an analysis of the shift to a 
Liberal National Party government in March 2012. As with previous changes of 
government, there is set to be a fundamental change in policy and law. The most recent 
change in power has witnessed a return to conservative ideology and values: the more
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contentious provisions of the VMA are set to be amended and land tenure on rural land 
is the subject of an inquiry into its continued relevance.
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Chapter Two: Land tenure -  basic principles and the 
evolution, advantages and prevalence of leasehold tenure in
Queensland
Introduction
The fundamental research problem in this thesis concerns the need for, and the legal 
mechanisms by which, sustainable land management practices have been implemented 
on privately held rural land in Queensland. One means of addressing this problem is by 
environmental legislation such as the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA), 
which initially impacted upon freeholders; and the Land Act 1994 (Qld) (LA) which 
applies just to leaseholders. Because the State government retains control over rural 
leasehold land, it is less controversial and more straightforward to introduce and 
implement environmental laws on leasehold as opposed to freehold land. Land tenure 
has been shaped in differing ways by the political cycles and ideologies of successive 
State governments: fundamental changes in land policy and law have accompanied each 
State administration. Land tenure and the title held by a rural landholder are significant 
for this thesis. This chapter therefore begins with an examination of the conventional 
foundations of the doctrine of tenure within Australian land law: it is a law shaped by a 
long established allegiance to inherited English law that has retained relevance by 
adapting to conditions in Australia and Queensland. The chapter also examines the 
evolution of tenure during the most recent and extensive periods of conservative and 
Labor rule.
A major phase of change began in the second half of the 1950s when a non-Labor
government took office in Queensland. At the outset of this prolonged conservative
period a review of land policy was undertaken and an era of closer settlement and
development was fostered. Freeholders had unfettered property rights and leaseholders
were regarded and treated like owners. The Bjelke-Petersen government dominated this
period and, during the pinnacle of its power, most 30-year pastoral leases gained an
automatic 20-year extension. There was no impetus or knowledge to adapt rural land
policy and law to take account of the environment. Rather, the overriding drive to
develop and clear land generated flawed policy and land management practices which
ultimately proved difficult to reconcile in a harsh and variable climate. This protracted
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conservative period of government left a legacy of degraded rural land. Change in land 
policy and law did not occur until 1990, along with the shift in power to Labor and the 
Goss government. A review of land policy and law once again followed a new 
government. This time the importance of sustainable land management practices on 
rural land and concern for the environment emerged. A statutory duty of care for 
leasehold land was introduced and recommendations from a policy review were to 
simplify and retain leasehold tenure. Further progress however was stalled by the abrupt 
demise of the Goss government. There followed a brief two year conservative coalition 
administration during which time a Broadscale Tree Clearing policy on leasehold land 
was introduced. This policy remained until 2004 when clearing on leasehold land was 
transferred to the VMA. This Act brought in the first legislative clearing controls on 
freehold land when Labor returned to power in 1999. The controversy surrounding the 
initial implementation years of vegetation management legislation on freehold tenure 
required more detailed consideration - this is provided in Chapter Four.
The VMA has been one of the most controversial pieces of legislation to be made and 
implemented in the last decade of the Queensland parliament. But amendments to the 
LA, made to implement the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy, never reached the same 
level of controversy. Part of the reason for this difference lies in land tenure and the 
expectations of title holders as lessees, and the requirements of government as lessor. 
Retention of control by the government and the corresponding ability to impose 
legislative restrictions with minimal opposition lies at the heart of the utility of 
leasehold tenure. Lease instruments are typically held out as having the capacity to 
adapt to prevailing societal and environmental needs. The reality for Queensland 
however, is that rural leases have undergone very little change: when leases are renewed 
under the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy their conditions will have stayed the same for 
50 years. Rural lease tenure in Queensland is characterised by static covenants and 
conditions and shifting regulations. Regulatory variation has been imposed from outside 
and not within the lease instrument. It is leasehold tenure that has smoothed the progress 
of such change in the recent past and will enable change in the future, when leases are 
renewed following amendments to the LA and consequent changes to lease conditions.
Leasehold tenure offers further advantages that have potential to create far-reaching and 
sustainable environmental change in Queensland. For example, the law attaches more
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restricted property rights to this land title. As a result, environmental legislative 
restrictions can be imposed on leaseholders with much less resistance than comparable 
regulations on freehold land. Unlike legislative restrictions on leasehold land, those on 
freehold land have tended to generate calls for compensation and challenges to the 
validity of the law. Political expediency rather than legal requirement obliged the 
Queensland Labor government to make financial adjustment payments to rural 
freeholders following some of the more extensive amendments to the Act. A further 
advantage of leasehold tenure lies in the sheer extent of this area of land. Most rural 
land in the State is privately held under freehold or leasehold tenure, but the principal 
tenure is leasehold and the predominant lease is pastoral. In order to establish the 
significant degree of rural leasehold land within Queensland the chapter concludes with 
a detailed account on the current division of land by tenure within the State.
Tenure and the traditional foundations of Australian land law
In 1788, as Australia was deemed to be a settled colony, the English brought and 
applied their laws as far as they were applicable to local circumstances. Two essential 
land law doctrines, the doctrine of tenure and the doctrine of estates, gradually became 
relevant as the early colonists settled land. Under the doctrine of tenure all land is vested 
in the Crown and under the doctrine of estates an individual may not own land but 
merely an estate in it for a period of time.* 1Tenure therefore describes the title held -  
such as freehold or leasehold -  and estate describes the period of time for which it is 
held.2
The most extensive form of ownership in land is a freehold estate or fee simple. With 
this tenure the period of ownership is indefinite and landholders may, subject to 
statutory requirements and restrictions on title, deal with the land as they choose. It is 
possible to carve a leasehold interest, a lesser form of tenure, out of a freehold estate: 
the owner of the freehold interest would be the lessor and the owner of the leasehold 
interest the lessee. The essential elements of a lease are that the lessee has the right to 
exclusive possession of the land for the term or duration of the lease and the
I Baker P V, Megarry's Manual o f  the Law o f Real Property (5lh edition. Steven & Sons, London. 1975) ch I .
1 he word tenure has its roots in the Freneh tenir and Latin teuere both meaning to hold. Macquarie Concise
Dictionary, Revised third edition. The Macquarie Library Pty Ltd, NSW. 2005, 1248.
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commencement and duration of the lease must be certain or capable of being certain.3 A 
freehold estate, therefore, is potentially a perpetual interest; whereas a leasehold estate 
is limited by time for the term of years granted. The doctrine of tenure may place limits 
particularly on a leaseholder; and the law may place additional legislative restrictions on 
both freehold and leasehold land that determine what can or cannot be done on the land.
At common law land includes the surface and what lies above and below the surface.4 
Above the surface landowners are entitled to such airspace as necessary for the 
reasonable use and enjoyment of the land.5 6Ownership of land below the surface is 
historically more complex and is dependent upon the legal instrument under which the 
land was conveyed and on statute: for example, a lease is likely to contain a reservation 
of rights to coal and minerals on or below the surface of the land. By the end of the 19th 
century all states had legislation reserving the right to minerals in the Crown/’ There are 
statutory definitions of what constitutes land which follow the common law and 
typically include hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal, of any tenure or description, 
and whatever may be the estate or interest therein.7 Over time ownership of land has 
faced increasing legislative restrictions.8
Australia has traditionally adopted the feudal doctrine of tenure in which land is held of 
the Crown. The English brought to Australia principles of land law they had acquired.4
3 See on leases generally: Maudsley R H & Bum E H. Land Law Cases and Materials ( 4lh edition, Buttervvorths, 
London, 1980) ch 8; Tan PL. Webb E, Wright D, Land Law ( 2nd edition. Buttervvorths, Australia, 2002) ch 16.
4 According to Butt P, Land Law (5lh edition, Lawbook Co, 2006, Australia) 10 the maxim cuius est solum eins est 
usque ad coelum et ad infernos means the landowner owns land from the heavens above to the centre of the earth 
below.
5 Established in Bernstein v Skyviews & Genera! Ltd [ 1978] QB 479 and developed in U P  Investments Pty Ltd v 
Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490.
6 For example, in Queensland the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) s 8 provides for the Crown's property in 
minerals, under s 8 (1) gold on or below the surface is the property of the Crown. Under s 8 (2) (a) and (b) coal on or 
below the surface is the property of the Crown though there are exceptions depending on when the land was 
alienated. Under s 8 (3) all minerals on or below the surface are the property of the Crown but again there are 
exceptions depending on when the land was alienated.
7 The definition of land is provided in Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 22 (1) (c) and Acts Interpretation Act 1954 
(Qld) s 36. Tan PL, Webb E, Wright D. Land Law (2nd edition. Buttervvorths, Australia, 2002) note that corporeal 
hereditaments include physical and permanent objects such as trees on the surface of the land together with mines and 
minerals lying beneath the land: and incorporeal hereditaments include intangible rights that may be enjoyed over the 
land such as a right of way easement 14.
8 For example State reservations include geothermal energy on or below the surface of the land Geothermal 
Exploration Act 2010 (Qld) s 11 (3) provides: This section applies despite any other Act. grant, title or other 
document. This legislation applies if the land is ‘freehold or other land.' The meaning o f ‘other land’ is not defined 
but a landholder includes the owner of land and those with a right to occupy (which would include lessees) and native 
titleholders.
f Blackstone W, Commentaries on the Laws o f England (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001) Vol 11.37- 
41 noted the difficulty of pinpointing the precise introduction of feudal tenure within England, but contended that the 
doctrine: became a fundamental maxim and necessary principle (though in reality a mere fiction) of our English 
tenures, ‘that the king is the universal lord and original proprietor of all the lands in his kingdom; and that no man
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By 1788, when the First Fleet landed on Australian shores, feudal administration within 
England had long ceased; and though it was conceivable that the Australian land law 
system would adapt to the prevailing circumstances it would take many years for this to 
occur. The first challenge to the feudal doctrine of tenure within Australia came with the 
Attorney General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge at 318. The significance of this case for 
tenure in Australia was the defence challenge to the application of the doctrine to a 
remote colonial outback and the enduring legacy of Stephen C J's ruling:
if the feudal system of tenures be, as we take it to be, part of the universal law of 
the parent state, on what shall it be said not to be the law in New South Wales? At 
the moment of its settlement the colonists brought the common law of England 
with them."’
Such reasoning found resonance in subsequent cases and firmly embedded the doctrine 
of tenure within Australian land law. A Privy Council decision, Cooper v Stuart (1889) 
14 AC 286, further confirmed acceptance of the doctrine which was followed in later 
cases." In Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 the Federal Court 
reaffirmed the position of the Crown as the source of title to land so that on colonisation 
‘every square inch of territory in the colony became the property of the Crown.'"
Property of the Crown was regarded as terra nullius or vacant land until Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo). The English legacy of land tenure was 
considered in Mabo and, of the doctrine of tenure, Brennan J stated:
does or can possess any part o f  it, but what has mediately or immediately been derived as a gift from him, to be held 
upon feudal services'... 42.
10Attorney-General v Brown (1847) 1 Legge at 318. There have been subsequent challenges to the doctrine o f tenure: 
Australia's traditional observance and allegiance to the doctrine has been branded an erroneous legal fiction that 
should be replaced by an allodial system o f landholding, see generally, Deveraux J and Dorsett S, ‘Towards a 
Reconsideration o f the Doctrines o f  Estate and Tenure' (1996) 4 Australian Property Law Journal. Allodial land is 
land without a lord so that the land is held absolutely without deriving title from the Crown. Butterworths Concise 
Australian Legal Dictionary, (Butterworths. Australia. 1997) 20. It is argued by Secher U, in ‘The Doctrine ofTenure 
in Australia post-Mabo: Replacing ’the feudal fiction' with a 'mere radical title fiction'- Part 1 & Part 2 (2006) 13 
Australian Property Law Journal, Lexis 2 that the earlier feudal fiction has simply been replaced by a radical title 
fiction. Australia is unlikely to follow the example o f other countries and abolish the doctrine as happened in 
Scotland following recommendations o f a Scottish Law Commission, available at:
blip:, ■•www.op.si.»ov.uL■:lci>islalion/scotland/s-acts20()0a.htm (viewed 10 January 2008), the Scottish Parliament
passed the Abolition o f Feudal Tenure (Scotland) Act 2000. Available at:
http: wwvv.opsi.gov.uk legislation Scotland aets2000 20000005.htm (viewed 10 January 2008).
11 For example: Randwick Corporation v Rutledge (1959) 102 CLR 54; and Wade v New South Wales Rutile Mining 
Co Pty Ltd ( 1969) 121 CLR 177.
12 Per Blackburn J at 245 which subsequently became authority for later cases such as: New South Wales v 
Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337.
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...it is a doctrine which could not be overturned without fracturing the skeleton 
which gives our land law its shape and consistency. It is derived from feudal 
origins. The feudal basis of the proposition of absolute Crown ownership.13
The significance of Mabo was that it established the Crown had radical, ultimate or final 
title rather than beneficial or complete ownership. This decision reflected a salient shift 
in established and inherited legal principles in Australian land law. The doctrine of 
tenure would continue and be adapted to Australian conditions. The common law would 
now give recognition to native title that, unlike freehold or leasehold title, did not derive 
from a Crown grant. Native title was held to survive both the Crown's acquisition of 
sovereignty and radical title.14 The assumption of radical title following from Mabo has 
enabled the doctrine of tenure to be modified: it has allowed what some regard as the 
‘legal tangle created by settlement'15 or the "mythological foundations of law '16 to 
continue.
Mabo gave rise to many issues regarding land tenure in Australia; and many of these 
issues were not resolved by the Commonwealth legislative response in the Native Title 
Act 1993 (Cth).17 For example, the Act did not clarify the position in respect of all types 
of leasehold estate. Had it done so in respect of pastoral leases, The Wik Peoples v The 
State o f Queensland ( 1996) 187 CLR 1 (Wik) would not have been obliged to continue. 
The Holroyd and Mitchellton pastoral leases in Wik were granted under the Land Act 
1910 (Qld) as amended.18 The majority judgements each considered the pastoral leases 
in question, within the historical context of the particular conditions of early settlement 
of New South Wales and subsequently the State of Queensland.19 Emphasis was placed 
on the role of the deriving legislation. Toohey J described the leases in question as 
‘creatures of statute’ and noted:
To approach the matter by reference to legislation is not to turn one’s back on 
centuries of history nor is it to impugn basic principles of property law. Rather, it is
13 Mabo v. Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 at [47],
14 Mabo (No 2), [1992] HCA 23 at [83],
15 Reynolds H, The Law o f the Land (2nd edition. Penguin Books Australia, 1992) 35.
16 Stuckey M, 'Feudalism and Australian Land Law: A Shadowy', Ghostlike Survival?’ (1994) 13 (1) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 113.
17 In 1998, the subsequent Howard government passed further amendments to the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). These 
legislative amendments severely eroded much of the land rights gains provided for in the 1993 Act.
18 The composition of the High Court had changed since Mabo: it was now headed by Brennan C J, who this time 
was one of the three dissenting judges along with Dawson and McHugh J J.
19 The four judges forming the majority delivered separate judgements. Being Toohey, Guadron, Gummow and Kirby 
J J.
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to recognise historical development, the changes in law over centuries and the need 
for property law to accommodate the very different situation in this country.20
This is especially so for the particular circumstances of Queensland with its vast tracks 
of arid and semi-arid land and the overriding drive, particularly of early State 
governments, to develop and populate the State. The impact of Wik for leasehold tenure 
in Australia was the majority opinion that pastoral leases were a distinctive entity of 
legislation. One of the essential elements of a common law lease is the right to exclusive 
possession, but the High Court found this not to be a fundamental part of a pastoral 
lease.21 Wik may have turned on the construction of the pastoral leases in question, but 
has far-reaching implications for pastoral leases generally, because of the standard 
nature of this type of lease instrument and because of the prevalence of pastoral leases 
within Queensland.
The evolution of leasehold tenure
As creatures of statute, State leases are generally regarded as having evolved from the 
1847 Order-in-Council passed by the New South Wales legislature.22 When Queensland 
became a separate colony from New South Wales in 1859, this evolution continued and 
what emerged for Queensland in the early days of settlement and beyond was a 
complicated web of tenure in which, ‘the complexity and multiplicity...beggars 
comparison unless we go back to the early medieval period of English land law.’23 This 
complex web of tenure inevitably mirrored the development of the State and the 
physical and geographical character of the land.
The roots of present-day State leases may be traced back to colonial settlement when 
leases, such as grazing leases, were issued as a means to control the use and settlement 
of land. As leases have evolved, their terms and conditions have likewise evolved to 
reflect prevailing social, economic and environmental trends: in the early pioneering 
times the prime directive was development. Past rural land policy in Queensland caused
20 The Wik Peoples v The State o f  Queensland [1996] HCA 40. 36.
21 As Kirby J observed, in comparing a common law lease with a pastoral lease, talk of exclusive possession had ‘an 
unreal quality' The Wik Peoples v The State o f  Queensland [1996] HCA 40. 109.
22 Fry T P, Freehold and Leasehold Tenancies o f  Queensland (The University of Queensland, 1946) 30.
23 Fry T P, n 22, 29.
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ruinous consequences for the environment but it reflected the concerns of the period.
For much of the twentieth century
governments in Queensland were battling to maintain the State as a viable entity, 
administering what was in all important essentials a frontier society and one 
dependent entirely on the fruits of primary production for its economic prosperity.
The State was underdeveloped and thinly populated, yet covering vast geographical 
areas. It lacked sufficient capital investment to shield the economy from the ill 
effects of droughts, floods and rural recessions...24
Tenure and conservative government: the Payne Commission
The drive for growth continued unabated throughout the early years of Queensland’s 
history. Land policy and law were pivotal to this development. A period which saw 
fundamental change began in 1957 when a non-Labor government returned to power. 
The Country-Liberal Party was led by Frank Nicklin, a former rural landholder. Nicklin 
appointed William Payne as a consultant and advisor on land matters; Payne had held 
the position of President of the Land Court since 1937. The new government was 
dedicated to legislative change, not least in land policy and law ‘which was designed to 
usher in a new era of rural progress’.25 In 1959, Payne’s review of land policy promoted 
the ‘populate or perish’ strategy.26 At that time the policy of closer settlement was a key 
aim; it was a policy described by Payne as ‘the division of land in economically sound 
areas so that it may be worked prudently and intensively and developed to the utmost’.27 
It was not envisaged that such an extensive exercise would lead ultimately to 
widespread land degradation; rather Payne regarded such development as being 
beneficial for the land which he advocated should be ‘cared for, protected and preserved 
so that it may remain a storehouse of wealth for future generations’.28 Inter-generational 
equity, though a concept yet to be articulated, was a common thread within the Payne 
Report. Provision for future generations however was misplaced: the outcome from the 
closer settlement policy and drive for development was a legacy of degraded land.
24 Murphy D, Joyce R and Cribb M, (eds) The Premiers o f  Owee«s/aw/,(University of Queensland Press, 1990, 
Queensland, Australia) xv.
25 Lack C, Three Decades of Queensland Political History 1929 -  I960 (Government Printer, Brisbane, undated) 523.
26 Payne W L, Report on Progressive Land Settlement in Queensland by the Land Settlement Advisory 
Commission,(Queensland Government Printer, 1959).
27 Payne W L, n 26, 5.
28 Payne W L, Report on Progressive Land Settlement in Queensland by the Land Settlement Advisory Commission, 
(Queensland Government Printer, 1959).
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The Payne Commission prompted the Land Act 1962 (Qld) which included a raft of 
different land tenures and maintained the focus of developing Queensland. This Act 
made provision for clearing or, as it was then expressed, the destruction of trees;" and 
prohibited such destruction without a prior written permit. ’0 To clear therefore a 
landholder was obliged to make an application to the Commissioner to destroy trees, 
even if the lease contained a condition that clearing should take place within a specified 
period of time.31 The application had to identify both the species of tree and the relevant 
area of land. If granted, the clearing permit would last for a given period and specify 
the manner in which destruction should take place. Each permit had further standard 
conditions and these included that the permit only applied to the specified trees and to 
the applicant, not transferees.’^  The Commissioner had discretion to cancel the permit in 
the event the permit was not complied w ith/5 Failing to obtain a permit or destroying 
trees otherwise than in accordance with the permit, amounted to an offence under the 
Act; and landholders found guilty of such an offence faced a fine between twenty-five 
and two hundred pounds/6
A key component of the Land Act 1962 (Qld) was the Brigalow Lease -  a far-reaching 
tenure with considerable long-term repercussions for the environment -  emerged to 
‘encourage and secure development’.37 At the time, two-thirds of the extensive Brigalow 
Belt was estimated as being undeveloped, and such leases were therefore subject to 
conditions to clear the whole or part of the land.38 In acknowledging the prevalence of 
leasehold tenure within Queensland, Payne adopted the accepted view of the era which 
stressed the necessity to ‘inculcate something akin to a sense of ownership’ in 
leaseholders such that they would ‘use and consider the land as their very own’/ 1' Rural 
leaseholders were given a statutory right to seek renewal in the final period of the lease
Destruction was defined in the Land Act 1962 (Qld) as: cutting down, felling, ringbarking, pushing over, poisoning 
or destroying by any means whatsoever.
3(1 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (1).
31 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (8).
32 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (2).
33 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (4).
34 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (5).
35 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (6).
36 Land Act 1962 (Qld) s 250 (9).
’7 Lack C, Three Decades o f  Queensland Political Historv 1929 -  1960 (Government Printer, Brisbane, undated) 558. 
38 Lack C, n 37, 559.
Payne W L, Report on Progressive Land Settlement in Queensland by the Land Settlement Advisoiy Commission, 
(Queensland Government Printer, 1959).
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term, for example in the final 10 years of a pastoral lease. This security of tenure, in 
Payne’s opinion, alleviated the 'menace of expiring leases’.4"
The dominance of various forms of National and Liberal Party coalitions and a 
prolonged conservative period within Queensland lasted for 32 years, from 1957 to 
1989. One of the longest serving premiers within the State, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 
epitomized the fixation with development. Prior to entering parliament Bjelke-Petersen 
owned and operated a land clearing business. He claimed to have pioneered the method 
of using two bulldozers with a chain stretched between them; a technique that, in those 
early days of broadscale clearing, meant up to one hundred acres per day could be 
cleared by two machines.41 In time as his business grew, more and larger machines were 
bought and increasingly larger areas of land cleared, Bjelke-Petersen recalled:
We cleared huge tracts of brigalow country in south-western and central 
Queensland, around places such as Meandarra, Tara, Glenmorgan, Surat, Biloela, 
and Thangool. By doing so, we created hundreds of thousands of acres of good 
pastoral land out of what had been useless timber country.42
Bjelke-Petersen continued to operate this business until the mid 1950s when the 
demands of parliamentary life apparently made it impossible to continue.43
The Land Act Amendment Act 1986 (Qld)
During this protracted conservative period the rural lobby was politically dominant and 
strong -  rural freeholders had unfettered property rights and leaseholders were regarded 
as land owners. A significant event occurred for leasehold land during the latter part of 
this conservative phase. The Land Act Amendment Act 1986 (Qld) gave most pastoral 
leases an automatic 20-year extension;44 before this, the typical term for most
411 Payne W L. Report on Progressive Land Settlement in Queensland by the Land Settlement Advisory Commission, 
(Queensland Government Printer, 1959).
41 Bjelke-Petersen J, D on’t you worry about that: the Joh Bjelke-Petersen Memoirs (Collins/ Angus & Robertson, 
Australia, 1990)33-36.
42 Bjelke-Petersen J, Don't you worry about that: the Joh Bjelke-Petersen Memoirs (Collins/ Angus & Robertson, 
Australia, 1990) 37.
43 Bjelke-Petersen J, n 41, 38.
44 Land Act Amendment Act 1986 (Qld) amended s 53 of the principal 1962 Act in providing an extension of the usual 
30 years to 50 years for every pastoral holding, preferential pastoral holding or pastoral development holding. The 
1986 Act was primarily concerned with lease terms and attendant amendments it did not amend the original s 250 of 
the 1962 Act.
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Queensland pastoral leases had been 30 years.45 Introducing the legislation into 
parliament, the Minister at the time. Bill Glasson, declared that the new laws 
consolidated the government's ‘stated aim since 1957 of gradually giving greater 
security of tenure’46 to rural landholders. There was no explanation by the Minister as to 
why it had taken 29 years to reach the stated aim. It might be assumed that by the mid- 
1980s many pastoral leases were near expiry and accordingly the lease renewal process 
required attention. The solution was to increase the maximum term for most pastoral 
holdings from 30 to 50 years. It may have been that the National Party foresaw their 
demise from office but in any event the opposition supported the legislation. There was 
agreement from both sides of the Legislative Assembly that a lease extension would 
facilitate greater security of tenure and borrowing capacity.
Parliamentary debate on the Land Act Amendment Act 1986 (Qld) was measured. This 
was not a controversial piece of legislation. Environmental awareness had not 
permeated the Queensland Parliament: there was only one mention, from a Liberal Party 
member, as to the legacy of detrimental past land management practices such as land 
clearing.47 It was generally accepted that a 50-year pastoral lease was ‘in accord with 
modern day thinking’.48 The amending legislation extended some lease terms but, 
according to the Minister, there was no change to lease conditions.4'7 There was further 
confirmation that lease conditions did stay the same by the regulators when they 
confirmed: ‘As far as we are aware lease conditions stayed the same'.50 Equally, a 
solicitor practicing at the time recalled:
.. .the lease instruments were endorsed with a stamp which stated that the term of 
the lease was extended for the term of 20 years. This stamp was the same process 
as was used at that time to record transfers, mortgages and sub leases. The stamp
4> Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Terms o f  leases fo r  Agriculture, 
Grazing or Pastoral Purposes, Policy Document PUX/901/338. version 2. In the scheme of Bjelke -  Petersen's 
political career granting leasehold title holders an additional 20 year term did not merit inclusion in either his own 
biography or biographical accounts written about him by others. For example: Bjelke-Petersen J, Don't you worry 
about that: the Joh Bjelke-Petersen Memoirs (Collins/ Angus & Robertson. Australia. 1990): Lunn H. Joh: the Life 
and Political Adventures o f  Johannes Bjelke- Petersen ((University of Queensland Press, 1987); Murphy D. Joyce R 
and Cribb M, (eds) The Premiers o f Queensland, (University of Queensland Press, 1990,); Evans R. A Itistoiy o f  
Queensland (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Fitzgerald R. Megarrity L and Symons D. Made in Queensland: A 
New Histoiy (University of Queensland Press, 2009).
46 Queensland government. Second Reading, Land Act Amendment Bill, 20 March 1986, 4529 per W H Glasson. 
Available at: httn://www.r>arliamcnt.cild.aov.au/documents/1iansard/1986/1986 03 20.pdf (viewed 10 January 2008).
47 Queensland government. Second Reading. Land Act Amendment Bill, 20 March 1986, 204 per Lickiss,. Available 
at: http://www.parliament.aid.gov.au/documcnts/hansard/1986/1986 03 20.pdf (viewed 10 January 2008).
48 Queensland government, Second Reading, Land Act Amendment Bill, 20 March 1986, 217 per W El Glasson. 
Available at: http://w\\\\,pari iament.uld.aov.au/documents/hansard/1986/1986 03 20.pdf (viewed 10 January 2008). 
40 Queensland government. Second Reading, Land Act Amendment Bill, 20 March 1986 219 per W H Glasson. 
Available at: http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/hansard/1986/1986 03 20.pdf (viewed 10 January 2008). 
50 E-mail correspondence in reply from a senior Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM) 
policy officer, dated 29 May 2012.
33
was I presume endorsed on the instrument of lease as an administrative act once the 
Act extending the lease terms had been passed. Generally it was done when the 
instrument itself was lodged in the Land Administration Commission to register a 
dealing.51
The opportunity to review and amend lease conditions was not addressed. There was no 
recognition in the mid 1980s -  from either side of the Legislative Assembly -  of the 
need to take steps to rectify past land management practices by adapting and changing 
lease conditions. Significant change to lease conditions did not emerge until the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy in 2007.52
The implications of this general lease extension meant there was no impetus to adapt 
land policy: the additional term marked a period of inertia and a preservation of the 
status quo. The 20 year period had been granted prior to the 1986 State election -  
leaseholders had security of tenure and favourable rents, a combination which arguably 
fostered and contributed to conservative electoral support. Joh Bjelke-Petersen returned 
to power in December 1986, this was his seventh consecutive term as leader. The year 
also marked the 11th consecutive term for conservative party rule within the State. It was 
a time of considerable power for Bjelke-Petersen who engineered malapportioned 
electoral districts to his advantage and achieved one-party government for the National 
Party in the 1983 and 1986 State elections. Bjelke-Petersen did not take part in 
parliamentary debate on the Land Act Amendment Act 1986 (Qld) -  his contribution was 
a single quote related by the Minister:
I think it is high time that we moved positively in this area, because the people who 
hold the pastoral leases, especially in isolated areas, have expressed concern that 
the government has not recognised their entitlement.53
Under a National Party government, the property rights of leaseholders were extended 
and entrenched. This was set to last until Queensland Labor returned to power in 1989.
51 E-mail correspondence in reply from Andrew Palmer. Senior Partner. Rees R & Sydney Jones solicitors, 
Rockhampton, dated 27 July 2012.
52 The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is examined in detail in Chapter Eight.
53 Queensland government, Second Reading, Land Act Amendment Bill, quoting Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 20 March 
1986, 219 per W H Glasson. Available at:
h(tp://w\vw.narliamcnt.old.aov.au/documcnts/hansard/1986/1986 03 20.pdf (viewed 20 April 2012).
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Tenure and Labor government: the Wolfe Review
The change in government generated momentum for statutory change: more than 500 
pieces of legislation were passed primarily in Labor's first two years of office.-4 In 1990, 
under the Goss government, a review of land policy and law was undertaken.55 This was 
the Wolfe Review, which recommended the simplification of the many tenure types and 
recognised the problem of land degradation within the State. Concerns about the 
environment and the importance of sustainable land management practices were 
beginning to emerge. Recommendations from the Wolfe Review were ‘intended to 
promote efficiency and fairness and to stimulate land care’.56 It was acknowledged State 
land was vulnerable to degradation and the advice was not to freehold but to retain 
leasehold tenure. Following on from the Wolfe Review, changes were made to the Land 
Act 1962 (Qld) in 1991, 1992 and 1993.
The sustainable management of rural land was apparent in some of the amendments to 
the Land Act 1962 (Qld) in the early 1990s. The main amendments in respect of 
sustainable land management were passed in 1992. In particular, provision was made 
for further controls on tree clearing on leasehold land. The revised legislation added the 
term ‘critical area' which was defined as land which was highly vulnerable to land 
degradation or of high nature conservation value.57 When applying for a tee clearing 
permit the landholder may have been asked to submit a tree management plan. This plan 
identified, inter alia, the major vegetation types and critical areas. The decision to grant 
a clearing permit now fell to the chief executive who was obliged to consider the 
following factors: the species of tree, the existence and extent of other trees in the area, 
the effect of clearing on the nature conservation value of the land, the extent of 
proposed clearing, the vulnerability to land degradation and any other matters 
considered relevant or in the tree management plan.5* Amendments to the Act in 1992 
provided for general exemptions on the need to obtain a tree clearing permit for routine
54 Evans R. A history o f Queensland (Cambridge University Press 2007) 252.
55 Wolfe PM, Murphy DG, Wright RG. Report o f  a review o f Land Policy and Administration in Queensland, Land 
Policy and Administration Review Committee, 1990 Queensland.
56 Wolfe PM. Murphy DG, Wright RG. n 55, i.
57 This was an amendment to s 250 Land Act 1962 (Qld).
5S Land Legislation Amendment Act (Qld) 1992 s7 (a) to (h).
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rural land maintenance:59 an opposition amendment previously rejected in the 1991 
parliamentary debate.60
The penalties for illegal clearing by an individual were increased considerably from 
$400 to $24,000.61 This rise in penalty prompted consternation from the opposition but, 
for the most part, parliamentary debate on the amendments was concerned with other 
issues generated by the Wolfe Review, such as the freeholding of State land and the 
determination of rents.62 Parliamentary process to pass the amendments was adhered to, 
in that debate spanned several sittings and included a full committee stage. This was 
consistent with the law making process in respect of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy 
and in contrast to controversial laws restricting rights on freehold land.63
Before this change was introduced, the clearing rates for the period from mid-1988 to 
mid-1991 in the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS) amounted to 730,000 
ha/year. But from the second part of 1991 to mid-1995 clearing rates went down to an 
average rate of 289,000 ha/year.64 This fall in clearing rates, based on the SLATS data, 
is not explained by parliamentary documents or debate, or even the SLATS report.65 It 
might be speculated that regulatory policy, influenced by the Wolfe review, would have 
been to deny applications to clear. But, as mentioned above, the concerns of the day for 
leasehold land focused on the transition of tenure to freehold and the issue of rents. 
Clarification of policy was sought from the Queensland Department of Environment
59 Lands Legislation Amendment Bill 1992, Explanatory Notes. 626.
60 This was a further amendment to s 250 Land Act 1962 (Qld).Queensland government. Second Reading, Lands 
Legislation Amendment Bill, 23 October 1991,646 per G N Smith. Available at:
http://www.pariiamenUild.uov.au/documents/Hansard/l992/921112ha.ixltflxml=hltp://uww.parliament.ctld.uov.au/in 
ternetsearch/isvsciuer\7e798f802-a9cl8-4h4d-a8da-l2clc 10754088/3 hilile/ (viewed 12 June 2008). The 1993 Land Act 
1962 (Qld) changes primarily concerned valuations for rental purposes. Lor example: Queensland government, 
Second Reading, Lands Legislation Amendment Bill 1993 (Qld), 14 October 1993 and 10 November. Available at: 
http://www.parl iament.old, uov.au/documcnts/1 lansard/1993/931014ha.ndtWxml-httn://www.narliament. cild.uov.au/in 
tcmctsearch/isysciucry/d75a2917-bc52-414c-9h 14-56376542876d/2/hilitc/ (viewed 12 June 2008).
61 Queensland government. Lands Legislation Amendment Bill 1991 (Qld). Committee Stage, 14 November 1991 
2939 . Available at:
http://uuu.parliament.cild.aov.au/doeumcnts/Hansard/1993/931014ha. pdf#xml=htt p ://w w w . parliament, qld. uov.au/in 
tcrnetscarch/isvsquerv/d75a29l7-bc52-4l4c-9hl4-56376542876d/2/hilile/ (viewed 12 June 2008).
62 Lor example the Second Reading debate spanned three prolonged debating sessions in October, see for example: 
Second Reading on 23 October:
http://wwu.parliament.qld.uov.aU/documents/l lansard/1991/91 1024ha.pdf#xml=http://wwu. parliament. c| Id.uov.au/in 
temetsearch/isvsquerv/0d02a273-37e6-4d()6-h342-2cc8d5dfdc9c/5/hilite/(viewed 22 May 2008).
63 The difference in the law making process is examined further in Chapter Lour for the Vegetation Management Act 
1999 (Qld) and Chapter Eight for the Land Act 1994 (Qld).
64 Queensland, Department of Natural Resources and Water, ‘Land Cover Change in Queensland 1988 -1991', see 
Ligure 1: Annual Clearing Rate in Queensland from 1988-2001,5. Available at: 
http://www.nnv.cild.gov.au/slats/repoit.html (viewed 10 January 2010).
65 Queensland, Department of Natural Resources and Water, ‘Land Cover Change in Queensland 1988 -1991’. 
Available at: http://www.nrvv.iild.uov.au/slats/report.html (viewed 10 January 2010).
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and Resource Management (DERM). The Director of State Land Asset Management 
responded: ‘I do not know the answer to your question and I don't think the corporate 
memory still exists in the department but probably exists on archived files'.66 A request 
to see the archived files was not made in light of the difficulties encountered in other 
requests for information.
The fall in land clearing rates between 1991 and 1995 was, according to Macintosh, due 
to factors other than legislation.67 He has identified three reasons for the declining trend 
in clearing rates during this period. Firstly, the declining availability of uncleared land 
reduced the prospects for profitable rural development. Secondly, a long-term 
deterioration in terms of trade for rural landholders meant investment in areas other than 
land clearing. Thirdly, the above average rainfall and high commodity prices of the late 
1980s and early 1990s,68 gave way to drought and global recession.69 In short cattle 
prices fell and there was a prolonged drought.70 These aggregated factors would account 
for the sustained fall in clearing during 1991 to 1995.71 The apparent abrupt fall in 
clearing rates in 1991, as depicted in Figure 1 in all the SLATS reports, represents the 
average annual clearing rate, as such this decline is likely to be more gradual than it 
appears.72 It might be speculated that climatic factors generated the onset of this period. 
The Bureau of Metrology has recorded extensive and major flooding in both coastal and 
inland regions of Queensland from January through to March 1991.73
66 E-mail correspondence in reply from Director of State land Asset Management. DERM, dated 24 April 2012.
67 Macintosh A, ‘Mitigation Targets, Burden Sharing and the Role of Economic Modelling in Climate Policy’ (2013) 
ANU Centre for Climate Law and Policy, 7.
68 Noted in Rolfe J, ‘Broadscale tree Clearing in Queensland' (2000) 7 (3) Agenda 226.
69 Macintosh A, n 67, 7-8.
711 Personal communication with John Rolfe dated 15 July 2013.
71 This fall from over 730,000 ha/year to the average rate of 289.000 ha/year is depicted in Eigure 1 in all the SLATS 
reports. See for example the latest report. Queensland government, Department of Science, Information Technology. 
Innovation and the Arts ‘Land Cover Change in Queensland 2009-2010', 1. Available at: 
http://wwAv.nnn.qld.aov.au/slats/rcpoils-snatial-Droducts.html (viewed 12 July 2013).
72 As this abrupt fall is not explained in any of the SLATS reports a query was sent to the principal scientist seeking 
an explanation. The reply stated: ‘One thing to point out is the clearing is shown as an average annual rate from 1991 
to 1995, as imagery was only purchased for 1991 and 1995. It could well be that the clearing rate for 1991-92 was 
approaching the levels indicated for 1988-91 (again, these clearing figures are averaged across this period as imagery 
only purchased for 1988 and 1991 ).The clearing rate probably gradually declined over this period (1991-1995) due to 
drought/economic hardship, as you mention. Similarly, from 1988-1991, there could have been a gradual decline'. E- 
mail correspondence in reply from SLATS principal scientist dated 25 July 2013.
73 Australian government, Bureau of Metrology, Queensland Flood Summary 1990 -  1999. Available at: 
http://wwAv.bom.gov.au/ukl/llood/nd historv/floodsum 1990,shtml (viewed 15 July 2013).
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The Land Act 1994 (Qld)
The Land Act 1994 (Qld) was part of a suite of new statutes introduced into parliament. 
For land policy, the Minister described the period as marking:
...a new era in land administration in Queensland, with a move away from the 
pioneering, closer settlement days appropriate to past years, to an era of 
consolidation, with the focus firmly placed on land sustainability.74
This Act brought in a statutory duty of care for leasehold land. All leaseholders would 
now be subject to this obligation.75 Duty of care was not defined in the 1994 Act but 
described in the Explanatory Notes as ‘good land management practices and the 
prevention, where possible, of degradation and other damage to the land caused by the 
action or inaction of the land holder'.76 In 1995, during the Goss Labor government, the 
Draft State Guidelines for Broadscale Tree Clearing on Leasehold and Other State 
Land.v in Queensland were produced. These guidelines failed to reduce land clearing 
and were widely criticized.77 Subsequently the guidelines were revised into a 
Preliminary Tree Clearing Policy. This policy gained little momentum: the Labor 
government ended with the resignation of Wayne Goss in February 1996.78
A conservative interlude: 1996 to 1998
Between 1996 and 1998, Rob Borbidge from the National Party and Joan Sheldon from 
the Liberal Party formed a coalition government in Queensland. During this brief
74 Queensland government, Land Bill, Second Reading, 16 November 1994, 10407, per Hon G N Smith. Available at: 
htto://w\vw.parliament.old.uov.au/doaimcnts/hansard/1994/941 I I6ha.pdf (viewed 12 June 2008).
75 Land Act 1994 (QId) s 199.
76 Queensland government. Land Bill 1994, Explanatory Notes, 26. Available at:
http://\\ u\v.leuislaiion.qld.uov.au/Bills/471* 1)171994/LandB94E.pdl'(viewed 14 June 2008). Clarification of the 
statutory duty of care came with the 2007 amendments to the Act which is taken up again with the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy in Chapter Eight.
77 Macintosh A, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries: A 
Cautionary Tale from Australia’ (2010) Policy Brief No 12, The Australia Institute, 10. And Queensland 
Parliamentary Library, Research Publications and Resources Section. Dixon N. Land Clearing Offences and Natural 
Resources and Other legislation Amendment Bill 2003 (Qld), Research Brief no 2003/06, 2.
78 The Goss government had narrowly won the 1995 election; in part the demise of this government was brought 
about by dissatisfaction with an allegedly draconian administrative approach which included an approval for a 
tollway connecting the Gold Coast and Brisbane. The proposed route would have impacted upon a koala sanctuary. 
Conservationists and residents potentially affected opposed the tollway which was subsequently abandoned. A by- 
election in Mundingburra left Labor and the coalition with an equal 44 seats. Independent member for Gladstone Liz 
Cunningham joined forces with the coalition. Rob Borbidge became Premier and Peter Beattie leader of the 
opposition. See for example: Fitzgerald R, Megarrity L and Symons D, Made in Queensland: A New History 
(University of Queensland Press, Queensland, Australia, 2009) 209-213 and Evans R, A History o f  Queensland 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 252-255.
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coalition period a Broadscale Tree Clearing Policy was introduced71' and adapted from 
the previous Goss Labor government. Now in opposition, the Labor Party did not 
contest the policy but made much of the irony of such a plan being championed by a 
National Party premier. This policy amended the Land Act 1994 (Qld) and brought in 
tree management provisions for clearing on leasehold land.80 But there was no reduction 
in clearing: in fact, from the start of the policy in 1995, and throughout the coalition 
years, the rate of clearing increased. The SLATS report for 1995 to 1997 recorded 
annual clearing at 340, 000 ha/year, 18% higher than the 1991 to 1995 period.81 For the 
1997 to 1999 period SLATS recorded the average clearing rate at 425,000 ha/year, 45 % 
higher than the 1991 to 1995 period. The failure of this policy was, according to 
Macintosh, due primarily to two factors: clearing on freehold tenure was mostly 
unregulated and the leasehold regulatory regime held many exemptions.82 Indeed 
fundamental change in land policy and law was unlikely: the Borbidge and Sheldon 
administration were a minority, interim and inexperienced government, beset with 
problems from the outset. Conservative ideology would not encompass either the 
imposition of regulation on those with freehold title, or a rigorous regime on those with 
leasehold title. Conservation of rural land was confined to an agreement between the 
Commonwealth Liberal National Party government and the State of Queensland.
The aim of this partnership agreement, entered into between the Borbidge government 
and the Howard government, was to 'reverse the long-term decline in the quality and 
extent of Australia's native vegetation cover'.83 In 1997 this resulted in funding from the 
Natural Heritage Trust fund of $30 million in furtherance of the National Vegetation 
Initiative.84 The tree management provisions for clearing on leasehold land lasted until 
2004 when they were repealed by the Labor government, who transferred the 
management of vegetation under both freehold and leasehold land to the Vegetation
71 Queensland government. Land Amendment Bill, Second Reading, 2 May 1996, 920 per Hobbs. Available at: 
http://wvvw.oarliament.qld.gov.aU/documcnts/l lansard/1996/96()502ha.pd<#xml=http://wvvw. parliament.i|ld.gov.au/in 
tcrnetsearch/isvsquerv/lda43b09-8155-40b8-he55-h59690cdd9bd/2/hilite/ (viewed 15 July 2008).
80 Queensland government. Ministerial statement, Tree-Clearing Guidelines, 28 October 1997, 3838 per Hobbs. 
Available at:
hUp:/Avwvv.parliament.uld.gov.au/documents/llansard/l997/971028ha.pdf#xml http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/in 
temctscarch/isvsquerv/lbad I5a0-a2b 1 -479t'-ad0a-d2ce2516ed68/4/hilite/ (viewed 15 July 2008).
81 Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources, 'Land Cover Change in Queensland 1995-1997.5. 
Available at: http://www.nnn.qld.gov.au/slats/previous reports.html#1995 1997 vegetation change report (viewed 
15 July 2008).
8“ Macintosh A, T he Australia Clause and RLDD: a cautionary tale' (2011) Springer Science, 7.
83 Queensland Parliamentary Library, LBR 12/00. Vegetation Management Amendment Bill 2000, Legislation Brief, 
September 2000.
84 Queensland government. Natural Heritage Trust Funds, National Vegetation Initiative, 21 November 1997. 4605 
per Hobbs. Available at: http://wvvw.parliament.qld.gov.aU/documents/hansard/l 997/971 12 lha.pdf (viewed 17 July 
2008).
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Management Act 1999 (Qld).85 The management of vegetation became what regulators 
and rural agricultural bodies now describe as tenure blind: meaning legislation that 
applies to landholders regardless of tenure. In 1999 Labor returned to power in 
Queensland with Peter Beattie as Premier. This period marked one of considerable 
controversy and change for vegetation management regulations which is dealt with in 
detail in Chapter Four.
The utility of leasehold tenure
A significant advantage of leasehold tenure lies in control: by alienating the land as 
leasehold the government retains control. The State has statutory authority under the 
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) to issue a lease of unallocated land.86 As lessor, the 
government may impose covenants and conditions, regulate, receive rents and, as holder 
of the reversionary interest, may decide on renewal and terms of renewal at the expiry 
of the lease. The potential utility of rural leasehold land tenure therefore lies in the 
capacity for change and the ability of the lease instrument to adapt to prevailing social, 
economic and environmental requirements. Rural leaseholders, their representative 
bodies and parliamentarians appear more accepting of change than rural freeholders. 
Amendments to the lease renewal process under the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy, as 
evidenced in this thesis, were not controversial.87
Leasehold tenure has received intermittent academic attention and very little 
consideration in recent times. Holmes has provided the most insightful and extensive 
academic analysis, particularly within Queensland in the 1990s. Together with Knight, 
he postulated that the mid-1990s was a period of'escalating revival of public interest’ in 
lease tenures as policy instruments.88 Leasehold -  especially a reformed system 
including an emphasis on sustainable land management -  was advocated as preferable 
to freehold tenure reinforced by regulation.89 Young had argued that covenants and 
conditions within a lease were more cost effective than regulation because they tended 
to be specific to the land.9" In 1997 Holmes reiterated his argument that a lease
85 This period is examined in Chapter Four.
8" Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) s 30.
87 The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is examined in Chapter Eight.
88 Holmes J and Knight L P, ‘Pastoral lease tenure in Australia: Historical relic or useful Contemporary Tool?’ (1994) 
16(1)  Rangeland Journal 106.
89 Holmes J and Knight L P, ‘Pastoral lease tenure in Australia: Historical relic or useful Contemporary Tool?’ (1994) 
16(1)  Rangeland Journal 106.
90 Young M D, ‘Pastoral Land Tenure Options in Australia'(1985) 7 (1) Rangeland Journal 43.
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instrument presented an ideal mechanism for the delivery of land policy and as a means 
of achieving sustainable land management practices,91 in a paper presented to a 
conference held by the then Centre for Conservation Biology at the University of 
Queensland. The conference theme and subsequent book of proceedings centered on 
biodiversity conservation beyond nature reserves and "explored the potential for 
conservation outside the traditional reserve system by examining approaches to land use 
that could enable sustainable primary production and nature conservation to be 
combined'.92 Participants included rural landholders, academics, community groups and 
representatives from regional and national regulatory bodies. In Queensland this appears 
to be the last time attention was directed towards biodiversity conservation on private 
land outside of a regulatory sphere.
Holmes has consistently argued that the advantage of leasehold tenure lies in its 
flexibility.93 Leases have the capability to be flexible instruments; however, prior to the 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy being introduced in 2007, pastoral leases in Queensland 
witnessed very little change since the 1950s. There is not a straightforward distinction 
between freehold tenure and regulation and leasehold tenure with covenants and 
conditions. Rather, for many years in Queensland, leasehold tenure has had covenants, 
conditions and regulations. Writing of comparable legislation in Western Australia in 
1999. Baston noted lease "conditions seem only to be able to be imposed at the 
beginning of the lease term'.94 This is true but they can also be reviewed during the lease 
term -  the opportunity to review was not taken by the Queensland government. In the 
event of a change in policy the government has imposed regulatory controls which 
override lease conditions during the lease term. This is evidenced, for example, by the 
1994 amendments to the Land Act 1994 (Qld). This amending legislation prevented tree 
clearing without a permit. At this time many leases would still have contained a 
standard condition to clear land. As a basic principle of statutory interpretation the latest 
legislation would apply, but the 1994 Act provided: ‘even if a condition of a lease
91 Holmes J, ‘Adapting leasehold tenures to meet emerging conservation needs’ in Hale P and Lamb D (ed) 
Conservation Outside Nature Reserves, Centre for Conservation Biology, The University of Queensland (1997) 136.
92 Hale P and Lamb D (ed) Conservation Outside Nature Reserves, Centre for Conservation Biology (The University 
of Queensland, 1997).
93 For example: Holmes J, ‘The Policy relevance of the State's Proprietary' Power: lease tenures in Queensland’ 
(1996) 3 Australian Journal o f Environmental Management 244.
,4 Baston R, ‘An evaluation of the Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) as a tool for the environmental management 
of pastoral leases in Western Australia’ (1999) 16 (2) Environmental Planning and Law Journal, 171.
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requires clearing or destruction of trees, the lessee must still obtain a tree clearing 
permit before complying with the condition*.95
There may have been a renewed interest in leasehold tenure in the 1990s but there was 
no necessity to implement policy changes to the lease renewal process at that time. The 
need to implement such changes began in the following decade when pastoral leases 
would begin to expire: in the 20 year period from 2001 to 2021 almost half of the 
pastoral holdings within the State would be due for renewal.96 Accordingly in 2001 the 
Queensland government introduced the first discussion paper on the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy. The change was, as Dovers would describe, a ‘predictable policy 
window’.97
Property rights and tenure
The meaning of tenure has been established earlier in this chapter. Provision of a 
meaning for property is problematic and much discussed.98 Property is traditionally 
classified as real or personal. Real property includes land and things attached to or 
embedded in land. All property not classified as real property is personal property. 
Classification of property may change: a tree growing on land would be real property 
but personal property once felled. Personal property is subdivided into chattels real and 
chattels personal. Freehold and leasehold tenure are classified differently. Leasehold 
tenure is land but classified as chattels real -  a lease is therefore classed as personal and 
not real property.99 As described by Riddall:
...it was recognised that a lease was a special form of chattel; and for this reason it 
was termed a “chattel real”; that is, a chattel, but a chattel which, since it relates to 
land, has affinities with real property.1"
95 Land Act 1994 (QId) s 258.
96 Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources and Mines. Managing State Rural Leasehold Land; A 
discussion paper, 2001, 2.
97 Dovers S, Environment and Sustainability Policy: Creation, Implementation, Evaluation (Federation Press, 2005) 
31.
98 As for example in: Tan PL, Webb E, Wright D. Land Law (2nd edition. Butterworths, Australia. 2002) 7; Fisher D 
E, 'Rights of Property in Water: Confusion or Clarity’ (2004) 21 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 200; 
Edgeworth B, Rossiter C J & Stone M A, Sackville and Neave Property Law: Cases and Materials (LexisNexis, 
Butterworths, 2004) 3; Bates G, Environmental taw in Australia (7,h Edition. LexisNexis, Butterworths. 2010) 46; 
Fisher D E, Australian Environmental Law: Norms, Principles and Rules, (Second Edition. Lawbook Company, 
2010) 211 .
99 This distinction has a long history which derives from a lessee’s recov ery action (by the writ ejectionae firmcte) not 
being the same as an action to protect a freehold estate in land. Discussed in Riddall J G,
Land Law (2nd edition, Butterworths, London. 1979) 34 and Maudsley R FI & Bum E H, Land Law Cases and 
Materials (4th edition, Butterworths, London, 1979) 4.
1011 Riddall J G, Land Law (2nd edition. Butterworths, London, 1979) 34.
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Property may be regarded as an object or thing that is capable o f being owned and, 
within law, the property rights to that object or thing. Gray and Gray argue ‘that 
property is not a thing but rather a relationship which one has with a thing' and that the 
term property is a description o f ‘particular concentrations o f power over things and 
resources’. 101 In Yanner v Eaton (1999) HCA 53 the High Court held property ‘refers to 
a degree o f power that is recognised in law as power permissibly exercised over the 
th ing '.102
Property has long been depicted as a bundle o f rights.103 Aligned with this assumption 
the essence o f property is described by Bates:
...by the rights it confers; rights to enjoy, use, protect and transfer land and its 
natural resources; exclude or restrict access to that property; and grant access rights 
that are either proprietary in nature, for example, leases and profits a prendre 
(rights to take resources);or non-proprietary, that is, of a personal nature, such as 
licenses or 'permissive ’ rights.104
Property rights are therefore legal rights which the law protects: the right to exclude is 
protected by the law o f trespass. As the law provides legitimacy and a procedural 
framework within which property rights operate and exist, it protects the rights over 
things and resources and acknowledges the right to control. The High Court in Yanner v 
Eaton observed that the bundle o f rights concept o f property might ‘have its limits as an 
analytical tool or accurate description’.105 The problem, as elaborated by Hepburn, is that 
...it treats ownership, particularly land ownership, in an abstract way not taking 
into account the ‘social and ecological’ communities which that land or resource is 
attached to. It defines land according to its constituent parts and thereby isolates it 
from the larger community.106
101 Gray K & Gray S F, ‘The Idea of Property in Law' in Bright and Dewar (ed) Land Law; Themes and Perspectives 
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 15.
102 As per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne J J at [17].
103 As noted by Hepburn S. Australian Property Law: Cases, Material and Analysis (LexisNexis, Butterwoilhs, 
2008) 2, the bundle of rights description stems from property philosopher Wesley Hohfeld. For example: Hohfeld W, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (2nd ed. Yale University 
Press, 1920) available at: http://archive.org/details/fimdamentallegalOOhohfuoft (viewed 5 December 2012) and A M 
Honore, for example: Honore A M, ‘Ownership' in Guest A G (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (Oxford 
University Press, 1961).
104 Bates G, Environmental taw in Australia (7th Edition. LexisNexis. Butterworths, 2010) 46.
105 Yanner v Eaton [1999] HCA 53 as per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne .1 J at [17].
106 Hepburn S, Australian Property Law: Cases, Material and Analysis (LexisNexis, Butterworths, 2008) 2.
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Yet property is a ‘social as well as a legal institution’.1(17 It operates within a wider 
community of public and private interests.
Balancing public and private interests is complex. But legislation, such as the VMA and 
the LA, typically places priority on public over private interests. The purpose o f the 
VMA is, inter alia, to regulate the clearing of vegetation in a way that conserves 
remnant vegetation, prevents the loss of biodiversity and maintains ecological 
processes.1"8 Equally, the objects of the LA require land to ‘be managed for the benefit 
of the people of Queensland’ having regard to sustainability.109 The immediate and long 
term purpose of each Act is therefore towards the public good. As explained by 
Bonyhady, this balance 'between competing individual and collective goals, the private 
and the public interest’110 is at the crux of understanding what is meant by property. This 
balance will never reach equilibrium: a law favourable to one group will be detrimental 
to another group. And tensions between public and private interests will be greater when 
there is little political and ideological alignment between private rural interests and 
government law makers. Rural landholders may never return to the level of influence 
they once enjoyed during prolonged conservative power in Queensland. Nevertheless 
the 2012 change to a conservative State government has tipped the scales a little 
towards the rural community and signals the potential for change in land tenure.1"
Our understanding of property is variable. As explained by Bonyhady:
The broader the concept of ownership and property - the more they are seen as 
involving rights without responsibilities - the more difficult it is for government to 
create new land use regimes without the consent of the landowner. Conversely, the 
more ownership and property are seen as limited rights, involving no more than the 
autonomy which society can afford individuals in particular contexts, the easier it 
is for government to constrain individuals for larger social ends such as 
environmental protection."2
107 Harris J W. 'Private and Non-Private Property: What is the Difference?' (1995) Law Quarterly Review 111.
108 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3( 1) (a) to (e). 
w> Land Act 1994 (QId) s4.
110 Bonyhady T, 'Property Rights' in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1992) 175 citing Underkuffler L S, 'On Property; an Essay' (1990) 100 Yale Law Journal 127-148.
111 The Liberal National Party Inquiry into the Future and Continued Relevance of Government Land Tenure across 
Queensland is included in Chapter Nine.
112 Bonyhady T, ‘Property Rights’ in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1992), 45.
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Though part of an analysis on the ‘competing understandings of property,’"3 this 
dichotomy provides an apt description of the basic distinction between freehold and 
leasehold tenure. The Queensland government faced immense challenges in making and 
implementing new land management practices on freehold land. As the most extensive 
form of land tenure freehold is often perceived as absolute ownership, legislative 
restrictions on such tenure therefore have the potential to unleash considerable 
opposition and resentment. This is particularly the case within rural Queensland, as 
observed by Wilcox J:
There is no doubt in my mind that many Australians, especially those outside the 
major cities, draw a distinction between freehold and leasehold land which is quite 
unjustified in terms of law.114
This distinction might be legally unfounded but it remains apparent in rural Queensland 
and is evident in the process in which laws are made and implemented. There are 
advantages and disadvantages in this: the advantage is that it is possible to make and 
implement environmental laws on leasehold land with minimal opposition; the 
disadvantage is that it is very difficult to make and implement environmental laws on 
freehold land. This is exacerbated in Queensland because rural freeholders had 
generally unregulated property rights during the protracted conservative period. To then 
withdraw those rights, as with the initial vegetation regulations on freehold land, ‘is 
much more difficult to implement where the postulated public good does not readily 
coincide with the interest of title holders, and particularly if it involves some real or 
potential loss in capital or income values’."5 This loss in value of land is a constant 
contention of rural representative bodies in Queensland such as Agforce, the 
Queensland Farmers Federation and Property Rights Australia."6 Loss in land value was 
an issue which prompted calls for compensation.
113 Bonyhady T, ‘Property Rights' in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1992), 45.
114 Wilcox J, ‘Retrospect and Prospect' in Bonyhady T (ed), Environment Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, 1992)207.
115 Holmes J.' The Policy relevance of the State's Proprietary Power: lease tenures in Queensland’ (1996) 3 
Australian Journal o f Environmental Management, 250.
116 In submissions (often in the form of case studies of individual properties) from representative bodies and airal 
landholders made to two Commonwealth Inquiries held in 2004 and 2010 into native vegetation legislation, evidence 
was provided of a loss in capital land value. Australian government. Productivity Commission. Impacts o f  Native 
Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations, Report no 29, (2004). Available at:
http://w-tt-w-.pc.uov.au/proiccts/inquirv/nativcvcgetation/docs/Tinalreport (viewed 8 December 2012) and Australian 
government, Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate Change Measures 
(2010). Available at: http://www.aph.uov ,au senate committee Capa ctle/climate change/index .him, (viewed 8 
December 2012). Both Inquiries are examined in more detail in Chapter Three. See also Kenny P, ‘Enforcement of 
Vegetation Management Legislation' paper presented to the Queensland Environmental Law Association, March 
2005. Peter Kenny was a former president of Agforce.
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Acquisitions, restrictions and calls for compensation
Under Commonwealth legislation compensation is payable if property is acquired.117 
The Commonwealth o f Australia Constitution Act (1977) (Cth) s 5 l(xxxi) makes 
provision for the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws, 
inter alia, providing for the acquisition of property on just terms, that is, with 
compensation. In Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625 (Tasmanian Dam) 
the State Liberal government in Tasmania challenged the validity of the Commonwealth 
Labor government’s legislation that prevented the construction of a dam on the Gordon 
River. A majority of the High Court held that sterilisation of land use in preventing the 
dam was not an acquisition and therefore compensation was not payable."8
Subsequently in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 147 ALR 42 
(Newcrest), the High Court considered if property in a number of Newcrest mining 
leases had been acquired otherwise than on just terms in breach of s 51 (xxxi).l|y After 
the mining leases had been granted to Newcrest, an amendment to the National Parks 
and Wildlife Conservation Act 1987 (Cth) extended Kakadu National Park to include the 
land subject to the mining leases with a further amendment prohibiting mining in 
Kakadu. A central issue in the case was the question of whether the Commonwealth 
government had acquired the property of the mining company. The majority of the High 
Court held that the Commonwealth had made an acquisition of property in terminating 
the mining rights.120 This case may be distinguished from the Tasmanian Dam case: in 
Newcrest, there was no other form of land use available to the plaintiffs whereas 
preventing the dam on the Gordon River did not prevent other forms of land use.121 In 
their analysis of the implications of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth 
(2009) 240 CLR 140 (ICM), Macintosh and Cunliffe clarified the position of the High 
Court following Newcrest and other similar cases, they note:
117 The origin o f which goes back to the Magna Carta 1215. Art 52 which made provision for individuals deprived o f  
property. The crux o f  this argument was used by David Walter a non-legal agent who acted for litigants in some o f  
the land clearing cases considered in Chapter Seven.
118 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625.
110 Kirby .1 in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth [1997] MCA 38 at 79 noted the influence o f the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) on legal development within Australia. The Universal Declaration (1948) 
provides in Article 17 that everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others and that 
no one shall be arbitrarily deprived o f their property.
120 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 147 ALR 42.
121 Bates G, Environmental Law in Australia: (8th ed Butterworths, 2013) 151.
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...for a law to give rise to an acquisition, it must result in either the Commonwealth 
(or a third party) obtaining possession and control of the plaintiff s property, or a 
“correlative benefit” where the plaintiffs interest is effectively sterilised.122
As noted by Macintosh and Cunliffe,123 uncertainty in the application of s 51(xxxi), has 
led to challenges by landholders following legislative restrictions imposed by 
environmental laws such as the VMA. The challenge to the validity of vegetation 
management laws in Queensland came with Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120. This 
case affirmed the law in holding that a landholder is not entitled to monetary 
compensation following legislative restrictions. After an unsuccessful appeal in the 
Queensland Supreme Court the landholder made a further application for special leave 
to appeal to the High Court, the application was denied and this Queensland precedent 
remains.124
A comparable challenge was made in New South Wales. In 2007 rural property owner 
Peter Spencer commenced proceedings against the Commonwealth government because 
of restrictions imposed on clearing vegetation on his land by virtue of the Native 
Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW). The essence of the claim was that the legislative 
restrictions amounted to an acquisition of property other than on just terms; and that the 
acquisition was made in furtherance of intergovernmental agreements between New 
South Wales and the Commonwealth.125 It was further alleged that the Commonwealth 
laws which authorised the agreements, being the Natural Resources Management 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1992 (Cth) and the Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 
1997 (Cth), were made for the purpose of acquiring property other than on just terms 
and were invalid by reason of s 51 (xxxi) Commonwealth o f Australia Constitution Act 
7977 (Cth).126
Before Emmet J, in the Federal Court, Peter Spencer’s case had been summarily 
dismissed on the basis that he had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting
122 Macintosh A and Cunliffe J, ‘The significance of ICM in the evolution of s 51(xxxi)' (2012) 29 Environmental 
Planning and Law Journal 314.
123 Macintosh A and Cunliffe J, n 122. 314.
1-4 Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120, at the end of this case is an editor's note which provides that the High Court 
refused special leave to appeal on the 25lh June 2003.
125 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f  Australia [2010] HCA 28 (1 September 2010) [ 1 ].
126 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f  Australia [2010] HCA 28 (1 September 2010) [1].
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the proceedings under s 31A Federal Court o f Australia Act 1976 (Cth).127 The Full 
Court of the Federal Court upheld this decision.128 Peter Spencer applied for and was 
granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. His application was referred by order 
of Gummow, Heydon and Bell J J to the Full Court of the High Court. In the leading 
joint judgment of French C J and Gummow J, it was held that the proceedings in the 
Federal Court were not appropriate for summary dismissal.129
It was apparent in the Spencer proceedings that the pleadings submitted, in particular 
the statement of claim, had many amendments. According to French C J and Gummow 
J, the statement of claim raised questions of fact about the existence of an arrangement 
between the Commonwealth and State of New South Wales which could be addressed 
within usual interlocutory proceedings such as discovery.130 The significance of those 
questions of fact were apparent to the High Court in the case of ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd 
v The Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, a decision which had not been delivered 
when the primary judge and the Full Federal Court decided the earlier hearings. In ICM 
the joint judgment of French CJ, Gummow and Crennan J J left open the question of 
whether a Commonwealth law may exist in an ‘informal fashion, falling short of an 
intergovernmental agreement’.131 The Court suggested that the practical operation of 
negotiations and funding arrangements between the Commonwealth and the State of 
New South Wales was not particularised, and could be invoked by Peter Spencer by 
further documentary discovery.132 The conclusion was:
That is not to say that, even on the proposed further amended statement of claim, 
he has a strong case. It is sufficient to say that it is not fanciful, and therefore not a 
case which he has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting.133
The appeal was allowed with costs. The Australian Farmers’ Fighting Fund provided 
financial assistance in the Spencer litigation.134
127 Per Emmet J, Peter Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1256 (26 August 2008) [211 ] - [216], s 31 
A (1) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) makes provision for summary judgment by providing that the court 
may give judgment for one party if satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of success.
128 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f Australia [2009] FCAFC 38 (24 March 2009).
129 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f Australia [2010] HCA 28 (1 September 2010) [4].
130 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f Australia [2010] HCA 28 (1 September 2010) [4].
131 ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51 [38],
132 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f Australia [2010] HCA 28 (1 September 2010) [31].
133 Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f Australia [2010 HCA 28 (1 September 2010) [31].
134 National Fanners Federation. The Farmers’ Voice, Official Publication of the Australian Farmers’ Fighting Fund 
(2011) 15, 3. The Australian Farmers’ Fighting Fund has separate governance from the National Fanners Federation 
but in order to make an application for support a rural landholder must first submit through a member organization 
such as Agforce. httn://www.n ff.oru.au/tmhtina-fund.html (viewed 6 December 2012).
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Some states have paid compensation for legislative restrictions. Yet there are strong 
arguments against such payments. Macintosh and Denniss contend such calls for 
compensation:
...are excessive and need to be balanced against the needs of the broader 
community. The rights to compensation in the Constitution are adequate and, in 
some respects, may exceed what is necessary to maximise social welfare.
Expanding the rights to compensation to protect farmers' interests in land will 
result in a large transfer of resources from taxpayers to farmers without any notable 
improvement in agricultural activity.135
The provision of pecuniary recompense following legislative restrictions has a 
chequered history. There remain inconsistencies and variations both between and within 
jurisdictions, characterised by often haphazard and political approaches to legislative 
change.136 Most States have avoided compensation for land use restrictions although 
Western Australia in the 1970s and South Australia in the 1980s made compensation 
payments to landowners.137 As noted by Bonyhady, Queensland was the only State to 
pass legislation which made provision for full compensation under the Soil 
Consen’ation Act 1986 (Qld) if a conservation plan required a landholder to implement 
soil conservation measures.138 This Act was made during Queensland's prolonged 
conservative period and marked the height of the Bjelke-Petersen reign. Provision for 
compensation to an ‘owner' included a freeholder and also ‘the holder of a lease, 
licence or permit’.139 As such, the Act was in keeping with other legislation of that era in 
treating leaseholders as owners. This statute survived the Labor period of government 
with little amendment.14"
I 3> Macintosh A and Denniss R. ‘Property Rights and the Environment: Should Farmers have a Right to 
Compensation? ’ (Australia Institute, 2004) 56.
136 Bonyhady T, ‘Property Rights’ in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1992) 76-78.
137 Bonyhady T, ‘Property Rights' in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1992) 66-67.
I3S Bonyhady T, ‘Property Rights' in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1992) 60. Under the Soil Conservation Act 1986 (Qld) s 17 the Chief Executive may serve a soil 
conservation order requiring a landholder to take steps to improve soil conservation including preventing or 
mitigating erosion see further s 17 (1) (a) to (d). The Act in s 28 (1) to (3) makes provision for compensation to be 
payable to a person whose estate or interest in land is injuriously affected by a soil conservation plan.
The Soil Conservation Act 1986 (Qld) s 6 defines an owner as the person other than the Crown or a person 
representing the Crown who for the time being is entitled to receive the rents or profits of the land in connection with 
which the word is used, and includes a statutory authority and a person who is the holder of a lease, licence or permit 
from the Crown or a person deriving title thereunder.
1 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate if any soil conservation plans have been made or compensation 
paid.
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The just terms requirements of s 51 (xxxi) do not apply to State laws such as the VMA. 
141 The Constitution o f Queensland Act 2001 (Qld), in keeping with other State 
Constitutions, has no just terms provisions. The only possibility of compensation will be 
if policy or law make such provision. This may be a political if not a legal necessity,142 
and may be influenced by pressure for compensation. The VMA prompted calls for 
compensation; the amendments to the LA, which brought about the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy, did not generate any demand for compensation from rural landholders, 
their representative bodies or within parliamentary debate when the amending laws 
were made. Because the law attaches different and more restricted property rights to 
leasehold tenure there is no expectation of compensation.
The VMA was passed in 1999 following the resurgence of the Queensland Labor 
government. The Act contained no provision for compensation. Queensland was slower 
than other jurisdictions to introduce vegetation management legislation and even slower 
to come up with any financial recompense for affected landholders. The VMA was 
assented in 1999, but a fiscal commitment to rural landholders did not emerge from the 
Queensland government coffers until 2004 when it was consistently referred to as a 
financial package -  there was no mention of compensation. Limited and varying forms 
of financial assistance have accompanied some of the amendments to the VMA, the 
most extensive being $150 million in 2004 when political expediency dictated a newly 
elected government meet a pre-election promise.143
In 2009, another Queensland State election year, controversial regrowth amendments 
came with a sum of $2 million for rural representative bodies to implement training and 
information on the new regulations.144 Beyond this sum there was no government 
promise of compensation or reference to schemes for financial assistance. It appeared 
no longer necessary for Queensland Labor to make such promises or for rural 
representative bodies or the opposition to demand them. This thesis demonstrates that 
pressure from rural landholders and their representative bodies for financial recompense 
following vegetation management restrictions was heightened in the initial transitory
141 Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA, 120, inter alia, reaffirmed the law in holding that a landholder is not 
entitled to compensation following legislative restrictions this case is discussed at p201. Burns v State o f 
Queensland [2004] QSC 434 followed Bone and is examined at p 203.
142 Bates G, Environmental Law in Australia (6th ed. Butterworths 2006) 27.
143 An examination of what Queensland Labor described as a financial commitment to rural landholders is provided 
in Chapter Four.
144 An examination of the 2009 amendments to the VMA is provided in Chapter Five.
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stages of the legislation; and on the introduction of far reaching restrictions, such as the 
2004 amendments, which brought about the end of broadscale land clearing. By 2009 
the regrowth amendments were contentious but calls for monetary compensation or 
financial schemes were not at the forefront of debate. Political pragmatism no longer 
required a significant fiscal commitment. Queensland Labor secured yet another term of 
office in 2009, it was now ten years since the VMA had been introduced and rural 
landholders settled into an acknowledgment of the law that the process of time appears 
to foster.
The prevalence of leasehold tenure in Queensland
The potential utility of leasehold tenure to promote sustainable rural land management 
is enhanced by the extent of land held under this type of tenure. Leasehold land has 
remained the dominant form of rural land holding in Queensland. As noted by Payne in 
1959, Queensland has remained ‘wedded to a policy of leasehold tenure of large areas 
for the protection and benefit of future generations’.145 Moreover this large proportion of 
land held in State ownership can be linked to the predominance of regions with sparse 
populations, harsh climate and marginal land use.146 This is apparent in the map 
provided in Figure 2.1 below.
14'' Payne W L, Report on Progressive Land Settlement in Queensland by the Land Settlement Advisory Commission, 
(Queensland, Government Printer, 1959) 7.
146 Queensland government, Managing State Rural Leasehold Land: A discussion paper, Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines, 2001.
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Figure 2.1: The extent o f  leasehold tenure within Queensland 147
147 Copyright in this map is owned by the Queensland government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines. 
Permission to reproduce the map is available under a creative commons licence provided the source is attributed to 
the Department and the use is for non-commercial purposes such as this thesis. E-mail confirmation of this was 
provided by the IP/Copyright officer at the Department on the 20 August 2013. Delbessie Leases are Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy leases; this name change is explained in Chapter Nine.
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The graph in Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of the State that is leasehold, which is just 
over 66% including freeholding leases.148 Freeholding leases are unique to Queensland. 
Such leases are granted typically to a lessee who has elected to pay the purchase price 
for the land over several years. The lease will be granted for a specified purpose such as 
agriculture. On payment of the final installment, a deed of grant converts the lease to 
freehold provided the landholder has complied with the lease conditions.149 The deed of 
grant will be subject to all encumbrances to which the lease was subject.150 Only a small 
proportion of leasehold tenure is now made up of freeholding leases. Figure 2.3 
provides a breakdown of leasehold tenure as a percentage of the State. This shows that 
freeholding leases amount to 2% of the State and most of this is made up of Grazing 
Homestead Freeholding leases.151 The majority of leasehold titles, just under 45%, are 
Pastoral Holdings; Grazing Homestead Perpetual Leases amount to 11% and Term 
Leases 6%. The amount of remaining land devoted to other types of lease and licence 
represent a small section of the State, for example Perpetual Leases cover 0.08% of 
land.
Freehold tenure amounts to 24% of the State.152 In terms of the total area of land, 
leasehold land covers 115,247,774 hectares and freehold land 42,541,313 hectares.153 
Figure 2.2 shows the small percentage of the State devoted to protected areas and State 
forests: being 11,843,193 hectares or 7% of land. Freehold and leasehold tenure thus 
account for 90% of land within the State. What happens on this vast area of privately 
held land has significant implications for the environment within the State, within 
Australia and globally.
148 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 have been compiled from Queensland government, Department o f Environment and Resource 
Management, Land tenure statistical information. The data is noted to be accurate as at 1 August 2011. Available at
http: \v\v u .dcrm.uld.uov.au land state pdf tenure stats 01 ()«S2() I l.pdf (viewed 20 December 2012).
149 Under the Land Act 1994 (Qld) provision is made for pre and post-Wolfe freeholding leases, under ss 457 and 
462.
150 Land Act 1994 (Qld) ss 458 (2) and 463(2).
151 Land Act 1994 (Qld) ss 464 to 467.
152 Queensland government, Department o f Environment and Resource Management, Land tenure statistical 
information. Available at http: u \\ \\ .  derm. uld.go\.au land .state pdf tenure suns 0108201 l.pdf (viewed 20 
December 2012).
153 Queensland government, Department o f Environment and Resource Management, Land tenure statistical 
information. Available at http: \\u\\ .dcrm.iild.uo\.au la n d '.täte pdf tenure stats 0108201 l.pdf. (viewed 20 
December 2012).
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Figure 2.2: How land is divided within Queensland
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Figure 2.3: Leasehold tenures as a percentage o f the State
Conclusion
Tenure is not a fixed doctrine rather it has emulated judicial development within the
common law and the values of consecutive State administrations within the legislature.
The dominant tenure in Queensland is leasehold and there is an underlying utility in this
type of tenure which might prove critical for the long term sustainability of rural land.
Retention of control on this vast area of State land has allowed the government to
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impose legislative restrictions with little resistance from landholders. Lease instruments 
are characteristically regarded as flexible, but the legacy of the Bjelke-Petersen 
government has rendered them inert for many years in Queensland. Legislative 
restrictions have been introduced which have overridden lease terms. It is leasehold 
tenure that has proved to be adaptable rather than the instruments that stem from it.
For the two pieces of legislation central to this thesis it has proved to be less contentious 
and less complicated to make and implement environmental legislation on leasehold 
land. In part this is because the law attaches more limited property rights to lease tenure. 
It has been established in this chapter that property works within a wider and often 
opposing community of public and private interests. The balance between public and 
private rights and interests is more readily achieved with leasehold as compared to 
freehold tenure. With the VMA, the balance between public and private interests was 
considerably out of alignment, because legislative restrictions were imposed upon 
freehold tenure and because there was little ideological parity between private rural 
interests and public decision makers. An additional complication with freeholders was 
the expectation of and pressure for compensation following the VMA; leaseholders on 
the other hand made no demands for compensation following amendments to the LA. 
Both laws examined in this thesis aimed to address the public environmental good 
provided by the performance of sustainable land management practices on rural land.
As demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five the making and implementation of the 
VMA was a complex and controversial process. Conversely, as demonstrated in Chapter 
Eight, the making and implementation of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy under the 
LA was a relatively straightforward process.
Environmental law and policy has been dominated and shaped by the protracted 
political cycles and ideologies of successive governments. The early dependence on 
primary production and preoccupation with development remains an integral part of 
Queensland's history. Land policy encouraged, and for leasehold land legally required, 
detrimental and unsustainable land management practices. This legacy of land 
degradation prompted the Goss Labor government to develop a tree clearing policy on 
leasehold land, which was later adapted by the Borbidge conservative coalition 
government. Ultimately the decision to legislate to prevent clearing on freehold land fell
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to the Beattie Labor government in 1999. As the following chapter shows adjusting to a 
regulated regime would not be easy for those on the land.
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Chapter Three: Agriculture and environmental legislation
Introduction
Agriculture is an integral part of the State of Queensland. It contributes in a substantial 
way to the economy and, at the same time, impacts extensively and often detrimentally 
upon the environment. Past land management practices within Queensland promoted 
broadscale land clearing primarily of native vegetation. This type of land clearance has 
significant implications for the environment and biodiversity and for the long-term 
sustainability of rural land in the State. The environmental consequences of agriculture 
are examined in this chapter in which it is contended that the Vegetation Management 
Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA), and the Land Act 1994 (Qld) (LA), are part of the solution to 
widespread land degradation. There remain, however, underlying problems in regulating 
agriculture which were exacerbated during the Labor period of government. Under past 
conservative governments in Queensland the rural community held an influential 
position within the State. For the most part agriculture was unregulated and rural 
landholders operated in a cooperative climate with an empathetic government and 
regulators. When Labor returned to govern in 1989, and increasingly throughout the 
Labor years, the influence of the rural lobby diminished. The Labor period of 
government in Queensland marked a significant policy shift that resulted in an increase 
in environmental regulation for agriculture.
The many and varied pieces of environmental legislation introduced during Labor's 
administration were generally regarded as excessive and an imposition by those on the 
land. Association between the regulators and rural landholders became increasingly 
strained and was far from conducive to a practical working relationship. As a 
consequence, rural organizations, such as Agforce and the Queensland Farmer’s 
Federation (QFF), undertook an essential function in facilitating the transition to an 
increasingly regulated environment. If legislation is to be implemented effectively the 
role of education and support for landholders is crucial, not least during periods of 
transition. For the VMA, legislative restrictions have proved complex: amendments 
were often hastily introduced, frequently retrospective and, in areas such as mapping, 
confusing. For the LA, the lease renewal process under the Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy is more time consuming and complicated than was previously the case: a new
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lease is no longer a simple matter of filling in a form and paying a prescribed fee. 
Agforce and the QFF filled the communication void between the regulators and the 
regulated. A further rural association, Property Rights Australia (PRA), was formed 
primarily in response to discontent with the regulatory environment. The function of 
these three rural organisations will be examined in this chapter as the position of 
Agforce and QFF differs from that of PRA.
The environmental laws that potentially affect a rural landholder, in relation to the 
management of vegetation, are examined in this chapter. There is an abundance of laws: 
in the event of an environmental issue there is a tendency to make and implement a law 
to address the issue. For Queensland, the degradation of rural land as a result of 
broadscale land clearing was a cause for concern. The VMA was a specific law created 
to address this issue, and the LA is an existing statute upon which environmental 
provisions for sustainable land management were grafted. The main provisions and 
objects of the VMA and the LA are set down in this chapter to provide a context for the 
remaining thesis. The chapter also includes the many State statutes on land management 
that might impact upon a rural landholder together with the Commonwealth 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC). The 
Federal legislation regulates the clearing of vegetation if it has an impact on matters of 
national environmental significance, but referrals from the agricultural sector are 
typically low.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of regulatory evaluation and assessment criteria 
in respect of environmental laws in Queensland generally and specifically for the two 
Acts relevant to this thesis. The proliferation of environmental laws may be of little 
benefit to the environment if the implementation of those laws is not evaluated and 
assessed, and if there is no means to measure whether any positive change has been 
made. There is a degree of evaluation in respect of the VMA. The Queensland 
government is primarily concerned with statutory effectiveness and the VMA has 
ultimately proved effective in reducing broadscale land clearing. However, appraisal of 
the LA environmental amendments has been non-existent. For example, the statutory 
duty of care for leasehold land was introduced in 1994 but it was neither defined nor 
clarified until the 2007 changes to the Act, which implemented the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy. Landholders can only demonstrate compliance with the statutory duty of
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care when their lease comes up for renewal and the condition of their land is assessed 
under the strategy. The statutory duty of care will be introduced in this chapter and 
examined further, along with the strategy, in Chapter Eight. The vegetation management 
regulations have remained a contentious issue but any further regulatory evaluation and 
assessment has been avoided or shelved by the Queensland government, despite the fact 
that the Commonwealth government has undertaken two inquiries into native vegetation 
legislation. The chapter concludes with detail of these inquiries; both of which highlight 
the failure to engage, and the lack of trust and cooperation between State regulators and 
rural landholders. These inquiries draw attention to the effect of the implementation of 
the VMA on some individual landholders, the positioning of the three rural bodies and 
the absence of the Queensland government.
The environmental impact of agriculture
Agriculture is one of the world's oldest industries. It is basic to human 
civilisation, fundamental to human survival, and a major contributor to the 
economy of many nations. Yet it is also one of the principal causes of 
environmental degradation.1 2
Agriculture is important to Queensland. Compared to other Australian States, 
Queensland has the largest area of agricultural land, which is around 141.4 million 
hectares," and the highest proportion of land dedicated to agriculture.3 In economic 
terms, the contribution of agriculture is significant: the total value of Queensland's 
primary industry commodities for 2011-2012 was forecast at $14.69 billion, with cattle 
being one of the highest value industries.4 As most agricultural land is primarily used for 
livestock grazing,5 the rural sector, particularly the rural livestock sector, is one of the
1 Cunningham N, Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press. 
Oxford. 1998)267.
2 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Available at:
liUn:/A\\vu.abs.ao\.au/Ausstats/ahsv/.ns(746dlbc47ac9d()c7bca236c47()()25fl87/r7635B38f792374BCA2560i:AOO 
0539l)A?opendocument (viewed 19 August 2010).
3 Queensland government. Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation: Forecasting. 
Analysis and Trends, Prospects for Queensland's Primary Industries, 2011-2012 4.
4 Queensland government. Department of Employment. Economic Development and Innovation: Forecasting. 
Analysis and Trends, Prospects for Queensland's Primary Industries, 2011-2012 2.
5 Australian Natural Resource Atlas: Available at:
http://audit.dch.uov.au/anra /'agriculture Ai fs/ae report/sect ion 1 /figure 1 2.ai ((viewed 19 August 2010).
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major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions.6 Approximately 40 per cent o f 
Queensland’s greenhouse gas emissions come from agriculture.7
Agricultural practices within Queensland mean the State has cleared, and continues to 
clear, more land than the rest o f Australia combined.8 Inevitably the land has degraded. 
Broadscale land clearing has primarily been o f native vegetation. What constitutes 
native vegetation varies between jurisdictions in statutory terms. The VMA defines 
vegetation as a native tree or plant other than grass or non-woody herbage; or plants 
within grassland regional ecosystems and mangroves.9
The management o f native vegetation by rural landholders is o f critical importance to 
the environment. Vegetation maintains biodiversity.
It also sustains ecological processes critical to delivering the ecosystem services 
that provide the life support systems for our planet. These processes and services 
include: forming the basis of food chains; purifying air and supplying oxygen; 
protecting water quality and yield; supporting forestry, agriculture and aquaculture; 
maintaining soil fertility and stability upon which many productive enterprises 
rely.10
Biodiversity includes the ‘variability among living organisms from all sources including 
terrestrial, aquatic, marine and other ecosystems and the ecological complexities o f 
which they are part’.11 Typically biodiversity has three levels:
6 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Climate Change in Australia, Australia's Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Agriculture. 
Available at: http://www.abs.gov .au/AUSSTATS/abs</ .nsf/Lookup/46l3.0Ecature+Articlcl.lan+20l0#AusGI 1G 
(viewed 19 August 2010). Australian government, Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resources Economics and 
Science, Climate Change and Variability, Issue 3-2011, 6. Available at:
hUr>://adl.brs.gov.au/.../SEI.2011,03 onlamiMitigation HR rev 1.0.1.0.txlf (viewed 19 August 2010).
7 Queensland government. Capturing Carbon in the Rural landscape: Opportunities for Queensland, 2009, 3.
s Australia Institute: ‘Land-use change and Australia 's Kyoto target' (1999) Submission to Senate Environment 
References Committee Inquiry into Australia's response to global warming. Auspoll research report prepared for the 
World Wildlife Fund: Attitudes towards Land Clearing and Environmental Issues in Queensland (2009).
9 s8 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld). The NSW vegetation legislation has a wider definition: s6( 1) Native 
Vegetation Act 2003( NSW) defines native vegetation as means any of the following types of indigenous 
vegetatiom(a) trees (including any sapling or shrub, or any scrub), (b) understorey plants, (c)groundcover (being any 
type of herbaceous vegetation),(d) plants occurring in a wetland. (2) Vegetation is 'indigenous’ if it is of a species of 
vegetation, or if it comprises species of vegetation, that existed in the State before European settlement. (3) For the 
purposes of this Act, 'native vegetation’ does not include any mangroves, sea grasses or any other type of marine 
vegetation to which section 205 of the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) applies. There is no definition of 
native vegetation in the EPBC Act but the Commonwealth government’s Native Vegetation Framework provides a 
definition, which again is wider than the Queensland meaning.
10 Australian government. Department of the Environment. Water, Heritage and the Arts, Native Vegetation 
Framework Review Task Group 2009, Australia ’s Native Vegetation Framework, Consultation Draft.
11 Australian government, Department of Sustainability, Environment. Water. Population and Communities, 
Australia 's Biodiversity Conservation Strategy (2010-2030). Available at
hltn:7www.environment,nov.au/biodivcrsily/nublications/stratoaY-2010-30' (viewed 19 March 2012).
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Genetic diversity refers to the variation in genes enabling organisms to evolve and 
adapt to new conditions. Species diversity refers to the number, types and 
distribution of species within an ecosystem. Ecosystem diversity refers to the 
variety of habitats and communities of different species that interact in a complex 
web of interdependent relationships.12
The 2001 Commonwealth State o f the Environment report observed that clearance o f 
native vegetation continued to be the single most significant threat to terrestrial 
biodiversity, the next report in 2006 noted:
The most visible indicator of land condition is the extent and quality of vegetation 
cover. Nationally the picture is deceptive — about 87 per cent of Australia's 
original native vegetation cover remains, but its condition is variable and masks an 
underlying issue of the decline of many ecological communities. Some ecological 
communities occupy less than 1 per cent of their original extent as a result of 
clearing for agriculture, and many others are highly fragmented.13
Because habitats are fragmented, isolated pockets o f native remnant vegetation remain. 
As a consequence, rare and endangered species are limited to these remaining areas o f 
vegetation. The 2011 Commonwealth State o f the Environment report found that the 
condition o f native vegetation is deteriorating and the rate o f land clearing ‘is slowing, 
but still averaged around one million hectares each year over the decade to 2010.14 The 
extensive degradation o f rural land within Queensland meant that regulation was 
inevitable and a significant means by which long-term and widespread changes to 
environmentally sustainable land management practices might be obtained. There are, 
however, inherent problems in regulating agriculture.
12 Gunningham N. Grabosky P and Sinclair D. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press. 
Oxford, 1998)269.
13 Beeton. R J S. Buckley, K I, Jones, G J. Morgan, D. Reichelt, R E and Trevvin, D (2006) Australian State o f the 
Environment Committee 2006, Independent report to the Australian government Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Canberra, 8.1. Available at:
htlp://\vw\v.environment.gov.au/State of the Environment /2006/publications/report/index.html (viewed 1 May 
2010) .
14 Hatton J. Cork S, Harper P. Joy R. Kanowski P. Mackay R. McKenzie N, and Ward T (2011) Australian State o f  
the Environment Committee 2011. Independent report to the Australian government Minister for Sustainability, 
Environments, Water. Population and Communities. Available at: 
http://www.cnviromnent.gov.au/soe/201 l/report/indcx.hlml (viewed 2 May 2010).
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Inherent problems of regulating agriculture
There are potential advantages inherent to environmental regulation. For the VMA the 
eventual cessation of broadscale land clearing within Queensland is long-term and 
widespread. It took a number of years for this effect to come to fruition: the introduction 
of the legislation was in 1999, but broadscale clearing did not end until 2006. The effect 
of the LA changes to implement the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy will initially be 
piecemeal and impact upon leaseholders as their lease approaches renewal, at which 
time their land will undergo a condition assessment. The strategy therefore has the 
potential to address the problem of land degradation and biodiversity loss and, 
ultimately, the effect could be long-term and widespread.15
There remain intrinsic difficulties with environmental legislation. As noted by 
Gunningham et al, one of the disadvantages of command and control regulation lies in 
its vulnerability to political manipulation.16 Chapters Four and Five demonstrate 
political expediency on the part of the Queensland Labor Party, as evidenced by the 
introduction and many amendments of the VMA; and, in Chapter Two, mention is made 
of political pressure from rural landholders and their rural organisations for 
compensation and schemes for financial assistance, particularly in the initial and more 
far reaching stages of regulatory control. This in turn raises the issue of the availability 
of public funds to meet financial adjustment costs; and ultimately leads into issues of 
social justice insofar as regulation inevitably places a burden on those regulated. 
Moreover:
Solving the inequity problem for one group would mean either reducing resources 
applied to other needs of society, or the community accepting the need for an 
increase in overall taxes to achieve social justice and environmental protection 
goals.17
Tensions are inevitable when the price is perceived by the rural community to be borne 
by their sector for the benefit of society generally; and a public benefit perceived to be 
borne by a private cost.
15 The land condition assessment and requirements o f the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy will be examined in Chapter 
Eight.
16 Gunningham N, Grabosky P and Sinclair D. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 1998)46.
17 Martin P, Bartel R, Sinden J, Gunningham N and Hannam 1, Developing a Good Regulatory Practice Model for 
Environmental Regulations Impacting on Farmers, Research Report, (2007) 39, Australian Farm Institute and 
Commonwealth government, Land and Water Australia.
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These tensions are exacerbated within the realms of agriculture, not least because 
traditionally the regulation
... of agriculture has been informal, based upon the provision of information and 
persuasion by government authorities, whose fundamental role has been not to 
police agricultural producers, but to assist them to do the right thing....18
And further, as noted by Martin and Gunningham, it is arguable that the regulation of 
agriculture remains distinct with the result that:
...in Australia, as elsewhere, political power and the tyranny of distance have 
ensured that agricultural enterprises have rarely been subject to the same degree of 
detailed regulatory scrutiny and control as have come to be accepted for other 
large-scale resource-consuming or polluting industries.19
The history of the agricultural community within Queensland has a unique set of 
circumstances and political power was at the crux of tensions between the rural 
community and the Queensland Labor government’s decision to regulate vegetation 
management.
In the past, under successive conservative governments, the rural community in 
Queensland had considerable political power and an influential role within the State. 
Under a Labor government the rural community became a marginalised group and 
struggled to find a voice and a place in policy decision-making on rural land. 
Agricultural land policy has been dominated and shaped by the protracted political 
cycles and ideologies of successive governments. The political environment in 
Queensland has been characterised by long periods of dominant one party government. 
For 32 years, the State had various combinations of conservative Liberal and National 
Party administrations. During this time rural landholders engaged with an empathetic 
power whose interests by and large aligned with their own. This was a period relatively 
unfettered by regulatory control on rural land. The Queensland Labor Party returned to 
power in 1989 and, aside from a two-year interlude, held office until March 2012. This 
Labor period marked a significant shift and increase in regulation for agriculture.
Ix Gunningham N. Grabosky P and Sinclair L), Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policv, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998) 278-279.
1 ’ Martin P and Gunningham N. ‘Leading reform of natural resource management law: core principles' (2011) 28 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 137.
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Facilitating regulation: the role of rural organisations
As noted by Martin and Gunningham, natural resource management legislation is 
‘fundamentally behavioural’ and as such requires, in addition to the imposition of 
controls, a wider and ‘comprehensive approach involving communication and 
education’.2" Facilitating the transition to regulation requires a sound working 
relationship between the regulated community and the regulators. As the relationship 
between the agricultural community and government regulators has been problematic -  
particularly for the management of vegetation -  the role of rural bodies has been 
critical.
Agforce is the primary rural organisation within Queensland and is one of the many 
State and territory rural bodies which collectively make up the National Farmers 
Federation (NFF). Agforce was formed in 1997 by an amalgamation of the Cattleman's 
Union of Australia, the Queensland Graingrowers' Association and the United Grazier’s 
Association. Members of these three bodies supported the need for a unifying 
representative voice on matters of most concern to rural landholders; such matters were 
expressed to include, inter alia, resource management, land tenure and environmental 
issues.21
The management of vegetation on rural land is recognised by Agforce as a significant 
policy issue. According to this organisation, long-term certainty in natural resource 
management is necessary, but they generally do not support regulation. Rather they 
advocate voluntary measures.22 Agforce has played, and continues to play, an important 
role in assisting rural landholders to understand vegetation management legislation. It 
has been assisted financially by the Queensland government to undertake this work. The 
Agforce workshops include advice to landholders on rights and responsibilities under 
the regulatory scheme, the advantages of applying for a Property Map of Assessable 
Vegetation (PMAV) and disputing incorrectly mapped areas.23 The fact that there is an
20 Martin P and Gunningham N, n 19, 144.
21 Agforce, History of Agforce, available at: http://vvwvv.aglbrcecild.org.au/index.php?tgtPage=about&page id= 101 
(viewed 2 September 2008).
22 Agforce, Vegetation management. Available at: http:/ vvvvvv.agforceukl.org.au/index.php?lgtPage=&page id -26 
(viewed 2 September 2008).
23 Agforce, Vegetation workshops. Vegetation management assistance. Available at:
http: 7agfprceproiects.org.au/index.pho7page id=39(viewed 25 September 2008). The importance of PMAV’s and 
correct mapping is considered in Chapter Six.
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on-going need for such workshops is indicative of the continuing complexity of the 
legislation, and the number of times the law has changed.
Agforce also provides assistance to rural landholders affected by the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy. Government investment in the strategy began in 2006 with $19 million 
being allocated over a four-year period to 2010 and a further $5 million in ongoing 
funds.24 The assistance provided by Agforce ranges from one-to-one guidance to the 
opportunity to attend a field day.25 These initiatives are available to all rural landholders 
but if they are not members of Agforce, it seems unlikely they would attend.26
As noted, Agforce receives significant financial governmental assistance. In addition to 
the monies provided for vegetation management workshops, the State government in 
2005 founded a Blueprint for the Bush project.27 The Blueprint was described as a 10- 
year plan for the government and landholders to work in partnership. The first stage 
gathered input from the agricultural community. It was estimated around eight hundred 
people attended in various rural centres around the State.2i< After these meetings, the 
then president of Agforce said:
The overwhelming message we heard from the bush from Hughenden to Emerald, 
from Nebo to Dalby was resounding -  the bush believes the government does not 
trust them and is favouring a big stick approach to legislative compliance over 
extension and advice.29
There were indications of a willingness to rectify this as the president subsequently 
noted. Despite being mistrustful of the government, landowners:
...appreciate that a resolution to many of the issues facing rural Queensland will 
require a genuine partnership and a rebuilding of the trust which seems to have 
been lost on both sides.31’
“4 Queensland government. Sustainability of primary production. Available at: 
http:/Av\vw.regions.qld.gov.auA.lsdwcb/v4/appsAveb/contcnt.cfm?id=l6703 (viewed 2 September 2008).
‘^Agforce, Leasehold Land. Leasehold Land project-providing assistance with Delbessie lease agreements. Available 
at: http:/'A\\\ u.agforccqld.ore.au/indcx.php‘/tgtPage=£page id 226 (viewed 22 September 2008).
26 Agforce did not respond to a request for clarification regarding the status of those who attended such days.
~7 Blueprint for the Bush: consultation report. Phase 1, September 2005. Available
at:http://wwu .agforeeqld.ore.au/Pl )Ls/Blueprint%20Consultation0o20rcport%20Phase%201%201'inal%20(2).ndf 
(viewed 3 March 2008).
-* Blueprint for the Bush. Available at: http:/. \\\v\v.agforeeuld.ore.au blueprintfoithebush.htm (viewed 3 March 
2006).
2> Agforce, Blueprint Tour. Peter Kenny, President, July 2005. Available at: 
http://www.agforceqld.ore.au/blucnrintforthcbush.htm (viewed 3 March 2008) 2.
30 Kenny P, n 29, 2.
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The period which saw the introduction of the Blueprint for the Bush was controversial 
in terms of vegetation management: in 2004, amendments to the legislation marked the 
phasing out of broadscale land clearing. A subsequent controversial period followed in 
2009 with the regrowth amendments. In 2010 the Queensland government adopted a 
further model for engagement with rural and regional Queensland known as 
Tomorrow’s regions: the Queensland government’s partnership with regional 
communities’.31 The ten-year aim for the Blueprint for the Bush was not reached but it 
has now been surpassed by this more recent proposal, which brings together the 
Blueprint for the Bush program with Regional Development Australia.32 The Blueprint 
goal of sustainability remains and is said to include the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy 
and environmental partnership schemes. This latter scheme is described as the 
Department of Environment and Resource Management’s (DERM) market-based 
incentive Nature Assist and Nature Refuge program. There was no mention of the 
Vegetation Incentive Program (VIP), in which the State government allocated $12 
million as part of the 2004 VMA financial package.33 The VIP was discarded and 
merged with the Nature Assist program.
The Queensland Farmers Federation (QFF) is a relatively small organisation compared 
to Agforce. This body represents intensive agriculture in Queensland such as dairy, 
cotton, grains and horticulture. The members predominantly own freehold land.34 Of the 
14 listed priorities for the QFF, one is the management of native vegetation.35 Like 
Agforce, the QFF conducts workshops and seminars on vegetation management 
legislation in addition to providing a vegetation hotline and property visits. It works 
collaboratively with Agforce on some workshops and receives funding from the State 
government.36 It also works alongside Agforce and the regulators in promoting 
education and communication on vegetation management regulations. The question was 
asked of QFF if the degree of support had lessened over time. The reply said: ‘no not 
really, we are still providing the same level of support, however it is getting harder to
31 Queensland government, ‘Blueprint for the Bush'. Available at:
httn://u \v\s.reaions.iild.ao\ .aiFdsdwcbM/annsAvcb/conlcnl.eltnVkN 13343 (viewed 3 March 2006).
32 Commonwealth government, Regional Development Australia is described as a joint Commonwealth and State 
initiative providing advice to government on issues and priorities in regional Queensland. Available at:
littd://wwv\.rda.uov.au/ (viewed 15 January 2009).
33 The Vegetation Incentive Program and a detailed account of the financial scheme is accounted for in Chapter Four.
34 Queensland Fanners Federation. Submission to the Productivity Commission 2004. 6.
35 Queensland Fanners Federation, Vegetation management. Available at: http: u ww.iiff.ora.au/policv-proiects/our- 
work/vcaetation-manauemcnt/ (viewed 10 May 2012).
36 Email correspondence in reply from the Project Officer, Vegetation Management. Queensland Fanners Federation, 
dated 23 May 2012.
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get some farmers or farm groups to attend due to the daily pressures on-farm.’37 It 
appears the legislation remains complex and that landholders may experience 
difficulties in devoting sufficient time to regulatory requirements.
Property Rights Australia (PRA) was formed in 2003 in response to increasing natural 
resource management legislation.38 PRA’s primary role is to assist landholders involved 
in land clearing litigation. This organisation is a non-profit group of rural landholders, 
that operates at the smaller end of agricultural production in representing individual and 
family operated businesses rather than larger pastoral companies. According to PRA the 
alliance
...was formed to seek recognition and protection of the right of private property 
owners in the development, introduction and administration of policies and 
legislation relating to the management of land, water and other natural resources.3'7
PRA originated with a fighting fund to support the prosecuted Central Queensland 
grazier Ashley McKay. The majority of PRA members are Queensland based, but 
membership does extend beyond the State.4" During the period of research for this thesis 
the management of vegetation has remained an issue, but there have been other equally 
pressing concerns for rural landholders such as the advance of mining and coal seam gas 
companies on rural land.41 The implication of this for PRA is that monetary support 
from members is not as substantial as when the organisation was initially formed. PRA 
emerged because of increasing regulation and the enforcement of that regulation; its 
existence suggests that Agforce does not meet the representational needs of all rural 
landholders. Supporting members in litigation proceedings remains the domain of the 
Australian Farmers’ Fighting Fund and the National Farmers Federation (NFF).42
As rural organisations, Agforce, QFF and PRA occupy different roles: Agforce and QFF 
are larger, more financially secure bodies; and government funding facilitates their 
communication and education role in assisting rural landholders to understand and
’7 Queensland Fanners Federation, n 36.
'8 Property Rights Australia, Why was PRA set up? Available at: httn://www.r>ropcrt vrightsaustralia.org/about/about- 
us/ (viewed 5 October 2012).
’’ Property Rights Australia. Submission no 171. to the Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts of Native 
Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations, 2003. 45-46.
40 Email correspondence in reply from Joanne Rae the current Chainnan of PRA dated 27 November 2012.
41 Personal communication with Joanne Rae Chairman of PRA on 14 October 2011.
4‘ Ihe role of PRA in litigation proceedings is explored further in Chapter Seven. An example of the NFF supporting 
a NSW rural landholder from their fighting fund is the case of Peter Spencer v Commonwealth o f Australia [2010] 
HCA 28 (1 September 2010), this case is included in Chapter Two.
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comply with regulatory requirements. PRA does not appear to have sufficient funding to 
take on an educative role and it is unlikely it would chose to do so, being steadfastly 
opposed to what it regards as regulatory intrusion. Unlike the other rural bodies, PRA 
does not work alongside the regulators. Agforce reluctantly tolerates legislation, lobbies 
against some aspects of it and continues to take government funding. The instructional 
and communication role of Agforce and the QFF has remained significant throughout 
the period of this research because of the volume of environmental legislation.
The emergence and volume of environmental legislation
Most jurisdictions in Australia draft a new piece of legislation for every environmental 
issue. 43 Queensland adopted this approach during the last Labor administration. The 
VMA and the LA are typical of environmental legislation generally in being a ‘product 
of crisis' . 44 In this instance, the crisis concerned the widespread extent of land clearing 
and resultant devastation of rural land. The irony is that it was earlier government policy 
which brought about this degradation of land; in the past, governments encouraged land 
clearing as part of basic land management practices. Landholders who cleared were 
rewarded with taxation incentives. For rural freeholders, a freehold title generally meant 
an unfettered title to clear; for rural leaseholders, past lease conditions required the 
leaseholder to obtain a permit to destroy trees. Typically a lease would require the 
leaseholder to clear trees and sow pasture within a given period of the lease 
commencing. 45
The most marked effect of the introduction of the VMA was the imposition of 
legislative clearing controls on the owners of freehold land; this was a new and 
significant legal restriction to apply to such landholders in Queensland. Before the
43 Martin P and Gunningham N, ‘Leading reform o f natural resource management law: core principles’ (2011) 28 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 148.
44 Bonyhady T, ‘The Disappointment o f the Law' in Dovers S, Wild River S, (ed), Managing Australia’s 
Environment (The Federation Press, Australia, 2003) 463.
45 See, for example, the standard lease condition M 80, employed by then Department o f Natural Resources and 
Mines in the mid seventies which required: The lessee shall within five years from the date o f  commencement o f  the 
lease, and to the satisfaction o f the Minister, develop an area o f not less than.( the number o f hectares would be 
applicable to the area o f the leased land) hectares o f  brigalow, gidyea and associated scrubs on the holding by: a) 
destroying by ringbarking or otherwise in accordance with a permit granted by the Land Commissioner, such scrub in 
equal proportions during each year o f such period and thereafter maintaining such area free from all regrowth, 
suckers and undergrowth: and b)buming all scrub destroyed in performance o f this condition as soon as it shall be 
practicable and prudent to do so; and c) sowing such cleared areas to improve pasture with such grass or grasses as 
may be approved by the Minister. The lessee shall, within one month from the commencement o f the term of the 
lease, apply to the Land Commissioner for a permit to destroy trees on the holding so that the performance o f this 
condition can be undertaken.
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VMA, legislative clearing restrictions on freehold land were piecemeal and limited to 
very specific types of land, for example: under the Wet Tropics World Heritage 
Protection and Management Act 1993 (Qld);46 or on State watercourses which 
potentially required statutory approval under the Water Act 2000 (Qld). Rural 
freeholders in Queensland were unused to statutory controls on what they could do on 
their land: a freehold title had generally meant an unregulated title. For rural 
leaseholders, initial and limited controls on land clearing emerged in the early 1990s 
and increased as the decade wore on.
The Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld)
The VMA was enacted in December 1999 but remained unproclaimed until September 
2000. The purposes of the legislation changed before the law was proclaimed and the 
areas of protected vegetation were reduced to those classified as endangered. In 2004, 
other categories of vegetation came into play, and in 2009 some regrowth vegetation 
was introduced and protected. As with most statutes the VMA has, with the passage of 
time, increased in volume; during the period of study for this thesis the legislation has 
more than doubled in size, progressing from the Act's inception to the latest 
amendments. The VMA has had 17 reprints, 23 amending Acts, and 497 amendments of 
which 179 have been retrospective.
In the following chapters the amendments to the VMA will be considered as they are 
relevant, for example the retrospective amendments of 2009 are considered in Chapter 
Five; and the difficulties which emanated from the inclusion, removal and subsequent 
reinstatement of a particular purpose of the Act will be examined in Chapter Seven as 
this is relevant to one of the land clearing cases considered. In order to establish the 
relevant provisions of the VMA, as pertinent to this thesis, the law that is set out here is 
the current version.47
The VMA is the major statute that applies to the clearing of vegetation within 
Queensland. The exceptions are vegetation on a forest reserve or protected area under
46 Wet Tropics World Heritage Protection and Management Act 1993 (Qld) s 56 (1) prohibits acts such as the 
destruction of a forest product (defined as a native plant) without a licence or permit.
47 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld). the latest version of the legislation is November 2011.
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the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld);4x an area declared as a State forest or timber 
reserve under the Forestry Act 1959 (Qld);4y or a forest entitlement under the Land Act 
1994 (Qld).50 The purpose of the VMA is to regulate the clearing of vegetation in such a 
way that conserves remnant vegetation, that is: an endangered regional ecosystem or an 
of concern regional ecosystem, or a least concern regional ecosystem; and conserves 
vegetation in declared areas; and ensures the clearing does not cause land degradation; 
and prevents loss of biodiversity; and maintains ecological processes; and manages the 
environmental effects of the clearing to achieve all these matters and, finally, reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions.51 The purposes of the legislation are to be achieved by: the 
provision of codes under the relevant planning legislation (currently the Sustainable 
Planning Act 2009 (Qld)) relating to the clearing of vegetation; the enforcement of 
vegetation clearing provisions; declared areas; and particular regrowth vegetation.52 The 
precautionary principle is generally to apply to the framework for decision making in 
achieving the purpose of the Act.53 The precautionary principle is further explained in 
this section, by stating that the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the environment, if there are 
threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage.
For the VMA, the term ‘environment' includes ecosystems together with people and 
communities; all natural and physical resources; those qualities and characteristics of 
locations, places that contribute to their biological diversity and integrity, intrinsic or 
attributed scientific value or interest, amenity, harmony and sense of community; and 
their social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions.54 The implementation of this 
legislation therefore is an integral part of the statutory framework and, at least in theory, 
recognises that account should be taken of the agricultural community.
The Land Act 1994 (Qld)
The Land and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) provided, inter alia, the 
amendments to the LA to implement the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. This
4X Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 7(1) (a) (b).
4y Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 7( 1) (c).
50 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 7( 1) (d).
51 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3( 1) (a) to (g).
52 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3(2) (a) to (c) and (f).
53 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3(2) (d).
54 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld s 3(3) (a) to (d)).
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legislation has remained relatively stable for long periods of time and, unlike the VMA, 
has not been characterised by frequent and retrospective change.55 The 2007 
amendments to the LA were substantial. The strategy impacted on all rural leases due to 
be renewed from January 2008. Sixty-five percent of State leases would be eligible for 
renewal during 2007-2012.56 The strategy applies to leases on rural leasehold land for 
terms of twenty years or more covering one hundred hectares or more.57 Generally a 
term lease for rural leasehold land will be issued for thirty years/8 Lessees will be 
required to enter into a land management agreement that will attach to the land and bind 
successors in title.59 If the regulators assess the land as being in good condition, the 
incentive is a forty-year lease. The potential for a fifty-year lease also exists if the land 
is in good condition and the lessee enters into an indigenous land use agreement and/or 
a conservation agreement or covenant/’0
The LA remains the current legislation. It had been more than thirty years since the 
legislation governing leasehold land had been revisited and rewritten. The potential 
environmental significance of the 1994 Act lay in the introduction of a statutory duty of 
care, which remained undefined at this stage. In addition, the concepts of sustainability 
and protection were introduced as statutory objects. Sustainability is defined as: 
‘sustainable resource use and development to ensure existing needs are met and the 
State's resources are conserved for the benefit of future generations7; and protection as 
the 'protection of environmentally and culturally valuable and sensitive areas and 
features’.61 The objects of the Act further emphasize the importance of improving State 
land for the public good and for community purposes together with consultation with 
community groups and efficient, open and accountable administration.62
Accompanying the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy amendments to the LA in 2007 was 
a clarification of the statutory duty of care.63 The move towards sustainable rural land
55 The law as set down for the thesis therefore has remained constant -  the latest version of the legislation is March 
2012.
56 Queensland government, Department of Natural Resources and Water, ‘State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy' 
Available at: hltp:/7www.nrw.qld.aov.au/blueprintpdl7srlIs u a.pdl (viewed 19 January 2009).
57 Rural leasehold land is defined in the Land Act 1994 as land for which leases may be issued in perpetuity or for a 
term of years for agriculture, grazing or pastoral purposes, it does not include reserves or national parks.
58 Land Act 1994 (Qld) sl55 (3).
59 The land management agreement must be registered while the lease continues s 176 U, s 279 Land Act 1994(QId).
60 Land Act 1994 (Qld) si 55 (4), (5).
61 Land Act /994(Q ld)s4 .
62 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 4.
63 The implementation of the statutory duty of care and its effectiveness in terms of promoting sustainable land 
management is examined in Chapter Eight.
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management practices is epitomized by the duty of care concept. It has taken time for 
the concept to be incorporated as an integral component of the Queensland leasehold 
system. Integration required introducing a statutory duty of care as a development of the 
common law duty of care. Under the common law principles of the tort of negligence, 
an action may be brought for negligent actions or omissions. The common law imposes 
a duty of care on all individuals to exercise reasonable care, such that their actions or 
omissions do not cause foreseeable harm. The standard of care is what would be 
reasonable in the circumstances. As noted by Bates, it is harm to the individual and not 
the environment that is actionable at common law, even though a negligent cause of 
action may also cause harm to the environment/’4 A statutory duty of care therefore 
encompasses harm to the environment.
Only leaseholders in Queensland are subject to the statutory duty of care. Following an 
Inquiry into ecologically sustainable land management, the Industry Commission 
recommended that a statutory duty of care for the environment should be included for 
landholders who owned or managed their land regardless of legal title.65 It would seem 
advisable, as noted by the Industry Commission, if all tenures were subject to a statutory 
duty of care. The effectiveness of this statutory duty will be examined in Chapter Eight. 
As the means by which landholders can demonstrate compliance is when their lease 
comes up for renewal and the condition of their land is assessed under the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy. At this point it is noteworthy that the duty has been around for 
almost 20 years and, until leases are renewed and in the absence of any other evaluation, 
it is impossible to determine if it has contributed to any positive change.
The Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld)
All rural tenures in Queensland are subject to the provisions of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1994 (Qld). This Act sets down a general environmental duty under 
which landholders must not carry out any activity that causes, or is likely to cause, 
environmental harm unless they take all reasonable and practical measures to prevent or
64 Bates G. Environmental Law in Australia, (Butterworths, 2006) 187.
65 Industry Commission, A Full repairing Lease; inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land Management, September 
1997, 72. The Industry Commission became the Productivity Commission: this body has evolved from the Tariff 
Board founded in 1921, which became the Industries Assistance Commission in 1974 and then the Industry 
Commission 1980s.
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minimize that harm.66 In deciding what is reasonable and practical, regard must be had 
to, inter alia: the nature of the harm or potential harm; the sensitivity of the receiving 
environment; and the current state of knowledge for the activity.67 The general 
environmental duty is applicable to environmental harm caused, for example, by 
pollution.68
Other State legislation
The management of vegetation on rural land is primarily dealt with under the VMA and 
the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld); but a host of other statutes have the potential 
to apply depending on the nature and geography of the land. Thus in terms of vegetation 
management rural land may be impacted by:
• Riparian vegetation which is protected by the Water Act 2000 (Qld). 
Amendments to the VMA in 2004 led to a confusing overlap in 
jurisdiction between the Water Act 2000 (Qld) and the VMA which 
necessitated further amendments to the VMA in 2005j69
• Declared pests under the Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route 
Management) Act 2002 (Qld) which provides for the management of 
declared pests, which include primarily feral animals and the clearing of 
certain plants or weeds;7"
66 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 319 (1). s 14 of the Act defines environmental harm as any adverse 
effect, or potential adverse effect on an environmental value; s 9 of the Act defines environmental value as a quality 
or physical characteristic of the environment that is conducive to ecological health or public amenity or safety; or 
another quality of the environment identified and declared to be an environmental value under an environmental 
protection policy or regulation.
67 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 319 (2) (a) to (c).
68 Gunningham and Grabosky observe that a common feature of command and control environmental legislation has 
been to compartmentalize different areas such as land and water into separate regulations, see Gunningham N, 
Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998) 39. However, as noted by 
Bates, (Environmental Law in Australia (8th Edition, LexisNexis, Butterworths, 2013. 612, footnote 88) Maroochy 
Shire Council v Barns [2001) QCA 273 suggests for Queensland that the concept of environmental harm could be 
applied to activities other than pollution, such as land clearing. In Maroochy Shire Council the Council had sought an 
injunction to restrain Bams from felling trees on his property. Subsequently the Council sought leave to appeal 
against a decision of Dodds J in the District Court sitting in the Planning and Environment Court. Thomas .1 A 
accepted that the appeal was premature as a final order had not been made in the original case but nonetheless dealt 
with the appeal and held that Dodds J had not made an error of law. Thomas J A went on to say; ‘It may well be that 
there could be further dispute about the form of relief that is to be granted’. To date Queensland has not adopted the 
Western Australian approach and included destruction or damage to native vegetation as part of the definition of 
environmental harm, see for example s 3A Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA).
6y Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2005 
(Qld). Available at: httnVAvuw.lemslation.iild.t’ov ,au Bills 51 PDE/2005/VctiManQl AB051 xn.pdf (viewed I 
November 2012).
711 Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Act 2002 (Qld) ss 3 and 4. Declared pests are defined in 
Schedule 2 of the Land Protection (Pest and Stock Route Management) Regulations 2003 (Qld), Class 1 pests' list 
more than 40 plants and include plants such as acacias not indigenous to Australia, gorse and prickly pear; Class 2 
pests include more than 12 species of animals including feral pigs, deer and goats.
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• Fire management which is regulated under the Fire and Rescue Service 
Act 1990 ( Qld), necessary firebreak clearing is also covered in the 
VMA;71
• The Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld) which controls 
clearing in coastal districts;72
• The Forestry Act 1959 (Qld) which regulates State forests and may apply 
if land adjoins a forest;
• The Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) if the land adjoins a National 
Park;73 or
• The Wet Tropics World Heritage Protection and Management Act 1993 
(Qld) which protects tropical rainforests in the wet tropics of Queensland, 
an area of land situated along the north-east coast.74
The many and various State laws cited above cover potentially additional aspects of 
vegetation management. There remain a myriad of other laws that impact upon the day- 
to-day organization of a rural property. The purpose of this thesis is to focus on the 
VMA and the LA; and note that the regulatory regime may be further complicated by 
the fact that rural properties can be fragmented and may encompass more than one title 
and tenure. Thus landholders who have a whole or part of their land under a rural lease 
must also take into account the VMA and the requirements of the Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy. Local government regulations and Commonwealth law add to these layers of 
legislation. At the Federal level the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC) regulates actions likely to have a significant
71 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 22 A defines firebreak as clearing that is necessary for a relevant 
purpose.
72 Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld) s 3 defines the main objects of this Act are to (a) provide for 
the protection, conservation, rehabilitation and management of the coast, including its resources and biological 
diversity.
73 A landholder cleared an area of adjoining National Park to increase pasture and facilitate the movement of cattle 
between two of his properties .In R v Vincent Thomas Boyle (2004) unreported, Queensland District Court, Vincent 
Thomas Boyle was prosecuted by the Queensland Environment Protection Agency under s 62 of the Nature 
Conservation Act 1992 (Qld). Following a guilty plea the case went to the District Court of Queensland for 
sentencing as it was a prosecution on indictment. The object of the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) is the 
conservation of nature, s4. Which is to be achieved by, inter alia, dedication, declaration and management of 
protected areas, s 5 (a) to (f), s 5(g) provides for the cooperative involvement of landholders in the conservation of 
nature and s 6 that the Act is to be administered, as far as practicable, in consultation with, and having regard to the 
views and interests of, landholders and interested groups and persons, including Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders.
74 Wet Tropics of Queensland, Unesco World Heritage, ref 486. Available at: 
http://whc.unesco.ora/na.cfm?cid=3 I Aid site=486 (viewed 15 January 2009).
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impact on matters of national environmental significance; the objects of this Act 
include, inter alia, the conservation of biodiversity.75
Commonwealth legislation: the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
The EPBC Act has the potential to impact upon rural landholders in Queensland. In 
2001, land clearing was included as a key threatening process under the Act: a key 
threatening process being defined as a process that ‘threatens, or may threaten the 
survival, abundance or evolutionary development of a native species or ecological 
community'.76 Under the Act, once such a process is listed the Minister decides whether 
to have a threat abatement plan and is advised on this by the relevant Scientific 
Committee or other body with appropriate expertise.77 The Threatened Species 
Scientific Committee considered, inter alia, the Native Vegetation Framework and State 
legislation, such as the VMA in Queensland, and concluded that a threat abatement plan 
was not a feasible, effective or efficient way to abate the process.78 The Committee 
advised the Minister that the Commonwealth ‘should encourage and support land 
management quality assurance and planning mechanisms at the appropriate scales to 
ensure the conservation of biodiversity, especially threatened species and ecological 
communities'.* 7'7
The EPBC Act regulates the clearing of vegetation if it has an impact on matters of 
national environmental significance. Clearing may impact upon matters of national 
environmental significance such as: a Ramsar wetland, a listed threatened species, 
ecological community or migratory species and fall within the referral, assessment and 
approval process of the Act.8" A Senate Inquiry into the operation of the Act noted 
various submissions to expand the scope of matters of national environmental
75 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 3 (c).
76 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 188 (3).
77 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 270 A ( I) to (4).
7,i Australian government, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water. Population and Communities. Land
Clearance. Advice to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage from the Threatened Species Scientific 
Committee on a public nomination of a Key Threatening Process under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Available at: lntn:/A\u w.ein ironment.gov.au/biodiversitv/threatcned/ktp/clearing.html 
(viewed 15 August 2012).
7 ’ Australian government, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities. Land 
Clearance. Advice to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage from the Threatened Species Scientific 
Committee on a public nomination of a Key Threatening Process under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity- 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Available at: httir//www.cnvironment.aov.au/hiodiversitv/lhrcatcned/ktp/clcarint».html 
(viewed 15 August 2012).
811 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) Part 3 Div I.
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significance in the legislation, one of the most prominent being land clearing/1 To date a 
specific trigger has not been included.
Initial analysis of the EPBC Act by Scanlon and Dyson described it as a ‘far-reaching 
and ambitious reform of federal environmental law’.82 Ogle acknowledged the 
‘significant change’ to Commonwealth environmental laws but questioned whether the 
statute could directly address issues, such as the clearing of native vegetation, in the 
absence of a specific land clearing trigger.83 Over time the legislation has generated both 
criticism and support.84 A continuing criticism of the EPBC Act has been the relatively 
few referrals from the agricultural sector.85 Referrals under the Act are assessed in a 
particular category. There are 18 such categories with a specific category for agriculture 
and forestry. A key finding by the Australian National Audit Office, in analysing the 
distribution of referrals by categories, noted that agricultural referrals were low rather 
than high, which was unusual ‘given the impact of land clearing on listed threatened 
species’.86 To ascertain if this criticism is well founded an analysis of referrals and 
decisions made for agriculture under the EPBC Act was made.87 Figure 3.1 demonstrates 
there are only minor differences between referrals made and decisions made, 
accordingly an analysis of trends in the number of agricultural decisions made over the 
duration of the Act is provided in Figure 3.2.
81 Commonwealth government. Standing Committee on Environment. Communications and the Arts, The Operation 
of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth); first report (2009) 17. Available at: 
http://wvvAv.aph.aov.au/senate/eommittee/eca ctte/ephc act/report/repoit.pdf (viewed 15 August 2012).
82 Scanlon J and Dyson M, ‘Will Fractice Hinder Principle? -  Implementing the EPBC Act’ (2001) 18 Environmental 
Planning and Law Journal, 22.
83 Ogle C, ‘The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): How Workable is it?’ (2000)
17 Environmental Planning and Law Journal 468. 470 and 477.
84 For example the deficiencies of the EPBC Act are highlighted in: Macintosh A, ‘Why the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act's referral, assessment and approval process is failing to achieve its environmental 
objectives' (2004) 21 Environmental Planning and Law Journal, 288: and Macintosh A, ‘The Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): an evaluation of its cost-effectiveness’ (2009) 26 
Environmental Planning and Law Journal, 337. Support for the legislation is detailed in: McGrath C, ‘Swirls in the 
stream of Australian environmental law: debate on the EPBC Act' (2006) 23 Environmental Planning and Law 
Journal, 165.
85 Noted initially in Chappie S, ‘The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth): One year 
Later’ (2001)18 Environmental Planning and Law Journal. 535: and subsequently by Macintosh A and Wilkinson D, 
‘Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act: A Five Year Assessment’, (2005) the Australia Institute, 
Number 81, and Macintosh A, ‘Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act: An Ongoing Failure’ 
(2006) the Australia Institute.
86 Australian government, Australian National Audit Office. Referrals, Assessment and Approvals under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999(Cth), Performance Audit No. 38 of 2002-03. 82.
87 The statistics for Figures 3.1 and 3.2 have been complied by combining the referrals received and decisions made 
in the agriculture and forestry category within the yearly Annual Reports from the initial period in 2000-2001 to the 
latest report being 2009-2010. Available at: http://www.environment.aov.au/cpbc/publications/reports.html (viewed 
15 August 2012).There is no breakdown of the distribution between agriculture and forestry.
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Compared to referrals in the other 18 activity categories under the EPBC Act, 
agriculture and forestry, as a category, has a very low level of referral.88 The graph in 
Figure 3.2 shows the level of activity is low and from 2007 to 2010 it has been 
exceptionally low. There have been a total of four referrals in these three periods: two 
were not controlled actions, one was to be taken in a particular manner and one referral 
became a controlled action. Over the period from 2000 to 2010 there have been a total 
of 58 decisions made for the agricultural sector: of these 29% were controlled actions; 
28% were actions to be taken in a particular manner and 43% were not controlled.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in referrals and decisions made in agriculture and forestry category 
under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)
88 For example in the 2009-2010 period referrals included: 4 for agriculture; 68 for mining; 49 for residential 
development; 22 for commercial development.
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The low level of referral activity from the agricultural sector appears set to continue. In 
2002 an environment liaison officer was seconded from the Commonwealth Department 
of Environment and Water Resources to the National Farmers Federation (NFF) to 
assist rural landholders in matters relating to the EPBC Act, particularly referral and 
assessment and the possible need for federal approval for new activities such as land 
clearing.89 The Commonwealth government is clearly aware of the lack of referral 
activity in this area: the appointment of one liaison officer to cover the whole of 
Australia however is hardly conducive to raising awareness.90 To date land clearing 
litigation within Queensland has been under State legislation. On the ground awareness 
of the potential effect of Commonwealth legislation may well be limited to flying foxes 
and proposed dams.91 These are issues of concern to the rural community and, unlike 
other EPBC Act matters, have typically featured in the rural press. Additionally, part of 
the reason for the low level of referral activity might be because the EPBC Act permits
89 National Farmers Federation, Natural Resource Management, Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).The NFF also provide a host o f comprehensive information sheets prepared by the 
Commonwealth governments Department o f Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities on the 
EPBC Act. Available at: h t tp :  wuw.nlT.ora.air'policx n r m .h t in l  cat 4 X 4 . (viewed 1 September 2011).
90 Personal communication with the environment liaison officer at the National Farmers Federation on 19 August 
2011 .
91 For example Booth v Bosworth [2001] FCA 1453 dealt with the issue of flying foxes and The Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc [2004] FCAFC 190 dealt with the proposed 
Nathan Dam. In a personal communication with a member o f the AgForward team from Agforce in 2009 1 asked if 
measures were taken to take into account Commonwealth legislation in the vegetation managements workshops, the 
reply was: T f s all we can do to get our heads around the State legislation'.
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a lawful continuation of existing land use if that use had commenced before the statute 
came into force in July 2000.92
Regulatory evaluation and assessment criteria
As noted by Gunningham and Grabosky, in the past there was little consensus on 
precisely what criteria a successful regulatory strategy should have.” They cite the most 
common assessment criteria as: effectiveness, efficiency and equity, noting that their 
1998 research concentrated on effectiveness and efficiency.94 Gunningham and 
Grabosky describe effectiveness and efficiency as ‘the two criteria most likely to yield 
substantial results in terms of improved environmental performance'95 and, as they note, 
they will be the criteria of primary concern to policy makers.
There is a large suite of environmental laws within Queensland. Only two of these 
environmental statutes -  the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) and the Coastal 
Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld) -  have detailed and easily identifiable 
evaluation criteria. Both Acts were administered by the former Environmental 
Protection Agency and are required to meet the requirements of the Queensland State of 
the Environment report. The report, in respect of these two pieces of legislation, must: 
include an assessment of the condition of Queensland’s major environmental resources; 
identify significant trends in environmental values; review significant environmental 
programs, activities and achievements; and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of 
environmental strategies implemented to achieve the objects of both Acts.96 There are no 
similar evaluation provisions within either the VMA or the LA.
How then does the Queensland government evaluate these Acts? With regard to the LA 
the following question was put to the regulators: on what criteria has the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy been or will be evaluated? The reply stated: The criteria were 
not and have not been determined; the only thing we have is what was published in the
’ Australian Government, Department ot Sustainability, Environment. Water. Population and Communities, Farming 
and National Environment Law, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).
Gunningham N. Grabosky P and Sinclair D. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998) 26.
Gunningham N. Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998) 26.
Gunningham N, Grabosky P and Sinclair D. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 1998)27.
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 547 (2) (a) to (d) and Coastal Protection and Management Act 1995 
(Old) s 166 (2) (a) to (d).
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Biodiversity Strategy’.97 In respect of the VMA the same question was put to the 
regulators. The response explained:
There are two key publications that evaluate the success of the vegetation 
management framework in achieving the objectives of the Vegetation Management 
Act 1999 (VMA). These are: Supplementary Report: An analysis of Woody 
Vegetation Clearing Rates in Queensland: and Land Cover Change in Queensland 
-  Statewide Landcover and Trees Study Report.98
This is in keeping with the Queensland government’s requirement of statutory 
effectiveness which is ‘assessed by how well a strategy has produced or helped to 
produce the intended result'.99 The intended result was to significantly reduce land 
clearing. The legislative means to achieve this was the phasing out of broadscale 
clearing of remnant vegetation."81 According to these criteria, the Queensland 
government has ultimately met its effectiveness standard which appears to be a foremost 
concern.
Meeting the effectiveness standard and reducing land clearing in Queensland has been 
neither straightforward nor rapid. The introduction of the VMA produced a peak period 
of clearing, and a classic example of panic clearing, between 1999 and 2000. This was 
in the period between the Act being passed and subsequently proclaimed."" Based on 
the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study Report (SLATS) data, in the period initially 
following the Act becoming law, clearing fell but then began to increase steadily 
between 2002 and 2003.",2 The average clearing rate for this latter period was 528,000 
ha/year;"’3 which prompted the Labor government to make further amendments to the 
VMA. From then on, clearing rates have declined within the State, the exception being 
the 2005-2006 period, when average rates of 375,000 ha/year increased to accommodate 
the last of the clearing permits, prior to the end of broadscale clearing in December
97 E-mail correspondence in reply from the Director. State Land Asset Management. Department of Environment and 
Resource Management, dated 17 May 2012.
98 Email correspondence in reply from a Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM) policy 
officer, in the vegetation management unit dated 28lh October 2011.
99 Queensland government. State o f the Environment, (2007) Legislation. 390.
1,81 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (2) (e).
101 Further discussion of clearing rates is included within Chapter Four as relevant to each particular amendment of 
the VMA.
102 The latest graphical depiction of clearing rates is in the Queensland government. DERM. Land cover change in 
Queensland 2009-2010. Statewide Landcover and Trees Study Report Figure 1.1. Available at:
http: , \\ ww .nrm.cikl.uos .au/slats reporls-spatial-products.hlml (viewed 16 July 2013).
1113 Queensland government, DERM, Land cover change in Queensland 2001-2003, Statewide Landcover and Trees 
Study Report Figure 1,1. Available at:
http:/A\Avw.nnn.Qld.gov.au/slats/previous reports.html#2001 2003 vegetation change report (viewed 16 July 
2013).
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2006.104 In the latest SLATS data the average clearing rate for 2009-2010 was 77,590 
ha/year.105 As noted by Macintosh the regulatory regime introduced in 2003-2004 was 
effective in curbing clearing, and. over time, the legislation has proved to be a ‘primary 
driver' in the phasing out of broadscale clearing.1"6
As for regulatory efficiency, according to Martin et al, it is important to differentiate 
between the different types of costs associated with such efficiency."'7 They divide costs 
between: public transaction costs such as administration and regulatory enforcement; 
private transaction costs such as compliance; and exclusion costs which, in the case of 
land clearing, would be prohibition."’8 For the Queensland government the question of 
efficiency amounts to: ‘how well resources have been used in obtaining the intended 
result’.109 How well resources have been utilized in the implementation of vegetation 
management legislation or the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is difficult to assess as 
this is not disclosed by the regulators. This thesis has however raised the question of 
regulatory efficiency in Chapter Seven as part of an analysis of compliance and 
enforcement. It was apparent in some of the land clearing investigations and protracted 
prosecutions that resources were not well used and the intended result, such as a 
successful prosecution, sometimes not achieved.
A review of the implementation of the VMA was mentioned briefly in the Queensland 
Parliament in 2007.“" The review was undertaken by environmental consultants and 
took the form of a survey. It was noted that this was the initial stage of the review which 
sought to compile and present the views of stakeholders in a Stakeholder Consultation
104 Queensland government, DERM. Land cover change in Queensland 2005-2006. Statewide Landcover and Trees 
Study Report. 1. Available at:
hUnVAvwu.nrm.uld.qov.au. slats, previous rcporls.htmb/2004 2005 vegetation change report (viewed 16 July 
2013).
105 The latest graphical depiction of clearing rates is in the Queensland government. DERM. Land cover change in 
Queensland 2009-2010. Statewide Landcover and Trees Study Report figure 1.1. Available at:
httn://www.nrm.uld.aov.au/slats/rcports-spatial-products.html (viewed 16 July 2013).
106 Macintosh A, ‘The Australia Clause and REDD: a cautionary tale' (2011) Springer Science. 7 and Macintosh A, 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Developing Countries: A Cautionary Tale from 
Australia' (2010) Policy BriefNo 12. The Australia Institute. 11.
107 Martin P, Bartel R. Sinden J, Gunningham N and Ilannam 1, Developing a Good Regulcitoiy Practice Model fo r  
Environmental Regulations Impacting on Farmers. Research Report. (2007) Australian Farm Institute and 
Commonwealth government. Land and Water Australia.
108 M artinetal. n 107, 7-8.
109 Queensland government. State of the Environment. (2007) Legislation, 390.
1 Queensland government. Estimates Committee C -  Natural Resources and W'ater. 12 July 2009. 60. per Hopper. 
Available at:
htln://uww.parliamcnt.uld.i’ov.audocuments/!lansard/2007/2007 07 12 ESI C.pdf#xml=httn://www.narliamenl.iil 
d.izov.au/intcrnetscarch/isvsquerv/e865cc50-7217-4609-9616-c5adf48al70d/l/Indite/ (viewed 15 August 2011).
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report."1 Nothing further was heard of the review until the 2009 amendments to the 
VMA were debated in parliament. During deliberations a Labor member noted that 
changes had been made to streamline the operation of the Act that had been 'derived 
from the review of the implementation'."2 It proved impossible to locate any other 
information on this review within the Queensland parliamentary web site. The 
environmental consultants confirmed they had undertaken the review but were ‘unable 
to share documents or information’."3 Their response included the regulatory contacts 
for the review, one of whom replied and included the director of vegetation 
management at the time, noting that the director may be able to assist with the query. 114 
A further e-mail was duly sent to the director but there was no response. As an 
evaluation process this review is difficult to comment on: there has been no report 
following the survey within the public domain.
For vegetation management legislation, the Queensland government appears primarily 
concerned with regulatory effectiveness and the public transaction costs associated with 
regulatory efficiency. There are no assessment criteria for the regulated: no account is 
taken of private transaction and exclusion costs. Equally there is no assessment of 
equity, and yet equitable concerns and issues of procedural justice have been raised in 
Chapter Seven in the examination of the implementation of compliance and 
enforcement. In 2011, Gunningham undertook research with Martin on natural resource 
management, and gave weight to all three criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and 
equity."5 Equity was defined as: ‘showing fairness in the burden sharing among players 
to which we add political acceptability (which includes factors such as liberty, 
transparency and accountability)’."6 These latter factors of transparency and 
accountability have found resonance throughout this thesis. The Queensland 
government has not undertaken any further evaluation into environmental laws; but the
111 Review of the implementation of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld), 1.
112 Queensland government. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 27 October 2009, 2842, 
per Wendt. Available at:
htlp:/7uww.narliament.cild.aov.au/documents/l lansard/2009/2009 10 27 \\ 11 K1 Y.ixIOxml hUp;//\\ww.parliamen 
l.uld.aov.aii/internetsearch/isvsuucrv./35fc3629-833f-4c99-a5dl-la6b342413ab/1 /hil ite/
113 Email correspondence in reply, from Lloyd Consulting. Wilston. Queensland, dated 19 February 2009.
114 E-mail correspondence form a Program Initiatives Officer. Land and Vegetation Division, Department of Natural 
Resources and Water, dated 19 February 2009.
See generally Martin P and Gunningham N, ‘Leading reform of natural resource management law: core principles’ 
(2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal.
116 This definition is provided in the earlier work: Gunningham N, Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1998) 26.
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Commonwealth government has undertaken two inquiries into native vegetation 
legislation: one in 2004 and a second in 2010.
The Productivity Commission Inquiry 2004
The Commission holds itself out as unique among public sector institutions in having 
the three core principles of: independence; transparency and a community wide focus."7 
Their function is described as:
...the Australian government's independent research and advisory body on a range 
of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of Australians.
Its role, expressed simply, is to help governments make better policies in the long­
term interest of the Australian community. "x
The 2004 Inquiry held ten initial public hearings in major centres across the country.
For Queensland this took in Brisbane and Cairns, with subsequent hearings in regional 
areas such as Mackay and Toowoomba. The Queensland government neither made a 
submission nor participated in the Inquiry beyond an initial meeting. However, Agforce, 
the QFF and PRA made submissions to the Inquiry on behalf of Queensland rural 
landholders. Common themes emerged from the submissions provided by each of these 
rural organisations. The areas of greatest impact of vegetation management legislation 
were claimed to include: an increased administrative burden; productivity loss; capital 
value loss; community unrest and anxiety from uncertainty with the law and 
deteriorating relations with government regulators.119 Each of the submissions provided 
case study examples, many based on actual properties, which provided evidence of a 
loss in capital value. Agforce declared it to be ‘an absolute travesty that in the lead up to 
the legislation being debated and subsequent to its passing through parliament there has 
been no assessment of the likely social and economic impacts on individuals as well as 
rural and regional communities’.120 Both Agforce and QFF stressed the complexity and 
costs of compliance requirements (the private transaction costs mentioned earlier) and
1 "Australian government. Productivity Commission From industry assistance to productivity: 30 years o f  ‘the 
Commission ’, Productivity Commission, Canberra (2003) 1.
Australian government. Productivity Commission, Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversity Regulations. 
Report no 29. Melbourne (2004). Available at:
IUtp://\vuw.pc\gov.au/proiects/inuuirv/nativevegeiation/docs/linalrcport (viewed 15 August 2011).
Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004) 5-46. Agforce: Submission no 54 and Queensland Fanners Federation (QFF) Submission no 177, 
2003 11. Available at: httir/Av\vw.i:>c.gov.au/nroiccls/inuuirv/nativevcactation/docs/submissions 
htlp://\vvv\s.legislalioii.cil(l.gov.au/Bills/51PI)F72005/VcgMan()I.AB()5Fxn.ndrtvie\ved 23 September 2011). 
Productivity Commission Inquiry. Agforce: Submission no 54.
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the layers of legislation that a landholder may be obliged to invoke in addition to the 
VMA.
A further criticism from the rural representative bodies was a lack of engagement in the 
decision-making processes that led to the vegetation management regulations. PRA 
noted the regulatory regime was ‘not well received by landholders, primarily due to the 
absence of a consultative approach’ . 121 The QFF also highlighted an absence of 
transparency, consultation and participation. 122 Agforce drew attention to the many rural 
landholders who had voluntarily spent up to two years on regional vegetation 
management planning committees only to have their input discarded. 123
Generally the Productivity Commission concluded that regulation, which banned the 
clearing of native vegetation, could lead to unproductive and unjust outcomes. Nearly 
all submissions by rural landholders from Queensland indicated that the impacts of the 
VMA were significantly negative. 124 Individual landholders and other rural 
representative bodies, such as Queensland Cane Growers, supported this view. 125 
Submissions were made by Landcare groups in the State, some in favour of regulation 
and some against it. 126 Support for a regulatory system came from the Australian 
Conservation Council who stressed the importance o f ‘transitional assistance, market 
measures, incentives, community education and voluntary conservation efforts’ . 127
Overall the Productivity Commission concluded that native vegetation legislation had 
‘serious design and implementation deficiencies, in many cases leading to inefficient.
121 Productivity Commission Inquiry. Property Rights Australia: Submission no 171. 10.
122 Productivity Commission Inquiry. QFF Submission no 177, 11.
123 Productivity Commission Inquiry, Agforce: Submission no 54. An examination of consultation prior to the 
vegetation management legislation is provided in Chapter Four; and prior to the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy in 
Chapter Eight.
124 Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004). 412.
125 For example the following submissions were made by individual landholders: nos 21,25, 35. 45. 50. 184. 186. and 
Queensland Cane Growers Submission no 101,2003. Available at:
http://w\\ w\pc.aov.au/proiccts/inquirv/nativcvcgelation/docs/submissionshtin://parlinfo. parliament, qld. eov.au/isvsqu 
erv/133c7f68-1 fcc-4292-b322-
43c59a461 a07/l/doc/0305291 lA.PI)F#xml http://narlinfo.parliamcnt.tild.»o\.au/isvsuucrv/l33c71'68-1 fec-4292- 
h322-43c59a461 a()7/1 /hilite (viewed 25 August 2011).
I2<> For example Tambourine Mountain Landcare was in favour (Submission no 5) and Miriam Vale Rural Science 
and Landcare Society (Submission no 105) against.
http: an ww. pc.gov.au/pmiects/iiuiuirvnativevegetation/docs subinissionshttp:/ parlinfo.parliament.uld.gov,au/isvsuu 
erv/133e7f68-1 lec-4292-b322-
43c59a461 a()7/l /doc/030529 H A, Pl)F#.xml=http://narl info, parliament, aid. aov.au/isvsciueiT/133e7f68-l fec-4292- 
b322-43c59a461a07/l/hilite/ (viewed 25 August 2011).
127 Australian Conservation Foundation, Submission no 146. 
http://www.pc.aov. au/proieets/inquirv/nativcvegetation/docs/submissions
http://www.legislation.cild.gov.aU/Bills/51 PF)F/2005/VegMan()LAB05Lxp.pdf (viewed 15 August 201 I).
84
ineffective and inequitable outcomes’.12* This criticism is borne out by research 
undertaken on the Queensland Vegetation Incentives Program in which a similar 
conclusion was reached.129 According to the Commission wide-ranging environmental 
goals such as the protection of biodiversity ‘are often difficult to measure with any 
precision. Hence, the extent of vegetation clearance is often used as a (albeit imperfect) 
proxy for the achievement of these goals’.13" The Commission cautioned that ‘policies 
that fail to engage the cooperation of landholders will themselves ultimately fail’.131
Within Queensland there has at times been a manifest regulatory failure to engage with 
rural landholders. This failure to engage has been apparent at the most difficult periods 
of vegetation management legislation: when the laws were particularly controversial 
and, arguably, when engagement should have been paramount. These contentious 
periods included the introduction of the law, the 2004 amendments, which led to the 
phasing out of broadscale land clearing, and the 2009 amendments which brought in 
controls on some regrowth. This engendered controversy within the parliamentary 
process. This thesis shows that the more controversial a law is, the less likely it will go 
through a parliamentary process as set down in State legislation and procedure.132 It also 
shows that the implementation of vegetation management regulations, especially in 
compliance and enforcement, has at times led to the ‘inefficient, ineffective and 
inequitable outcomes’133 noted by the Productivity Commission. This has not led, as 
predicted by the Commission, to policy failure. The policy became law and was 
implemented. Instead it has generated, in some rural landholders, irrevocable harm to 
the regulatory relationship, a relationship that should be based upon trust and 
cooperation.
'■x Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004) XLV1.
129 'the Vegetation Incentives Program (VIP), which was part of the Queensland government's 2004 financial 
package, is examined in Chapter Four.
1311 Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004) 398.
131 Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004) 398.
132 This argument is examined further in Chapter Four.
133 Australian government, Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversitv 
Regulations (2004) XLVI.
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The Senate Inquiry into Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement and Climate Change Measures 2010
This Inquiry received 354 public submissions and 44 confidential submissions.134 Public 
hearings were held in New South Wales, Western Australia and Queensland.135 This 
Inquiry was less extensive than that of the Productivity Commission, in terms of 
hearings held and the ultimate report produced. The Queensland government, in keeping 
with the 2004 Inquiry, did not make a submission or take any part in the hearings.
Following the Inquiry, the Senate Committee wrote to the Queensland government 
noting that during the course of investigations the Committee had ‘received evidence 
indicating significant concerns about the poor relationship between landholders and 
officers implementing Queensland's native vegetation management regime’.136 The 
Queensland government was given the opportunity to respond to these and other 
concerns. The reply provided by the Director-General of DERM detailed the number of 
regulatory staff employed to administer the vegetation management policy: 140 
individuals who had over 200,000 interactions with landholders between 2004 and 
2010.137 The response further highlighted the Queensland government’s $10 million 
investment into raising awareness of the legislation, noting that 4800 landholders had 
taken part in the Agforce workshops.1311 The Director-General concluded the government 
recognised ‘that in order to achieve the important sustainability outcomes through the 
VMA, ongoing engagement and constructive working relationships with landholders’ 
was required.131' The number of regulatory staff employed, together with the number of 
interactions they had with rural landholders, may be evidence of'ongoing engagement’ 
but it remains unclear if this was positive or negative engagement and, in the absence of
134 Australian government, Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010). Available at:
http://vvwvv.aph.gov.au/senate/cornmiUee/fapa ctte/climate change/index.htm(viewed 15 August 2011).
137 I attended the public hearing in Rockhampton and made a written submission to the Senate Committee primarily 
based upon the research undertaken in Chapter Four.
136 Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws. Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), under additional information received. Available at:
httn://\v\\Av.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fana ctte/climate change/index.htm (viewed 19 August 2011).
137 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, letter from the Director-General 
in reply to the Senate Committee on Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate Change 
Measures (2010). Available at: http://wAvw.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fana ctte/climate change/submissions.htm 
(viewed 21 September 2011).
I 3H Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, letter from the Director-General 
in reply to the Senate Committee on Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate Change 
Measures (2010).
13v Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, letter from the Director-General 
in reply to the Senate Committee on Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate Change 
Measures (2010)).
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an insight into the purpose of the interactions, it is likewise difficult to conclude this is 
evidence of a ‘constructive working relationship'.
Comparable vegetation management legislation was introduced in New South Wales 
with the Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW).14" This statute has been controversial and 
subject to legal challenge.141 As part of the 2010 Senate Inquiry, regional groups, such as 
the NSW Regional Community Survival group, voiced similar concerns to PRA in 
terms of lack of recognition of property rights and lack of financial compensation.142 The 
NSW Farmer's Association, like Agforce, is a member of the NFF. Its submission was 
in keeping with the other agricultural representative bodies in calling for just terms 
compensation and a more balanced approach to vegetation management policy and law 
within their State.143 Tensions within the regulatory relationship are therefore equally 
apparent in NSW but there are signs of some engagement from this State government. 
Unlike the Queensland government, the NSW government took an active part in the 
2010 Senate Inquiry. The Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water 
made a submission,144 gave oral evidence in the public hearing and subsequently 
supplied further information on being requested to do so by the Senate Committee. 
Equally the NSW government appeared to undertake consultation with relevant parties 
for at least two years prior to the implementation of their vegetation management 
legislation.145 The Wentworth Group provided advice that was accepted as the basis for 
the vegetation management regulations. l4r,Thereafter a Native Vegetation Reform 
Implementation Group, chaired by Ian Sinclair, and including representatives from rural
14,1 The Act followed the Native Vegetation Conservation Act 1997 (NSW).
141 For example the case of Peter Spencer considered in Chapter Two.
I4" Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws. Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010). submission no 16.
IJ’Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws. Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), submission no 236.
144 Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws. Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010). submission no 15.
145 Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws. Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), submission no 15.
146 The Wentworth Group of concerned scientists was established in 2002. their aim being to: ‘drive innovation in the 
management of Australia's land, water and marine resources; engage business, community and political leaders to 
find and implement solutions to the challenge of environmental stewardship facing the future of Australian society; 
and build capacity by mentoring and supporting young scientists, lawyers and economists to develop their skills and 
understanding of public policy'. Available at: http:/A\ cntuorthnroup.org about-us (viewed 15 April 2014).
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landholders and environmental groups was formed. This group provided a report, which 
formed the basis of the NSW regulatory reforms.147
By comparison the Queensland Vegetation Management Advisory Committee, 
established for a similar purpose by the then Premier Peter Beattie was unable to reach 
agreement in their recommendations to government.I4X This Committee was established 
in March 1999. The initial VMA was introduced into parliament in December of the 
same year. More time may not necessarily have smoothed the progress of agreement or 
facilitated consensual recommendations; but it may have assuaged some of the 
disappointment felt by Committee members, which the hasty and politicised 
introduction of the VMA generated.
In addition to their submissions, both Agforce and PRA gave oral evidence to the 
Queensland public hearing for the 2010 Senate Inquiry. The QFF did not make a 
submission nor attend the hearing. Themes that had reverberated in the earlier 
Productivity Commission process remained relevant to both representative bodies. 
Agforce continued to advocate against a regulatory approach, stressed the negative 
impact of the regulations on productivity, the loss of property value and the extent of 
uncertainty caused by constantly shifting legislative regimes.149 Loss of productivity and 
decreasing land values were also paramount for the PRA, as too was their scepticism of 
the ability of the vegetation management legislation to promote sustainable land 
management.1511 Agforce actively promoted the expansion of voluntary environmental 
stewardship programs, such as conservation agreements between the State government
147 Australian government. Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010). Ian Sinclair has long-standing links with the land, the rural community and conservative 
politics. He is the Chairman of the Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal, the objectives of this organisation are 
described as being ‘to promote for the public benefit rural and regional renewal, regeneration and development in 
Australia in social, economic, environmental and cultural areas.' The Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal 
available at: htMr//u\\\\. lirr.org.au cb pages objectives.phn (viewed 2 November 2012). In 1961 he was elected to 
the NSW Legislative Council and from 1963 to 1998 in the House of Representatives where he represented New 
England. Fie served as leader and deputy leader of the National Party for almost 19 years and retired as speaker in 
October 1998. In 1987, as leader of the Nationals, internal party contlict was visited upon him by the "Joh for PM! 
campaign of Joh Bjelke- Petersen. At the behest of Bjelke-Petersen he reluctantly ended the coalition with the Liberal 
Party in April ofthat year. The federal conservatives endured an election in a broken state allowing Bob Flawke to 
call an early election and secure a third term. In 1989 he was ousted as party leader by Charles Blunt. See generally, 
Evans R, A History o f  Queensland (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 227-228. Fitzgerald R et al. Made in 
Queensland A New History> (University of Queensland Press. 2009) 180-181. Kelly P. The End o f Certainty: The 
Story o f  the 1980s, (Allen and Unwin. 1992) 322-341, Lunn H. The Life and Political Adventures o f  Sir Johannes 
Bjelke -  Petersen, (University of Queensland Press, 1987) xiii and 376 and Parliament of New South Wales, Former 
Members, available at: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/members.nsfTviewed 2 November 2012).
148 The Queensland Vegetation Management Advisory Committee is considered in Chapter Four.
149 Australian government, Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), submission no 7.
150 Australian government, Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), submission no 14.
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and rural landholders under the Queensland Nature Assist and Nature Refuge 
program.151
In advocating voluntary environmental stewardship, Agforce aligned with their parent 
body, the NFF. who also support such arrangements for the conservation of native 
vegetation. Such stewardship programs are governed by legislation and therefore seem 
at odds with the anti-regulation philosophy familiar to rural representative organisations 
and apparent in their submissions to both the Productivity Commission and the Senate 
Inquiry. The difference lies in the element of choice: landholders in Queensland may 
choose to enter into a conservation agreement under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 
(Qld). The VMA is a regulatory control, the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) a 
regulatory option.
Recommendations and the potential for change
Recommendations of the Productivity Commission in 2004 were threefold: the first was 
to implement regulatory best practice to include transparent processes, regulatory 
impact assessments and reviews of performance; the second to encourage greater 
private conservation effort; and the third was to clarify landholder and community 
environmental responsibilities.152 The Commission argued that landholders should bear 
the costs of actions that directly contribute to sustainable resource use but the wider 
public should bear the costs of retaining and managing native vegetation to promote 
'■public-good' environmental services such as biodiversity.153
In 2010 the Senate Inquiry concluded There are legitimate concerns about the impact of 
the current native vegetation laws upon a small group... namely landholders in rural and 
regional Australia'.l54And further that native vegetation laws remain a contested part of 
public policy, to the extent that there remains substantial scope to improve the operation 
of these laws and the lack of trust and cooperation between the regulators and the
151 Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), submission no 7.
152 Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry: Impacts o f  Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004) 221 -231.
153 Australian government. Productivity Commission Inquiry': Impacts o f Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations (2004) 221 -231.
1 4 Australian government. Senate Committee. Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), Chapter 5, Conclusions and Recommendations, cl 5.1
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regulated.155 This Inquiry made three recommendations: the first was for the Council of 
Australian governments (COAG) to re-examine native vegetation legislation; the second 
was for the Commonwealth to initiate, through the Natural Resource Management 
Ministerial Council (NRMMC), a national review to assess the impact of vegetation 
management regulations to include the liability of landholders for payment of rates and 
taxes for land no longer available for productive use; and the third was to review best 
practice for stewardship initiatives.156
Was there any potential for change following both Inquires? The establishment and 
function of the Productivity Commission is set down in the Productivity Commission 
Act 1998 (Cth). Following an inquiry, a report is tabled in parliament and the Treasurer 
may announce the government's decision on the report at that time or at a later date. 
Reports from the Commission may form the basis of future government policy, but the 
Commonwealth government is not obliged to act on recommendations made. The report 
from the Senate Inquiry, tabled in parliament in May 2010, did appear to generate some 
environmental initiatives. In January 2012 the Commonwealth government responded 
and addressed the three recommendations from the Inquiry mentioned above.157 The 
government disagreed with the first recommendation that COAG re-examine native 
vegetation legislation stating it had recently undertaken a review of the EPBC Act. 15xAs 
for the second recommendation, for a national review to assess the impact of vegetation 
management regulations, the Commonwealth government agreed with the policy intent 
of this but noted such management is 'primarily a state and territory responsibility’.159 
The Commonwealth government again agreed with the policy intent of the third 
recommendation, for a review of best practice of stewardship initiatives, noting the 
Caring for our Country initiative and the Environmental Stewardship Program.160 The 
utility of State vegetation management law is evident: it assists the Commonwealth 
government to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.
I5;' Australian government. Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations cl 5.2, 5.8..
156 Australian government, Senate Committee, Native Vegetation Laws, Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate 
Change Measures (2010), Chapter 5. Conclusions and Recommendations, els 5.23, 5.24. 5.28.
I >7 Australian government. Australian Government Response to the Senate Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration -  Native Vegetation Laws. Greenhouse Gas Abatement and Climate Change Measures (2012). 
Available at:
htlp://ww\\.anh.aov.au/Parliamenlarv Business/Committees/Senate Finance and Public Administration/Completed 
iiuiuiries/2008-10/climate chanae/index (viewed 17 September 2013).
1511 Australian government, n 157, 2.
159 Australian government, n 157, 3.
160 Australian government, n 157, 4-5.
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State vegetation management law also enables the Commonwealth to further 
environmental policy as part of the Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010-2030 
produced by the NRMMC in 2010. This coincided with the United Nations international 
year of biodiversity.161 The policy adds to the bureaucratic layers in that it is stated to be 
a policy 'umbrella' over more specific frameworks such as the National Framework for 
the Management and Monitoring of Australia's Native Vegetation. Earlier 
Commonwealth endorsement of ecologically sustainable development included 
becoming a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992 
and, in the same year, producing a National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development.162
Inquiries such as that held by the Productivity Commission and the Senate must be a 
considerable expense on the public purse. If ultimately they do not result in significant 
change do they serve a purpose? According to Sloane, a former Commissioner between 
1998 and 2010, the Commission has made major contributions to public policy and is 
preferable to ad hoc government committees particularly for contentious policy topics 
as it has 'a long and consistent record of consulting, listening and receiving 
submissions' and further that 'the mere release of a well-argued and rational response to 
a policy problem can have an impact and stands as a permanent record'.163 At best the 
outcomes from both investigations stands as a permanent testimony. It was apparent in 
the Queensland Senate hearing that those with an interest in vegetation management 
legislation -  rural landholders, rural representative bodies and conservationists -  were 
given a voice and the potential for local publicity for their cause. The approach to the 
hearing by Agforce and PRA differed and reflected the positioning of each body and 
those they represent. The Agforce president at the time, John Cotter, and Policy Director 
Andrew Wagner attended and gave evidence, but they did little to encourage their 
members to make a submission or attend. PRA on the other hand encouraged members 
to make a submission and attend the hearing. In the Queensland hearing PRA members 
dominated the proceedings. The then Chairman, Ron Bahnisch, gave evidence as did 
some of their more vocal members: Lee McNicoll, Dixie Nott and Dale Stiller. A 
representative from a Queensland based law firm that typically acts for rural
161 In the decade following 2010 the United Nations embarked on a Strategic Plan for biodiversity. See for example: 
United Nations Decade on Biodiversity, 2010 -2020, available at: http://wvv\v.ebd.int/2011 -2020 (viewed 12 
November 2012).
162Australian government. National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development. Department of Sustainability, 
Environment. Water. Population and Communities. Available
at:htlp://w\\ w.ein ironment.gov.au/ahout/csd/publications/stratcgv/indcx.html (viewed 12 November 2012).
163 Sloan J. ‘How Useful is the Productivity Commission?' (2011) 27 (1) Policy.
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landholders, also gave evidence empathising with landholders the firm represent. 
Capricorn Conservation Council provided the environmental voice. As noted earlier, the 
Queensland government did not make a submission, nor did any representative from the 
regulators attend the hearing. The Inquiry facilitated some engagement with affected 
communities. But the engagement was with the Commonwealth and not the Queensland 
government. It appeared those involved viewed the hearing as an appeasement: there 
was little expectation that the law would change.164
The Productivity Commission undertook its report in 2004 during the Howard Liberal 
National coalition government. In Queensland at that time the Beattie Labor 
government held a strong parliamentary position, and the ideological distance between 
the State and federal governments was apparent. The neo-liberal anti-regulation 
philosophy of the Commonwealth government and the Productivity Commission in 
Canberra was clearly at odds with a State Labor Party in Queensland. Writing of the 
Commission's immediate predecessor, the Industry Commission. Hamilton has 
observed:
Its views on almost every issue referred to it were formed on the basis of a well- 
defined and all encompassing ideology, that of neo-classical economics and its 
policy interpretation know as economic rationalism.1'-
The Senate Inquiry took place in the first part of 2010. at which time Labor held office 
in both federal and State government. The two Labor senators on the Inquiry supported 
the final recommendations, but diverted responsibility for the regulations and claimed 
the Howard government had pressured the Queensland Labor government to pass native 
vegetation legislation. There is some truth in this assertion, although Peter Beattie 
recognised the utility of ending broadscale land clearing as a pre-election promise in 
1999. The reticence of the Queensland government to play an active role in either 
Inquiry was apparent.
164 This was clear in the evidence given and in personal communications with attendees at the hearing.
165 Hamilton C, ‘The Resources Assessment Commission: Lessons in the Venality o f Modem Politics' in Dovers S & 
Wild River S (ed), Managing Australia 's Environment (The Federation Press, 2003) 122 The Productivity 
Commission has developed from the Tariff Board founded in 1921, which became the Industries Assistance 
Commission in 1974 and then the Industry Commission 1980s.
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Conclusion
Rural land management policy and practices in Queensland have led to extensive 
degradation of land. This has been aggravated by the extent and predominance of 
agriculture within the State. Environmental regulation was inevitable and a significant 
means by which long-term and widespread change might be obtained. However the 
resulting proliferation of environmental laws, and the innate and continuing 
complexities of regulating agriculture, challenged the Labor government, the regulators 
and those regulated. The move to a statutory regime has been made easier by rural 
organisations such as Agforce and the QFF: both bodies act as paid agents of the 
government to facilitate the transition to regulation. The position of these two bodies 
differs from that of PRA. This alliance was formed amidst a groundswell of opposition 
against ever-increasing legislation: it fills a void within Queensland that is not met by 
either Agforce or the QFF.
This chapter introduced the two pieces of environmental legislation central to this 
thesis: the VMA and the LA. Divergence between the Acts is apparent within the realm 
of change. For an Act that was promised by the Labor government to bring certainty, 
the VMA has been characterised for ten years by continuous amendments, many of 
which were retrospective, and by the removal and reintroduction of a significant 
purpose of the Act. The LA remained unchanged for a long period of time: a new Act 
was passed in 1994 following a thirty year hiatus and amended in 2007 with the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy. Both statutes were part of the many environmental laws that 
characterised the period of Labor government within Queensland. Evaluation of such 
laws is piecemeal and lacks consistency. For vegetation management legislation the 
government is primarily concerned with regulatory effectiveness and the public 
transaction costs associated with regulatory efficiency -  there is no assessment of 
equity. For the LA, an evaluation process is yet to be determined and is currently stalled 
by the 2012 change in government in Queensland. A consistent, transparent and 
accountable evaluation framework would be beneficial to all parties and the 
environment. A fundamental purpose of this thesis is to examine how environmental 
laws are made and implemented. This chapter has set down the statutes pertinent to this 
research to provide a context in which to examine the introduction and many 
amendments to vegetation management regulations, which form the basis of the 
following two chapters.
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Chapter Four: Environmental law making in Queensland -  
the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld)
Introduction
This chapter examines environmental law making in Queensland and, in so doing, 
concentrates on the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA). A fundamental 
task of this study is to examine how environmental laws are made and implemented. 
This chapter asks the question: how was the VMA made, implemented and amended 
from the introduction o f the legislation in 1999 to 2008? This particular environmental 
law was enacted within a heightened and hurried political context. The Queensland 
Labor government persistently promised that the VMA would bring certainty to rural 
landholders and protect the unique biodiversity of the State. This chapter demonstrates, 
however, that the effect of the political machinations underlying the VMA contributed 
to considerable uncertainty amongst some landholders; and, rather than conserving the 
land, delay in the proclamation of the VMA generated a peak period of land clearing. A 
sequential examination of vegetation management legislation in Queensland is provided 
here and consideration is given to the more significant and controversial periods of the 
VMA including: the introduction of the Act in 1999; the 2003 amendments that 
launched a retrospective moratorium on land clearing applications; the 2004 
amendments which facilitated the phasing out of broadscale land clearing and provided 
a financial package for rural landholders; and further retrospective amendments in 
2008.' Because of the significance of the political circumstances in which these laws 
were made, consideration is also given to the following question: what were the 
parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament and the political context under 
which the VMA was made and implemented?
The beginnings of vegetation management in Queensland
An essential role of the legislature Ts to create laws that are clear and accessible to 
those most affected by them’.1 2 As explained by the Queensland government:
1 The extensive 2003 amendments to the compliance and enforcement provisions of the legislation warranted separate 
analysis which is included in Chapter Six.
2 Twining W & Miers D. How to Do Things with Rules. (Butterworths, London. 1999) 239.
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Well-drafted laws, which can be expected to result from an appropriate preparation 
period, bring other rewards to government and the community generally. They are 
easily understood (and so generally attract a higher level of compliance because 
people better understand what the law requires of them) and offer certainty in their 
application.3
The reality however, as evidenced by the VMA is that laws, and especially 
environmental laws, reflect their political nature and the preoccupations of the dominant 
political party. Vegetation management legislation for freehold land began in 
Queensland in December 1999 when the Labor Premier at the time, Peter Beattie, 
reminded Parliament of his pre-election promise: to introduce vegetation management 
legislation to protect land from unsustainable clearing and land degradation in order to 
‘protect our unique biodiversity and give certainty to our farmers’.4 The election 
promise was to be fulfilled by the VMA. From 1999 to 2008, the VMA has been 
amended every year apart from 2001, and sometimes up to three times in a given year.5 6
The Act has been controversial from the outset, with the most significant and 
contentious amendments being made in May 2004. These amendments heralded the 
phasing out of broadscale land clearing in Queensland by December 2006. By 2008 the 
Labor government had resorted to passing retrospective amendments to the Act.
The Vegetation Management Advisory Committee
Prior to the passing of the VMA in March 1999, a Vegetation Management Advisory 
Committee (VMAC) was established by the Beattie administration. The Committee was 
independently chaired by John Holmes/' Various groups were represented including: 
from the rural sector, Agforce and the Queensland Farmers Federation (QFF); from the 
environment sector, the Queensland Conservation Council and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature and Landcare; from local government, the Local Government Association of
3 Queensland Parliament. The Queensland Legislation Handbook: Governing Queensland. Policy development of a 
government Bill, cl 2.9
4 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Ministerial Statement. Land Clearing, 8 Dec 1999. 6055. per Peter 
Beattie. Available at: http://parlinfo.parliament.qld.gov.au/isysquery/052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a51 b- 
c69ce80263e/23/doc/991208ha.pdfWxml=http://parlinfo. parliament, qld. gov. au/isysquery/052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a5 Ib- 
5c69ce80263e/23/hilite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
5 Queensland government. Superseded Legislation. Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld). Available at: 
http://\\w\v.legislation.cikl.gov.au/Acts SLs/Superseded/SUPLRS V/Vegct Man A99.htm (viewed 1 February 2009).
6 Emeritus Professor John Holmes. Department of Geographical Sciences and Planning, University of Queensland 
kindly discussed his role as Chair of VMAC on 15 July 2008 and provided his extensive file of documents compiled 
during the existence of the committee. This section on VMAC has been written based primarily on the contents of 
that file.
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Queensland; and, from the development sector, the Urban Development Institute of 
Australia. The Committee had seven meetings between March and November 1999. 
During this period more in-depth research was undertaken by working groups that 
concentrated on specific areas such as freehold tenure and incentives.
The VMAC was to advise the Minister for Environment and Heritage and Natural 
Resources on:
‘The necessity for, and if agreed upon, the development of interim arrangements 
for tree clearing on freehold land to maintain productivity and sustainability of the 
land, and to protect and maintain environmental values of the landscape, 
particularly the biodiversity and conservation status of regional vegetation 
communities.’7
Though the initial brief was to establish an interim vegetation management policy, it 
transpired that Premier Beattie intended to introduce a new statute before the year 
expired. Committee members sought expert opinions and feedback from a wide range of 
sources including individual landholders and national and regional environmental 
groups.
Divergence of views within the Committee was greatest between the environmentalists, 
represented by the Queensland Conservation Council, and the landholders, represented 
by Agforce and the QFF. The environmentalists put forward their fundamental 
requirements of a vegetation policy which included: the maintenance of biodiversity; 
sustainable land use; regional guidelines, planning and rigorously enforced penalties.8 910
For landholders the imposition of statutory regulation on freehold land was unwelcome 
but recognized as inevitable.1' Their main concerns centered on: the need for adequate 
data on which to base decisions; a preference for regional and self-regulatory vegetation 
management and compensation."’
7 VMAC, (1999) Report on Interim Tree Clearing Policy fo r Freehold Land submitted to the Minister for 
Environment and Heritage and Natural Resources, Rod Welford on 15 November 1999.
8 Queensland Conservation Council. ‘Core components of Arrangements for Native Vegetation Protection', A work 
in progress submitted to VMAC in November 1999.
9 McGowan G, ‘Update on the first skirmish' The Grazier. (April 1999) 3. Gus McGowan was the United Graziers 
Association representative on VMAC.
10 McGowan G. ‘Holding Pattern on Vegetation' The Grazier. (May 1999) 10.
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Divergence between the environmentalists and the landholders was reflected in the final 
draft policy submission by the VMAC to the Minister in November 1999." Despite 
general agreement with much of the policy, there remained significant areas of dispute 
regarding proposed statutory requirements in relation to: of concern remnant regional 
ecosystems; not of concern remnant regional ecosystems and regrowth.12 There was only 
one area on which the Committee was unanimous on clearance and this was that no 
clearing should occur in areas of endangered remnant ecosystems.13
As for the three issues of disagreement, the first issue was that the landholders favoured 
a regional policy which took account of regional circumstances in relation to of concern 
remnant regional ecosystems, whereas the environmentalists favoured no clearing.14 The 
second difference of opinion centered on not of concern remnant regional ecosystems. 
Here the environmental groups proposed an interim 80% retention moving to no 
clearing by 2003; whereas the landholders advocated clearing until it threatened the 
threshold 30% retention.15 The third issue concerned regrowth which was particularly 
divisive despite additional efforts by the Regrowth Working Group. The 
environmentalists wanted no clearing of high environmental value regrowth, including 
of concern regional ecosystems and recommended clearing on not of concern regional 
ecosystems be progressively reduced; the landholders did not agree to any interim
11 VMAC, (1999) Report on Interim Tree Clearing Policy for Freehold Land submitted to the Minister for 
Environment and Heritage and Natural Resources. Rod Welford on 15 November 1999.
12 For the purposes of the Tree Clearing Policy submitted to the Minister, the following definitions were employed: 
endangered regional ecosystems were those with less than 10% of their original extent remaining or between 10-30% 
original extent and less than 10000 ha in area: of concern regional ecosystems had 10% to 30% of their original 
extent remaining or greater than 30% but less than 10000 ha in area: not of concern regional ecosystems refers to 
regional ecosystems with greater than 30% of their original extent remaining. A definition of regrowth was not 
provided pending resolution of this as a key policy issue, 14. For the purposes of the VMAC remnant vegetation was 
vegetation mapped as such by the Queensland Herbarium. 15.
13 VMAC. (1999) Report on Interim Tree Clearing Policy fo r Freehold Land. Table 1 -  Application of Regulatory 
arrangements to remnant endangered regional ecosystems.
14 VMAC, (1999) Report on Interim Tree Clearing Policy fo r Freehold Land. Table 2 -  Application of regulatory 
arrangements to o f  concern regional ecosystems. Evidence was put to the VMAC by the Queensland Herbarium that 
species loss accelerates as habitat falls below a 30% threshold. This was backed by significant peer support but the 
landholders required further corroboration. 15-16. Utilising a regional policy was consistently promoted by Agforce 
but never adopted in the legislation. Some clearing is still allowed under the legislation, for example clearing on 
Category X areas, see p 164.
15 VMAC. (1999) Report on Interim Tree Clearing Policy for Freehold Land. Table 3 -  Application of regulatory 
arrangements to not o f  concern regional ecosystems. Currently the legislation refers to ‘least concern regional 
ecosystems' this is defined in s22FC as remnant vegetation where more than 30% of the pre-clearing extent of the 
regional ecosystem and more than 1000 ha. It appears that the 30% guideline advocated by the Queensland 
Herbarium (noted in the footnote above) has been adopted. Section 99 of the current Act stipulates that from the 8 
October 2009. a reference in an Act or document to a not of concern regional ecosystem is, if the context permits, 
taken to be a reference to a least concern regional ecosystem. Not of concern regional ecosystems were in the original 
Act. but removed when the Act was proclaimed in September 2000 and were reinstated in 2009. This is noted in the 
subsequent section in this thesis: Further retrospective amendments -  The Vegetation Management Amendment Act 
2008 (Qld). This retrospective amendment was to clarify definitions and to validate retrospectively all past decisions 
of the courts affected by those definitions, see p 116.
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Controls but were prepared to consider longer term arrangements.16 The inability to 
agree on proposed definitions, in particular that of high environmental value regrowth 
was fundamental to this area of disagreement.17
During its short existence the VMAC operated as a central hub into which many varied 
and competing interests were included. The extent and diversity of interests canvassed 
however, necessarily meant that consensus for the Committee would be difficult to 
achieve. More time may not necessarily have facilitated agreement but it may have 
alleviated some of the frustration, on the part of those who had expended much time and 
effort, which the precipitous introduction of the VMA generated.Ix
Environmental law making in the Queensland parliamentary process
The parliamentary political system inherited from England traditionally dictates an 
Upper and Lower House, a convention to which Queensland initially adhered. However, 
tensions between the two Houses occurred from time to time and came to a head early 
in the twentieth century.19 During this period it became commonplace for the primarily 
non-Labor Legislative Council or Upper House to veto the Labor government’s 
proposed legislation and, unlike other states, no effective means of resolving deadlock 
between the two Houses of Parliament existed.20 The Labor government of Ted 
Theodore accordingly brought in new members into the Legislative Council with the 
purpose of ensuring its downfall, which came in 1922.21 This unique constitutional 
reform made Queensland the only unicameral parliament within the Australian states.22
16 VMAC, (1999) Report on Interim Tree Clearing Policy for Freehold Land, Table 4 -  Application of regulatory 
arrangements to regrowth. Regrowth was not included in the original legislation but became controversial when it 
was introduced in 2009 with the Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009 (Qld) this is 
examined at p 134.
17 The environmental groups accepted the Queensland Herbarium definition of high environmental value regrowth as: 
regrowth that falls within the pre-clearing extent of endangered and of concern polygons; intersects with the State 
Land and Tree Landcover data to satisfy cover criteria; and is in an area larger than 20 ha. VMAC. (1999) Report on 
Interim Tree Clearing Policy fo r  Freehold Land 17.
Ix This was apparent in the interview with John Holmes and in a personal communication with Imogen Zethoven a 
VMAC member in July 2008. As a result of the outcome of this Committee Ms Zethoven moved into a different 
sphere of environmental campaigning.
1 Murphy D. ‘Abolition of the Legislative Council' in Murphy D. Joyce R and Hughes C, (ed) Labor in Power: The 
Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957 (University of Queensland Press, 1980) 95. Disputes 
between the two chambers have a long history which is documented in Bemays C A. Queensland Politics during 
sixty years (1859-1919) (Government Printer. Brisbane, 1920) 235-282.
2,1 Evans R, A history o f Queensland (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 164.
21 Murphy D. n 19, 110-116.
22 Unicameral parliaments also operate in the Australian Capital Territorv and the Northern Territory.
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The effect of this, as illustrated by the VMA, is that a majority government may push 
through statutory reform without heed to divergent interests either within or beyond the 
confines of the Legislative Assembly. There is a long tradition in Queensland for 
premiers -  regardless of party -  to 'have been largely able to disregard parliament’ 
which has resulted in the ‘decline of parliament in this State, not only in the gradual but 
insidious debasement of the level of rhetoric and debate but, most importantly, in 
parliament's role of watchdog over the executive and its administration’.23
The role of executive government is significant within the realms of law making. There 
will necessarily be different forms of relationship between the executive and legislative 
functions of government;24 and legislatures will operate in different ways.25 But the 
traditional foundation of the legal system, with its adherence to the separation of powers 
doctrine, is all too often a remote ideal. As a model system of government put forward 
by Montesquieu, the three powers are distinctive and include the power to make law (by 
the legislature), the power to administer law (by the executive), and the power to 
interpret law (by the judiciary).26 This distinction is promoted in the interests and 
protection of basic human rights which, advocated Montesquieu, would more than 
likely be secure if all three powers remained separate.
The powers of government are not so neatly distinguished, the legislative and executive 
functions are connected and, under the accompanying doctrine of responsible 
government, the executive should, at least in theory, be accountable to the legislature. In 
practice, control lies with executive power and executive dominance continued in 
Queensland throughout the Labor administration. This is not unusual in a Westminster 
system of parliamentary government in which, according to Olson, ‘the 90 per cent rule 
applies, with 90 per cent of legislative activity being initiated by the executive, which 
gets 90 per cent of what it wants'.27 Research on legislative process in 1990 concluded 
that the Queensland Legislative Assembly: ‘met relatively infrequently, allocated 
relatively little time for scrutiny activities and continued to be dominated by executive
23 Murphy D, Joyce R and Cribb M, The Premiers of Queensland, University of Queensland Press. 1990. Queensland. 
Australia) xviii - xix.
"* 4 *King A, ‘Modes o f Executive- Legislative Relations; Great Britain, France and West Germany* (1976) 1 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 12 to 16.
25 Arter D. ‘Comparing the Legislative Performance of Legislatures' (2007) The Journal of Legislative Studies, 12 (3-
4) 249.
26 Montesquieu C, The Spirit o f Laws (The University of Chicago, 1989) Book X 1,68 -84.
~7 Olson D M, ‘Legislatures in democratic transition' (1996) 2 (1) The Journal of Legislative Studies. 7. Citing also
an earlier work: Olsen D M. The Legislative Process: A Comparative Approach (New York; Harper & Row. 1980) 
174.
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control’.2!i In 2008 Ransley similarly observed that parliament continued to be 
‘controlled and manipulated by the executive government and limited in its capacity for 
independent review.2'2
In a bicameral parliamentary system, an Upper House - if a genuine house of review - is 
potentially an effective means of ensuring appropriate and democratic checks and 
balances. In the absence of an Upper House, a means of reviewing legislation in the 
Queensland parliamentary process fell, during the period of research for this thesis, 
upon the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC). This committee was established by 
the Goss government in 1995 under the Parliamentary Committees Act 1995 (Qld). It 
was one of the statutory committees operating within the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly during the period of research for this thesis.3" Such committees were made up 
of seven members, four from the government and three from the opposition.31 The 
parliamentary committee system therefore in Queensland was a self-governing one. The 
role of the SLC provided an insight, not only into the origins and subsequent 
amendments of the VMA, but also into the workings of the Queensland parliament. 
Martin et al note the importance of sound regulatory principles in law making and cite 
the regulatory process in Queensland as:
...a local example, with its ‘fundamental legislative principles’ being incorporated 
into the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld). These establish broad principles of 
justice, supported by a parliamentary committee (the Scrutiny of Legislation 
Committee) to check draft legislation for conformity to these principles.32
:x Ransley J, 'Reform of Parliamentary Process,' in Hede A. Prasser S and Neylan M (ed). Keeping them Honest: 
Democratic reform in Queensland (University of Queensland Press, 1992).
29 Ransley J, ‘Illusions of reform: Queensland’s Legislative Assembly since Fitzgerald' in Aroney N, Prasser S and 
Nethercote J R (ed). Restraining Elective Dictatorship: the Upper House Solution (University of Western Australia 
Press, 2008) 259. Influence on executive government, and the laws ultimately made, is all too frequently negotiated 
outside the parliamentary arena with minor political parties such as the Greens, this is discussed further in Chapter 
Five.
311 In 2011 this Committee was replaced with seven portfolio committees under the Parliament o f  Queensland 
(Reform and Modernisation) Act 2011 (Qld). The relevant portfolio committee for land and vegetation management 
would now be the Environment. Agriculture, Resources and Energy Committee. In keeping with the operation of the 
former SLC the new committee will examine the policy to be given effect by the legislation and the application of 
fundamental legislative principles. The law which governs the functions of the new committee remains the same but 
the focus of the Committee has become more specialised. A further change in regulatory process within Queensland 
was introduced by the Bligh government in 2011 with the regulatory’ assessment statement (RAS). Previously 
statements were required for significant subordinate legislation if proposed new laws imposed appreciable costs on 
the community or part of the community. Now all significant regulatory proposals for both primary and subordinate 
legislation will require an RAS to ensure costs and benefits associated with making the legislation are fully assessed. 
The RAS process therefore was not relevant to the period of research.
31 Parliament o f  Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 81.
32 Martin P, Bartel R, Sinden J, Gunningham N and Hannam I, ‘ Developing a Good Regulatory’ Practice Model fo r  
Environmental Regulations Impacting on Farmers\ Research Report, Chapter 9. 27 (2007) Australian Farm Institute 
and Commonwealth government. Land and Water Australia.
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As this thesis shows there is a considerable gap between regulatory principles and 
processes as set down in legislation and parliamentary drafting guidelines and the 
realities of how controversial laws, such as the VMA, are made within Queensland.
In keeping with the inherited Westminster system, parliamentary procedure within 
Queensland requires that proposed legislation pass through first, second and third 
readings in the Legislative Assembly. Every Bill introduced into Parliament must be 
accompanied by Explanatory Notes, either when the Bill is tabled or prior to the second 
reading debate.33 At the close of the second reading speech the debate should be 
adjourned for 13 whole calendar days unless the Bill is urgent.34 During this period the 
SLC examined both the Bill and the Explanatory Notes.
There is a statutory requirement that the content of Explanatory Notes meet certain 
criteria.35 Thus the Notes should include a statement of policy objectives and how they 
will be achieved; any alternative means of achieving the policy objective; an assessment 
of administrative costs; an assessment of the consistency of the proposed legislation 
with fundamental legislative principles and reasons for any inconsistency; the extent of 
consultation carried out; and an explanation of the purpose of each clause and its 
relation to Commonwealth legislation.36 A reason for non-inclusion must be given if the 
Explanatory Note does not include any of this required content.37
The purpose of the SLC was to consider the application of fundamental legislative 
principles and the lawfulness of proposed legislation.38 Fundamental legislative 
principles being defined as those principles that ‘underlie a parliamentary democracy 
based on the rule of law’39 and “include requiring that legislation has sufficient regard to 
the rights and liberties of individuals and the institution of Parliament’ .4" The Legislative 
Standards Act 1992 (Qld) goes on to list certain criteria in the consideration of whether 
the proposed new laws have sufficient regard to rights and liberties, including whether
33 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 22 (1).
34 Queensland Parliament. The Queensland Parliamentary Procedures Handbook: Governing Queensland. 2000. cl 
7.7. There is no definition of an urgent Bill only recognition that the normal parliamentary procedures may be 
suspended to allow such a Bill to pass through the relevant stages in a given time, e 17.15.
35 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 23.
36 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 23 (1) (a) to (i).
37 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 23 (2).
38 Parliament o f  Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 103.
39 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4 (1).
40 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s (2) (a) (b).
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the legislation "is consistent with the principles of natural justice’ . 41 It is worthy of note 
that the SLC was required, as a benchmark, to have ‘sufficient regard' to essential 
legislative principles. Its role therefore, was one of recommendation to parliament. 
Having analysed proposed new legislation the Committee reported back to Parliament 
in a weekly Alert Digest report and any questions raised by the Committee should then 
be determined by Parliament. 42
The SLC noted, on the introduction of the VMA. that an urgent report ‘was considered 
necessary because of the Minister’s apparent intent to have the Bill debated during the 
same sitting week’ . 43 The report produced by the Committee, and tabled in Parliament 
two days after the Bill was introduced, considered the question of whether the proposed 
statute had sufficient regard to the rights and liberties of individuals and in so doing 
listed many concerns. 44
A prime concern of the Committee was the proposed regulation of clearing on freehold 
land. The Committee acknowledged that the traditional expectations of a freeholder had 
been increasingly eroded within common law countries and that rural freeholders were 
subject to ever increasing regulatory controls. 43 Accordingly, the Committee referred to 
‘Parliament the question of whether the restrictions and liabilities which this Bill 
imposes upon owners of freehold land have sufficient regard to the rights of 
landholders, their neighbours, contractors and the community’ . 46 Other areas of concern 
included the substantial increase in penalties for unauthorised clearing and, importantly, 
that the Explanatory Notes did not address the issue of the Bill's compliance with 
fundamental legislative principles. 47 One of the pivotal purposes therefore of the SLC -  
the consideration of fundamental legislative principles -  was not included in the notes 
and the Labor government gave no explanation for this. 48
Within the Queensland parliamentary process it is open to the relevant minister to 
correspond with the SLC, who may then reply in the final part of their report. In this
41 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 3(a). The criteria are set down in seetions (a) through to (k).
42 Queensland Parliament. Legislative Assembly of Queensland. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Annual Report. 
1 July 1999-30 June 2000. 2 -3 .
43 Queensland Parliament. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest, No 17 of 1999, 4.
44 Queensland Parliament, n 43, 2.
43 Queensland Parliament, n 43, 1 - 2.
46 Queensland Parliament, n 43, 3.
47 Queensland Parliament, n 43, 4 - 8.
48 This is contrary to the requirements of: Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld), s 23 (1) (f) and s 23 (2) and 
Parliament o f  Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 103.
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instance there was no ministerial correspondence with the Committee. 49 The statutory 
committees operating within the Queensland Legislative Assembly are generally 
entitled to a response from the relevant minister following submission of a report; the 
SLC was an exception however, and did not have the benefit of this statutory 
obligation . 5(1
The Beattie government seemingly gave no regard to the report on the VMA prepared 
by the SLC. The report was tabled in the final stages of the second reading debate and 
referred to by just one member of the opposition. 51 Prior to the final vote on the Bill 
there was no response by any government members to the concerns of the Committee. 
In the opinion of a member of the Committee at the time: Independent member for 
Gladstone, Liz Cunningham:
The government just wasn't interested in giving any credence to the concerns 
raised by the Committee in relation to vegetation management. They were on a 
political vendetta and nothing was going to stop or constrain their direction. 52
Yet the purposes of Queensland parliamentary committees are supposedly to 
‘effectively enhance the democratic process by taking the Parliament to the people and 
giving them a role in its operation ' . 51
A basic governmental function is to scrutinize new legislation; a lax attitude towards 
scrutiny is a shortcoming not limited to Queensland. More established and bicameral 
parliamentary systems appear to be equally adept at steering statutes through the 
parliamentary process without adequate scrutiny. In the case of the British House of 
Commons:
... the more important and controversial the bill, the less likely is parliament to 
play a creative part in its scrutiny. The result is a mass of hastily considered and 
badly drafted bills, which often later have to be revised. 54
49 Queensland Parliament, n 43, 8.
50 Parliament o f  Queensland Act 200I(Q  Id) s 107.
M Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management Bill, Second Reading, 10 December 
1999, 6339 per Lavarch L. as Chair of the Committee tabled the Alert Digest report at 3.07 pm , voting on the Bill 
was guillotined at 4.43 pm. Available at: htlp:/7parl info.wtrliament.qld.gov.au/isvsquery/a9e64009-94b4-40fd-bd le- 
2beedh982b89/'1/doc 9912 lOha.pdlWxml ::httn:. pari in to.parliament.old.uo\ .au. is\ squerv/a9e64009-94b4-40ld-bd le- 
2hccdb982h89/1 hi I itc (viewed 1 February 2009).
>2 E-mail correspondence in reply from Liz Cunningham Independent member for Gladstone, dated: 19 June 2008. 
v' Queensland Parliament, The Queensland Parliamentary Procedures Handbook: Governing Queensland, 2000, cl 
15.1.
54 Riddell P, Parliament under Pressure. (Victor Gollancz, London. 1998) 29.
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This problem may well arise because of the practical difficulties of reconciling 
parliamentary procedures designed in the nineteenth century with current governmental 
needs.55 In this particular instance however, the failure to perform their legislative role 
lies squarely with the Queensland Labor government. The SLC efficiently discharged its 
role insofar as limited time and a lack of crucial information allowed.56
A controversial introduction -  The Vegetation Management Act 1999
(Qld)
The proposed VMA generated a great deal of controversy amongst rural landholders 
and their representative bodies, such as Agforce, who warned of a rural backlash, not 
least because of the economic impact of the legislation.57 The then opposition leader 
Rob Borbidge fueled the argument at every opportunity by contending that 'any attempt 
to impose limits on freehold land use was akin to declaring war on the bush'.5x Some 
landholders reacted by clearing land in anticipation of the foreshadowed legal 
restrictions and environmental groups, such as the Queensland Conservation Council, 
urged the government to legislate to end panic clearing.5y The Labor government duly 
began the statutory process. Arguments started in the media were echoed by opposition 
members in parliament and predominantly concerned, on behalf of landholders, the 
inviolability of freehold tenure and the necessity of adequate compensation for 
potentially devalued land.60 The VMA was introduced into the Queensland Parliament 
alongside a raft of other proposed statutes and amid allegations from the opposition of 
undue haste and improper usage of parliamentary procedure.61 Certainly the Beattie 
administration utilised the guillotine process and channeled through a bundle of Bills 
prior to the end of the 1999 December sitting. Within the last three days of the final
55 Twining W & Miers D. How to Do Things with Rules, (Butterworths. London. 1999) 236.
76 Ransley J, ‘Illusions of reform: Queensland's Legislative Assembly since Fitzgerald' in Aroney N. Prasser S and 
Nethercote .1 R(ed), Restraining Elective Dictatorship: the Upper House Solution (University of Western Australia 
Press, 2008) in which Ransley concluded that parliamentary refonns in Queensland, following the Fitzgerald report 
and recommendations, had failed to provide true scrutiny of government action and. as found in this thesis, the SLC 
did ‘perform scrutiny functions, but often to very little effect in terms of government response' 256 and 259.
77 Collie G, ‘Farms anxious about curbs' Courier Mail (13 October 1999) 6.
7X Greber .1 & Ryan S, 'Beattie takes land stand' Courier Mail (8 October 1999) per Rob Borbidge, 2.
79 Franklin M, ‘Bush bums in race to beat curbs on clearing' Courier Mail (6 December 1999) 5.
60 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management Bill, Second Reading, 10 December 
1999, 6325, per Borbidge R. Available at: htlp://narlinfo.narliament.uld.»ov.au. isvsquerv/a9e64009-94b4-4()fd-bd le- 
2beedb982h89/l/doc/991210ha.r)df#\ml=httn://parlinfo.parliament.qld.go\ .au/isvsciuerv/a9e64009-94b4-40fd-bd le- 
2beedb982b89/1 /hilite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
‘’‘Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Bills: remaining stages. 8 December 1999, 6084- 6087. per 
Beanland D, Available at: http://parlinfo.parliament.qld.uov.au/isysquerv/21547e73-1567-4c7f-a7e3- 
a6297blbc899/1/doc/991208ha.Ddf#xmMittn://Darlin fo.narliament.qld.gov.au/isv.sqiicrv721547e75- 1567-4e7f-a7e3- 
a6297hthe899/1 /hi 1 itc (viewed 1 February 2009).
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weeks sitting period, the Labor government ushered eleven Bills, including the VMA, 
through parliament. 62
Parliamentary debate on the introduction of the VMA was vigorous, at times vitriolic 
and frequently emotive. Premier Beattie expressed his disappointment that the VMAC 
were unable to reach agreement prior to the introduction of the VMA. 63 The National 
and Liberal Party opposition members expressed their disappointment that the VMAC 
report and the Department of Primary Industries (DPI) Tree Clearing Report were not 
made available for consideration either before or during the parliamentary debate. 
Premier Beattie ensured the Tree Clearing Report's confidentiality by taking it to 
Cabinet as an example of agency capture, a move, according to the opposition leader at 
the time, which meant the far reaching impact of the laws on landholders, would remain 
suppressed. 64 Clearly the report, produced by the government's own department, did not 
align with the aims of the Labor government and taking it to Cabinet ensured it would 
not be subject to freedom of information requirements for thirty years. 65
Opposition members also lamented, because of the use of the guillotine procedure, that 
time was not available for adequate debate, including any deliberation on the clauses of 
the proposed legislation. 66 Such derision is typical of opposition parties. Nevertheless, 
debate within parliament and consultation with landholders was curtailed, and the ill- 
feeling and frustrations generated by the introduction of this legislation was generally 
conveyed by the opposition and summed up by one Independent member who observed 
that ‘no time was allowed for the Bill to be scrutinized by the very people who will be 
constrained by it' nor even for those members representing rural constituents to have an 
opportunity to speak. 67
62 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Bills: remaining stages, 8 December 1999. 6084, per Mackenroth 
T M . Available at: htlp://parlinfo.parliament.qld.gov.au/isvsuuerv/2l547e75-l 567-4e7f-a7e3- 
a6297hlbc899/l/doc/99l208ha.pdffl.\mMntp://parlinfo.parliamcnl.qld.aov.au/isvsqucrv/21547c75- 1567-4c7f-a7c3- 
a6297bfbc899/1 /hilitc/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
63 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Ministerial Statement: Tree-Clearing Guidelines. 10 December 
1999. 6292. per Peter Beattie. Available at: http:/ pari info.parliament.old.eo\.au/is\suucrv/a9e64009-94b4-40 Id-
bd Ie-2beedh982b89/l /doc/9912 101ui.pdr#\ml=lntp://parl in lb,parliament.uld.uox ■au/isvsqucrv/a9c64009-94h4-40fd- 
bd Ic-2bccdb982h89/l/hilitc (viewed 1 February 2009).
64 Greber J, ‘Secret report on tree clearing' Courier Mail (11 December 1999) 6. Rob Borbidge was leader of the 
opposition from November 1980 until he resigned in March 2001.
65 Freedom o f Information 1992 (Qld) s 36 (1) (a).
66 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill, Second Reading, 10 December 
1999. 6339. per Sweeney .1. Available at: http:, pari in lb.parliament.ukl.uov .au/isysuuerv a9c64009-94b4-40rd-bd 1c- 
2beedb9S2b89 1 doe 991210ha.pdlb\ml http: pari in tb.pnrliament.uld.iun .au/isysciuerv/a9c64009-94b4-40fd-bd 1 e- 
2beedb982b89 1 /hilitc/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
67 Queensland- Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management Bill, Second Reading, 10 December 1999. 6345. per 
Cunningham L. Available at: http: narlinlb,parliament.old.uo\ ,au. isvsoucn /a9c640()9-94b4-40fd-bd le-
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Uncooperative federalism prevailed and exacerbated the divisions in the inevitable clash 
between the Queensland Labor government and the Liberal National Coalition 
government in Canberra. In 1999 the Commonwealth government commissioned the 
Australian Bureau of Agriculture Resource Economics to assess details of the effects of 
tree clearing restrictions on agricultural production and green house gas emissions.™ The 
Commonwealth government accused the Queensland government of failing to cooperate 
with this endeavour;™ the Queensland government accused the Commonwealth of 
failing to contribute to a compensatory financial package that a change in the law might 
require.70
During the period in which the VMA was presented in parliament the Queensland 
government evaded a firm financial commitment for landholders affected by the VMA: 
there was nothing during the parliamentary debates from Premier Beattie or his Minister 
to indicate any monies were available in the Queensland public purse for monetary 
compensation. The only reference to a financial commitment on the part of the Labor 
government came in the Explanatory Notes for the Vegetation Management Bill 1999 
(Qld) in which the administrative cost to government of the implementation of the 
proposed law was summed up as follows:
There are two major costs to government that relate to administration and potential 
financial assistance to landholders. It is intended that the Queensland government 
meets the administrative cost. Financial assistance arrangements for landholders 
are being discussed with the Commonwealth.71
It was clear at the time that such discussions were neither productive nor progressing; 
and, as observed by the Federal Environment Minister at the time, other states had 
brought in tree clearing guidelines without first seeking monetary assistance from 
Canberra.72
2hecdb982h89/L/doc/9912 lOha.pd f#\ml=httn://parl in fo.parliament.qld.gov.au/isvsqucrv/a9c64009-94h4-401d-hdle- 
2hcedh982b89/ 1. hilitc/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
™ Hill R. "Beattie must come clean on tree clearing' (Media release 14 December 1999) available at: 
http://narlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piw’eb/vievN document.asr).\?id=34630&table=PRFSSRF.l. (viewed 1 February 2009). 
Robert Hill was the Federal Environment Minister from 1998 to 2001.
69 Hill R. n 68.
70 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Ministerial Statement. Land Clearing. 8 Dec 1999. 6056 per Peter Beattie. 
Available at: http://parlinfo.parliament.cild.gov.au/isvsciuerv/052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a51 b-
c69ce80263e/23/doc/991208ha.pd l~#xml=htlp://parl info.parliamenl.qld.gOY.au/isvsquerv7052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a5 I b- 
5c69ce80263e/23/hiIite (viewed 1 February 2009).
71 Queensland government, Explanatory Notes, Vegetation Management Bill 1999 (Qld). Available at: 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Bills/49PDF/1999/Vegetation.MgmtB99E\p.pdf (viewed 1 February 2009).
72 Griffin C & Greber J, "Hill rejects Beattie ultimatum over green commitment' Courier Mail (29 November 1999). 
7; Hill R. "Leave it to Beattie' Courier Mail (15 February 2000) 15.
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As Premier Beattie's political skirmish with the Commonwealth government continued, 
tensions between the Queensland government and rural landholders heightened and 
steps were taken to appease the agricultural community. Meetings were held in rural 
constituencies such as Emerald in Central Queensland and a country Cabinet meeting 
took place in Winton.73 The Premier again shifted the spotlight towards the 
Commonwealth government in declaring that the VMA would not be proclaimed in the 
absence of a Commonwealth financial contribution. Protesting graziers however were 
not impressed and Premier Beattie resorted to warning that planned federal legislation 
(the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC)) 
would impose even harsher vegetation restrictions.74 The implications of this political 
deadlock meant the Act remained unproclaimed.
The introduction of the VMA generated a peak period in land clearing
The VMA was assented to in December 1999, but only in respect of the title and 
commencement of the legislation; the bulk of statutory provisions did not commence 
until September 2000. The paradox of this was that the new statute had been declared by 
Premier Beattie as bringing certainty to landholders to enable sustainable and long-term 
viability of the land and to protect the unique biodiversity of the State.7' During 1999 
and 2000, the Statewide Landcover and Trees Study (SLATS) undertaken by the 
regulators recorded the highest clearing rate since monitoring began when the total area 
cleared reached 758,000 ha/year.7'’ Of this total area 498,000 ha/year was cleared on 
freehold land and 252,000 on leasehold land; and this total clearing rate was 78 per cent 
higher than the 1997-1999 average rate of 425,000 ha/year.77 A spokesman for the 
landholders noted: ‘If clearing on freehold land has risen in recent years it has been 
accelerated by uncertainty about draconian measures promoted by the conservation 
movement as the State government moves to impose controls.778 Rather than bring 
certainty to rural landholders the effect of the implementation of the VMA was to
73 Grcbcr J, "Nationals claim rush to beat tree laws* Courier Mail (3 February 2000) 4.
74 Morley P, ‘Labor tree plan fires bush fury' Courier Mail (13 February 2000) 9.
75 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Ministerial Statement, Land Clearing. 8 Dec 1999. 6055. per Peter Beattie. 
Available at: hllp://parlinfo.parliamcnt.qld.ao\ .au/isvsttticrv/052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a51 b-
c69co80263c/23/doc/99l208ha.pdf#\ml -http://narlinro.narliament.uld.uov.au isvsciucrv7052a515e-3d5a-4c63-a5 lb- 
5e69cc80263e/23/hi 1 ite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
7(’ Queensland. Department of Natural Resources and Water. "Land Cover Change in Queensland 2004-2005', see 
Figure 1: Annual woody vegetation clearing rate in Queensland (1988-2005). Available at: 
http: \ \ uu  ,nn \.uld.aov.au/slats/rcport.html (viewed 1 February 2009).
77 Queensland. Department of Natural Resources and Water. "Land Cover Change in Queensland 1999 -2001', see 
Figure 1: Annual Clearing Rate in Queensland from 1991-2001 and also Figure 8: Trends in clearing rate by tenure 
type (1991-2001.) Available at: http:/7www.nrw.uld.gov.au/slats/rcport.html (viewed l February 2009).
7X McGowan G. "Balance is vital for rural landscape controls' Courier Mail (8 September 1999).
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promote uncertainty and, ironically, to generate a peak period of land clearing, 
particularly on freehold land.
The precision of the SLATS reporting has been challenged not only as to its accuracy™ 
but also in respect of the reporting of total annual clearing rates which do not, for 
example, take account of the fact that the final clearing rate includes the necessary 
clearing of weeds such as lantana and rubber vine.80 Whilst both sides of the land 
clearing debate are swift to accuse the other of emotive and misleading arguments, the 
fact remains that the initial implementation of the VMA was opposite to its fundamental 
intent. Yet it was predictable that landholders would clear whilst the opportunity to do 
so legally remained; and it was equally predictable that the government could have 
expected the mere passing of the Act would have the effect of a starter's pistol. The 
average annual clearing rate declined following the enactment of the VMA, but by the 
2002 to 2003 period rates began to increase.81 When the VMA was first introduced into 
parliament Premier Beattie had stressed there would be no moratorium on broadscale 
clearing applications.82 On 16 May 2003 however, the Premier announced a moratorium 
on clearing applications under the Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Act 2003 (Qld) 
(VACA).83
A moratorium on land clearing applications -  The Vegetation 
(Application for Clearing) Act 2003 (Qld)
The Beattie government declared the objective of this legislation was to stop the 
acceptance of any new applications for vegetation clearing until consultations with 
interested parties and the Commonwealth government were finalised.84 There was little 
time for parliamentary due process. It was acknowledged by the Labor government that
70 Bredhauer J, ‘Can’t See the Scrub for the Trees' (2004) 21 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 44.
80 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly, Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill, Second Reading. 29 
May 2003. 2372, per Seeney J. Available at: http://parlinfo.parliameinAild.nov.au/isvsciucrv/fl ff60c2-d9ec-4845- 
9733-Id04c0)5c207/1/doc/0305291L\.PDF#xml=http://parl iiifo.parliamcnt.qld.aov.au/isvsqucrv/fl H60c2-d9cc-4845- 
9733-1 d()4clT)5c207/1 /hilitc/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
81 Queensland, Department of Natural Resources and Water. ‘Land Cover Change in Queensland 2001 -  2003\ see 
Figure 1: Annual clearing rates in Queensland (1988 -  2003). Available at: 
http://wwu.nrwAild.aov.au/slats/report.hlml (viewed 1 February 2009).
82 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Ministerial Statement. Land Clearing. 8 Dec 1999. 6056-6058, per 
Peter Beattie. Available at: http://parlinfo.parliamenl.cild.aov.au/isvsquerv7052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a51 b- 
c69ce80263c/23/doc/991208ha.pdl#\ml=httn://parlinfo.parliameni.tild.aov.au/isvsqucrv/052a515e-3d5a-4e63-a5 Ih- 
5c69ce80263e/23/hiIilc (viewed 1 February 2009).
83 Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Act 2003 (Qld.)
84Queensland government. Explanatory Notes Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill 2003 (Qld). 1. Available at: 
http://www.lcaislalionAild.aov.au/Bills/50PDF72003/VeaApClearB03Exn.Ddf
http:/7www.leaislation.qld.ao\ .au/Bills/51 PDF/2005 VcaManOLAB05Exp.pdf (viewed 1 February 2009).
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the proposed statute did not comply with fundamental legislative principles in two 
respects: the law was to be retrospective to the date when Premier Beattie announced 
the moratorium in order to prevent a rush of applications; and there was no right of 
appeal against refusal of an application/5 The government justified these measures as 
necessary to prevent ‘the spectre of panic clearing hindering proceedings'/6 If a 
retrospective amendment is an inevitable consequence of hasty legislation then it is 
difficult to reconcile with the government's own legislative statutory standards which, 
as mentioned earlier, require that new laws are ‘consistent with the principles of natural 
justice’, and ‘do not adversely affect rights and liberties, or impose obligations, 
retrospectively’/ 7
The Act was an interim step and for an indefinite period. The moratorium would start 
from the date of Premier Beattie’s announcement on 16 May 2003 until a date to be 
prescribed -  there was no sunset clause. The National Party did propose that the 
moratorium be for a fixed period of time but this amendment was not agreed to in 
parliament/* The moratorium did exclude some types of clearing, such as that necessary 
to prov ide fodder for stock in drought declared areas and clearing of regrowth/9
Time was even more of the essence for the Queensland Labor government. The Act was 
not considered at all by the SLC/° While many landholders and other interested parties 
had worked on regional vegetation management committees since the start of the VMA, 
their potential contributions were forestalled by the commencement of the VACA/* 1 IOf 
prime concern for the Beattie administration during the introduction of this particular
*5 Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill 2003 (Qld). Explanatory Notes. 2.
*6 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly. Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill 2003 (Qld), Second
Reading. 29 May 2003. 2083 per Robertson S. Available at:
lnitr//narl info, parliament.old. szo\ .au/isvsciuer\/8abbc814-4339-46da-h524-
906b34731 l28/2/doc/030527l 1 A. lM)L#xml~-http://parlin fo.parliamcnt.cild.goy.au/isvsiiucrv/8abhc814-4339-46da- 
b524-906b34731128/2/hilite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
87 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 3 (b) and (g).
**On a vote. 19 members supported the amendment and 53 voted against it. Queensland, Legislative Assembly, 
Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill. Second Reading, 29 May 2003, 2425. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.parliament.qld.aov.au/isvscitiery/fl ff60c2-d9ec-4845-9733-
I d()4cf05c207/l/doc/03052911 A.l)DL#xml --http://parlinfo.parliament.qld.aov.au/isvsqucrv/fl ff60c2-d9cc-4845-9733- 
Id04cl05c207/l/hilite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
*9 Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Act 2003 (Qld) s 2(a) (iii) and 2 (b).
911 The Alert Digest Reports for May 2003 do not include the VACA. Available
at:http://w\\w.pari iamenl.cild.gov .au/vicw/commitlces/SI .C.asp?SuhArea=2003 alcrts&SuhNav alerts (viewed 1 
February 2009).
II Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill. Second Reading. 29 May 2003, 
various members referred to the work many landholders had put into proposals for regional vegetation management 
plans in the period since the VMA was initially passed, e.g. Seeney J at 2376: Springborg L at 2384: Wellington at 
2389: and Quinn at 2413. Available at: http: pari in lb.parliament.uld.gov .au/isysqucrv/133c7f6X-1 fcc-4292-b322- 
43c59a461a07/l/doc703052911 A. l>DF#xml=httn://parl in fo.narliamcnl.tild.gov.au/isysqucrv/133c7f68-1 fcc-4292- 
b322-43c59a461 a07 I hi 1 itc (viewed 1 February 2009).
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Act was the prevention of a repeat peak rate of clearing; accordingly there was no 
consultation beyond that with other state agencies; nor was there the usual promises that 
the legislation would bring certainty to landholders. As a provisional measure this 
legislation brought clearing applications to an end. The more complex issues of 
consultation with interested parties and a possible Commonwealth and State financial 
package with which to compensate affected landholders were yet to be determined.
As for compensation, during the parliamentary debates on the commencement of the 
VMA and the introduction of the VACA opposition members reminded the government 
of their shelving of the DPI report on the economic impact estimate of vegetation 
management legislation. The Tree Clearing Report estimated that $500 million would 
be necessary to compensate rural landholders.92 The Labor government however 
consistently referred to a figure of $150 million and claimed that this amount was to be 
a jointly shared sum between the Commonwealth and the State.93 Monetary 
compensation or schemes for financial assistance were nonexistent and far from certain 
at this point.
Further legislation and a State financial commitment -  The Vegetation 
Management and other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (Qld)
Much of the uncertainty for the rural community was generated by the length of time it 
took the Labor government to make a financial commitment to landholders alongside 
the legislative changes: that is, from the time the Act was passed in 1999 until the 2004 
amendments. From the very outset of the vegetation management legislation, Premier 
Beattie persisted in his call for a Commonwealth financial contribution and, whilst the 
Commonwealth appeared amenable to consultations with rural representative bodies 
and the State government, John Howard, the Prime Minister at the time, evaded a firm
There were many referenees to the DPI Tree Clearing Report by opposition members -  they were consistent in 
quoting this figure from what must have been a leaked document. For example: Queensland. Legislative Assembly, 
Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill. Second Reading. 29 May 2003. 2411. per Rowell M. Available at: 
hiuv//narlin fo.narHamcnt.qld.aov.au/isvsciuerv/fl ff60c2-d9ec-4845-9733-
Id04cl05e207/1 doc/0.3052911 A. PDF#xml-=httn://iwl in fo.parliamem.ald.aov.au/isvsciuerv/fl lT60c2-d9cc-4845-9733- 
1 cl()4ctt)5e207 1 /hi 1 itc hUn://narlinfo.parliamcnt.uld.aov.au/isvsqucr\/133c7l’68-l lcc-4292-h322- 
43c59a461 a07/1/doc/03052911 A. Pl)F#xinl=:hltD://parl in lb, parliament, cild.aov.au/isvsuuery/l33c7f68-l fcc-4292- 
b322-43c59a461a()7/1 hilile (viewed I February 2009).
93 Queensland. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill. Second Reading, 29 May 2003, 
2411. for example: Pearce J, 2395 and Hayward K W. 2403. Available at: 
httn://nurl info, parliament .old. uo\ .au is\sciuerv/Pl lT60c2-d9cc-4845-9733-
ld04efl)5e207/l/doi7Q30529HA.PDF#xml:=http://oarlinfo.parliament.uld.ao\ .au/isvsuuerv/fl IT60c2-d9ec-4845-9733- 
1 d ()4 e 10 5 c 2 07/1 /hi 1 itc/ http://narlinfo.narliamcnt.uld.aov.au/isvsciuerv/133e7f68-1 fcc-4292-b322- 
43c59a461 a07/l/doc/03052911 A. PDF#xml=httn://parl info.parliament.cild.aov.au/isvsqucry7133c7f68-l fcc-4292- 
b322-43c59a46la()7/l/hilite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
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financial promise.94 The Commonwealth Minister for Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry 
did note that the federal government had been prepared to offer financial support but 
this was subsequently withdrawn.95 Failure to reach agreement rankled the Beattie 
administration: they argued that the restrictions on clearing imposed in Queensland 
would enable the Commonwealth government to meet its commitments under the Kyoto 
protocol, warranting a financial contribution.96
The gulf between the State Labor government and the Commonwealth Coalition 
continued. And so it was that the Beattie government, in introducing further amended 
vegetation management legislation following re-election in 2004, eventually bore the 
brunt of a $150 million financial package without Commonwealth support. This 
financial package, however, was considerably less than the $500 million apparently 
recommended by the DPI. Delay in both proclaiming the Act and committing to a 
financial package did little to promote certainty or protect the environment. The 2004 
amendments were nonetheless significant in that they were set to end broadscale 
clearing by December 2006 and, in the interim, to cap clearing at 500,000 hectares; 
landholders could apply to clear within this limit and applications were to be decided by 
a ballot.97
The amending statute was the Vegetation Management and other Legislation 
Amendment Act, which commenced in May 2004.9S Initially the Act had applied only to 
clearing on freehold land. These latest amendments meant the statute would now apply 
to leaseholders and freeholders. The Labor government acknowledged that the land 
management systems in place prior to the 2004 changes were complex and that a
94 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Ministerial Statement, Tree Clearing, per Beattie P who tabled a letter dated 15 
May 2003 from the Prime Minister. See also Landers K ‘The Prime Minister Visits Queensland' ABC Stateline 
Transeript 23 May 2003 available at: http://www.ahc.nct.au/stateline/qld/eontent/2003/s862499.htm (viewed 1 
February 2009).
95 Australian government, House of Representatives. Questions without notice: environment - land clearing. 3 March 
2004. 2511A. per Truss W Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: 
http://wuAv.aph.aov.aU/hansard/hanssen.htm#2004 (viewed 1 February' 2009).
96 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 
Second Reading. 21 April 2004. 312-313 per Robertson S. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.parliamcnt.qld.iZov.au/isysLiuerv79b4cfl77-d45c-4dc2-8b5h-
24da79h454c9/l/doc/0404211 IA.PI)F#\ml"-http://parlin (b. parliament, q Id. eov .au/isvsqucrv/9h4cfl77-d45c-4dc2- 
8h5b-24da79h454e9/1 /hilite, (viewed 1 February 2009).
97 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 
Second Reading, 21 April 2004.63-66. per Robertson S.. Available at:
http:, pari in lo. pari iamenl.qki.izov ,au isvsquerv 9b4eH77-d45e-4de2-8b5b-
24da79h454c9/l /doc/04042111A. PDF#xml=http://parl info, pari iamcnt.qld.izov.au/isvsquerv/9b4cH77-d45c-4dc2- 
8h5b-24da79h454c9/1 /hilite/ (viewed I February 2009).
98 This Act repealed the Vegetation (Application fo r  Clearing) Act 2003 (Qld).
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consistent approach across all land tenures was needed.99 For practical purposes such 
consistency was necessary but this legislative change marked, for Queensland, a 
fundamental philosophical shift in the regulatory treatment of freehold and leasehold 
land. The management of vegetation for rural leaseholders would now be under the 
same regulatory requirements as rural freeholders, and the Laud Act 1994 (Qldj, which 
previously provided for leasehold land, was amended to reflect this.
Parliamentary debate on the 2004 amendments to the VMA was more extensive than 
when the Act was introduced. This time a committee stage was held and the amending 
clauses debated.100 This time the SLC prepared a report, which was tabled two days after 
the Bill was introduced."" The Committee reiterated the concerns of the initial SLC 
report and raised two more concerns brought about by the amendments. The first was 
over the denial of appeal rights for landholders unsuccessful in the ballot process, and 
the second concern was the potential for a retrospective effect of one of the amending 
clauses.102 The denial of appeal rights was referred back to Parliament by the SLC to 
determine if it was appropriate;103 but while referred to briefly by two members 
opposing the legislation, the denial of a right of appeal was not deliberated by 
parliament during the course of debate. The denial of appeal was noted by the Minister 
during the introduction to the amendments and also acknowledged in the Explanatory 
Notes as necessary to ensure all clearing was completed by December 2006.104 An 
acknowledgement however is not the same as a determination by Parliament.
Premier Beattie’s earlier promises of certainty for landholders and protection of 
Queensland's unique biodiversity were echoed, some five years later, by the Minister 
introducing the Bill.105 As noted earlier, the financial commitment from the Labor Party
99 Queensland government, Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2004 
(Qld). Available at: http:/A\vvu.legislation.cild.gov.au/Bills/51 PDL7Z004/VegManQl.AB04lAp.pdf. 2 
http:/Avww. legislation.old.gov.au/Bills/51 PI)172005/VcgMan()LAB05F.xp.pdf (viewed 1 February 2009).
100 Queensland. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Committee 
Stage, 317-409,
101 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest. No 1 of 2004.
102 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest. No 1 of 2004.
103 Queensland Parliament. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest. No 1 of 2004.
1(14 Queensland government. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Second Reading, 18 
March 2004. 64, per Robertson S. Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, and Explanatory Notes, Vegetation 
Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2004. Available at:
http:/A\u w.legislation.ukl.gov.au/Bills/51 PDE/2004/VegManQLAB04L\n.pdf 3 (viewed 1 February 2009).
105 Queensland government. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Second Reading, 18 
March 2004, 63- 66 per Robertson S. Minister for Natural Resources and Mines. Available at: 
hltp://narl in fo.parliamcnt. uld. gov.au/isvsuuerv/82a99582-4 007-4962-8928-
241f2b84a 1 d5/4/doc/0403181 lA.PDF#xml=http://parlinfo.parliament.cild.gov.au/isvsauerv/82a99582-4007-4962- 
8928-241 !2b84a I cl5/4 hilite/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
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totaled $150 million. This was to be divided as follows: $130 million for a structural 
adjustment package for landholders; $12 million for incentive programs and $8 million 
for rural industry groups, in this instance Agforce.106
The Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA) undertook administration of the 
$130 million package. The QRAA described these potential payments as being to 
‘reduce the impact’ of the VMA.107 Two types of financial support were made available: 
enterprise assistance in the form of grants up to $100,000 and exit assistance for 
landholders whose long-term viability was so affected by the legislative changes that 
they would be obliged to leave their property."”* Most landholders chose to apply for 
enterprise assistance and, as the scheme progressed so too did the number of 
applications and grants made. The Beattie administration did take steps to help 
landholders. As the application process for both schemes was complicated, the 
government increased funding to employ extra staff to assist landholders.109 Eligibility 
criteria for making a claim were extended in 2005, which appeared to be in response to 
lobbying from Agforce.110 Equally, the Labor government added an additional $20 
million to ensure eligible landholders who had made an application by the February 
deadline could potentially receive financial assistance.* 111
A detailed assessment of the implementation of the financial adjustment package is 
difficult to make. According to QRAA, the monies received by landholders in enterprise 
assistance were utilised in a variety of ways including: ‘new farming systems and 
technology, enhancing water measures, expanding stock numbers, acquiring essential 
farming equipment, restructuring partnerships and succession planning'.112 From these
106 Robertson S, n 105. 65.
107 Queensland government. Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority. Annual Report. 2005-2006. 30. Available at: 
http:/Av\v\v.qraa.qld.gov.au/
lox Queensland government. Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority. Annual Report, 2005-2006, 30.
109 Kehoe J, 'Land Clearing in Queensland' (2006) 23, Environmental Planning and Law Journal, 151.
110 Robertson S, Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, 'Eligibility criteria for $130 million tree clearing 
assistance broadened' (Media release, 18 July 2005). Available at: http://statements.cabinet.qid.gov.au/ (viewed 1 
February 2009).
111 Wallace C, Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, 'State budget gives extra $20 million for vegetation 
assistance cheques' (Media release, 15 June 2007). Available at: httr>://statements.cabinet,qId.gov ,au (viewed 1 
February 2009).
112 Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA), Annual Report. 2006-2007, 30. Available at: 
htln://w\\\\.qraa.qld.gov.au/ (viewed 1 February 2009). A Team Leader for the QRAA further described the broad 
categories covering the majority of applications. For example: assisting with additional property purchase: building 
laneways and constructing self mustering gates to aid herd management, reducing mustering costs and limiting 
animal stress: building new holding yards and drafting race with watering facilities: construction and/or equipping of 
dams and bores together with poly piping and troughs etc.; desilting and expanding the capacity of dams; fencing; 
implementing whole of property pasture rotational grazing management plan; purchasing additional stock after the 
development: purchasing farm equipment to assist with productivity projects undertaken (as above);regrowth control: 
seeding (including aerial seeding);solar panels for remote water pumps; stickraking and pasture improvement;
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generalized descriptions it is not possible to assess the effectiveness of this structural 
adjustment package. The purpose of this financial assistance was described as being to 
‘assist landholders significantly disadvantaged by the new vegetation management 
framework, with a focus on sustaining production’."3 The QRAA account provides the 
only information available on what this money was actually used for, as the 
management plans submitted by landholders with their applications for financial 
assistance are not in the public domain.
By the February 2007 deadline, 1,610 landholders applied for assistance and, as at June 
2007, 1,305 had been approved and $111 million distributed."4 Inevitably some 
landholders were unsuccessful."5 Five properties were purchased under the exit 
assistance scheme costing a total of $9 million; this land was acquired for new national 
parks or transferred to the Queensland Trust for Nature for resale."6 It is not clear how 
many landholders applied for exit assistance.
Part of the financial commitment to landholders was $12 million to support land 
management incentive programs. This funding was used by the regulators for the 
Vegetation Incentive Program (VIP). The program, designed and implemented between 
2004 and 2006, had a great deal of potential but ‘was launched against a background of 
widespread anger amongst rural landholders over the changes to vegetation legislation 
and distrust of the State government’."7 The VIP used a conservation auction in which 
landholders submitted a land management plan and a bid or tender price for undertaking 
the conservation measures within the plan.
developing stands of Leucaena etc; and weed control. Email correspondence in reply from a QRAA Team Leader 
dated: 27 October 2008.
113 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 
Second Reading. 18 March 2004. 65 per S Robertson S. Minister for Natural Resources and Mines. Available at: 
lnip://parlinfo.pariiamcnt.oId.gov.au/isvsitucrv/82a9Q582-4007-4962-8928 (viewed 1 Lebruary 2009).
114 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Estimates Committee C -  Natural resources and Water. 12 July 
2007, 62 per Hon. C Wallace, Minister for Natural Resources and Mines. Available at: 
http:.7parlinlb.narliament.uld.uo\ .au/isvscHierv/82a99582-4007-4962-8928-
24112h84a I d5/4/doc/0403181 IATM)L#\mMmp://parhnfo.parliamcn[.cild.gov.au/isvsquerv/82a99582-4007-4962- 
8928-241 l2b84ald5/4/hilitc/ (viewed 1 Lebruary 2009).
115 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly, 6 March 2007,674 per Hopper R. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.parliament.cild.gov.au/isvsquerv/lb977fE4-2312-4c94-bd85-
9013lced39dl/8/doc/2007 03 06 WTTKEY.pdf#\mMittp://parlinfo.pariiament.cild.gov.au/isvsciuerv lb977184- 
23l2-4c94-bd85-90131 ced39df 8 hilite (viewed 1 Lebruary 2009).
116 Kehoe J, ‘Land Clearing in Queensland’ (2006) 23, Environmental Planning and Law Journal. 151.
117 Comerford E, ‘Designing more effective conservation auctions: Lessons from Queensland's Vegetation Incentives 
Program.' (PhD thesis, School of Economics. The Universitv of Queensland. 2007) 110.
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In keeping with the hurried beginnings of the VMA and its subsequent amendments, the 
VIP was initiated in haste and this impacted upon the implementation, design and 
effectiveness of the program. Problems with its design included the initial requirement 
of an onerous covenant that would attach to the land title in perpetuity.118 The 
requirements of the covenant proved to be a deterrent and led landholders to increase 
their bids.* 1 Subsequently the program was changed and landholders were given a 
choice of incentive, the available options included: a covenant; a nature refuge, being 
an individually negotiated covenant managed by the Environmental Protection Agency; 
a limited term covenant which would last until the vegetation became remnant and 
therefore protected by the VMA; and a declaration in which the landholder declared the 
vegetation as remnant and so protected.12"
In practical terms the initial design time for the program proved problematic simply 
because it was limited to around two months. This left ‘no opportunities to consult with 
likely participants’ and ‘was due to political pressure to have the funding devolved 
within a short period of time’.121 A program involving $12 million ‘deserved greater 
attention to its design and management’, which was unlikely when ‘there was not a 
great deal of senior oversight ... and only limited staff resources’.122 Other problems 
included: equity issues because the options changed; lack of targeting of agricultural 
landholders more likely to be affected by the VMA changes; uncertainty on the part of 
landholders in the actual auction process and how much to bid. All these problems may 
have been alleviated if there had been adequate time.123
According to the regulators, the environmental benefits of the VIP included the 
protection of 22,400 hectares of native vegetation in the State.124 This is a relatively 
small area of land compared to the 758,000 ha/year cleared during the peak clearing 
period between 1999 and 2000. The VIP was subsequently transferred to another
118 Kehoe J, ‘Land Clearing in Queensland' (2006) 23, Environmental Planning and Law Journal, lists the conditions 
o f the covenant at 153.
1 ,l’ Commerford E, ‘Designing more effective conservation auctions: Lessons from Queensland's Vegetation 
Incentives Program.' (PhD thesis, School o f Economics, The University o f  Queensland. 2007) 110, 257 and 261.
120 Commerford E and Binney J, ‘Lessons learned to date from the Queensland Vegetation Incentives Program in 
moving from a conceptual ideal to practical reality' paper presented to the Sustainable Agriculture State Level 
Investment Program (Ag SIP). Resource Economics Workshop. Department o f Primary Industries. Rockhampton. 28 
October 2005.
121 Comerford E, ‘Designing more effective conservation auctions: Lessons from Queensland's Vegetation Incentives 
Program.' (PhD thesis, School o f Economics, The University o f  Queensland, 2007) 113.
122 Comerford E. n 121. 254.
123 Comerford E. n 121. 253-258.
1-4 Queensland. Department o f Natural Resources and Water. Vegetation Incentives Program. Available at: 
httn://\\ ww.nrw.uld.aov.au/vcaetation> linancial/vin.html (viewed 1 February 2009).
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regulatory department under the Nature Assist program.125 The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which ran the program at that time, had more experience in 
this area; they had a network of trained extension officers and more effective 
monitoring systems.126 It may have been more advantageous -  and saved considerable 
time and money -  to have utilised the experience of the EPA with the initial VIP.
The final part of the Labor government’s financial package amounted to $8 million 
provided to the rural representative body Agforce.127 As this money was not fully 
expended it was carried forward to June 2009.12* The money was used to establish 
Agforward, a program providing workshops around Queensland to assist landholders in 
the various aspects of the VMA which affected them, for example: reducing the risk of 
prosecution; regional ecosystem mapping; lodging a property map of assessable 
vegetation (PMAV), basic computer mapping and global positioning systems.129 The 
very fact that such workshops were necessary and that there was a continuing demand 
for these services in 2012 is indicative of the continuing complexities of the VMA.
Further retrospective amendments -  The Vegetation Management 
Amendment Act 2008 (Qld)
Early in 2008 the VMA was amended once again. There had been another change in the 
Minister for Natural Resources and Water who echoed his predecessor in the assurance 
of certainty for landholders.13" A familiar pattern had emerged with this legislation and, 
once again, the Bill was dealt with as urgent, which meant little regard for due 
parliamentary process. The proposed amendments were not considered by the SLC.131 
Consultation with the relevant community and industry stakeholders was not undertaken
l2’ Queensland, Environment Protection Authority. NatureAssist. Available at:
htlp://vv\vvv.epa.qld.gov.au/nature conservation/nature refuaes/natureassist/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
126 Comerford E, ‘Designing more effective conservation auctions: Lessons from Queensland's Vegetation Incentives 
Program.' (PhD thesis, School of Economics, The University of Queensland. 2007). 260.
127 The Agforce program is available at: httn://www.aalbrward.ora.au/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
I2X Email correspondence with the Manager of Operations at AgForward dated 8 December 2008.
129 Agfonvard is available at: http://www.aaforward.onz.au/\captation.him (viewed 1 February 2009).
130 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management Amendment Bill, Second Reading, 26 
February 2008, 336. per Wallace C. Craig Wallace was the Minister from November 2006 to March 2009. Available 
at: http: /pariinTo.paiTiamcnt.qld.a.o\ .aii/is\squerv/1 137c0b9-5494-4965-8ha9-
58942lc3888c/3/doc/2008 02 26 WEFKLY.ndf#\ml=httn://parlinlb.pariiament.pld.uov.au isvscinery/l I37c0b9- 
5494-4965-8ba9-589421 c3888c/3/hilite/ (viewed I February' 2009).
131 The Alert Digest Reports for February 2008 do not include the Vegetation Management Amendment Act.
Available at: htttr/Avww, nail iament. cild.gov. au/vicw7coinmittces/SLC.asp?SubArea=alcrts (viewed 1 February 
2009).
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'due to the sensitivity of the issues’.132 Once again the amendments were retrospective. 
The tendency to utilise retrospective legislation was a recurring feature of the Beattie 
Labor government and. during debate on the 2008 amendments, there was disagreement 
as to whether the Labor government had passed 149 or 158 retrospective laws since 
1998.133
The objectives of the amendments were described as being to clarify the definitions of 
endangered, of concern and not of concern regional ecosystems and to validate 
retrospectively all past decisions of the courts affected by these definitions.134 Whether 
the proposed amendments were consistent with fundamental legislative principles was 
addressed in the Explanatory Notes and the retrospective operation was justified as 
necessary to 'minimise the risks of future legal challenge', the retrospective application 
of criminal liability was also justified as necessary as the amendments were held to 
confirm the methodology and interpretations used to determine the differing regional 
ecosystems.135 It was not only the risks of future legal challenge that prompted these 
particular amendments. A landholder had already instigated proceedings challenging the 
definitions, which was why the definitions were clarified. The need tor haste was in 
order to thwart that litigation.
The political context of the VMA
Environmental law in Queensland, and in particular a controversial law such as the 
VMA, has been shaped by the political context in which the law has been made and 
amended. The Queensland Labor government had a long period of political power 
unimpeded by a parliamentary Upper House; and by an effective and united opposition. 
During Labor’s reign the opposition weakened and fragmented and was offen variable 
in its alliances. The Liberals primarily supported the Nationals but sometimes supported 
Labor. The power of Queensland Labor grew over their time in office. On the 
commencement of the VMA in December 1999 the Labor Party only had 39 votes in 
favour of the Act, as did the combined opposition parties against the Act. It was
132 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. The Vegetation Management Amendment Bill 2008 (Qld) 2. 
Available at: httn: 'wuu.legislation.old.tzov ,au. Bills 52PDI 2008/VeaMulAB081.\n.pdf (viewed 1 February 2009).
133 See for example: Queensland government, Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management Amendment Bill, 
Second Reading, 26 February 2008. 336-599, and. in particular, Langbroek. 580-582.
134 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. The Vegetation Management Amendment Bill 2008 (Qld) 2. 
Available at: hltm//w\\\v. legislation.uld.aox .au Bills/521)I)172008/VcaMsztAB08Fxp.ixir(viewed 1 February 2009), 
1 .
135 Queensland government, Explanatory Notes, n 134.2.
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necessary therefore for the Labor Party to rely on the casting vote of the Speaker.136 The 
parliamentary authority of the Labor government in the Legislative Assembly gathered 
momentum after the initial introduction of the VMA. Part of the reason for this may be 
attributed to the diverse opposition mix which arose from the 1998 State election. This 
was the year of the rise of the One Nation Party within Queensland, a rise which split 
and decimated the conservative opposition. The National and Liberal Parties both lost 
seats to One Nation who, in contesting a State election for the first time, gained an 
extraordinary 11 seats compared to 9 for the Libera! party and 23 for the National 
party.137
By 2003, with the introduction of the VACA. a much stronger parliamentary Labor 
Party had emerged unfettered by a viable opposition. The VACA was approved with the 
support of 58 members of parliament who were primarily Labor members; and, this 
time, the three Liberal party members voted with the government.138 The National Party 
was now down to 11 members and, even with the support of two independents and the 
sole One Nation member, it was hardly a feasible opposition. If the Queensland One 
Nation Party had tapped into widespread disquiet within the electorate in 1998 their 
victory was short-lived. In the 2001 State election they gained three seats; and by the 
2006 State election. One Nation held one seat which was ultimately lost in the 2009 
election.13'7
The Labor Party achieved its most unassailable position in 2004. It was prior to this 
State election that Premier Beattie made what proved to be a successful election 
promise: to end broadscale land clearing of remnant vegetation in Queensland. Pre­
election campaigning included images of rural landholders ruthlessly clearing the land.
136 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill. Third Reading. 10 December 1999, 
6355. Available at: http://narlinro.parliamcnt.ald.aov.au/isvsquerv/449al 151 -b9c3-42bc-b()a4-
fe231 a752782/l/doc/99l210ha.pdf#\mlHittp://parl in fo.parliament.uld.aov.au/isvsquerv/449a I151-b9e3-42be-b0a4- 
fc23 Ia752782/l/hiliic/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
137 Queensland Parliament, Comparison of Party Performances Queensland State Elections 1977-2001. Available at: 
lntp://vvvvw.pariiamcnl.qld.aov.au/vicw/lnstorical/documents/elcctionsRclercndums/PartYPcrronnaneeStalcl lections. 
pdf (viewed 1 February 2009).
138 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly. Vegetation (Application for Clearing) Bill, Third Reading, 2425, 
29 May 2003. Available at: http://parlinlb.narliament.ald.aov.au/isvsquen/ll lT60c2-d9ec-4845-9733- 
Id04et05e207/1/doe/03052911 A.PDF#\ml=httn://parlinfo.narliamenl.qld.aoY.au/isvsquerv/fl lT60e2-d9ec-4845-9733- 
I d()4eIU5e207/1 /hiIitc/ (viewed 1 February 2009).
I3‘7 Queensland Parliament. Comparison of Party Performances Queensland State Elections 1977-2001 & 2004-2006. 
Available at:
http://vvvvvv.oarhament.uld.aoY.au/view7historical/docmments/electionsReferendums/PartvPerformanceStateLlcctions. 
pdf (viewed 1 February 2009). Rosa Lee Long was the longest serving One Nation MP: she represented the 
Tablelands electorate and served three consecutive terms in office between 2001 and March 2009. There is unlikely 
to be a resurgence of One Nation: Pauline Flanson was unsuccessful in her bid as an Independent candidate for 
Beaudesert in the March 2009 State election.
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The Queensland electorate returned the Labor Party to office with 63 of the 89 available 
seats.14" Voting on the 2004 amendments was 58 in favour, again including Liberal 
support.141 The Nationals, who were shored up by independent members, could only 
manage 19 votes against the legislation.142
Broadscale land clearing has been an emotive and divisive issue in Queensland. By 
virtue of the 2004 VMA amendments such clearing was set to end by December 2006 
and it was during this year that the Queensland Labor Party won its fourth consecutive 
term. For the 2006 State election however it was problems in the health system, rather 
than the environment, which proved to be a critical issue.
The political dominance of the Labor parliamentary party continued, reflecting a long- 
established tradition in Queensland of a dominant party holding power for a 
considerable period.141 The clearing of land and the former strength of the agricultural 
lobby are so closely entwined within Queensland's political past that the alienation of 
some rural sectors and the frustration with increasing regulation was palpable. 
Environmental laws, such as the VMA, which promise certainty but generate confusion, 
exacerbate this frustration; this was especially the case with the retrospective 
amendments passed in 2008. The Labor Party commanded 42 votes in favour of the 
retrospective amendments as against 19 opposition members. Their force as a political 
party may have diminished but this was still a considerable majority.144 Liberal 
members, being primarily concerned with the retrospective nature of the amendments, 
changed allegiance and this time voted alongside the Nationals against the Bill.
1411 Queensland Parliament, Comparison of Party Performances Queensland State Elections 2004-2006. Available at: 
liUpi/Avmv.narliamcml.Qld.gov.au/\ icu/historical doeuments/electionsReferendums/Pail\ PerformanceStateElections. 
pdf (viewed 1 February 2009).
141 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. 
Third Reading. 21 April 2004. 410. Available at: htlp://parlinfo.parliament.cild.gov.au.( viewed 1 February 2009).
I4‘ Queensland government, Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. 
Third Reading, 21 April 2004. 410. Available at: http:/ pari into.pari iament.cild.gov.au.( viewed 1 February 2009).
141 See Appendix One: Timeline. The Queensland governing parties have been as follows: the Labor Party from 1932 
to 1957: between 1957 and 1989 variations of conserv ative parties have held office for example the Country- 
Liberals, followed by the National-Liberals, followed by the National party; from 1989 to the present the Labor arty 
have dominated. A short inroad into their dominance occurred during 1996 to 1998 when the Coalition held power. 
Queensland Parliament. Precis of Results of Queensland State Elections 1932 to 2006. Available at: 
htt p:/Av\\\\ .parliament, old.gov.auA'ievv/historical/electionsReferendums.asp?Sub Area=elect ions Referendums eleetio 
n I fates (viewed 1 February 2009).
144 Queensland. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management Amendment Bill. Third Reading. 26 February 2008, 
599. Available at: http://parlinfo.parliament.qld.gov.au/isvsciucrv747712f4f-40af-42e9-8b70- 
6159790c65db/l/doe/2008 02 28 W l:.FRLY.pdlWxml=http://parlinfo.pariiament.cild.gov.au/isvsQuerv747712 f4f- 
40al-42e9-8b7()-6f5979()e65clb;l hilite- (viewed 1 February 2009).
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined how the VMA was made and implemented from the 
introduction of the legislation to the 2008 amendments. It is apparent that eristic laws 
are much more than a procedural implementation exercise albeit an imperfect one: they 
reflect the political context and reality of the parliamentary processes in which they are 
made. The reality for Queensland for many years was that a dominant Labor 
government was able to selectively attend to parliamentary process and its legislative 
role. The VMA has been characterized by urgent and guillotined debate, forestalled 
consultation with interested parties, and frequently a lack of opportunity for opposition 
members to fully examine proposed legislation and speak on behalf of rural 
constituents.
The Queensland electorate consistently provided authority to the Labor government by 
returning it to power. However, in a unicameral parliamentary system it is crucial that 
the incumbent government abides by its own legislative standards and confers more 
than a cursory nod towards its legislative role. The making and subsequent amendments 
of the VMA revealed an ingrained parliamentary system; with a dominant leader 
presiding over a one party government keen to establish its mark following prolonged 
conservative rule. The more controversial the law the less likelihood there is of scrutiny; 
the more haste in parliamentary procedure the more likelihood there is of amendments, 
including retrospective amendments. This underlying flaw is endemic to other 
parliamentary systems but a cautionary note is particularly relevant in Queensland’s 
unicameral system. If Parliamentary processes serve the needs of the prevailing majority 
government and laws are made simply because it is within the mandate of that 
government to do so, it behooves us to question those processes and the accountability 
of government.
In March 2009 the Queensland Labor Party, with Anna Bligh as Premier, returned to
govern for their fifth consecutive term. In many ways Anna Bligh continued in the
authoritarian leadership mode carved by Peter Beattie: she was given the legitimacy of
an elected leader and returned Stephen Robertson to the role of Minister for Natural
Resources, Mines and Energy. The same Minister was responsible for the controversial
2003 and 2004 VMA amendments. The merger of the Queensland divisions of the
Liberal and National parties saw the beginnings of what was to become a viable
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opposition. Queensland Labor however still had another term in office. Part of the 
means by which they achieved a further term forms the basis of the following chapter.
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Chapter Five: Vegetation management legislation in 2009
Introduction
This chapter asks: how the VMA was made and implemented in 2009 and what were the 
parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament within which the amendments 
were made? Much of the discontent with statutory regulation for rural landholders was 
generated by the politicisation of the VMA. The Act was frequently characterised by 
pre-election promises from the Queensland branch of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
followed by post election changes to the law. Such was the case in the 2009 Queensland 
State election, in which a particularly controversial and retrospective amendment 
brought about a six-month moratorium on clearing endangered regrowth vegetation.
The moratorium began in April 2009 with the Vegetation Management (Regrowth 
Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009 (Qld) and ended in October with the Vegetation 
Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Qld).
The Queensland electoral system was, in 2009, pivotal to a pre-election political deal 
that led to the VMA amendments in that year. Accordingly, the electoral system is 
explored in this chapter, which begins by providing the historical context in which a 
significant change to Queensland's electoral system occurred. The change was the 
adoption of optional preferential voting. A review of political science literature on 
electoral systems, together with an analysis of the outcome of this change for the 2009 
State election, is therefore undertaken. The significance of optional preferential voting 
is that it has the potential to produce dominant single party government, as evidenced in 
Queensland, and pre-election political deals, as evidenced in the 2009 State election. 
The pre-election horse-trading, between the ALP and the Queensland Green Party in 
2009, necessitated an examination of the role of the Green Party within the State’s 
political system and prompted a further research question: which groups influenced the 
political processes and the law that was ultimately made? An analysis of the pre­
election preference deal is made, as part of the pay-back for this arrangement was the 
2009 VMA regrowth amendments. Finally, consideration is given to the political 
context in 2009 under which these controversial amendments were implemented.
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Historical background leading to a change in the electoral system
The management of rural land in Queensland has reflected the policies and laws of 
successive governments.1 There is a long tradition within the State of a dominant 
political party holding office for a prolonged period. Thus the longest serving National 
or conservative party premier, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, held office for almost twenty 
years from 1968 to 1987. The overall period of conservative government at that time 
lasted for 32 years,2 ending with the demise of Bjelke-Petersen and subsequently the 
National Party. The downfall of the Bjelke-Petersen administration followed an 
independent inquiry, undertaken by Tony Fitzgerald, which found evidence of 
entrenched and widespread corruption within Queensland.3 The Inquiry began in May 
1987 and, though initially expected to last for six weeks, it lasted until June 1989. A 
pivotal moment in the Inquiry came when Michael Forde QC cross-examined Bjelke- 
Petersen on his understanding of the separation of powers doctrine. The confused 
response of the ex-premier:
...exposed not only a leader’s flawed and corrupted methodology but also the 
cabinet's that had echoed it, the parliaments that had authorised it, a public service 
that had delivered it, a police force that had facilitated it, a media that had mostly 
endorsed it and a public opinion that, by and large, had tolerated and even 
applauded it.4
Charges against Bjelke-Petersen for official corruption and perjury during the Inquiry 
were ultimately withdrawn following a trial and a hung jury. Clearly a great deal 
remained to be done: the jury foreman at the trial was a branch secretary of Bjelke- 
Petersen's political party.5 6Nevertheless, this period was described as a time of hope for 
Queensland ‘...as it began the Herculean task of cleaning its Augean stables’/’
1 See Appendix One: Timeline.
2 Queensland Parliament. Precis of Results of Queensland State Elections 1932 to 2006. Available at: 
http://www.iwliament.Lild.gov.au/vicw historical/clectionsRefcrcndums.asp?SubArca=eleclionsRcfcrendums electio 
nDates (viewed 4 June 2009).
3 Fitzgerald G E. Report o f  a Commission o f Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council, (Queensland Government 
Printer. Brisbane, 1989). Available at:
htto://wwu .cmc.uld.gox ,au data/portal 00000005 eontcnl/81330001131406907822.pdf (viewed 4 June 2009). This 
Inquiry was announced by Bill Gunn, the acting Premier at the time, whilst Bjelke-Petersen was overseas. The 
announcement followed the catalytic ABC Four Comers investigative Report 'The Moonlight State’ which 
highlighted the systemic corruption within both the Queensland government and the police.
4 Evans R. A history> o f Queensland (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 247.
5 Fitzgerald R, Megarrity L and Symons D. Made in Queensland, A New History (University of Queensland Press. 
2009)185.
6 Evans R. A history o f Oueensland (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2007), 249.
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Reform of the electoral system -  optional preferential voting
One essential task was reform of the electoral system. The longevity of the Bjelke- 
Petersen era owed much to the electoral system prevailing at that time. A prime area of 
concern for the Fitzgerald Inquiry was the issue of fairness of the electoral process, 
particularly electoral laws, zones and boundaries, which were alleged to be biased in 
favour of the Bjelke-Petersen Government. 7 The allegations primarily concerned the 
unfair advantage given by both electoral gerrymander and malapportionment. 8 *1One of 
the major recommendations of the Inquiry, therefore, was the formation of an 
independent Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) charged with 
undertaking an extensive review of electoral and administrative processes within the 
State.’'
Following this wide-ranging review, in which submissions were made and public 
hearings held, the EARC recommended electoral reform. The controversial issues of 
electoral boundaries and zones were to be addressed by independent bodies ‘free from 
interference by the government of the day' . 1(1 Change in the voting system was also 
recommended: from compulsory preferential voting to optional preferential voting. In 
recommending this change to the voting system the EARC noted a return to ‘first past 
the post’ would not be appropriate for Queensland as, they contended, this method did 
not ensure fairness -  a major concern to the Fitzgerald Inquiry -  and had been rejected 
by other states and the Commonwealth." Optional preferential voting was therefore 
suggested. The Commission noted they were mindful of evidence that had emerged 
from New South Wales that optional preferential voting meant many voters expressed 
just a first preference but concluded:
...this phenomenon reinforces the view that under the current compulsory 
preferential system voters are being required to express views they may not have. 
Encouraging voters to express preferences is ultimately a matter for candidates and 
parties, not the electoral system. 12
7 Fitzgerald G E, n 3. 127.
8 The Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, Report on Queensland Legislative Assembly Electoral 
System, Volume l- The Report, November 1990. xiii. defines gerrymander as drawing electoral boundaries to enhance 
the likelihood of election; and malapportionment as a term used to describe the existence of electoral districts which 
have significant difference in the number of electors.
y Fitzgerald G E, n 3. 370-371 the other main recommendation was the establishment of a Criminal Justice 
Commission to watch over police practices.
1(1 The Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, n 8. 232.
11 The Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, n 8. 8.
12 The Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, n 8. 59.
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The Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) facilitated many of the recommended changes and 
established an independent Electoral Commission and more equitable electoral districts 
and redistributions.13
The Electoral Commission described optional preferential voting as ‘an unusual, if not 
unique, voting system'.14 The shift to this system marked the fourth change to voting 
methods in the State. Optional preferential voting is a variant of the alternative vote 
electoral system. Queensland and the New South Wales Lower House are the only 
States to use optional preferential voting. Optional is perhaps a misleading term in that 
voting in Australia is compulsory. In this context the term means that voters have the 
option to vote for one candidate only, or to vote for one candidate and allocate 
preference to some or all of the other candidates, ft is a majoritarian system in that the 
winning candidate needs to secure an absolute majority of the votes cast. If this is not 
achieved on the first count, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and their 
preferences are allocated. This process continues until one candidate has a majority of 
votes. In contrast, compulsory or full preferential voting requires the voter to allocate 
preference to all candidates.15
The post Fitzgerald reforms were primarily driven by the Queensland branch of the 
ALP and by Wayne Goss, their leader at the time. Despite concerns from all parties as 
to the desirability of adopting optional preferential voting, the influence of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry prevailed and the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), which brought about the 
changes, was unopposed in parliament.16 For the first time in Queensland, changes were 
made to the voting system for reasons other than the ‘perceived benefit by the 
government of the day’.17 In 1989, the year the Fitzgerald Inquiry handed down its 
report, Queensland Labor won over 50% of the votes cast in the State election as the 
inevitable electoral backlash against the BjeIke-Petersen administration took its toll.1*
13 The functions and powers of the Commission are provided for in the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld).
14 Queensland Electoral Commission. Optional Preferential Voting. Fact Sheet. Available at: 
htitv.//\vw\\ .ccu.cild.gov.au asp index.aspVnaid 170 (viewed 4 June 2009).
15 Submissions of arguments both for and against each voting system are detailed in: Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission, n 8. chapter 6.
16 The Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, n 8. 55-56: and Queensland government. Legislative 
Assembly. Electoral Bill. Second Reading, 19 May 1992. 5242 -5251 and 5253 -5291. Available at:
http://w\\\\ .parliament ■uld.gov.au/documents/Hansard/1992/9205 19ha.pdf#xinl=htln://\\wvv. parliament.old. ao\ .au/in 
ternetseareh/isvsciuerv/59242247-ebe4-4b6b-bd 16-aadb92740d 1 l/l/hilite/ (viewed 10 July 2009).
17 Wanna J, Democratic and Electoral Shifts in Queensland: Back to First Past the Post Voting (2004) Governance 
and Public Policy Research Centre. Griffith University. Brisbane.
IS Queensland government. Comparison of Party Performance Queensland State Elections 1977-2001. Table 2 B. The 
percentage of votes for the National Party fell from 40% in the 1986 election to 24% in 1989. Available at:
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The end of this politically conservative and evidently dark period meant that Labor 
returned to dominate the political arena and generally continued to do so. apart from a 
two-year interlude, from 1989 until March 2012.
Within Queensland, the optional preferential voting system has continued to date. In the 
first three elections following the changed voting system the effects were marginal.19 
Indeed it appeared that the Electoral Commission of Queensland quietly ‘disapproved' 
of optional preferential voting -  and certainly did not actively ‘promote the concept’20 in 
those elections. During their time as the incumbent government, the ALP predictably 
adopted a tactical use of this voting system; and, starting in the 2001 election, 
campaigned for voters to vote just for the ALP, a strategy known as ‘plumping’.21 The 
outcome of an election with a high rate of plumping is that a candidate may be elected 
with less than a clear majority of votes.
The meaning of representation, within political science literature, contrasts the 
‘microcosm’ or proportional electoral system with the ‘principal-agent’ or non­
proportional system.22 In the microcosm system parliament would, as far as possible, be 
a representative sample of the population; whereas the principle-agent system typifies 
Members of Parliament acting on behalf of constituents and the composition of 
parliament is less important than the decisions it makes.23 The Queensland electoral 
system is a non-proportional system; smaller parties, such as the Greens, are unlikely to 
be represented within parliament but may be accommodated outside the Legislative 
Assembly in the interests of political pragmatism. As for decisions made by the 
government, some decisions, such as the implementation of the 2009 amendments to the 
VMA, reflect the very essence of politics and the competing and varied interests of the 
electorate.
http://wAVAv.pariiamcnt.ukl.aov.au/vicw/historical/docunKmts/eleH.nionsRctcrcndums/PartvPerfonr)anccStatcP.lcctions. 
pdf (viewed 4 June 2009).
19 Wanna J. Democratic and Electoral Shifts in Queensland: Back to First Past the Post I'oting (2004) Governance 
and Public Policy Research Centre, Griffith University, Brisbane 2.
20 Wanna J, n 19, 2.
21 This was especially the case with the 2001 Queensland State election, see for example: Stockwell S. T he impact of 
optional preferential voting on the 2001 Queensland State election' (2003) 10 (1) Queensland Review 155-162.
22 Farrell D M, Comparing Electoral Systems (Prentice Hall, UK, 1997) 6. The implication of the significance of 
electoral systems was initially chronicled in Rae D, The Political Consequences o f  Electoral Laws (New Haven, CT, 
Yale University Press. 1967).
23 Farrell D M, n 22, 6-7.
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There is little agreement as to which is the best electoral system.-4 For Queensland, a 
very real concern is that 'the optional preferential system produces a less representative 
and less democratic outcome than the compulsory preferential system’.25 It is only under 
the latter system that 'elected representatives could genuinely claim to represent the 
electorate’.26 A note o f caution accompanies the State's electoral system such that:
In democratic terms, the use of optional preferential voting in Queensland appears 
to empower the voter, allowing individuals to decide whether or not to allocate 
preference to some or all candidates. But in the hands of parties anxious to 
maximise electoral advantage, optional preferential voting risks becoming a de 
facto first past the post system -  in which candidates can be elected with around 
35% of the formal vote.27
Optional preferential voting is regarded by some as the facilitator o f inclusiveness and, 
while it may 'weaken the hand o f minor parties in the horse trading over preferences, it 
gives them extra leverage in bargaining over policies and hence an indirect form o f 
political representation and inclusiveness is achieved’.2X For Queensland, however, in 
2009 this inclusiveness was outside o f the parliamentary system with a non-elected 
minor party.
An analysis o f the consequences o f electoral systems within Australia by Farrell and 
McAllister concluded with a recommendation that compulsory preferential voting 
should be replaced with optional preferential voting.2" It acknowledged the inherent 
risks with optional preferential voting:
...where 'Just Vote 1’ strategies (as practised, for example, by the ALP in 
Queensland in 1998 and 2001) could so weaken the value of preferences as to
24 Farrell D M. n 22, Chapter 7. Bowler S. Farrell DM and Pettit R. ‘Expert opinion on electoral systems: so which
electoral system is ‘best’?' (2005) 15 (1) Journal o f Elections, Public Opinion Parties, 3-19 surveyed the views of
electoral system experts on the world's main electoral systems. The survey found a large degree of consensus on the 
issue of proportionality and the capacity of the different electoral systems to produce proportionality. The electoral 
system decided as best by the experts was the mixed-member proportional system followed by a single transferable 
vote system.
27 Stockwell S, ‘The impact of optional preferential voting on the 2001 Queensland State election" (2003) 10 (1) 
Queensland Review 155.
26 Wanna J, Democratic and Electoral Shifts in Queensland: Back to First Past the Post Voting (2004) Governance 
and Public Policy Research Centre. Griffith University. Brisbane, 3.
"7 Wanna J. n 26. 3-4. Also the Queensland Legislative Assembly Electoral System. Volume I -  The Report.
November 1990, defines first past the post voting as a system where the winning candidate is the one who receives 
the largest number of votes regardless of whether a majority is obtained. This system is used in the UK, USA. Canada 
and New Zealand and was for a period, from 1860 to 1892. adopted in Queensland.
25 Orr G, ‘Australian Electoral Systems -  How well do they serve political equality?'(2004) The Australian National 
University. Report No 2. Prepared for the Democratic Audit of Australia. Available at: 
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au (viewed 8 December 2009).
Farrell D M & McAllister I, The Australian Electoral System: Origins. Variations and Consequences (University 
of New South Wales Press, Sydney. 2006) 178 -179.
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result by default in single member plurality elections. But this need not be the case, 
and other jurisdictions that allow optional expression of preferences (for example 
Ireland) have not witnessed such trends.30
Other jurisdictions may not have experienced such trends but they remain apparent in 
Queensland elections, and the ALP. during their political reign, generally directed their 
supporters to give their party first preference and not preference any of the other 
candidates.31
Trends in optional preferential voting in Queensland
A more detailed breakdown of trends in voting behaviour is provided in the Ballot Paper 
Survey undertaken by the Electoral Commission of Queensland following each 
election.32 Ballot papers in 11 electoral districts are analysed: they include urban, 
provincial and rural seats and the same districts are considered in each survey to allow a 
comparative study.33
Figure 5.1 demonstrates how optional preferential voting actually played out in recent 
Queensland elections.34 The trends are relatively consistent. Voters who simply vote 
once were in the majority and increased slightly at each election. The “Just Vote One’ 
strategy was an extremely successful tactic for the ALP for many years. Approximately 
30% of voters utilised the full preferential vote in each election. Those opting for a 
partial preference are in the minority. The report for the Ballot Paper Survey conducted 
following the 2001 election concluded:
This report has refrained from suggesting that we now have a de facto first past the 
post system as this would be to overstate the issue, but we have moved a 
considerable distance in that direction.35
30 Farrell D M & McAllister 1, n 29.178.
31 Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services. Bennett S & Lundie R. ‘Australian electoral 
systems' August 2007. no 5. 12.
32
Electoral Commission of Queensland, 2001 Queensland Election Ballot Paper Survey, March 2002. Under the 
Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), s 8( 1) (c) the purpose being to consider, and report to the Minister on (i) electoral matters 
referred to it by the Minister; and (ii) such other electoral matters as it considers appropriate.
^Queensland Electoral Commission. 2004 Queensland Election Ballot Paper Survey. June 2005.
’4 This table has been compiled by taking the percentages supplied in each of the Ballot Paper Survey reports for 
2001, 2004. 2006 and 2009. Available at: http: \\\\\\.eea.cild.apv.au/scarch.asn\?searchie\t-Ballot%20survev . 
There are no statistics for the 1998 election: the 2012 Ballot Paper Survey results are not yet available but in any 
event would be outside of the research period for this thesis.
35 Queensland Electoral Commission. 2001 Queensland Election Ballot Paper Survey. March 2002. 26.
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Subsequent surveys did not address this issue but the statistics clearly indicate actual 
voting practice: the majority of voters do not exercise their preferences.
70
2001 2004 2006 2009
■ Just 1 vote
■ Full preferential vote
■ Partial preferential vote
Figure 5.1: Trends in optional preferential voting in recent Queensland elections
The irony is that this voting system was established in an apparently genuine bi-partisan 
attempt to adhere to the recommendations of the EARC. Back in 1989 the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry noted: ‘It is no solution to the deep-seated problems which have occurred to 
simply replace one set of imposed ideas and approaches to administration with 
another’.36 It is unlikely that the current voting system will change. It suited the ALP’s 
tactical use in past elections, when re-election was not an issue, up to the 2009 election 
when it clearly was.
Environmental lobbying and the influence of the Queensland Greens in 
party politics in 2009
The ability of environmental groups, such as the Greens, to influence policy and law 
and bring about environmental change, depends upon sustained and strategic lobbying 
and seizing opportunity. Environmental lobbyists operating outside the parliamentary
j6 Fitzgerald G E, Report o f a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council, (Queensland Government 
Printer, Brisbane, 1989) 357. Available at:
http: u u u .ciiK.uld.LHn ,au data, portal ()(H)()00()5 content. 8 1350001 13 1906U07822.ndf (viewed 4 June 2009).
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system typically have a low level of influence in the absence of any bargaining power.37 
Lobbying to produce beneficial environmental outcomes requires, according to Connors 
and Hutton, concentrated activity and considerable expertise on the part of 
conservationists, a planned education and mobilisation campaign and sometimes an 
election commitment, given by the Queensland Labor Party, in return for Green 
preferences.38 The electoral impact of the Greens within Queensland has been 
chequered; and the degree to which they have allocated preferences varies with each 
election.39 Involvement of the Green Party in electoral politics is a legitimate mode of 
environmental lobbying.40 It is also an effective mechanism for change, when the 
greening of mainstream politics is invariably slow and often disappointing.41 The utility 
of preferences as a bargaining tool will necessarily vary and depend on the political 
power and electoral needs of the Labor Party at any given time. In the 2009 Queensland 
State election the Greens had a degree of bargaining power and an opportunity to 
influence amendments to the VMA.
There are 89 electoral districts within the State of Queensland with an average of four 
candidates contending for each district.42 State elections are essentially a contest 
between the two main parties. In 2009 this contest was between the ALP and the 
conservative Liberal National Party (LNP) coalition formed in 2008. There are 
Independent candidates and smaller parties such as the Family First Party, but in the 
2009 State election, the Independents gained only 4 of the 89 seats.43 The Greens first 
appeared upon the Queensland election scene in the 1995 election when they contested 
28 seats and polled 2.87% of the vote.44 This voting percentage was reasonably 
consistent for the following two elections and increased to 6.76% in the 2004 election
j7 Reitig K, ‘Public pressure versus lobbying -  how do Environmental NGOs matter most in Climate 
negotiations?(2011) Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working and the Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment, Working paper, 21.
j8 Connors L & Hutton D, ‘Connecting with Political Power: Social Movement Activism and Environmental Law’ 
(1999) 8 (2) Griffith Law Review, 230-231. The authors cite for example negotiated agreements such as the Regional 
Forest Agreement for South East Queensland between the timber industry, conservationists and the state government. 
An analysis of the emergence of green politics within Queensland is provide in Hutton D, ‘What is green Politics?’ in 
Hutton D (ed),Green Politics in Australia (Angus and Robertson, 1987) 2- 33. 
j9 Hutton D, 'The greens and electoral politics’ (1996) 22 Arena Magazine 14-16.
40 Roberts G K, ‘Modes of Environmental Activism' (2007) 16 (4) Environmental Politics, 677.
41 Potter G R,‘I Predict a Riot: Green Politics, Environmental Activism and Socio-Ecological Despair’ (2012) 90 (1) 
Criminal Justice Matters, 20-21
42 Queensland Electoral Commission, Candidates. Available at: http: u u u  .cciuild.uov .an asp index .’pGd= 197 
(viewed 9 September 2009).
43 Queensland Electoral Commission, declared seats. Available at: http: \\\\ u.ecu.old.cuv-in asp indc\?puid -~I9" 
(viewed 9 September 2009).
44 Queensland government, Comparison o f Party Performance Queensland State Elections 1977-2001, Table 2 B and 
2 A. Available at:
http://ww\\.parliamcnt.uld.uov.au/\icw/historical.documcnts/electionsRcfcrcndums/Part\PerformanceStatel lections.
pdf (viewed 4 June 2009).
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and 8.37% in the 2009 election.45 This increase has been attributed to the 'substantial 
interstate migration to the State's southeast, a pattern that has contributed to a partial 
transformation of Queensland's traditional political culture to one more disposed to 
Green support'.4'’ Such support translates for Queensland Labor into the electoral 
benefits of Green preference deals, particularly in marginal seats.47 Despite being a 
minor party, the influence of the Greens in 2009 cannot be underestimated because it is 
in those marginal seats, particularly in the southeast corner of the State, that an election 
may be won or lost.
It was the possibility that the election may be lost that prompted the 2009 pre-election 
preference deal between the ALP and the Greens. The Queensland Labor government 
returned to power for their fifth consecutive term in 2009. Under the prevailing electoral 
system Labor gained 51 seats with 42.25% of the vote, the LNP took 34 seats with 
41.60% of the vote; and the Green Party, with 8.37% of the vote, were unable to secure 
any seats.48 The ALP lost 8 seats and the LNP gained 9 seats. The days of landslide 
electoral victories for the ALP diminish with each election: from polling over 50% ot 
the vote following the Fitzgerald Inquiry in 1989, their primary vote fell to 46.9% in 
2006, to the 42.5% previously mentioned for 2009. The continuing durability ot the 
ALP period in government owed much to the fragmented and fragile Queensland 
coalition parties. In 2006, a majority of voters polled on the eve of the election, believed 
the ALP did not deserve re-election but equally that the coalition were not ready tor 
office.417
The ALP's long-term grip on governmental office also reflected the electoral system. In 
the 2009 election, the ALP had 0.65% more primary votes than the LNP. This modest 
gain however turned into a significant majority of seats within parliament. This is a 
typical outcome of a non-proportional electoral system, the champions of which tend to 
emphasise the resulting ‘twin virtues of strong but responsive government'/" As a 
dominant one-party government in a unicameral parliament the ALP had no need to
45 Queensland government. Total Formal First Preference Vote by Party. 2009 State Election. Available at: 
http://www.ceu.old.gov.au/ (viewed 4 June 2009).
4<’ Williams P D. “The greening of the Queensland electorate?" (2006) 41 (3) Australian Journal o f  Political Science 
325-337.
47 Williams P D, n 46. 329 considers the arguments for and against preference allocation.
48 Queensland Electoral Commission, 2009 State General Election. Available at:
hlip:,Cwww.ecu.tild.nov.au/elcctions/slate slate2009/results. sununarv.html? 13 (viewed 4 June 2009).
4‘’ Williams P D, ‘Defying the Odds: Peter Beattie and the 2006 Queensland Election' (2007) 22 (2) Australasian 
Parliamentary Review, 220.
5,1 Norris P. ‘The Politics of Electoral Reform in Britain' (1995) 16(1) International Political Science Review 66.
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bargain or consult with members of parliament outside their party: they had an 
unencumbered mandate for three years. Nevertheless, strong established political parties 
should remain responsive since ‘at the end of their tenure of office they remain 
accountable to the electorate, who can throw them out if they so wish’.51 The absence of 
a viable opposition in Queensland until 2011 meant the question of accountability and 
degree of responsiveness of the Queensland ALP was somewhat diminished.
Green support for Labor was most apparent in the 2009 election. As a minority party in 
a non-proportional electoral system preference deals for the Greens appear to be their 
only realistic chance of making an impact. According to the ALP Premier at the time 
Anna Bligh, such deals do not undermine, ‘what is a very legitimate democratic 
process’; the Premier went on to say, in response to a question as to whether the 
preference deal had taken place, ‘in Queensland we’ve committed to a number of 
environmental issues publicly, nothing secret. And as a result of that, the Greens party 
has made an assessment of where they will put their preferences’.52
A pre-election preference deal
Green preferences were directed towards the ALP in 14 marginal seats in the 2009 State 
election.53 Figure 5.2 is a comparison of the votes allocated to the ALP, the LNP and the 
Green parties in the 14 seats in which the Greens directed preferences to the ALP.54 In 
the 14 seats depicted in Figure 5.2, the ALP gained between 45% and 49% of the votes 
in 7 districts, between 40% and 45% in 6 seats and, in the remaining seat of Gaven, they 
gained less than 40% of votes and lost to the LNP.55 By comparison, the LNP had only
51 Norris P, n 50, 66.
5~ Bligh A. Premier of Queensland. Transcript of National Press Club Address, 4 September 2009, 19. This statement 
was in response to a question from Lucy Knight, rural press. Canberra Bureau Chief. Press Gallery Parliament House. 
In adopting a preference strategy at a time of electoral weakness the State Labor Party adopted a similar tactic to that 
employed by Federal Labor in the 1990 election. In Richardson G. Whatever it Takes (Bantam Books. 1994) Graham 
Richardson describes the implementation of a similar strategy which gave Federal Labor a narrow victory'.
Richardson noted the electoral win: ‘occurred because we received an unbelievable preference drift, and there is no 
doubt that the environment was the issue that delivered us the preference share" he further noted the win was ‘the 
culmination of three years hard yakka convincing the conservation movement of our bona fides. shepherding through 
cabinet a series of hotly contested and controversial pro-environment decisions...’ Richardson concluded this ‘was not 
the only factor - there never is only one - but it was a very big one in a great Labor victory" 276.
53 Personal Communication with Drew Hutton from the Queensland Green Party on 29 June 2009. Written 
confirmation was also provided by Drew Hutton who supplied the Greens State Election Campaign Committee report 
on the preference deal and the impact upon three policy areas: the wild rivers legislation; a renewable energy scheme 
and the moratorium on clearing vegetation regrowth.
54 The 14 seats being listed in the Greens State Election Campaign Committee report on the preference deal noted 
above.
5> Queensland Electoral Commission, 2009 State Election, Election Summary. Available at: 
hlliW/w uw.cca.old.ttov.au/elections/statc/statc2009/rcsults/booth28.html (viewed 9 September 2009).
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one seat with over 45% of the vote, 7 seats between 40% and 45% and 5 seats between 
35% and 40%.56 In these 14 marginal seats therefore, the ALP may generally have had 
more votes than the LNP but they still needed Green preferences to achieve the majority 
of votes as required by the Queensland electoral system.
For the ALP, two electoral districts were particularly reliant on Green preference 
support: Barron River and Everton. In the Barron River district the LNP polled 43.83% 
on first preference votes compared to the ALP’s 43.2%.57 Three candidates contested 
this seat and, since the first preference votes fell short of a majority, the Green’s 
contender was excluded and her preferences distributed to the ALP boosting their vote 
to 52% and the winning seat.58 A similar picture emerged in Everton when, following 
counting on first preference votes, the ALP had 44.39% and the LNP 44.12%.59 Once 
again, the Green preferences enabled the ALP to secure 51% of the vote and the win the 
seat.60
56Queensland Electoral Commission, 2009 State Election, Election Summary. Available at:
http: uuu.ccii.ulil.cov.au elections stale statc2()(>9 results hooth28.html (viewed 9 September 2009).
57 Queensland Electoral Commission, Barron River, District Summary. Available at:
http: uuu.ecii.uld.upN.aii'clections state statc2009 results .district5.html (viewed 9 September 2009).
>8 Queensland Electoral Commission, Barron River, Booth Details, Summary o f Distribution o f Preferences. 
Available at: http: w wu.eeo.uld.utn.au elections state stakCuiN iv^nlts distriet5.html (viewed 9 September 2009).
59 Queensland Electoral Commission, Everton, District Summary. Available at:
http: uuu.ccii.uld.eoN ,au elections >tate state20()c) results dKtricl2S.html (viewed 9 September 2009).
60 Queensland Electoral Commission, Everton, Booth Details, Summary o f Distribution o f Preferences. Available at: 
http: www.eai.uld.uov.au election^ >tuic staic20Q9 results booth28.html (viewed 9 September 2009).
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Figure 5.2: A comparison o f the votes allocated to the ALP, the LNP and the Green 
parties in the 14 seats in which the Greens directed preferences to the ALP in the 2009 
State election.
Within the Queensland Parliament, the Greens had a Member of Parliament sit for a 
short period by default. In October 2008 Ronan Lee, the ALP member for 
Indooroopilly, defected to the Greens. He was defeated by the LNP in the 2009 election. 
In the absence of parliamentary representation, Green preference deals of varying 
degrees -  depending on the electoral requirements of the incumbent party -  appear set 
to continue. Part of the payback for such pre-election deals came in the form of post 
election controversial environmental laws such as the Vegetation Management 
(Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009.
The Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009
(Qld)
The politicization of the VMA influenced the structure and substance of the law; and the
implementation of the 2009 amendments had a far-reaching potential to disengage rural
landholders. The overarching effect of the VMA for the rural community has been to
undermine the most basic principles of democracy, however remote and ideal they may
be, that ‘all adult citizens should have a voice in respect of decisions made in the
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societies in which they live’.61 If rural landholders were particularly aggrieved in 2009 it 
was because the voice of the Greens carried more weight -  unlike rural landholders, 
they had a say. The Greens prompted the 2009 changes to the VMA even if not to the 
extent which they desired. Prior to the 2009 State election the Green's biodiversity and 
environment policy on vegetation was to amend the VMA ‘to protect endangered, of 
concern and high conservation value regrowth vegetation, all remnant vegetation in 
urban areas, and vegetation in riparian and wildlife corridors’.62 Following the State 
election, a Green party report on the preference deal noted: 'the Greens support the 
moratorium and will seek input into the final legislation, including ensuring the 
connectivity of habitat areas of endangered systems and stabilizing structures to prevent 
erosion’.63
Queensland Labor was duly re-elected and returned to govern on 21 March 2009. The 
regrowth moratorium was announced in a ministerial release on 7 April. It was to take 
effect from midnight of the same day. The ban on clearing covered endangered 
regrowth vegetation, and the Minister of the day, Stephen Robertson, instructed the 
regulator’s ‘compliance officers to actively monitor and investigate compliance with the 
moratorium’.64 On 7 April the Labor government thus announced a retrospective 
moratorium: this was a law yet to be made. Indeed the opening of the Queensland 
Parliament did not take place until 21 April. The first parliamentary session was held on 
22 April at which time the Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) 
Bill 2009 was introduced. The Act was deemed to have started on the 8 April.65
Scrutiny of the Act passed in April 2009, at the start of the moratorium, was limited. 
Fundamental legislative principles were not considered by the Scrutiny of Legislation 
Committee (SLC) because the Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing 
Moratorium) Bill 2009 was dealt with as an urgent Bill and the responsibility of the 
SLC ended once the Bill became an Act and therefore a law.66 The Committee regarded
61 Stoker G. Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work (Palgrave Macmillan. UK, 2006) 9.
62 Queensland Greens, Queensland State Election. Biodiversity and Environment Policy para [121. Available at: 
http://qld.grccns.oru.au/clection poliev/biodivcrsitv-and-cnvironmcnl (viewed 4 June 2009).
63 The Greens State Election Campaign Committee report on the preference deal supplied by Drew I lutton.
64 Robertson S, ‘ 1,000,000 hectares of critical regrowth under moratorium' (Media Release 7 April 2009). Available 
at: http://statements.cabinet.qld.gov.au (viewed 4 June 2009).
65 Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009 (Qld) s 2. Retrospective legislation is 
considered in Chapter One.
66 Queensland Parliament. Legislative Assembly. Alert Digest, No 2 of 2009, 85-86. Available at: 
http: www.parliament,qld.go\ ,au \ iew 'committees. SEC.asp'/SubArca alerts (viewed 4 June 2009).
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their responsibility towards new legislation as ended once a law was made, even if they 
had not had the opportunity to scrutinize and report to parliament on the law/’7
How then did the Queensland government explain the retrospective moratorium? The 
Explanatory Notes which customarily accompany a new statute acknowledged that the 
retrospective application of the Act may ‘arguably offend' the government's own 
legislative standards legislation.“ The retrospective moratorium was further explained 
as necessary to prevent pre-emptive clearing and ‘justified where the interests of the 
public as a whole outweigh the interests of an individual'/’9 Ultimately the government's 
defence was that the legislation had arisen ‘from an election commitment on the 15 
March 2009 by the Premier which included a temporary moratorium on clearing of 
endangered regrowth'.7" The Minister of the day, Stephen Robertson, further confirmed 
the Premier's commitment in his Second Reading speech and said the legislation 
facilitated ‘the implementation of Labor’s commitment announced during the 2009 
election campaign to further protect existing vegetation to provide a number of 
important environmental outcomes' and in so doing, kept ‘faith with the electors of 
Queensland to deliver on commitments made by Premier Anna Bligh during the course 
of the recent State election campaign'.71
To pass the retrospective moratorium, the Bill, as noted earlier, was declared urgent. 
The Labor government utilised a Standing Order, suspended normal parliamentary 
business and debated the legislation in one day’s sitting.72 It was noted by the ALP 
Leader of the House that the urgency was necessary ‘to protect the forests of 
Queensland'.73 The legislation has no impact upon the forests of Queensland.
67 Queensland Parliament, Legislative Assembly of Queensland. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Annual Report 
No 40. August 2009.3.
“  Queensland government, Explanatory Notes, Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 2009 
(Qld), 5. Available at: htlp:/A\\\ w.leuislation.cild.go\.au/Bil 1 s/53PI)1 2009/Ve»MetRCMB09L\n.pdf (viewed 4 
June 2009).
M Queensland government, Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 2009 
(Qld), 6.
70 Queensland government, Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 
2009(Qld), 1.
71 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 
2009. Second Reading, 22 April 2009, 62 & 64. per Robertson S. Available at:
http:7parlinfo.parhament.cilcl.»ov.au/is\sciuerv 09da03ca-b259-499a-bc7c- (viewed 4 June 2009).
72 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 
2009. Declared Urgent: Allocation of time order. 23 April 2009, 156. Available at: 
hltp://parlinfo.parliament.cild.ao\ .au/isvsciuerw09da03ca-b259-499a-bc7c-
I'5e6alc3ca32/1 doc/2009 04 23 \YLLKLY.pdtftxmMntpv/parlinfo.parliamenl.cdd.uov.au is\squerv09da03ca- 
b259-499a-bc7c-l'5e6a Ic3ca32/l/hilite/ (viewed 4 June 2009).
73 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 
2009. 23 April 2009, 157, per Spence J. Available at: http:/ parlinfo.parliamcnt.uld.uov.au/isvsquerv/09da03ca-b259- 
499a-hc7c-
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Opposition and independent members claimed that the urgency was necessary to 
appease the Green Party for a pre-election preference deal.74
The impact of the implementation of the 2009 amendments to the 
Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld)
Rural landholders had an opportunity to make submissions on the Act to the relevant 
regulators and their own Members of Parliament. In the past, consultations surrounding 
amendments to the VMA have been initiated and subsequently disregarded by the 
Queensland Labor government.75 A number of submissions revealed how, once again, a 
law promising certainty generated yet more confusion. Regrowth vegetation affected by 
the moratorium, which was coloured blue on the mapping system adopted by the 
regulators, included pastures, crops and part of the township of Dalby76 and the entire 
area of an avocado orchard in Childers. The government's response to the concerns of 
this landholder was: 'Satellite imagery was used to make regrowth maps and sometimes 
non-native tree cover, like orchards of different trees, is mistakenly interpreted as native 
vegetation. This is an inevitable consequence of satellite imagery'.77A further 
consequence of the Act was that rights of appeal on moratorium maps were suspended 
for the duration of the moratorium period.™
The moratorium period was initially set to last for three months but subsequently 
extended for an additional three months as provided for in the legislation.79 The 
moratorium thus lasted for six months, until 7 October 2009. In May 2009, one Member 
of Parliament tabled over 200 submissions regarding the moratorium sent to him by
I'5c6a I c3ca32/l/doc/2009 04 23 Wl I Kl Y.pcir#xml=hltp://nai linfo.parliament.ukl.ao\.au is\siiueiv/()9da03c,i- 
h259-499a-hc7c-l~5c6a 1 c3ca32/1. hi 1 itc/ (viewed 4 June 2009).
4 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 
2009. 23 April 2009. for example: per Seeney J. 175. Cunningham L, 233. Available at: 
hltp://parl in lb.parliament.qld.aov.au/isYsqucrv/09da03ca-b259-499a-bc7c-
f5c6a I c3ca32/1/doc/2009 04 23 WKEK.LY.pdt%xml=hltr>://parlinfo.parliament.qld.aov.au/isvsquerv/09da03ca- 
b259-499a-bc7c-f5c6alc3ca32/l/hililc/ (viewed 4 June 2009).
75 Kehoe J. ‘Environmental Law Making in Queensland: the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (2009) 26 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal. 392.
79 Phelps M, ‘Regrowth mapping flawed' Queensland Country Life (7 May 2009) 9: Morley P, ‘Vegetation maps 
need clearing up" The Courier Mail (15 May 2009) 15.
77 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 
27 October 2009. 2858 per Messenger. Available at:
http://w\\w.Darliamcnl.qld.aoY.au/vio\v/leaislalivoAssemhl\/hansard/documents/2009.pd 1/2009 10 27 \\ I 1 KI V.p 
df (Viewed 7 October 2009).
7X The Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009 s 28 removed rights of appeal lor the 
moratorium period.
7 ’ The Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009 s 7 provided for the six-month 
moratorium period.
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rural landholders.80 Common themes emerged from these submissions. It was not lost on 
landholders that the regrowth moratorium was the outcome o f a preference deal with the 
Greens, or that the former premier, Peter Beattie, had promised that regrowth would not 
be regulated. Many landholders referred to the uncertainty caused by the moratorium, 
the inaccuracies o f the mapping system and the potential effects o f a loss o f productivity 
and income coupled with a fall in land values.
The effect o f the implementation o f the 2009 amendments on one particular landholder 
from Mitchell was described as follows:
With the introduction of the Moratorium Bill we expect that our overall production 
will fall by as much as a quarter in the next 6 years, reducing our property’s value 
to approximately 50%. As responsible land managers we value trees as an essential 
part of a balanced ecosystem, particularly when used in order to create shade, 
wildlife corridors and wind breaks. We also use trees such as Brigalow for soil 
conditioning, as they have the unique ability to place nitrogen back into the soil.
However there is a major difference between well managed, ecologically healthy 
stands of Brigalow. that contribute greatly to soil and plant health, and Regrowth 
Brigalow, which creates a thick monoculture, causing reduced wildlife numbers 
and erosion due to lack of ground cover. We have planned for a future on the land, 
and invested 100% of what we have to give, both financially and physically. We 
hope that one day our children will want to take on our ‘sustainable and profitable’ 
business that provides an irreplaceable resource for Australia and the world.81
And from a landholder in Goondiwindi:
Our family-run property is located near Westmar, on the southern boundary of 
Dalby Regional Council. Our family has owned and run this property for 35 years, 
we are a third generation cropping and cattle property, with all three generations 
living and working for our current and future livelihood. Already due to legislation, 
we have a third of our property that we cannot touch as it is timbered. The area that 
you are proposing on the moratorium is partly made up of shade lines and wind
80 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Private Members' Statements, Vegetation Management. 20 May 
2009. per Seeney Jeff. Available at:
http://\v\v\\.parliament.uld.gov.au/view/lesiislativeAssemhlv7hansard/documents/2009.pdr/2009 05 20 W1 I.Kl.Y.p 
d£ (viewed 7 October 2009).
81 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly. Address-in Reply, 20 August 2009. 1862-1863 per Hobbs. 
Available at: http://narlinro.parliamcnt.qld.aov.au/isvsqucrv fee 1 a8a2-l984-4163-827h-202165c30859/1 I -20/list/ 
(viewed 7 October 2009).
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breaks that we have purposefully left, so it seems we have been penalized for doing 
the right thing.82
Other Members o f Parliament also tabled letters received from rural landholders, for 
example:
We are very angered by this latest attack on the farming sector by the Labor 
government. This latest attack is nothing more than a grab for green votes so as to 
secure another term in office. There is no economic, ecological or environmental 
reason for this latest land grab from the current government. Mrs Bligh doesn't 
give a toss about endangered regrowth, the Great Barrier Reef or the welfare of 
country Queensland -  all this is a grab for power at fanner’s expense and an 
agenda from the extreme greens to stop land clearing altogether.
As a business sector we felt that we had managed the current land clearing 
(vegetation management legislation) well and had adjusted our economics and land 
management practices accordingly. We have been dealt another severe blow to our 
industry and cannot trust a government that keeps changing the goal posts and the 
laws to suit. Furthermore the mapping that we have been issued that covers the 
latest land grab (blue spots on the maps) are incorrect. Areas shown on our maps 
that are now to be locked up with no further regrowth management are 
predominantly grass pastures. Other fanners have said that their blue dots cover the 
sorghum crop perfectly. The mapping that this land grab is based on is also 
incorrect.83
One continuing area o f contention between rural landholders and the vegetation 
management regulations has been on the issue o f clearing mulga. The regrowth 
moratorium once again made this type o f clearing problematic. During periods o f 
drought, mulga is an essential feedstock for cattle. In 2009, Queensland had endured a 
prolonged and, in some areas, unprecedented drought. A landholder from Dirranbandi 
stressed the importance o f mulga and the implications o f not being able to clear it for 
feedstock:
82 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Address-in Reply, 20 August 2009. 1862. per Hobbs. Available at: 
http://narlinfo,pariiamenl.qId.uo\ .au/isvsoucrv Tee I a8a2-IV84-4163-827b-202165c30859/l 1 -20/list/ (viewed 7 
Oetober 2009).
83 Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 2009, 23 April 
2009. 237 per Cunningham L. Available at: http: . pariin lb.parliament.tild.tan .au isvsuuerv 09da03ca-b259-499a- 
bc7c-
I~5e6a I c3ca32/l/doc/2009 04 23 WL1 kl.Y.pdtT\ml=http://parlinfb.parliament■uld.aov.au/isvsaucrv/09da03ca- 
b259-499;i-bc7c-r5e6a I c.3ca32/1 hilitc (viewed 4 June 2009).
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...there are several patches of moratorium blue on our map including the regrowth 
mulga which has deliberately been regrown by us to use for fodder harvesting 
should we have another drought, which is inevitable, just a matter of when. Our 
situation is that we are prepared to keep the mulga for however long we can but we 
need to be able to use it when we have to (instead of selling our very precious 
breeding herd again). The stands of mulga are never completely ‘wiped 0111" as it is 
too valuable to us.84
The impact o f the moratorium also affected rural land sales. A real estate agent 
specializing in the marketing o f rural properties in the Roma distract had this to say:
1 have attached details on a property we had recently marketed for Auction.
However due to the introduction of the Moratorium and the dramatic effects it had 
on this particular property we had to cancel the Auction in the last few days prior to 
Auction as all interested parties withdrew their interest ... The Vendors had spent a 
considerable amount of money on advertising (in excess of $12,000) and 1 had also 
invested considerable time and money in conducting several inspections on the 
property (250 km round trip just to conduct the inspection). The Vendors had only 
purchased the property 18 months earlier for $6 M and it was expected that a 
similar figure would have been achieved at our scheduled Auction. As all interest 
in the property was withdrawn following the implementation of the Moratorium it 
can be assumed that this action by your government has resulted in the loss of 
commission income to this business in excess of $100 k, a loss in Transfer Stamp 
Duty to your own Government of approx $200 k and an even greater figure, yet to 
be determined, in a capital loss to the owners of the property. Contrary to Mr 
Stephen Robertson’s comments that this Moratorium will not result in the loss of 
any jobs, this as you can see is already having a negative impact in our business 
which will impact not only immediately but also on future business sustainability.85
A potential issue therefore for rural landholders was that o f compensation. State liability 
to pay compensation would arise if a statute provides for compulsory acquisition o f 
property with fair compensation.86 The 2009 amending VMA legislation stipulated that 
no compensation would be payable under the moratorium as this was an interim
84 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Address-in Reply, 20 August 2009. 1863 per Hobbs. Available at: 
http://parlinro.parliament.cild.gov.au/isvsiiuerv7fee Ia8a2-1984-4163-827b-202165e30859/l 1 -20 list/ (viewed 7 
October 2009).
86 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Address-in Reply, 20 August 2009, 1863 per Hobbs. Available at: 
http://parlinfo.ruirliamcmt.qld.gov.au/isvsqtierv/fce Ia8a2-f984-4163-827b-202165e30859/1 1 -20/list/ (viewed 7 
October 2009).
86 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4 (3) (i).
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measure and a means of exploring “longer term options'.87 As noted in Chapter Two the 
VMA was initially passed in 1999 but it took the Labor Government until the 
contentious 2004 amendments to make a financial commitment to landholders affected 
by the legislation. Much of the earlier reluctance of the Queensland government was 
attributed to the unwillingness of the Commonwealth Coalition Government to 
contribute to a financial assurance for affected landholders. With the April 2009 
amendments the government stated their regulators would ‘investigate the costs of any 
future regulation including potential cost to enterprises made unviable'.88
Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009
(Qld)
At the end of the moratorium period in October 2009, a further Act was introduced and 
this time the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC) did examine the proposed 
statute.89 As discussed in earlier chapters the SLC has a duty to consider if the proposed 
legislation complies with fundamental legislative principles, which include requiring 
that legislation has sufficient regard to rights and liberties of individuals.90 In keeping 
with earlier SLC reports on the VMA many concerns were listed. They included, inter 
alia, concerns with regard to the amended Act’s provisions on offences and penalties, 
the administrative power of the regulators, and the retrospective aspects of the proposed 
statute.
In regard to offences and penalties, the Committee noted the potential effect of some of 
the proposed offences under the amendments, in particular the complexity of statutory 
provisions contained in the VMA, which was required to be read at that time in
87 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management (Regrovvth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 2009 
(Qld). 8.
88Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Bill 2009 
(Qld), 8.
89 The Vegetation Management and other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009 was introduced on 6 October and the 
Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009 was assented to on 3 November 2009. I bis Act 
also introduced a vegetation offsets policy, such policies may be utilised to balance or compensate for environmental 
impacts of land clearing that cannot be circumvented or alleviated. Under the amending legislation slO C set out the 
characteristics of a suitable offset area, including the area and size, any remnant status and current level of protection 
of the vegetation. It was possible to specify through an Agreement registered at the Land Registry (and therefore 
binding on successors in title) the details of the offset obligation on the part of the landholder. This Agreement had 
the potential to require a financial contribution. The Agreement had to be consistent with the State offsets policy 
which at the time was the Queensland Government Environmental Offsets Policy (QGEOP) established in July 2008. 
This policy and amendment to the Act was somewhat dwarfed by the moratorium and the implications of the 
moratorium during this period, for example there was only one mention of offsets by the Minister Stephen Robertson 
during the Second Reading Speech. The offsets policy continues under s 10 of the current Act and has a 2014 olTsets 
policy.
911 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4 (2).
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conjunction with the Integrated Planning Act 7997(Qld).91 The Committee concluded 
that the requirements of the law and liability for an offence would be difficult for a 
landholder to establish.92 The SLC also had misgivings on the penalties relating to some 
offences.93 The letter of response from the Minister to the Committee reiterated much of 
the detail from the Explanatory Notes that accompanied the proposed new law, by 
stating that the offences and related penalties were necessary for the Act to be enforced 
and effective and was equivalent to the unamended provisions of the VMA.94
With regard to the administrative powers of the regulators, the SLC regarded these as 
significant in that they included the power to give a landholder a stop work or 
restoration notice, and to use reasonable force or take any other reasonable action to 
prevent breach of a stop work or restoration notice.95 In his letter of response to the 
Committee the Minister once again noted that these provisions were similar to the 
unamended Act; and repeated information supplied in the Explanatory Note stating that 
the 'power is justified because situations have arisen as to where the use of reasonable 
force would be the only means of ensuring an offence in progress is stopped’.96 The SLC 
noted that the terms ‘reasonable force’ and 'other reasonable action’ were not defined in 
the legislation and that potentially this could impact upon the rights and liberties of 
individuals.97
The retrospective operation of the 2009 amendments to the VMA followed a similar 
pattern to that witnessed with earlier VMA legislative changes. The statutory 
requirements of the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) oblige the SLC to consider if 
retrospectivity would have sufficient regard to the rights and liberties of individuals. In 
reply to the Committees' concerns the Minister, in his responding letter, again restated
91 For example the amended ss 19 R and 19 W of the VMA must be read with s 4.3.1(1) of the Integrated Planning 
Act 1997 (Qld) which covers carrying out an assessable development without a permit. See Queensland Parliament, 
Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest No 10 of 2009. 40-41. In 2009 the Integrated Planning Act 1997 
(Qld) changed to the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld).
92 Queensland Parliament. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest No 10 of 2009. 4L
93 Queensland Parliament, Scmtiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest No 10 of 2009, 4L
94 Queensland government, Hon Stephen Robertson MP, Minister for Natural Resources, Mines and Energy and 
Minister for Trade, letter to Jo-Anne Miller MP, Chair of the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, dated 11 November 
2009. Explanatory Notes, Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009, available at: 
hltir//w\vw.lemslation.iild.gov.aifBilIs 53PDE/2009/VM()l .AB09l~\p.pdf (viewed 10 November 2009).
95 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest. No 10 of 2009. 42.
96 The Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009. 4. Available at:
httn:/A\uw.legislation.old.uoY.au/Bills/53PDI /2009/VMQI AB09E\p.pdf (viewed 10 November 2009). 
97Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest. No 10 of 2009. 42. The amended section 
of the VMA is s 54 C which provides: If the person does an act, or makes an omission, in contravention of the stop 
work notice or restoration notice, an official may use reasonable force and take any other reasonable action to stop 
the contravention.
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the account provided in the Explanatory Note. This was to the effect that retrospectivity 
was justified to prevent pre-emptive clearing and was mitigated by public 
announcement of the introduction of the legislation, keeping the period of 
retrospectivity as short as possible and excluding criminal liability for the retrospective 
period.™
The parliamentary process for the 2009 amendments to the VMA followed a heavily 
trodden path. If a proposed law is declared urgent, the SLC will not examine the Bill, as 
happened at the start of the moratorium. If normal parliamentary procedures are adhered 
to, the SLC prepare a report that is duly tabled in parliament, as happened at the end of 
the moratorium. At the time the practice of the Committee in its report was to list the 
clauses about which they had concerns, and then extract a rationalization from the 
relevant part of the Explanatory Notes and insert these into the report. The Minister, in 
his letter of reply to the Committee, likewise repeated the rationalization from the 
Explanatory Notes.
This process becomes more fundamentally flawed within the Legislative Assembly, as it 
is in this forum that the concerns of the Committee should be debated and ultimately 
determined by Parliament.™ However, it is in the Legislative Assembly that such 
deliberations are unlikely to take place. In the debate on the 2009 amendments, 
opposition members representing rural constituents listed the concerns of the SLC, but 
the response from the Minister was minimal.100 The SLC may draw the attention of 
parliament to proposed legislative clauses that may affect the rights and liabilities of 
rural landholders but the debate and determination of these issues does not occur and, in 
reality, often ends with the restatement of information supplied in the Explanatory 
Notes.
At the start of the moratorium on clearing regrowth in April 2009, the purpose of the 
amending Act was to protect all regrowth vegetation in rural areas, including certain
™ Queensland government, Hon Stephen Robertson MP. Minister for Natural Resources. Mines and Energy and 
Minister for Trade, letter dated 11 November 2009 to Jo-Anne Miller MP. Chair of the Scrutiny of Legislation 
Committee. And Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009. 44.
™ Queensland Parliament. Legislative Assembly of Queensland. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Annual Report 
No 40 of 2009, 2-3.
100 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill, Second Reading, 27 October 2009, 
2866. per Robertson S. Available at: http:/■■■parh'nfo.parliament.qld.uov.au/isysquerv 25ffcla 12-3823-47cd-b3c6- 
6a 179010683b/1/doc/2009 10 27 WEEKLY.pdf#xml=http://parlinfo.parliament.qld.uov.au/isvsuuerv/25ffdal 2- 
5823-47cd-b3c6-6a179010683b/l/hilile- (viewed November 2009 ).
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areas of riparian regrowth.101 At the end of the moratorium period the government made 
some concessions. The October amendments included:
• Regulation of regrowth vegetation on agricultural and grazing leasehold 
land and non-urban freehold and indigenous land;
• Protection of mature regrowth vegetation that had not been cleared since 
31 December 1989;
• Protection of riparian regrowth in the Great Barrier Reef catchments of 
Burdekin, Mackay-Whitsundays and the Wet Tropics;
• A new regrowth vegetation code;
• A permit to clear is no longer required but landholders must give notice of 
intention to clear and a penalty applies in the event of failure to give 
notice;
• Protection of regrowth vegetation to be the same on freehold and leasehold 
land.102
Making the regulation of freehold land the same as leasehold land in respect of regrowth 
marks a continuing move by the VMA to merge the regulation of different tenures. This 
may well, as the Minister claimed, facilitate a simpler administrative process but it 
signals a further and basic philosophical shift in the treatment of leasehold and freehold 
land tenure.103
The October VMA amendments do seem to have taken into account the many 
submissions made by landholders during the moratorium period. It appeared that 
consultation with interested parties did have an impact, which had hitherto not been 
apparent with earlier VMA amendments. Thus, as noted by the Minister, the 
government made the following concessions:
• A hardship provision -  if the new laws render a property unviable the 
regulators may authorise clearing that would otherwise be protected;
101 Vegetation Management (Regrowth Clearing Moratorium) Act 2009 (Qld) s (1) (a) (b).
102 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill. Second Reading, 6 October 2009, 
2508-2509. per Robertson S. Available at: lntn: y~iarlinro.ncirliament.uld.ü()\ .au is\ suucr\/25Hda 12-5823-47cd-b3c6-
6a 179010683b/1/doc/2009 10 27 WLbKLY.ndlWxml=http://iwlinfo.parliament.uld.gov.au/is\siiuerv/25fl’dal2-
5823-47ed-b.3c6-6a 179010683lv 1 hiIite (viewed 22 November 2009 ).And also Explanatory Notes, Vegetation 
Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009. 1-3.
103 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill. Second Reading, 6 October 2009, 
2508-2509, per Robertson S. Available at: httr>://parlinfo.parliament.cild.aov.au/isvsqucrv/251Tdal2-5823-47cd-b3c6- 
6a 179010683b/1/doc/2009 10 27 \VLI:Kl.V.pdf#xml=http://parlinfo.riarliament.uld.a()\■au/isvsoucrv725ffdal2- 
5823-47cd-b3c6-6a179010683b/1/hilite/ (viewed 22 November 2009).
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• Small and isolated areas of protected vegetation may be cleared if a larger 
area of unregulated regrowth is protected in exchange; and
• Excluding regrowth less than 20 years old to lessen the impact on primary 
production land.104
There was no financial compensation for affected landholders beyond a commitment of 
$2 million to assist bodies such as Agforce to implement training and information on 
the regrowth regulations. During the moratorium period Agforce took ministers and 
senior bureaucrats to rural Queensland properties. At the end of the moratorium period 
Agforce took some of the credit for the concessions, claiming to have ‘lead the way in 
ensuring the Queensland government understood the implications of the moratorium 
and legislation to sustainable agricultural production'.105
The October 2009 amendments to the VMA provided protection for an additional one 
million hectares of land.106 The total area of land devoted to agriculture in Queensland is 
141.4 million hectares."’7 If one of the main purposes of the Act is to prevent the loss of 
biodiversity and maintain ecological processes, m  the VMA has a long way to go. After 
the October amendments the World Wildlife Fund, Queensland Conservation Council, 
the Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland and the Wilderness Society joined 
together to express their disappointment with the amendments. In a joint statement the 
conservation groups described Queensland as the bulldozer capital of Australia and said 
the law would ‘do little to stop greenhouse gas emissions or the continued destruction of 
our endangered ecosystems and vulnerable landscapes'."w The Queensland Greens 
criticised the exemptions in the legislation and declared: ‘Queensland landholders need 
certainty and support to comply with these new rules and vegetation needs more
104 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill. Second Reading. 6 October 2009. 2509. per 
Robertson S. Available at: http://paiiinfo.parliament.qld.tiov.au/isvsqucrv/25ffdal 2-5823-47cd-b3c6- 
6a 179()|Q6X3b/l/doc/2009 10 27 WLLKLY.pdf#xmNitlp://parlinlb.parliament.cild.aov.au/isvsquerv/251Tda 12- 
5823-47cd-b3c6-6a 179010683b/l/hilite/ (viewed 22 November 2009).
"" Vegetation Management in 2009. Agforce. Available at:
httir 7\ \  \\\\ .a»loreeuld.()ra.au/inde\.php'.iell)aee nolicics&iuee id 26 (viewed 22 November 2009).
106 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Vegetation Management Bill. Second Reading. 6 October 2009. 
2509, per Robertson S. Available at: httpT/parlinfo.parliamcnt.cild.uov.au/isvsciucrv 25fldal2-5823-47cd-b3c6-
6a 179010683b/1/doe/2009 10 27 Wl 1 K.1 Y.pdf#\mNhUp://parl in fo.parliamcnt.iild.gov.au/isvsciucrv/25ffdal2- 
5823-47ed-b3c6-6a 179010683b l/hilite (viewed 22 November 2009).
107 Australian Bureau o f  Statistics, Land management and farming in Queensland. 2007-2008. Available at: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSS LVfS/ahsV .nsf'Lookup/1318.3l;eature%20Article 14Jun%202009 (viewed 22 April 
2013).
"IX Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (1).
109 World Wildlife Fund Australia. ‘New laws won't keep bulldozers at bay" (2009). Available at: 
http://wwf.org.au/ncws/ncvv-landclcarine-laws-wont-kecp-hulldozcrs-at-bay/ (viewed 22 November 2009).
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comprehensive protection to safeguard biodiversity and carbon stores’."" The 
Queensland government has consistently advocated that the VMA would bring certainty 
to rural landholders. The 2009 regrowth moratorium lasted for six months during which 
time the requirements of the law were far from certain and the implications for some 
landholders far reaching. These amendments did little to promote a cooperative working 
relationship between the government and rural landholders.
Rural landholders and the Queensland government in 2009
The political sensors of Queensland Labor in the 2009 State election may well have 
been attuned to the immediate requirements of an election, but sustainable land 
management practices on rural land require engagement and cooperation between the 
regulators and the rural community. It is clear from this thesis this has been a 
problematic journey. The gulf between political rhetoric and political practice for the 
Labor government in 2009 was wide. The environment was a key electoral factor. Prior 
to the 2009 election, a survey of attitudes of Queensland voters towards land clearing 
and the environment was undertaken on behalf of the World Wildlife Fund."1 Almost 
three quarters of Queensland voters polled said that the environment would have a 
strong influence on their vote."2 How then did the Labor Government measure up 
environmentally? Were there inconsistencies between what was said and what was 
done?
The VMA brought an end to broadscale land clearing in Queensland in 2006. The long­
term environmental significance of this legislation cannot be under estimated."3 The 
politicization of the VMA, however, engendered alienation in some sectors of the rural 
community. This estrangement was exacerbated by the government’s support of the 
surge in mining and mineral exploration permits on rural land at this time. A total of 
$563.3 million was invested in exploration permits between 2007 and 2008; this amount
1111 Waters L, Queensland Greens Spokesperson, ‘New regrowth laws need enforcement and fewer exemptions' 
(Media release October 2009). Available at: http://cikl.grecns.org.au/inedia-relcascs/new-rcgrowth-laws-necd- 
enforeement-and-few,er-e.\emptions?searchterm:=regro\vth+ (viewed 22 November 2009).
111 Auspol research report prepared for the World Wildlife Fund: 'Attitudes towards Land Clearing and 
Environmental Issues in Queensland' (2009). The survey of 1016 participants was conducted in February 2009 and 
included metropolitan and regional/rural residents.
112 Auspol research report prepared for the World Wildlife Fund: 'Attitudes towards Land Clearing and 
Environmental Issues in Queensland’ (2009) 6.
113 The environmental significance of the end of broadscale clearing in Queensland is dealt with in: McGrath C. 
‘Editorial commentary: End of broadscale clearing in Queensland’ (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 5-13.
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was double the previously assessed period."4 In February 2009 the government 
amended the Acquisition o f Land Act 1967 (Qld) for those affected by land resumption. 
The potential advance of mining on prime agricultural land caused alarm and anguish in 
the bush,"5 not least because clearing for mining is not regulated under the VMA."6
Similar issues emerged in 2009 for nature refuges within the State. A relatively small 
proportion of land is conserved under this type of voluntary agreement made between 
landholders and the government."7 In Queensland, provision is made for such 
agreements under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld). The object of the Act is the 
conservation of nature and the emphasis is on community participation."K Yet a growing 
number of Nature Refuges have been subjected to mining and mineral exploration. The 
8000-hectare Bimblebox Refuge in Central Queensland came under threat from mining 
by Clive Palmer's Waratah Coal Company in 2009 and remains in danger in 2012.""
The significant cultural and natural resources and values of Bimblebox are listed to 
include ‘a large area of intact habitat in a landscape that has been subjected to 
widespread clearing'.12" A similar fate awaits the Avocet Nature Refuge which supports 
‘vegetation ecosystems considered endangered in the brigalow belt bioregion'.121 Then 
Premier of the Labor Government, Anna Bligh said exploration permits on nature 
refuges would be considered on a case-by-case basis. A genuine acknowledgement of 
the environmental significance of these sanctuaries should impose a blanket ban on such 
exploration.
114 Queensland government. Department of Mines and Energy. Annual Report 2007- 08 in partieular 17-20 and 
Queensland government. ‘Queensland's Resources Explosion' (2008) Queensland Government Mining Journal. 
which notes that resource exploration investment has doubled in the past three years from $270 million in 2004-2005 
to $563.3 million. Available at: http:/ wuu.dmc.qld.»ov.au/rnincs/ciami spring 2008.din (viewed 4 June 2009).
1"  Fuller G. ‘Coal vs. cropping fight widens' The Land (15 October 2008). available at:
http://thcland.farmonlinc.com.au ncws/nationalrural/agribusincss-and-eeneral/acneral/coal-vs-croppiini-lit’ht- 
u idcns/1333183.aspx (viewed 4 June 2009). In 2009. long serving Queensland Greens activist Drew Hutton 
announced his intention to resign from The Greens and devote his attention to ‘helping rural landholders fight for 
greater regulatory protections against negative impacts from mining...' Fuller G, ‘Environmentalist weighs in' 
Queensland Country Life (6 May 2010) 9. The rural press take on regulation appears to depend on who is being 
regulated.
116 Clearing for mining is exempt under the regulatory provisions of both the VMA and the Sustainable Planning Act 
2009 (Qld). Under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) the conservation status of regional ecosystems may 
be taken into account if applicable.
117 Kehoe J, ‘Voluntary agreements in Queensland Australia: contributing factors and current incentive schemes' in S 
Wilkes (ed). Seeking Environmental Justice (Rodopi. Amsterdam -  New York. 2008).
118 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) ss 4 & 6.
11 ’ See Bimblebox Nature Reserve. Available at:w \\u .bimblebox.oru (viewed 20 November 2009).
120 Nature Conservation (Declaration o f  Nature Refuges) Regulation 1994 (Qld) Part 88. Bimblebox Nature Refuge. 
Available at: httir//w\vw.lemslalion.uld.ao\ .au. EEGISE I N/SUPERSED/N/NatureConPdARbd 08A 030509.pdf 
(viewed 4 June 2009).
Nature Conservation (Declaration of Nature Refuges) Regulation 1994. Part 31, Avocet Nature Refuge.
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Queensland politics in 2009
This chapter began with reference to Tony Fitzgerald. In July 2009, he addressed an 
audience in the State Library of Queensland gathered to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of the Fitzgerald Report. Of Queensland politics in 2009, he had this to say: 
Access can now be purchased, patronage is dispensed, mates and supporters are 
appointed and retired politicians exploit their connections to obtain 'success fees’ 
for deals between business and government. Neither side of politics is interested in 
these issues except for short-term political advantage as each enjoys or plots 
impatiently for its turn at the privileges and opportunities which accompany 
power.122
Subsequently, in Parliament, Anna Bligh addressed the issue of accountability in 
government and noted some of the reforms her government had made in such areas as 
freedom of information.123 She failed to mention her government's tendency to put to 
Cabinet those documents that the government wished to suppress. This tactic ensured 
that such documents were not subject to freedom of information requirements for thirty 
years and was employed by the Queensland Labor Party on the introduction of the 
VMA, in order to repress a report by their own Department of Primary Industries on the 
economic impact of vegetation management legislation on rural landholders.124 Twenty 
years ago the Fitzgerald Report cautioned that 'the institutional culture of public 
administration risks degeneration if, for any reason, a government’s activities ceased to 
be moderated by concern at the possibility of losing power’.125 The possibility of losing 
power became a potential reality for the ALP in the 2009 State election. By November 
of that year the ALP introduced and passed the Integrity Act 2009 (Qld) and claimed 
this to be the start of a raft of integrity and accountability reforms within Queensland.126
122 Fitzgerald G E. ‘The Tony Fitzgerald Lecture' 28 July 2009. Available at: http://w\\\\.arifluh.cdu.au/arls- 
laimuaues-criminologv/kev•-eentre-ethics-lau-iustice-govemanee/news-events/lonv-fitzgerald-leclure-series-and- 
scholarship-fund (viewed 30 October 2009). A further account of Queensland, twenty years post Fitzgerald, 
concluded that the Fitzgerald Report achieved little of substance despite procedural changes and this was because the 
"political culture in Queensland has remained essentially the same, not least because the State's constitutional and 
political framework has made it all too easy for executive governments supported and sustained by disciplined 
political parties to continue to sideline those aspects of the Fitzgerald agenda inimical to their interests' Prasser S and 
Aroney N, "Real Constitutional Reform after Fitzgerald: Still waiting for Godot' (2009) 18 (3) Griffith Law Review, 
617.
123 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Ministerial Statements. Agriculture Industry. 1 September 2009. 
1904. per Bligh A M. Available at: http://pariinlb.Darliamenl.cild.aov.au/search/ (Viewed 30 October 2009).
124 Freedom o f Information Act 1992 (Qld) s 36 (1) (a).
125 Fitzgerald G E. Report o f  a Commission o f Inquiry' Pursuant to Orders in Council, (Queensland Government 
Printer. Brisbane, 1989) 127. Available at:
htlp:/Avuv\■cmc.qld.uov.au/data/poilal/0()()00()05/content/8135000113 1406907822.pdf (viewed 4 June 2009).
126 The Integrity Act 1999 (Qld) was passed on the 25 November 2009. See also. The State of Queensland 
(Department of the Premier and Cabinet) Response to Integritv and Accountability in Queensland. November 2009.
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Conclusion
The making and implementation of the 2009 amendments to the VMA followed a 
pattern observed with previous legislative changes. The political processes within which 
the amendments were made tracked a typical parliamentary course of action for a 
controversial piece of legislation. The Queensland Labor Party has in the past 
introduced vegetation management legislation at the first sitting following re-election, 
as in 2004. After re-election in 2009 the vegetation management amendments were 
announced two weeks before the first parliamentary session; and a retrospective law 
was made on the opening of the new parliament, which suspended normal parliamentary 
business.
Ideally the environment should be beyond political expediency. The reality for 
Queensland, however, is that minority groups may from time to time find themselves in 
a position to influence and shape environmental policy and law. Under the prevailing 
electoral system in Queensland -  and when the majority Labor governments' power was 
in decline and required topping up with preference votes -  it was the Greens who had 
the ear of government and, as such, influenced the political process and the law that was 
ultimately made. Political reality dictates that a policy favourable to one group will 
adversely affect another group. In the past, under successive conservative regimes, the 
rural community in Queensland had an influential role within the State. By 2009 this 
had lessened to the status of a marginalised group struggling to find a voice and a 
genuine participatory place in policy decision-making affecting rural land. The 
amendments brought uncertainty, disruption and marginalisation to those rural 
landholders most affected by the Act during the six month moratorium period. Rural 
landholders were aware that the regrowth moratorium was the outcome of a preference 
deal with the Greens; and angered further by Peter Beattie who had consistently 
promised regrowth would not be regulated. Many landholders were aggrieved by the 
uncertainty caused by the moratorium, the specific moratorium inaccuracies of the 
mapping system and the potential effects of a loss of productivity and a fall in land 
values. Such disruption must have had a detrimental impact on the regulatory 
relationship and all for the ultimate protection of an additional one million hectares of 
land in a State where 141 million hectares is used for agriculture.
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Political expediency meant the antenna of Queensland Labor was attuned to the pressing 
requirements of an election. The political context in 2009 was aggravated by the start of 
a significant rise in mining and mineral exploration on rural land, including land under 
the supposed protection of perpetual conservation covenants. Doubts were expressed, 
not least by Tony Fitzgerald that Queensland had really moved on from the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry era. It remains of critical importance therefore to constantly review and call into 
question our parliamentary systems and political processes. The accountability reforms 
promised by the ALP in 2009 were tested in the following chapter when information on 
the compliance and enforcement policy and practices of the government's regulatory 
administrators was sought.
150
Chapter Six: Compliance and enforcement under the 
vegetation management regulations
Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of environmental crime and criminal responsibility, as 
a framework within which to consider the legislative structure for compliance and 
enforcement of vegetation management, during the Labor period of government in 
Queensland. Both Acts pertinent to this thesis are considered. In 2003, the Vegetation 
Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA) and the Land Act 1994 (Qld), (LA) were amended 
and leasehold land was brought, alongside freehold land, under the VMA for the 
purposes of compliance and enforcement. As the illegal clearing of land is potentially a 
significant environmental crime, the chapter begins with an analysis of the literature in 
this area, which tends to focus on particular statutory schemes and jurisdictions.
Common themes abound within the literature, such as the difficulties of applying 
general principles of criminal law to environmental law. If environmental crime 
continues to be regarded as a victimless offence, common perception will need to adjust 
considerably to acknowledge the victim is generally the environment, and present and 
ultimately future generations. For Queensland, the crime of illegal land clearing has 
additional complications. Until relatively recently, clearing was regarded as 
development and included as a lease condition for leaseholders. Clearing is generally 
undertaken within a rural landholder's home environment, inescapably invoking the 
contentious issue of property rights -  particularly for freeholders. The inherent 
difficulties of defending and prosecuting environmental crime emerged as one of the 
themes from the literature and are apparent in this and the following chapter.
Breach of the vegetation management regulations potentially take an accused landholder 
into the realms of criminal law and criminal responsibility. Accordingly an analysis of 
criminal law and criminal responsibility and attendant literature, with particular 
reference to the jurisdiction of Queensland, is included. In the initial implementation 
stages of the vegetation management regulations, there was confusion on the part of 
some landholders as to their criminal responsibility. This arose because of uncertainty, 
particularly with vegetation mapping. The relationship between the regulators and 
regulated was strained. It was not assisted by the predisposition of the Department of
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Environment and Resource Management (DERM), during investigations, to record 
conversations without the consent or knowledge of the landholder.
What a property owner may or may not clear depended on how the vegetation was 
categorized by the regulators under the appropriate vegetation management map, 
together with any requirements of their land title or titles. Rural landholders seeking 
clarification of what amounted to an offence might well struggle with the complexities 
of the statutory arrangement for compliance and enforcement. Accordingly, this chapter 
sets down the legislative structure for vegetation clearing offences in Queensland. This 
requires the VMA to be read with applicable and complex planning legislation. Further 
complications occurred when the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) was completely 
overhauled into the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld). Clearing on certain categories 
of land may amount to an assessable development which landholders can ascertain by 
applying for a property map of assessable vegetation -  some landholders waited up to 
two years for a confirmatory map.
In 2003 the VMA was amended extensively and, in keeping with other chapters in this 
thesis, this one examines the question: how were the enforcement and compliance 
provisions o f the VMA made and what were the parliamentary> processes o f the 
Queensland parliament within which the amendments were made?' Government 
rhetoric was frequently antagonistic and emphasized reliance on traditional command 
and control legislation. The Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC), as ever hard- 
pressed for time under government pressure, listed extensive concerns with the 
changing regulations, but were unable to include detailed consideration of every 
amendment. As a means of legislative scrutiny this persistent treatment of the 
committee's work is further evidence of a lack of accountability on the part of 
Queensland Labor. Parliamentary procedure pursued the habitual course for vegetation 
management law making within the State. The amendments were extensive and 
controversial: they included the removal of the defence of honest and reasonable 
mistake, an extension of regulatory powers to issue a compliance notice and enter 
private property, together with further regulatory advantages in an extension of statutory 
time limits, a reversal of the onus of proof and the denial of the privilege against self-
1 The political processes are typically considered in this thesis together with the political context but this was 
examined in Chapter Four. Implementation o f the compliance and enforcement provisions is included in the 
following chapter.
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incrimination. The Minister at the time was Stephen Robertson, a member habitually 
employed and re-engaged during the most contentious amendments to the Act. Such 
tactics and additional restrictions engendered a basic mistrust and volatility to land 
clearing investigations.
A fundamental aspect of regulatory compliance lies in the decision to prosecute. The 
final part of this chapter therefore examines the question: how did the regulator decide 
to prosecute? If environmental laws are to be effective they must be a realistic and just 
deterrent. Studies of regulatory enforcement strategies included in this chapter however 
consistently concluded prosecution was a measure of last resort. This chapter advances 
the argument that prosecution policy will vary depending on the values and affinities of 
the governing administration. In the latest period of Labor government the regulators at 
times took an extreme and forceful attitude to enforcement. The chapter concludes with 
consideration of regulatory compliance strategy and enforcement guidelines.
Environmental crime
Within many European countries, there is a basic division between what may be 
regarded as ordinary crime and regulatory breach. The absence of this clarity in 
common law jurisdictions such as Australia has meant ‘that we acquired two paradigms 
of criminal law: the serious, stigmatic crime and the minor, largely technical offence 
governing otherwise acceptable activities for the sake of the public welfare'.2 It is 
inevitable that this distinction may have no clear boundaries and that the boundaries 
would shift with time. It is likewise inevitable that growing environmental awareness 
would lead to recognition, at least in some states, that there are different levels of 
environmental crimes requiring different sanctions. In New South Wales, for example, 
the boundaries between ordinary and regulatory crime are given statutory recognition in 
three levels of offences under the provisions of the Protection o f the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 (NSW). Offences and penalties are divided into: serious offences 
requiring proof of fault and carrying potentially heavy fines and the possibility of 
imprisonment; middle range offences carrying fines; and less serious offences dealt with
2 Simester A P, Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford University Press. 2005) ix.
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by an infringement notice system -  these latter two offences are provable in the absence 
of fault.3
The literature on environmental crime has received intermittent attention within 
Australia. In 1993 interest was focused on the role of criminal law in environmental 
protection.4 The consensus of opinion flowing from an environmental crime conference 
held at that time acknowledged the importance of the role of criminal law; but as one 
element of a wider and comprehensive system of environmental protection.5 
Fundamental and recurring themes periodically reverberate within the literature on 
environmental crime: the reluctance, in the late 1980s, of regulatory authorities to 
prosecute;6 the prosecution policies of regulatory agencies;7 *910the priority of 
environmental protection;* striking an appropriate balance between cooperation and 
coercion;14 criminal enforcement for the intractable minority;"’ lack of enforcement 
despite legislative provision;" the difficulties of applying general principles of criminal 
law to environmental law;12 and the limits of criminal sanctions, especially fines, to 
deter environmental crime.13
Australian analysis of environmental crime tends to centre on a particular piece of 
legislation and jurisdiction. Literature on environmental crime in Queensland, for 
example, has concentrated primarily on offences under the Environmental Protection
3 Lipman Z, ‘Old Wine in New Bottles: Difficulties in the Application of General Principles of Criminal Law to 
Environmental Law' provides a comprehensive account of Tier 1. 2 and 3 offences in the Environmental Offences 
and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW) ( now the Protection o f  the Environment Operations Act 1 997(NSW) in Gunningham 
N, Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) Environmental Crime: Proceedings o f  a Conference, September 1995, Australian 
Institute of Criminology.
4 The proceedings of the 1993 conference were published in: Gunningham N. Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3.
’ Gunningham N, & Norberry J, Introduction, in Gunningham N, Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3.
6 Grabosky P and Braith waite J, O f Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies o f  Australian Business Regulatory 
Agencies, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, in Association with the Australian institute of Criminology. 1986) I.
7 Peters J. ‘The EPA's Perspective on Prosecution. Compliance and Enforcement.' (2001) paper presented at a 
Queensland Environmental Law Association Seminar. Norberry J. ‘Australian Pollution Laws: offences, penalties 
and regulatory agencies', (1993) in Gunningham N, Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3.
* Gunningham N. & Norberry J. Introduction, in Gunningham N. Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3.
9 Clifford P and Ivey S, ‘Problems with defending crimes against the Environment' (1993) in Gunningham N, 
Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3. Farrier D, ‘In search of real Criminal Law' in Bonyhady T, Environmental 
Protection and Legal Change (Federation Press, 1992) 92-94.
10 Lipman Z, "Old Wine in New Bottles: Difficulties in the Application of General Principles of Criminal Law to 
Environmental Law' (1993) in Gunningham N, Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3.
11 Lipman Z, ‘An evaluation of compliance and enforcement mechanisms in the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)’ (2010) 27 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 98.
12 Lipman Z and Roots L, 'Protecting the Environment through Criminal Sanctions: the Environment Offences and 
Penalties Act 1989 (NSW)' (1995) 12 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 16.
13 Abbott C, ‘The Enforcement of Pollution Control laws in England and Wales: A case for reform'? (2005) 22 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 68. The same criticism could apply equally to Australia. Bricknell S,
‘Environmental Crime in Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology, October 2010. xii. Hain M and Cocklin 
C,‘The effectiveness of the Courts in Achieving the Goals of Environment Protection Legislation' (2001) 18 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 319.
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Act 1994 (Qld) and compliance and enforcement measures undertaken by the former 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as administrators.14 This has included 
examination of the early stages of the Act’s implementation;15 and alleged under­
enforcement and regulatory capture, which prompted a detailed denial from the 
regulator.14’
The benefit of reliance on criminal law within the environmental arena was questioned 
in Australia in 1993.17 Greater use of civil enforcement was endorsed particularly for 
less serious crimes.Ix However, an American perspective has advocated the significant 
role that effective criminal prosecution can have alongside civil remedies in establishing 
a strong system of environmental enforcement.19 It is argued that an effective criminal 
enforcement structure should include the possibility of a custodial sentence and that a 
vigorous prosecution policy can have a beneficial deterrent and educative effect.20 The 
key word here is effective; ineffective prosecution, as demonstrated in the following 
chapter, is counterproductive.
The concept of environmental crime may be more readily acceptable in recent times but 
many of the difficulties, specifically inherent to such offences, remain. Bricknell has 
argued that such crimes lack an apparent victim, that their impact may go undetected for 
a considerable time and, when ultimately detected, the treatment of offenders is 
frequently too lenient.21 This assessment is not wholly applicable to illegal land clearing 
in Queensland: the victim is the degraded land. As for detection, this is primarily
14 For example: Nicholls D, ‘Standing at the Crossroads: Public Enforcement under the Environment Protection Act 
1994 (Old),' (1995) 1 Queensland Environmental Practice Reporter 111; Tranter M, 'A path beginning to wear: 
prosecutions under the Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld)’ (1998) 4 Queensland Environmental Practice 
Reporter 175; Milne R. ‘ How to avoid or Minimise Criminal or Civil Action following an Environmental Incident.' 
Peters J; ‘The EPA's Perspective on Prosecution. Compliance and Enforcement’; Devlin R, ‘Counsel's Perspective 
on Prosecutions and Enforcement under the Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld) and related legislation. Papers 
presented at a Queensland Environmental Law Association Seminar, July 2001.
15 Kelleher B, ‘Major Offences under the Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld)' (1998) 15 Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 264.
10 Briody M and Prenzler T, ‘The Enforcement of Environmental Protection Laws in Queensland: a case of 
Regulatory Capture?' (1998) 15 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 54. The regulatory response came from 
Gilmour J, Department of Environment Queensland in a letter to the editor (1998) 15 Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal 163.
17 Pain N, ‘Criminal Lau and Environmental Protection: overview of issues and themes’ (1993) in Gunningham N. 
Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3.
IX For example: Pain N, ‘Criminal Law and Environmental Protection: overview of issues and themes'; Stein P, ‘The 
role of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court in Environmental Crime'; Lipman Z, ‘Old wine in new 
bottles: difficulties in the application of general principles of criminal law to environmental laws (1993) in 
Gunningham N. Norberry J and McKillop S (eds) n 3 .
10 Smith S, ‘An iron fist in the velvet glove: redefining the role of criminal prosecution in creating an effective 
environmental enforcement system’ (1995) 19 Criminal Law Journal 12.
211 In this instance the example of American corporate polluters is given in Smith S, n 19, 12.
21 Bricknell S. ‘Environmental Crime in Australia. Australian Institute of Criminologv. October 2010, xii .
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undertaken by the Statewide Land Cover and Trees Study (SLATS) reports that are 
included in this chapter. How the regulators decide to prosecute landholders and have 
conducted some land clearing cases is dealt with in this and the following chapters.
As an environmental crime, the illegal clearing of land within Queensland has 
additional complexities, thus: illegal clearing entered into the sphere of criminal 
jurisdiction relatively recently; conduct which was once legal is now illegal; clearing 
was a covenanted requirement for leasehold land; and the activity of clearing is 
typically undertaken within a rural landholder's home environment, inevitably invoking 
issues of property rights and resentment at regulatory intrusion. A deep sense of 
incompleteness remains in the realm of environmental crime, as policy and lawmakers 
continue to 'attempt to mould the law to suit the contours of specific social problems’.22 
Within Australia, the legal and practical difficulty of defending and prosecuting crimes 
against the environment emerged as an issue in the early 1990s, was noted again in 
2010, and remain relevant to some of the land clearing cases considered in the following 
chapter.23
Criminal responsibility
Breach of the vegetation management regulations potentially takes the accused 
landholder into the realms of criminal law and criminal responsibility. Following the 
traditional principles of common law, criminal responsibility for an offence requires an 
act or omission (actus reus) together with a guilty mind (mens rea).2A As Queensland 
has a Criminal Code, the common law doctrine of mens rea is replaced with the 
provisions of the Code, which provides that a person is not criminally responsible for an 
act or omission that occurs independently of the exercise of the person’s will, or for an 
event that occurs by accident.25 Judicial views differ regarding the extent to which the
22 Farrier D, i n  search of real Criminal Law' in Bonyhady T(ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change 
(Federation Press, 1992) 79-80.
23 Clifford P and Ivey S,' Problems with defending crimes against the Environment ’(1993) in Gunningham N, 
Norberry J & McKillop S (ed) n 3 . Noted in 2010 by Bricknell S, ‘Environmental Crime in Australia' Australian 
Institute of Criminology, October 2010. xii.
24 Kenny R G, An Introduction to Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia (5lh ed. Butterworths, 2000)
92.
25 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 23 (1) these provisions are primarily based on common law developments. The 
dominance of statute law is espoused in the frequently cited obiter of Griffith CJ in Widgee Shire Council v Bonney 
(1907) 4 CLR at 981: ‘Under the criminal law of Queensland as defined in the Criminal Code, it is never necessary to 
have recourse to the old doctrine of mens rea..."
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Criminal Code mirrors the common law doctrine of mens rea. 20 Nonetheless, the sole 
test for Queensland remains with the Code and this is particularly the case if a statute 
does not expressly include a mental element to a given offence, as is the case for 
vegetation clearing offences.
There are generally different types of statutory environmental offences: those which 
require proof of a mental element or guilty mind; those that are offences of strict 
liability requiring the prosecution to prove only the act but not the state of mind of the 
accused; and offences of absolute liability where no fault element needs to be proved by 
the prosecution. 27 Absolute liability offences arise if it is not possible to plead the 
defence of honest and reasonable mistake. The defence of honest and reasonable 
mistake under the Queensland Criminal Code is, in essence, the same as the common 
law defence. The Code provides that:
A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but 
mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible 
for the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been 
such as the person believed to exist.28
The express or implied provisions of the law may exclude the operation of this 
defence. 20 This is the case for vegetation clearing offences as the VMA expressly 
excludes the defence of mistake of fact. 30
This then distinguishes a strict liability offence, in which it will be open to an accused to 
plead honest and reasonable mistake, from an absolute liability offence in which this 
defence is not available. Absolute liability offences are rare in Australia.-31 Indeed the 
effect of absolute liability ‘is to place on individuals engaged in potentially hazardous or 
harmful activity a legal obligation of extreme (not merely reasonable) care’ . 32 
Conversely the Minister responsible for these amendments to the VMA declared the
20 Shanahan M J, Irwin M P. Smith P L, Carter's Criminal Law o f Queensland (12th ed. Butterworths. 2001) 255 cites 
a plethora of cases some supporting the opinion that the common law doctrine is the same as the code, they include 
Griffith C J in his note on the Draft Code together with McCawley J in Thomas v McEather [1920] St R Qd 166 and 
Webb CJ in R v Callaghan [1942] St R Qd 40. An opposing view has been taken by Cooper C.I and Lukin .1 in 
Thomas v McEather at 174-5 and by Philp J in Anderson v Nystrom [ 1941 ] St R Qd 56.
27 He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR. 523. 533-534.'
28 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 24 ( I).
20 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 24 (2).
30 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 67 B.
31 Bronitt S and McSherry B. Principles of Criminal Law (Law Book Company 2001) 346. See also Bates G. 
Environmental Law in Australia (6th ed. Butterworths 2006) 237.
32 Bronitt S and McSherry B. n 31. 192.
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removal of this defence as being ‘designed to promote a duty to take reasonable care 
when undertaking activity which impacts on native vegetation to ensure that the activity 
is conducted strictly in accordance with the regulatory framework’ . 33
It is more typical within Australia for environmental crime to be an offence of strict 
liability; the justification for this, founded on the decisions of English cases, is that such 
crime is against society as a whole. 34 That being said the English origins of strict 
liability crime have been explained as being ‘developed in the nineteenth century when 
enforcement bodies were considered to lack the capability to investigate the internal 
complexities of business operations’ . 35 This explanation is not applicable to rural 
landholders in Queensland and the regulatory requirements of vegetation management. 
Rather, the reliance on strict liability environmental offences reflects ever-increasing 
societal regulation and the attendant ‘economics and expediency’ . 36
The act of unlawful land clearing should remain an offence of strict liability in keeping 
with other Australian environmental crimes. The practical possibility of an accused 
landholder successfully pleading the defence of honest and reasonable mistake may well 
be rare, 37 but at the very least the availability of this defence would render the justice 
system under which accused landholders operate fair. 38 This is especially so in the light 
of alleged regulatory mapping inaccuracies and the potential for mistakes to be made in 
mapping. 39
Regrowth is one of the areas in which mapping has been particularly problematic. The 
Queensland government has declared that the regrowth vegetation map ‘was developed 
using rigorous scientific methodologies as well as satellite imagery used by the
33 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Papers. 7 October 2003. 3594. per Robertson S. Available at: 
htln:/Av\v\v.parliament.uld.aov.au/doeuments/l lansard/2003/03100711A. PDE#xml=hltp://\vw\\. parliament, qkl.aov.au 
/intcrnctscareh/isvs(iucrv/l5a4aca6-999b-409f-88he-hd66b62d7n09/l/hilile/ ( viewed 4 September 2010).
34 Bates G. Environmental Law in Australia (6th ed. Butterworths 2006), 236 in which the following English cases 
are provided as examples: Alphacell v Woodward | 1972] AC 824: Environment Agency (Formerly National Rivers 
Authority> v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22.
35 Macrory R, Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law (Hartford Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland. Oregon. 2010) 12.
36 Findlay M. Odgers S and Yeo S, Australian Criminal Justice, (2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, 1999) 20.
37 Bates G, Environmental Law in Australia (6th ed, Butterworths 2006) 241.
38 Under comparable offences such as Tier 2 offences under the Protection o f the Environment Operations Act 
I997(NSW) the defence of honest and reasonable mistake remains available.
39 Bredhauer J, ‘Can't See the Scrub for the Trees' (2004) 21 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 44.
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Queensland Herbarium and in the SLATS reports’.411 However, the regulators in their 
information for rural landholders note:
Satellite imagery was used to make the regrowth maps and sometimes non native 
tree cover like orchards are mistakenly interpreted as native vegetation. This is an 
inevitable consequence of satellite imagery which is why the maps and the law 
work together. The maps should not be read in isolation and should be interpreted 
with the legislation. If the vegetation isn't native or there isn't a regional 
ecosystem, the laws do not apply.41
The regulators go on to say that such mapping mistakes will be corrected without 
payment. Nonetheless understanding the maps and interpreting the complexities o f the 
legislation is not an easy task. For example, a rural landholder seeking clarification o f 
the meaning o f a regional ecosystem would find this is defined as ‘a vegetation 
community in a bioregion that is consistently associated with a particular combination 
o f geology, landform and soil'.42 This assumes rural landholders are aware that statutory 
definitions may be located in the Schedule to a statute. To further assume an 
understanding o f this definition and an ability to interpret this alongside the map is an 
unrealistic expectation on the part o f the regulators.
Rural landholders who have sought advice from the regulators may still be mistaken 
about their liability for criminal responsibility. The following experience o f a 
prosecuted landholder from Surat was tabled in the Legislative Assembly by Jeff 
Seeney. This account demonstrates the uncertainty o f regulatory mapping, the effect o f 
the continuing complexity o f the VMA, and the confusion surrounding the initial 
implementation o f the regulations:
During July, August and early September 2000, there was a lot of media and press 
releases from the Government with regard to implementing tree clearing 
guidelines, and that a permit would be required to clear native title vegetation on 
all land including freehold land. We were intending to pull some virgin timber 
around this time and had asked a neighbour to work with us where we had our own 
dozer and they provided the other to pull about 1,000 acres. I was concerned about 
the media releasing details of what was to come, being the proclamation of the 
Vegetation Management Act.
40 Explanatory Notes. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2009 (Qld).
Available at: hltn:/A\ w w .leuislation.uld.gov.au Bi 1 ls/53EDI72009/VMOI.ABQ9E\p.pdf (viewed 4 September 2010).
41 Queensland government. DERM. Property maps of assessable vegetation (PMAVs), Fact Sheet. Available at: 
htin://\v\v\v.dcnn.old.gov.au/lact.shcets/pdl7vcactation/v7.ndr (viewed 4 September 2010).
4" Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) Schedule.
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Prior to this date I was liaising with senior Department of Natural Resources and 
Mines (DNR) in Roma, Dalby and Warwick, with regard to what to do if the 
legislation was introduced whilst we were pulling. We wanted to pull 
approximately 1,000 acres and had the opportunity to do this as a neighbour was 
travelling through our property with their dozers and we could hire one of theirs to 
pull with our own machine. We had these senior officers visit our property at an 
earlier date, when, they actually drew up a tree-clearing plan for the whole of our 
property with our assistance, long before it was required from DNR.
They all indicated to me in their own words to keep pulling as we had a plan and 
that we were pulling within their guidelines and that there was no timber species 
that was endangered and that a permit would be approved anyway. These DNR 
personnel had not been briefed on what procedures were required; being what 
forms would need to be supplied or any details whatsoever with regard to making 
an application to clear. In other words there was total confusion in DNR for a 
month as to what was required. A permit would be approved if and when it was 
required to clear according to our tree clearing plan. They did suggest that if we 
had a breakdown or got wet weather to hold off and apply for a permit. 1 made 
notes in my Diary of these phone calls.
We started pulling on 15 December and later we found out on the news that the 
Vegetation Management Act was proclaimed in parliament and that there were 
restrictions on tree clearing in Queensland. In February 2002 I had a phone call 
from DNR requesting a meeting with me at our property to discuss anomalies with 
the tree clearing maps. I agreed to meet with them on the next day to what I 
thought was to correct some anomalies with their maps. I felt that they needed my 
help as I have lived here all of my life and 1 was made to think that they needed my 
assistance, knowing my local knowledge of the district. How wrong was 1? Two of 
them came out and I invited them into our home and made them a cup of tea and 
they produced maps and started questioning me and it was after about two hours 
that 1 realised things were not right when I was asked for my Drivers License to 
identify myself.
1 then realised that he was talking into a tape recorder and that 1 had told him things 
that did not relate to the original investigation. 1 was not made aware that our 
conversation was being recorded. This has led to me being charged for Tree 
Clearing without a Permit for clearing 49.7 HA of the 1,000 acres. Technically, we 
were clearing without a permit for the few days to complete the 1,000 acres, 
because of their inefficiencies of not being able to issue a permit. 1 was in fact 
consulting with them to prevent exactly what has happened.
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It is very serious as I appeared in Roma Magistrates Court and the Crown had a 
barrister from Crown Law Office to present their case. It was adjourned over legal 
argument, as they have not provided us with the evidence they are bringing against 
me, which by law they are required to do.43
The outcome of this particular case and the regulatory evidential problems leading to 
withdrawal of the action by the regulators is common to some of the cases considered in 
the following chapter. It is clear from this account that the landholder attempted to liaise 
with regulatory officials and avoid criminal responsibility.
This description also provides some explanation of the animosity felt by some rural 
landholders towards the regulators. This particular landholder was not made aware that 
his conversations were being recorded . 44 Information provided by the regulators to 
landholders on compliance discusses the possibility of an interview with an authorised 
officer being recorded. It states:
...officers may record a conversation to ensure accuracy without your permission.
You can get a copy of the recoding. These recordings protect both the authorised 
officer and the person against whom the allegation was made and may be used in 
subsequent court proceedings. 45
What occurred is contrary to the regulatory claim that authorised officers will act with 
‘professionalism and courtesy’.4' It is questionable whether such an investigatory 
practice is justified: there would be evidential procedures involved in the admissibility 
of such evidence and it is hardly conducive to a working relationship.
A complex legislative structure for vegetation clearing offences
The experience of the Surat landholder demonstrates the complexities of vegetation 
management legislation; and prompted an examination of the legislative structure for
43 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment B ill,, 13 
March 2003, 656 letter from a rural landholder Ray White tabled by Seeney J. Available at: 
http:/Avww.narliamcnt.uld.gov.auA icw/legislativcAsscmhlv/hansard/documents/2003/03031311 A. PDF 
(viewed 4 September 2010).
44 Recording without the landholder's knowledge is allegedly a frequent occurrence: personal communication from 
Ron Bahnisch then Chairman of Australian Property Rights Association on 27 April 2011.
45Queensland government. Compliance -  Investigation. Department of Natural Resources and Water. Information 
Sheet.
4'’ Queensland government. Compliance -  Investigation. Department of Natural Resources and Water. Information 
Sheet.
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Vegetation clearing offences in Queensland. Rural landholders seeking clarification of 
what amounts to a vegetation clearing offence may well struggle with the statutory 
scheme. This is because the legislative scheme for vegetation clearing offences requires 
an understanding of the relevant provisions of both the VMA and the Sustainable 
Planning Act 2009 (Qld). The Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) was replaced by the 
Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) relatively recently; accordingly, most of the land 
clearing cases considered still refer to the provisions of the Integrated Planning Act 
1997 (Qld).47 Vegetation clearing offences are not included in the VMA but under the 
provisions of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld). The VMA confusingly defines a 
clearing offence as an offence under the Forestry Act 1959 (Qld), the Nature 
Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) or the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld); it further 
defines a vegetation clearing offence as an offence against a vegetation clearing 
provision; and a vegetation clearing provision means the relevant provisions of the 
Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) as far as they relate to clearing vegetation.4*
The Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) includes vegetation clearing as an aspect of 
development. For the purposes of this Act, development includes carrying out 
operational work that in turn includes clearing vegetation to which the VMA applies.44 
For regulatory purposes therefore, vegetation clearing is potentially an assessable 
development; and the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) prohibits carrying out 
assessable development without a compliance permit.
What amounts to clearing is defined under the VMA; for the purposes of this legislation 
it means to remove, cut down, ringbark, push over, poison or destroy in any way 
including burning, flooding or draining but does not include destroying standing 
vegetation by stock, or lopping a tree.50 Vegetation includes a native tree or plant but not 
a grass or mangrove.51 What a landholder may or may not clear depends on how the 
vegetation is categorized by the regulators under the appropriate vegetation 
management map. Vegetation management maps present a confusing array. They are
47 The Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) replaced the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) see Explanatory Notes. 
Sustainable Planning Bill 2009 (Qld). Available at:
http:/A\\v\v.leaislaiion.c]ld.uo\ .au/Bills/53Pl)l72009/Susl)lanB091.\p.pdf (viewed 4 September 2010).
4X The relevant sections are listed in the VMA Schedule e.g. ss 578 (1), 580 (1). 581. 582 or 594 (1) s 578 (1) provide 
that a person must not carry out assessable development unless there is an effective development permit for the 
development.
44 The Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld), Part 3, Division 2, s 7(c) and Division 3, s 10, 1(f).
50 Defined in the Schedule of the I'egetation Management Act 1999 (Qld).
51 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 8.
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broken down into: a regional ecosystem map; a remnant map; a regrowth map; an 
essential habitat map and a registered area of agriculture map. Over the life of the 
legislation the definition of regional ecosystem maps has changed.52 At the time of 
writing, such maps are defined to include areas of remnant vegetation that are: an 
endangered regional ecosystem; or, an of concern regional ecosystem; or a least concern 
regional ecosystem.53 A remnant map covers remnant vegetation which is defined in the 
Act as vegetation that has all of the following characteristics: the predominant canopy 
of the vegetation covers more than 50% of the undisturbed predominant canopy; it 
averages more than 70% of the vegetation's undisturbed height and is composed of 
species characteristic of the undisturbed predominant canopy. A regrowth vegetation 
map includes endangered, of concern and of least concern regional ecosystems which 
have not been cleared since 31 December 1989.54 An essential habitat map covers 
essential habitat for protected wildlife.55 A registered area of agriculture map includes, 
where applicable, any wild river area.56
Adhering to the requirements of the VMA and the LA will depend on how the 
vegetation is categorized by the regulators. In order to clarify how land is categorized, a 
landholder may apply for a property map of assessable vegetation (PMAV). A PMAV is 
a property scale map of the location, boundary and status of the vegetation and divides 
the land into categories. During the life of the legislation the categories have changed -  
initially there were 24 categories, which made the legislation excessively complex. In 
2006 this was reduced to four categories. Further amendments were made in 2009 
following the change from the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) to the Sustainable 
Planning Act 2009 (Qld).
A PMAV currently divides the land into four categories. These categories are A, B. C, 
and X regions; and areas, which are subject to a regional ecosystem map, remnant map 
or regrowth vegetation map.57 Category A areas include areas which have been 
unlawfully cleared or are subject to a restoration, compliance or enforcement notice of 
court proceedings in which the landholder is found guilty.5x Category B areas are
52 For example: the definition of this type of map was changed in 2003 by Act No 10 s 75 (3) and in 2004 by Act No 
1 s 28 (3).
53 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 A.
54 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AB.
55 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AC.
56 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AD.
57 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AK.
5X Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AL.
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remnant vegetation.59 Category C areas are high value regrowth vegetation;60 and 
Category X areas include land that has been cleared, but when the PMAV was made, 
did not contain remnant vegetation and therefore assessable vegetation.61
Vegetation in category X areas may be cleared without a permit. A permit is required 
for the other categories unless the clearing is an exempt activity. An exempt activity 
under the VMA includes fodder harvesting, thinning or clearing for an encroachment.62 
Category X areas appear white on the maps, anything else will be a particular colour 
reflecting the vegetation type; it is the coloured areas which should put the landholder 
on notice that clearing on these areas may amount to an assessable development.63 Some 
landholders have sought expert assistance in respect of mapping. The first task of the 
experts is typically to assess if the mapping is correct.64 During the life of the legislation 
there has been some frustration surrounding PMAVs, especially in terms of extensive 
waiting periods.65 At the time of writing 8,354 rural landholders had made an 
application for a PMAV.66
Having established what can or cannot be done with vegetation on their land, a rural 
landholder must also take into account their land title or titles. Many rural properties 
encompass more than one title and may include differing titles such as freehold, 
leasehold or freeholding lease. The land title or titles for each property must be searched 
at the Land Registry to ensure there are no relevant restricting vegetation notices, 
covenants or encumbrances.
The many laws governing the management of vegetation on rural land are elucidated in 
Chapter Three of this thesis. Legislative liability may potentially exist at 
Commonwealth, State and local government levels. At State level, the VMA and the LA
y> Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AM.
60 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AN.
61 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 20 AO.
62 Vegetation Management Act 1999 ( Qld) s 22 A.
63 One of the selling features of rural property may now include that the land to be sold is 'white on the map'.
64 Chenoweth A and Chenoweth D F, 'Vegetation Regulation: an on the ground perspective' (2009) paper presented 
to the Queensland Environmental Law Association. The authors are environmental planning and landscape architects.
65 Landsberg J, 'Frustration at two year wait for veg maps' ABC, 27 November 2006. Transcript available at: 
http:/A\ ww.abc.net.au/rural/uld/content/2006/s 1798404.htm (viewed 4 September 2010).
66 A query regarding the proportion of landholders this amounts to was made to DERM, the email response stated: 
'DERM's reporting system uses the variable of number of property applications received, a landholder that owns 
more than one property may submit applications for each of these properties. We have received 8. 354 PMAV 
applications up to and including May 2011. Using this variable it would not be possible to say the percentage of 
landholders that currently hold a PMAV’. Email from a policy officer, vegetation management. DERM dated 14 July 
2011 .
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and the numerous Acts listed in Chapter Three may be applicable, as may 
Commonwealth and local government legislation. Despite the many layers of legislation 
and the complex nature of the particular statutes there remains a general and well-settled 
legal principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Rural landholders, like all 
citizens, cannot plead ignorance of the law but must abide by the law if they wish to 
evade the further tangled web of vegetation clearing offences. Such offences were 
further complicated by amendments to the investigatory and prosecution powers of the 
regulators in 2003.
Amendments to investigatory and prosecution powers of the 
regulators: the Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act 2003 (Qld)
In 2003 the Queensland Labor Government amended the VMA and the LA, in particular 
the provisions relating to enforcement and compliance, in an attempt to address the 
'scourge of illegal clearing'/’7 The amendments to both pieces of legislation marked the 
continuing trend toward treating freehold and leasehold tenure in the same way in 
regard to compliance and enforcement of vegetation management regulations. In 
keeping with the thesis task, the question was raised: what were the parliamentary 
processes oj the Queensland Parliament under which the compliance and enforcement 
amendments were made and implemented? The Natural Resources and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (Qld) amended a total of five Acts, which included the 
VMA and the LA. The Explanatory Notes that accompanied the Bill confirmed that the 
proposed legislation addressed two distinct policy objectives, namely illegal tree 
clearing and native title.68 There was no explanation as to why two diverse objectives 
should be considered within the same Bill. The Minister was Stephen Robertson who 
promised to investigate ‘every single notification of illegal clearing' and boasted, in 
terms of prosecutions, a ‘success rate of 100 per cent in cases that go to court’.69 This is 
an exaggerated claim in light of the earlier example of the Surat landholder and some of
67 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Second reading. 25 
February 2003. 53. per Stephen Robertson. Available at:
httn:/Av\vu .pari iamcnt.old.aov.auA iew/lcaislalivcAsscmhlv/hansard/dociimcnts/2003/03022511 A. PDF (viewed 4 
September 2010).
6S Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld). Available at: http:/, wu w.lcaislation.iikl.uox. au/Bi I ls/50P I) FY2003/N at Res 1 .ea A B031 -An. pd f (viewed 4 
September 2010).
69 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Second 
reading, 25 February 2003, 53, per Robertson S. Available at:
http://w\\\\.pari iamcnt.cild.aov.au/view/leaislativcAsscmhlv/hansard/doaiments/2003/03022511A.PPF (viewed 4 
September 2010).
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the cases included in the following chapter. Nonetheless, the Minister's emphasis was 
on the need for additional enforcement and deterrents, which he maintained justified the 
increased investigatory and prosecution powers of the regulators.
The amendments to the investigatory and prosecution provisions of the legislation were 
extensive. The Minister claimed the changes were necessary because existing laws were 
not an adequate deterrent. The SLATS report for the period had identified 61,000 
hectares of potentially illegal clearing.* 7" There was some sceptisicm surrounding the 
allegation of 61,000 hectares, particularly as the SLATS report simply identified 
changes in vegetation coverage.71 It was necessary for Queensland Herbarium to then 
assess whether the changes would be in breach of regulatory requirements.72 As noted 
by a compliance official at the time, the 61,000 hectares represented potential illegal 
clearing of cases yet to be investigated.73 The then Premier Peter Beattie referred to 
illegal clearing being undertaken by ‘cowboys’.74 The message from the Queensland 
Labor government was clear: traditional command and control legislation was needed.
The 61,000 hectares was used by the Queensland Labor Government as justification for 
the investigatory and compliance amendments to the law.75 The question was put to 
DERM whether it subsequently proved possible to ascertain how much of the 61.000 
hectares had been illegally cleared. The regulators responded:
SLATS assists in identifying potential illegal clearing by analysing changes in 
vegetation cover across Queensland. The instances of potential illegal clearing are 
then entered into DERM’s database, where they are assessed and prioritized for
70 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 (Qld)
7. Available at: htln:/Avw\\. legislation.old.eo\.au/Bills/50PDl7/2003/NatRcsLe»AB03lAp.r>d f t viewed 4 September 
2010 ) .
71 Bredhauer J. ‘Can't See the Scrub for the Trees' (2004) 21 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 44. 46; and 
Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Seeond reading ,12 
March 2003, 536-538 per Seeney J. Available at:
hllp:/A\ w\\. parliament.qld.aov.auA'iew/leuislativeAssembly/lninsard/documents/2003/0303121I A. Pl)l (viewed 4 
September 2010 ).
72 Neider J, 'Summary of Procedure for Creating Regional Ecosystem Maps as defined under the I'egetation 
Management Act 1999 (Qld)' (2003) Queensland Herbarium. Environmental Protection Agency.
73 Sullivan G, ‘Enforcing Queensland's Vegetation Clearing Laws' (2003), Acting Manager, Compliance 
Coordination Unit, Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, paper presented to the Queensland 
Environmental Law' Association.
74 Beattie P. Premier. Beattie flags tough new measures to stop illegal clearing (Media release, 22 January 2003). 
Available at: hUp://\NAv\v .cahinct.qld.gov .au/MMS/Statcmenll)isplavSingle.aspx?id=l 7844 (viewed 4 September 
2010) .
7‘ Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Second reading ,25 
February 2003, 54, per Robertson S. Available at:
httD:/Avww.Darliamcnt.qld.ao\.auA-icw/lcgislalivcAsscmblv/hansard/documcnts/2003/030225HA.Pl)E (viewed 4 
September 2010).
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action. DERM takes enforcement action on those instances in accordance with its 
Enforcement Guidelines.
It is not possible to state categorically what proportion of the 61,000 hectares of 
potentially illegal clearing was in fact illegal without completing prosecutions for 
all of the clearing activity. Such an undertaking would be beyond the resources of 
DERM and would in any event be inconsistent with DERM's Enforcement 
Guidelines.76
As outlined in Chapter Four, the Queensland parliamentary process should include the 
Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC) on the introduction of new and amending 
legislation. The primary role of the SLC is to consider if the proposed new laws comply 
with fundamental legislative principles, and these principles require that legislation has 
sufficient regard to the rights and liberties of individuals.77 The SLC considered the 
amendments and listed its initial concerns.78
The Committee noted the amendments were numerous and accordingly that it was 
difficult, in the time available, to provide a detailed consideration of each amendment.79 
The areas of central concern to the SLC included, inter alia, the following:
• Removal of the defence of honest and reasonable mistake;
• Regulatory extension of powers to issue a compliance notice -  the 
amendments provided authority for an authorized person to issue a 
compliance notice if they reasonably believed a tree clearing offence is or 
has been committed, the notice would attach to the land and bind 
successors in title;
• Extension of powers to enter private property -  amendments were added to 
the LA to bring it into line with the VMA and additionally to expand the 
powers of the VMA, in respect of entry and post entry powers to private 
property, for the purpose of monitoring or enforcing compliance;
76 Queensland government. DERM, letter in response from the A/Director. Litigation Unit dated 4 May 2011. The 
Enforcement Guidelines of DERM are considered subsequently in this Chapter.
77 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4 (2).
78 Queensland Parliament. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest. No 2 of 2003. Available at:
htlp:/Av\v\v.parliament.cild.uov,au. view commiUees/documents/Sl C7alerts/2003/02/Sl.CD0302T.pdf (viewed 3 
October 2010).
1 ’ Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest. No 2 of 2003. 5. Available at: 
http:/Av\\vv.parliamcnt.ald.t»ov.au/vic\v/committccs/documcnt.s/SI.C7alcrts/2003/02/SI.CD0302T.ndf (viewed 5 
October 2010).
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• Extension o f powers to obtain a criminal history -  authority for an 
authorized person, if they believed a landholder would create an 
unacceptable level o f risk, to obtain the criminal history o f that person 
including spent convictions;
• Extension o f statutory time limits -  provision for an extension o f the usual 
time limits applicable to commencement o f proceedings if the court 
considered an extension just and equitable;
• A reversal o f the onus o f proof in respect o f regulatory evidence -  the 
amendments made provision for an instrument, equipment or installation 
o f a prescribed type, in the absence o f evidence to the contrary, to be 
accurate and to have been used by an appropriately qualified person; and
• Denial o f the privilege against self-incrimination -  amending provisions 
denied landholders the benefit o f  the rule against self-incrimination when 
giving information to an authorized person.8"
The Ministerial response to the concerns o f the SLC was included in a subsequent Alert 
Digest report. He stated:
I note the Committee’s comments on whether the amendments have sufficient 
regard to the rights of persons against whom the provisions have been invoked. 1 
consider that the Explanatory Notes provide an adequate explanation of the 
purpose of and reasons for the clauses. The provisions only affect those who clear 
vegetation illegally. The provisions do not change what constitutes illegal clearing.
In considering these provisions, the community's interest in protecting vegetation 
must be weighed against the individual’s right to privacy. Where proposed 
provisions infringe fundamental legislative principles safeguards have been 
included to protect the individual/1
There are recurring patterns in the Queensland parliamentary process that reveal 
underlying weaknesses in the typical law making practice o f the Queensland Labor 
government. Generally legislation is introduced and accompanied by Explanatory 
Notes. The rhetoric o f the Notes is constantly repeated in parliamentary debate and
80 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee. Alert Digest. No 2 of 2003, 6-7. Available at: 
http://vvwvv.parliament.cild.gov.au/vievv/commiUees/documents/Sl.C7alerts/2003/02/Sl.CD0302T.ixlf (viewed 14 
September 2010).
81 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest, No 3 of 2003. Available at: 
lntp:/Av\v\v.parliament.cild.aov.aii/vic\v/committccs/documcnts/SLC7alcrts/2(>()3/03/SLCD0303T.ixlf (viewed 15 
September 2010).
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Ministerial responses to concerns by the SLC. Thus in this particular instance of 
amendments, the Minister refers the SLC back to the Explanatory Notes. Subsequently, 
in the relevant Alert Digest report, it is noted that the Minister's response is reproduced 
in full in the appendix to the report. What this amounts to is a letter from the Minister in 
which the paragraph quoted above is merely repeated/ 2
Debate on new legislation concerning vegetation management has been regularly 
declared urgent and frequently guillotined. However, the debate for the compliance 
amendments was considerably more extensive than usual. This time a Committee Stage 
was held and the amending clauses were debated. The applicable SLC Alert Digest 
report was tabled midway through the Committee Stage. As is so frequently the case the 
Alert Digest report -  and the concerns contained therein -  did not become a pivotal 
feature of parliamentary debate even though the object of the Committee was to assist 
‘Parliament in its determination whether legislation has sufficient regard to rights and 
liberties of individuals’ . 83
A lengthy debate spanning several days ensued. It was unlikely that any of the proposed 
clauses would be changed as the Queensland Labor Party at the time had a commanding 
majority. Coalition members put forward several amendments to the proposed 
legislation during the Committee Stage but none were successful. Reference was not 
made to the SLC during parliamentary debate; but deliberations did include the areas of 
central concern to the Committee. Each of these areas of concern will be considered.
Removal of the defence of honest and reasonable mistake
Removal of this defence proved to be extremely contentious within parliamentary 
deliberations. The Minister acknowledged that this was the ‘most frequently raised 
defence’ 84 and that landholders commonly pleaded ‘mistakes in map interpretation,
82 Queensland government. Hon Stephen Robertson MP. Minister for Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, letter 
dated 20 March 2003 to Warren Pitt MP. Chair of the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee.
83 Queensland Parliament. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Annual Report 2009 - 2010. Report number 43. 
Available at: hltp://\\\\u.parliament.old.tzo\ .an \ iew. committces/documcnts/SLC/reports/Sl CR043.pdf (viewed 14 
October 2010).
84 Queensland government. Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. 
Committee Stage. 26 March 2003. 812. per Stephen Robertson . Available at:
hltp://www.paii iamcnt.uld.uov.au/vicw/lcuislativcAsscmblv7hansard/documcnts/2003/0303261 lA.PDL (viewed 24 
October 2010).
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Status of vegetation and errors relating to location on a property’.1(5 He again asserted 
that the impact of this legislative change was limited to those engaged in unauthorized 
clearing. The following chapter, however, shows that the vegetation compliance laws, 
while clearly affecting those who undertake unlawful clearing, also impact upon 
prosecuted landholders whose cases were subsequently discharged by the courts. 
Inevitably some prosecutions will be unsuccessful, but the pervasiveness of this law on 
rural land necessarily means that rural landholders, as a community, will be aware of the 
effects of vegetation management enforcement. Land clearing cases are publicized in 
the local media and press and particularly in the rural press.
Extension of powers to issue a compliance notice
Under the 2003 amendments authorised officers were given the power to issue 
compliance notices (renamed stop work or restoration notices in a further amendment in 
2009).8(> This extension of powers to compliance officers, in particular the level of 
training authorized officers would undergo prior to undertaking this role, was a source 
of concern to the SLC and during parliamentary debate.87 The Minister advised that 
compliance officers would undertake the same vetting processes as other public sector 
employees. Authorised officers are appointed by and are under the directions of the 
chief executive.88
Following my request, the regulators provided some information on the number of 
compliance notices issued between 2004 and 2009.8l) The regulatory list supplied did not 
include names of the parties on whom they were served. Figure 6.1 shows the number 
of compliance or statutory notices issued over time and by region. Notices may be 
issued without any litigation having taken place. Or, an authorised officer may, if 
unsuccessful in litigation proceedings, subsequently issue a compliance notice as
88 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld).lO. Available at: http:' \\\v\v. leuislal ion, uld.aov .au/Bills .'SOLDE 2003 Nat Re>4.cgAB03 Exn.nd f t viewed 8 
September 2010).
86 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 25 (1) (b).
87 Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Committee Stage, 
26 March, 2003, 818-819. Available at:
http:/Av\v\v.parliamcnt.qld.£Ov.auA ie\\7lcaislativeAsscmbl\7hansard/doeuments/2003/0303261 lA.PDI (viewed 24 
October 2010).
88 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 25.
89 Queensland government. DERM, letter in response from the A/Director, Litigation Unit dated 4lh May 2011. An 
interview was undertaken with on the A/Director 13 December 2010.
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happened in the case of Van Reit,90 the one Central West case in the 2007-2008 period. 
Or the regulators may, having been successful in a prosecution case, issue a compliance 
notice as happened in the case of Dore,91 the one notice made in the North in the 2006- 
2007 period. In the opinion of this latter prosecuted landholder, once a statutory notice 
is served the regulators make frequent visits.921 therefore asked the regulators if there 
was a policy on monitoring statutory notices. The reply was: The procedure on how 
frequently a notice is monitored is a matter for the staff of each region based on the 
circumstance of the case’.93
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Figure 6.1: Number o f compliance notices issued by region
Statutory notices are the means by which the land may be re-established with 
vegetation; as such they are of critical importance. As the regulators provided a list of 
statutory notices without the names of those served, it is not possible to link all the 
notices to the cases subsequently considered in the following chapter and clearly some 
notices would be issued in the absence of litigation. The list of statutory notices 
supplied by the regulators covers the period from 2004 to 2009, the list of prosecutions 
supplied from 2000 to 2010. During 2004 to 2009 a total of 18 notices were issued, 12 
of those in the South West region. During 2004 to 2009 there were a total of 39 land
90 Peter Robert Witheyman v Nicholas Daniel Van Reit (2006) Roma Magistrate Court no. 00192264/05(7) transcript 
of proceedings considered in the following chapter.
91 Dore & Ors v Penny [2004] QDC 364 considered in the following chapter.
92 Personal communication with Gary Dore on the 2 July 2010 one of the three defendants in the case of Dore & Ors 
v Penny [2004] QDC 364 considered in the following chapter.
93 Queensland government, DERM, letter in response from the A/Director, Litigation Unit dated 4 May 2011.
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clearing cases.94 All that it is possible to deduce from this is that statutory restoration 
notices have not been issued in all the clearing cases.
In some cases such notices are not viable because the land has been sold on, as in 
Winks;95 or cannot be implemented because of the dire financial circumstances of the 
defendant, as in Draper.96 Yet a fundamental object of the vegetation management 
regulations is to manage ‘the environmental effects of clearing’97 to achieve the 
purposes of the legislation. The purposes include conserving protected vegetation to 
ensure clearing does not cause land degradation, prevent the loss of biodiversity and 
maintain ecological processes.98 The reality is that restoration of the land is not a 
universal course of action and the objects of the statute remain a distant goal.99
Extension of powers to enter private property
With regard to the extensive amendments for entry to private property, the SLC relied 
on the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) to raise their disquiet and to ‘draw to the 
attention of Parliament the nature and extent of these powers’.100 The Act provides that 
the question of whether legislation has sufficient regard to rights and liberties of 
individuals depends on, for example, whether the legislation confers power to enter 
premises and search for or seize documents or other property without a warrant issued 
by a judge or other judicial officer.101 The Minister’s response in the Alert Digest report 
again reiterated the relevant content of the Explanatory Notes, which acknowledged that 
‘entry to a property without a warrant may constitute a breach of fundamental
94 See the following chapter.
95 Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) Beaudesert Magistrates Court no. 3009209 transcript o f proceedings, 
considered in the following chapter.
96 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (29 September, 2010) Rockhampton Magistrates Court no. M- 
00087418 transcript o f proceedings, considered in the following chapter.
97 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (1).
98 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3(1) (a) to (g). The purpose o f the Act is to regulate the clearing of 
vegetation in such a way that: conserves remnant vegetation that is: an endangered regional ecosystem or an of 
concern regional ecosystem or a least concern regional ecosystem and conserves vegetation in declared areas; and 
ensures the clearing does not cause land degradation; and prevents loss o f biodiversity; and maintains ecological 
processes; and manages the environmental effects of the clearing to achieve all these matters and, finally, to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.
99 The underlying question of whether the land and ecosystems can ever be completely restored to its pre-cleared state 
is beyond the scope o f this thesis.
100 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny o f Legislation Committee, Alert Digest, No 2 of 2003, 8. Available at:
http: u uu.parliament.iild.eo\ .au view committees documents SIX' alerts 2003 02 SI .CD0302 I'.pdf (viewed 7 
December 2010).
101 Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s4 (3) (e).
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legislative principles'1,12 but declared that adequate safeguards mitigated the effect of this 
type of entry. The safeguards were: warrantless entry did not include residential 
dwellings; entry was limited to serving or checking compliance with a restoration or 
compliance notice; and, if serving a notice, the compliance officer must reasonably 
suspect an offence has or is occurring; and finally no power of seizure accompanies 
warrantless entry.103
In Parliament, warrantless entry generated much disquiet amongst opposition members 
who queried the need for compliance officers to be given such extensive powers. The 
Minister justified this provision particularly in terms of the necessity of a physical 
examination of property to assess observance with a compliance notice."’4 Once again 
the explanation for infringement of an individual landholder's right to privacy was 
weighed against the community's interest in protecting vegetation from being 
unlawfully cleared.105
The 2003 legislative changes considerably expanded the powers of entry to private rural 
land to monitor regulatory compliance under the VMA and the LA.106 Because the initial 
VMA was so stringent, the Queensland Labor government felt it necessary to bring the 
LA and leasehold land into line with the regulatory requirements for freehold land. 
Authorised officers have power to enter a rural landholder's property if the landholder 
consents to the entry or the land is subject to any of the following: a lease under the LA; 
a development approval; a stop work, restoration or enforcement notice or for the 
purpose of giving a stop work notice if a vegetation clearing offence is being 
committed.107 Comparable legislation, such as the Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld), contains similar provisions in respect of regulatory powers to enter land if the 
purpose is to monitor compliance."”4
102 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest. No 2 of 2003, 8.
103 Queensland Parliament. Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest. No 3 of 2003. 19. Available at: 
httpi/Avwu ■narliament.uld.aov.au/vic\v/committecs/documcnts/SLC/alcrts/2()03/02/StX'D0302T.ixlf (15 December 
2010) .
104 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Natural Resources and Qther Legislation Amendment Bill. Committee Stage. 
26 March, 2003, 865 -867. Available at:
http:/A\u w.narliaincnl.uld.iiON .auA icw/lcuislati\cAsscmblv/hansard/doaimcins 2003/03032611A.PDI (viewed 17 
December 2010).
105 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld).Available at: httrx/Auvu .lcuislation.qkl.go\ .ati/Bills/5()Pl)l '/2()()3/NatRcsLceAB()3l:\p .p d f  (viewed 
15 December 2010).
106 See for example: Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 400.
107 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 30 (1) (c) to (d).
"IX Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 452.
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Extension of powers to obtain criminal history reports of landholders
Alongside the power of entry, authorized regulatory officers were given additional 
authority to obtain criminal history reports. The legislation provides that this additional 
power enables the regulator to decide if entry to a landholder’s property would create an 
unacceptable level of risk.11)0 The request must come from the chief executive to the 
commissioner of police and the chief executive must then identify any offences 
involving the use of a weapon or violence, and provide an account to the requesting 
regulatory officer.110 The Act further provides that the criminal history report is a 
confidential document and should be destroyed as soon as practicable within the 
investigation process."1 Once again this extensive power was criticised by opposition 
members in parliament. It was conceded by the Minister in the Explanatory Notes that 
access to criminal history ‘may be considered a breach of the right to privacy' but this 
was declared a necessity because compliance officers ‘are unarmed and work in remote 
areas with little chance of immediate assistance should they be confronted with a violent 
situation’.112 The compliance officer could then be accompanied by a police officer in 
the event a landholder had previous convictions involving violence.
Other comparable Queensland legislation, such as the Environmental Protection Act 
1994 (Qld). does not have such provisions and it is arguable that authorized officers 
under both types of legislation would face similar situations. It is also common practice 
in rural areas -  under the many pieces of legislation governing rural landholders -  for 
regulators to seek police assistance during preliminary investigations in the event of any 
safety concerns.113 The potential for regulatory authorities in vegetation management to 
obtain criminal history reports exceeds common practice in other legal settings such as a 
lawyer-client relationship. A lawyer acting for a client in a criminal matter must seek 
the client’s written permission to obtain their criminal history. Yet these provisions 
allow for the disclosure of past convictions to compliance officers, including spent 
convictions. Ordinarily in Queensland, in furtherance of rehabilitation, a convicted
100 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 55 B.
110 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 55 C (1) to (5).
111 J’egetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 55 D (1) to (3).
112 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld) 13. Available at: hitp://vvw\\.leuislation.cild.aov.au/Bills/50PDr,72003/NatRcsLegAB031 \n.pdf (viewed 20 
December 2010).
113 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly, Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, 
Committee Stage. 26 March, 2003, 877, per Cunningham L. Available at:
http://\wv\v.parliament.tild.aov.au/vievv71eaislativeAssemblv7hansard/documcnts/2003/030326l 1A.PDF (viewed 21 
December 2010).
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person’s previous convictions are regarded as spent after ten years for an indictable 
offence and five years for a summary offence.114
These extra powers granted to regulatory officials operating in this arena demonstrate 
the underlying mistrust and volatility of land clearing investigations. This was 
particularly the case in the initial period of regulation, but unfortunately the 
unpredictability of regulatory visits to rural properties has the potential, in some 
instances, to remain problematic."5 While the regulators were asked if they had any 
record as to how many criminal history checks have been made since the introduction of 
the 2003 amendments the response was that: 'DERM does not keep figures on how 
many criminal history checks are conducted’.116
Extension of procedural time limits
A further amendment in 2003 extended procedural time limits. A time limit of one year 
was increased in the LA to be in keeping with the VMA which, may be up to five years 
after an offence has been committed."7 In addition to this set period the Magistrates 
Court may, if it considers it just and equitable in the circumstances, extend the time 
limits."x This clause was of concern to the SLC and debated vigorously in parliament 
but once again was passed without amendment. The implications could be far reaching 
for some landholders, as the case of Van Reit demonstrates in the following chapter; 
being outside the one year time limit, as the law then stood, meant a thwarted action for 
the regulators and no doubt prompted this particular amendment.
Reversal of the onus of proof in respect of regulatory evidence
Further revisions to vegetation management law were included in respect of evidence 
relied on by the regulators in illegal clearing cases. The legislation was amended to 
provide that instruments, equipment and evidence of remotely sensed imagery are taken
114 Criminal Law (Rehabilitation o f  Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) s 3 (1) (a) (i) and (b) (i).
1"  See for example the incident referred to in the case of Harvey Simpson in the following chapter. It has proved 
difficult to obtain statistical confirmation but many compliance officers are also ex-police officers. This is true of the 
two officers based in the Rockhampton region. Whilst this is understandable in terms of their ability to investigate 
and establish whether there is a prima facie case to answer it has the potential to add to an already fractious situation.
Queensland government. DERM, letter in response from the A/Director. Litigation Unit dated 4 May 2011.
117 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 68 (2).
1 lx Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 68 (4).
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to be accurate and precise in the absence of evidence to the contrary. " 9 The Minister 
again conceded in the Explanatory Notes that this provision may be a reversal of the 
onus of proof but declared appropriate safeguards mitigated this. 120 The safeguards were: 
the reversal of the onus of proof is limited to types of equipment prescribed under 
regulation and to remotely sensed images; an appropriately qualified person must certify 
the remotely sensed image; and the defendant may provide evidence to the contrary. 121 A 
subsequent analysis of satellite monitoring questioned these amended evidential 
presumptions; one regulatory response agreed ‘there was now an argument that they had 
gone too far in the legislation, the reality was that the defence could still employ their 
own expert in the field’ . 122
It might be argued that it would be extremely difficult for a defendant landholder to 
provide contrary expert evidence: the costs alone would be prohibitive. However, a 
tactic employed by some rural landholders, or more particularly those advising them, is 
to enlist the expert mapping services of individuals previously employed by DERM.
One lawyer cited three instances in which preliminary investigations were dropped and 
a fourth case in which a complaint was laid, the hearing adjourned nine times and then 
subsequently withdrawn by DERM after submission of contrary expert mapping 
evidence. 123
There are also the practical difficulties of providing contrary expert evidence. The VMA 
provides that a proceeding for a vegetation clearing offence may be brought up to five 
years after the offence has been committed. 124 A landholder who cleared some years ago 
may not be able to prove the vegetation cleared was not of the type specified by the 
regulators. According to one compliance officer in the Rockhampton region of Central 
Queensland, the typical initial response to a site visit of suspected illegal clearing was 
dismay at being questioned on clearing that may have occurred up to five years ago. 125
119 / 'egetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 66 A.
120 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld) 14. Available at: httn://\vuw.lemslation.qld.gov.au/Bills/50PDE/2003/NatResLcgAB03Lxp.pdf (viewed 4 
January 2011).
121 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 (Qld) 
14. Available at: http://www.legislaiion.ci ld.gov.au/Bills/50PDE/2003/Nai Rcsl.cgAB03Exp.pdf (viewed 4 January 
2011) .
122 Purdy R, Satellite Monitoring o f  Environmental Laws: Lessons to be learnt from Australia, (2010) Centre for Law 
and the Environment, Faculty of Laws, University College London. The quote was described as by a government 
official and footnoted as a personal communication.
123 Personal communication with Gerald Byrne, Barrister. Rockhampton, dated 10 May 2011. An account of the 
fourth case against Christopher Holmes is included in the following chapter.
124 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 68 (2).
125 Personal communication with Rockhampton DERM compliance officer dated 8 November 2010.
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If the onus of proof in these matters remained with the prosecution the litigation would 
at least meet the basic requirements of procedural justice. This clause was the subject of 
particularly protracted debate in the Legislative Assembly.126 Nevertheless the clause 
was passed unchanged.
Denial of the privilege against self-incrimination
The powers of authorised officers to require information was further expanded within 
the realms of the privilege against self-incrimination. The legislation provides that if an 
authorised officer reasonably believes a vegetation clearing offence has been 
committed, and an individual may be able to give information about the offence, the 
individual cannot refuse to give the information because it may be incriminating.127 The 
Explanatory Notes grant that this may ‘constitute a breach of the fundamental legislative 
principles with regard to the protection against seif-incrimination' but stated that any 
information provided cannot be used in subsequent criminal or civil proceedings.128 This 
potential to deny individuals the benefit of the rule against self-incrimination was a 
prime concern for the SLC, but not as contentious within parliamentary debate as other 
amendments. Under comparable legislation, such as the Environmental Protection Act 
1994 (Qld), the privilege against self-incrimination remains available except in 
emergencies.129
The privilege against self-incrimination is the common law right of an individual not to 
answer questions or produce material which may incriminate or potentially lay them 
open to a criminal charge. Self-incrimination includes both words and real evidence and 
situations in which an individual is compelled to answer questions or provide 
documents.130 Rationalization for the removal of this basic right was included in the 
Explanatory Notes, which stated that the amendment was necessary to avoid company 
employees refusing to supply information in relation to an alleged offence, thereby
126 Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Committee Stage. 
27 March 2003. 930-942. Available at:
http://\v\vtt.parliament.old.aov.auAie\v/leeislalivcAsscmblv/hansard/documents/2003.-0303261 IA.PDL (viewed 5 
January 2011).
127 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 51 (1) and (4).
128 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld) 12. Available at: hUp:/Avw\v.legislation.uld.go\ ■au/Bills/50PI)E/2003/NatRcsLeaAB031 \p.pdf (viewed 6 
January 2011).
129 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 473 (4) (a).
130 Shanahan M J. Irwin MP and Smith PE, Carter’s Criminal Code o f Queensland ( Butterworths 2001) 1533 
Arenson K. and Bagaric M. Rules o f  Evidence in Australia ( Butterworths 2005) 48; and also Sorby v Commonwealth 
(1983) 152 CLR281
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opting for a smaller penalty for failing to produce information rather than risk 
prosecution and conviction for an offence of unlawful clearing.131 It was established by 
the High Court in the case of Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining 
Company Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 that a company cannot claim the common law 
privilege against self-incrimination.132 It seems reasonable, therefore, for the Queensland 
government to amend the law in respect of companies; but the amendment could have 
excluded individuals and maintained the traditional protection afforded to individuals 
confronted w ith the criminal justice system within an environmental setting.133
The 2003 amendments to vegetation management laws were extremely controversial. 
Jeff Seeney, the Liberal National Party member for the rural seat of Callide, tabled a 
petition in parliament signed by 660 petitioners calling for an independent review of 
vegetation management legislation. The Minister's letter in reply was likewise tabled in 
parliament and reiterated much of what had been previously said by way of explanation 
for the amendments.134 Outside parliament, the erosion of basic rights was castigated by 
the president of the Australian Council for Civil Liberties, Terry O'Gorman, who also 
noted the dangers inherent in undermining fundamental civil liberties.135 As noted by 
Farrier, there is a familiar and aging dichotomy in which we continue to have: ‘on the 
one hand, politicians keen to pursue law and order bandwagons through vigorous and 
manifest use of criminal law and on the other, the increasingly faint voice of those 
advocating the protection of civil liberties through the espousal of the general principles 
traditionally associated with regulation through criminal law’.136
131 Queensland government. Explanatory Notes. Natural Resources and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 
(Qld) Explanatory Notes, 12. Available at:
http:/Avwan. legislation .old.aowau/Bills/50PI)F/2003/NalRcsl eg AB031 xp.ndf (viewed 4 January 201 I ).
132 In doing so the High Court reaffirmed the original decision of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court 
in State Pollution Control Commission v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1991) 72 L.GRA 212 and overruled the Court of 
Appeal in Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1991) LGRA 46.
1"  That being said in other areas of dealings with government regulators, such as taxation, similar provisions apply in 
respect of the regulatory powers of authorised officers. Thus warrantless entry to private property is available to the 
Australian Tax Office in certain circumstances; and individual taxpayers cannot prevent the Tax Office from 
accessing information from them or indeed claim the privilege against self-incrimination. Under s 263 Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) an authorised officer may enter buildings and take copies of documents, records and data 
store on computers; s 264 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) requires the individual to provide this information. 
Refusal by an individual to supply information amounts to a strict liability offence under s 8 C Taxation 
Administration Act 1953 (Cth) conversely, as this chapter shows, vegetation clearing is an absolute liability offence.
134 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly. Letter to The Clerk of the Parliament from Minister Stephen 
Robertson S, 7, October 2003, 3594. Available at:
http:/Avww.pari iament.old.uo\ .auAiew/lcaislativeAssemblv/hansard/documems 2003/03032611 A. PPL (viewed 7 
January 2011).
135 O ‘Gorman T, ‘Tree Clearing Laws Infringe Rights’. Rural news, ABC, 21 March 2003. Available online at: 
htlir/A\ w\\ ■abc.net.au/rural/news/index/archive.htm (viewed 22 January 2011).
136 Farrier D, ‘In Search of Real Criminal Law’ in Bonyhady T (ed) Environmental Protection and Legal Change 
(Federation Press, 1992) 118.
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Prosecution and compliance
A common criticism of environmental laws is their lack of enforcement and the 
"profound gulf between the letter of legislation and its implementation' . 137 However, the 
political climate within which the vegetation management compliance regulations 
operated was frequently volatile. At times the regulators took a vigorous stance in 
enforcing the statute and generated much unrest and resentment within some parts of the 
rural community. Even after the legislation had been in force for some years, the 
continual amendments frequently fueled a rural backlash as landholders lobbied their 
Members of Parliament to voice their annoyance at compliance officers or ‘tree 
police,'13* or took advantage of the Queensland Parliament sitting in rural seats to protest 
against the legislative amendments. 139
As a manifest demonstration of regulatory authority, a prosecution draws attention to 
both sides of the litigation process and unavoidably brings the defendant landholder into 
the public arena. Inevitably ‘prosecution is a symbolic act' and has the potential to 
segregate a target group.14" It is from this isolating process that likeminded individuals 
may emerge to stand as a group and challenge the regulator. One such group of rural 
landholders being Property Rights Australia (PRA) formed in Central Queensland in the 
early stages of the vegetation management regulations. PRA provides support and 
financial assistance to some rural landholders during investigation and prosecution. 
Their role is wide-ranging; as a representative body they provide more than financial 
support, they also provide the solidarity of a like-minded group of individuals. This 
organization supports members, particularly during an investigation and prosecution. 
The Chairman often played an integral part in the conduct of some land clearing cases 
considered in this thesis. 141 It was commonplace for representatives from PRA to attend 
court hearings alongside the accused landholder.
137 Bonyhady T. 'The Disappointment of the Law' in Dovers S, Wild River S, (ed) Managing Australia 's 
Environment (The Federation Press. Australia. 2003) 464.
I3X Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Parliamentary Debates. 24 May 2005. 1521-1522. in which 
Seeney J described a meeting with 660 plus landholders in his constituency of Callide. Available at: 
http://uu w.parliamcnt.qld.uov.au documcnts/Hansard/20()5/2()()5 05 24 \V1 T KLY.pdf#xml http://uuu.pailiamcn 
t.qld.uov.au/intemctscareh/isvsqucn 51697c98-138f-4959-9cl9-571dd()l’643ha/2/hilitc/ (viewed 29 January 2011).
139 Schwarten E. ‘City March Organised as Queensland Parliament Sits: 350 Protest Tree Clearing Laws’, The 
Morning Bulletin (7 October 2005).
14111 Iawkins K, ‘Law as Last Resort' in Baldwin R. Scott C and Hood C, (ed) A Reader on Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 291.
141 During the initial interview that took place at the Gracemere property of the then Chairman Ron Bahnisch. he was 
in possession of all relevant court filed documents and instructed counsel along with the accused landholder. The 
extent of support provided seemed to vary with the particular needs of each litigant.
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How then do the regulators decide who should be prosecuted? Grabosky and 
Braithwaite aimed to ‘shed light’ on the enforcement strategies of regulatory agencies in 
Australia and concluded in the late 1980s that the decision to prosecute was a measure 
of last resort and regulators were generally ‘of manners gentle'.142 This research 
incorporated regulatory agencies across Australia. The three major environmental 
agencies in Queensland included: the Noise Abatement Authority; the Water Quality 
Council, and the Air Pollution Council. Two of the regulatory bodies refused to 
cooperate with the research, the Air Pollution Council did so at the behest of the 
Minister at the time Russ Hinze.143 Grabosky and Braithwaite analyzed prosecution data 
from the three Queensland agencies annual reports from 1974 to 1984 and concluded 
there was ‘an explicit avoidance of prosecution in favour of a tolerant, conciliatory 
approach’.144 The period of this research would have coincided with the conservative 
phase of the Bjelke-Petersen government.
A study of water authorities in England also found that they prosecute in extremis, and 
argued that the economic rational argument that bargaining may be more efficient than 
expending time and expense on enforcement, misses the ‘moral component at its heart 
and the social context in which enforcement is conducted'.143 The social context in 
which enforcement of vegetation management regulations is conducted has been 
explored as far as it proved possible; Hawkin's description of a regulatory body’s 
decision to prosecute as ‘a shadowy entity lurking off-stage, often invoked, however 
discreetly, yet rarely revealed'146 proved apt for DERM.
The regulators were not prepared to divulge information beyond the general compliance 
material available on their web site. An in-depth analysis of their compliance policy is 
therefore difficult to provide. Following a request for more specific details, the 
regulators cited their department's compliance strategy, enforcement guidelines, and 
annual compliance plan as providing sufficient evidence of their policy. An examination 
of these three documents will be undertaken but it should be noted that they are
142 Grabosky P and Braithwaite J, O f Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies o f  Australian Business Regulatory 
Agencies, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, in Association with the Australian Institute of Criminology, 1986) 1.
143 Grabosky P and Braithwaite J, n 142. In a Queensland, Legislative Assembly, Motion of Condolence. (16 July 
1991) 6; Wayne Goss then Premier described Russ Hinze by his commonly known title as "Minister for Everything’. 
Goss noted Hinze had resigned from Parliament but did not say this was part of the fallout from the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry'.
144 Grabosky P and Braithwaite J. n 142. 43.
143 Hawkins K, Law as L.ast Resort’ in Baldwin R. Scott C and Hood C, (ed) A Reader on Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 289.
146 Hawkins K, n 145,288.
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generalized accounts which encompass all sixty Acts that DERM administers. 
Consideration of how DERM exercises any discretion in their vegetation management 
regime is therefore difficult to determine. Discretion is an important aspect of their 
compliance policy particularly as the erosion of the usual customary safeguards 
afforded to accused persons may be assuaged by discretion in prosecution and 
compliance policies that may ‘ameliorate the coercive and potentially unjust nature of 
“no-fault” liability’ . 147
The compliance strategy provides that:
DERM is committed to proactively managing and monitoring risks to 
Queensland's environment and natural resources through the implementation of a 
compliance strategy founded on a targeted and transparent approach to compliance, 
supported by a modern and strong enforcement capability. 148
The regulatory claim of a ‘transparent approach’ is not substantiated in light of the 
information they are actually prepared to divulge. DERM state their approach to 
compliance will:
• Ensure that our clients understand Queensland's environmental and natural 
resource management obligations;
• Encourage voluntary compliance with those obligations;
• Work with government, business, industry and the community to improve 
performance;
• Monitor compliance with Queensland's environmental and natural 
resource management laws; and
• Take consistent and proportionate responses to non-compliance in 
accordance with the Enforcement Guidelines to achieve environmental and 
natural resource outcomes and deter further non-compliance. 149
The proportionate and consistent approach is again reiterated in the Enforcement 
Guidelines of DERM, with a stated reliance on an ‘enforcement pyramid’, a concept
147 Bronitt S and McSherry B. Principles o f  Criminal Law (Law Book Company 2001)192.
148 Queensland government. DKRM. Compliance Strategy 2010-2014. Available at:
hltp://\\ wu. derm .old, uov.au/em ironmental manaucmenl/compliance/pdl/complianec-slrnleav-2010-14.pdf (viewed 
2 February 2011).
141 Queensland government. DERM. Compliance Strategy 2010-2014. Available at:
http://www.dcrm.nld.uov.au/environmcntal managcmcnt/compliance/pdl7compliance-stratcav-2010-I4.pdf (viewed 
2 February 2011) 1.
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developed by Ayres and Braithwaite in 1992.15(1 With time the enforcement pyramid has 
evolved and adapted to particular regulatory requirements.151 Thus Gunningham and 
Grabosky, in building on the work of Ayres and Braithwaite, have advocated smart 
regulation which accepts the benefits of the enforcement pyramid and further promotes 
the ‘virtues of expanding regulation beyond the dyadic (state) regulator-regulatee 
relationship' which would ‘include second and third parties (both commercial and non 
commercial) as surrogate regulators, thereby achieving not only better policy outcomes 
at less cost but also freeing up scarce regulatory resources'.152
A basic Ayres and Braithwaite enforcement pyramid would begin at the base with self 
regulation, move to enforced self regulation, then to command and control regulation 
with discretionary punishment, and finally to command and control regulation with non­
discretionary punishment.153 The reasoning behind the enforcement pyramid is this: 
when a state negotiates their regulatory goal with the regulated community and allows 
them discretion and responsibility this facilitates ‘the best chance of an optimal strategy 
that trades off maximum gaol attainment at least cost’.154 As some individuals will 
inevitably exploit such a policy, Ayres and Braithwaite held ‘the state must also 
communicate its willingness to escalate its regulatory strategy’.155 This escalation would 
operate within a pyramid of regulatory strategies.
150 Ayres I and Braithwaite J. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University 
Press, 1992). t his work is essentially the foundational theory for responsive regulation. This theory has been built 
upon and there is now a body of literature advocating regulators should employ a mix of regulatory strategies and 
policy instruments to improve compliance. For example: Braithwaite J, ‘The Essence of Responsive Regulation’
(2011) University o f  British Columbia Review 44. Gunningham N, Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1998) 11: Gunningham N and Johnstone R. Regulating 
Workplace Safety: Systems and Sanctions (Oxford University Press, 1999); Martin P and Gunningham N, ‘Leading 
reform of natural resource management law: core principles’ (2011) 28 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 
141: Baldwin R and Black J, ‘ Really Responsive Regulation' (2008) 71(1) Modern Law Review 59.
IM Evolution of the enforcement pyramid is chronicled in: Braithwaite J and Braithwaite V. ‘An evolving compliance 
model for tax enforcement' in Shover N and Wright J P. (ed) Crimes o f  Privilege: Readings in White-collar Crime 
(OUP. 2000) 1-19.
I>: Smart regulation was developed particularly in Gunningham N. Grabosky P and Sinclair D. Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1998) 11: and further, for example, in: Gunningham N 
and Johnstone R, Regulating Workplace Safety: Systems and Sanctions (Oxford University Press, 1999); and Parker 
C, The Open Corporation: Effective Self Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge University Press. 2002) and more 
recently in Gunningham N, ‘Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond' in 
Parker C and Nielsen V L (ed) Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation ( Edward Elgar, 2011) 199 
- 2 2 1 .
153 Ayres I and Braithwaite J. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University 
Press, 1992) for example Eigure 2.3 on 39. Braithwaite had previously argued in Braithwaite J. To Punish or 
Persuade: Enforcement o f Coal Mine Safety’ (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1985) that governments 
were more likely to achieve compliance with effective self regulation.
154 Ayres 1 and Braithwaite J, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University 
Press, 1992)38.
155 Ayres 1 and Braithwaite J. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University 
Press, 1992)38.
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DERM is one of many regulatory agencies throughout Australia to utilise and adapt the 
enforcement pyramid.156 DERM's enforcement pyramid was as follows: the bottom of 
the pyramid shows compliance requiring no enforcement; followed by education and 
warning notices; then administrative enforcement action such as compliance and 
restoration notices, with criminal prosecution being the smallest section at the top of the 
pyramid. Within this pyramid, prosecution is a last resort action and DERM goes on to 
say: ‘consideration needs to be given to whether money is better spent on preventing a 
problem or remediating the impacts of an unlawful activity rather than undertaking 
costly prosecution actions'.157 Some of the cases considered in the following chapter 
demonstrate that such a measured declaration is often far removed from day-to-day 
regulatory practice and, rather than promoting a culture of compliance, regulatory 
behaviour sometimes had the opposite effect.
Critiques of the enforcement pyramid often explore a specific area or issue: for example 
in 2003 Job and Honaker examined the Australian Taxation Office during the period 
when the Taxation Office moved from a long established style of command and control 
administration to a program of responsive regulation.I5S Job and Honaker interviewed 
employees and found that the shift in compliance method was resisted by some 
employees but this was balanced by those who were willing to take on new ideas in the 
furtherance of personal and collective goals. Job and Honaker cautioned that the success 
of this move to responsive regulation required the Australian Taxation Office, as 
employers, to communicate and share experiences and to develop intrinsic rewards such 
as praise and gratitude. Such an examination of the regulatory practice of DERM would 
have been impossible since, as noted earlier, they declined to reveal any information 
beyond the broadly based compliance material on their web site.159
156 The enforcement pyramid can be adapted in isolation or utilised alongside other enforcement strategies. For 
example the Australian Taxation Office currently employs an adapted enforcement pyramid together with a 
differentiation framework compliance strategy. This is comprehensively examined in Hamilton S, 'New Dimensions 
in Regulatory Compliance-Building the Bridge to Better Compliance" (2012) 10 (2) eJournal o f  Tax Research.
M7 Queensland government. DERM. Enforcement Guidelines. 2010. 2. Available at:
http:/Av\v\\ .derm.uld.gov.au/cnvironmcntal manaacmcnt/txlf/cnforccment-suiidclincs.ndf (viewed 6 February 2011)., 
4.
l7S Job J and Honaker D. ‘Short-term Experience with responsive Regulation in the Australian Taxation office in 
Braithwaite V (ed) 111 -  129. A further example is that of Parker, her study of the ACCC and cartel enforcement 
revealed that a lack of political support for the law could undermine an enforcement pyramid and lead regulators to 
enforce the law 'soilly" and therefore ineffectively. See Parker C, The “Compliance’* Trap: the Moral Message in 
Responsive Regulatory Enforcement" (2006) 40 Law and Society Review 591.
I5) A recent search of the regulatory web site, following the change in State government, revealed that the compliance 
strategy and enforcement guidelines have been replaced with a Regulatory Strategy. This document and the annual 
compliance plan for 2013 -2014 contain no reference to the enforcement pyramid. For example: Annual Compliance 
Plan 2013-2014 and Regulatory Strategy are available at: httn:,7wu w.ehn.uld.t’ox ,au/ (viewed 8 April 2014). The 
shill in compliance and enforcement is further explored in the concluding Chapter Nine at pp 285 -286.
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The decision to prosecute is a fundamental aspect of regulatory compliance and, as a 
government department DERM is governed by Guidelines from the Queensland 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The Guidelines establish a two-tiered test: is 
there sufficient evidence; and, if so, does the public interest require a prosecution? 160 
Sufficient evidence is established by a prima facie case and a reasonable prospect of 
conviction; together with the overriding caveat that criminal matters require guilt to be 
established beyond reasonable doubt. 161 Public interest criteria are set down in the DPP 
Guidelines and adapted by DERM as applicable to environmental crime they include, 
inter alia:
• The seriousness, triviality, or ‘technical nature' of the offence;
• The harm or potential harm to the environment caused by the offence;
• Any mitigating or aggravating circumstances;
• The degree of culpability of the alleged offender;
• The availability and effectiveness of any alternatives to enforcement 
action;
• Whether the offender has been dealt with previously without enforcement 
action and, if so, what level of enforcement action;
• Whether the breach is a continuing or second offence;
• Whether the offence is ongoing;
• Whether the administrative action or court orders are necessary to prevent 
a recurrence of the offence;
• The prevalence of the alleged offence and the need for deterrence;
• The length of time since the alleged offence occurred;
• The age and physical or mental health of the offender; and
• Whether there are counter-productive features of the proposed 
enforcement tools. 162
The regulators conclude in the Enforcement Guidelines that a principle aim of making a 
breach of law an environmental crime is to deter others within the same community. 163
16(1 Queensland government, Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Director's Guidelines, 2. Available at: 
http:/7\\ ww.justice.uld.uov .au/ data/assets/pdf lile/0015/1670 l/l)irectors-auidelines.pdf (viewed 6 February 2011).
161 Queensland government. Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Director's Guidelines, 3.
162 Queensland government, DERM. Enforcement Guidelines, 2010. 2. Available at:
bttp://\vww.denn.i|ld.aov.au/cnvironmcntal manaaement/pdt/cn forccment-auidclincs.pdf (viewed 6 February 2011).
163 Queensland government, DERM. Enforcement Guidelines, 2010. 4.
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The third aspect of regulatory compliance policy is the Annual Compliance Plan, which 
includes details of proposed activities of the regulators over the coining year and in 
doing so, according to DERM, gives ‘effect to its commitment to transparency in the 
way that compliance activities are carried out',164 The compliance approach is divided 
into nine areas; one of these is vegetation management. Specific compliance projects are 
outlined in these areas and there are thirteen projects for 2010-2011. Two of these are 
relevant to the management of vegetation: a vegetation management best practice 
framework and a SLATS assessment.165 The objectives of the best practice framework 
are described as being:
To make refinements to vegetation management codes, making them more 
practical and understandable and to increase client awareness and ability to 
interpret and implement aspects of the vegetation management framework.166
The expected outcomes include increased compliance and an increased opportunity for 
self-regulation and education.167 What is clear from this project is the regulator's 
recognition that more needs to be done to ensure rural landholders understand the 
regulatory requirements.
The SLATS identification of vegetation clearing for 2007-2008 identifies 12,500 
hectares of unexplained clearing.I6X The scope of this project is described as being to 
implement compliance responses * based on the scale of clearing and the biodiversity 
value of the vegetation cleared'.169 The expected outcomes of this project are said to 
include discussion with landholders, warning letters, penalty infringement notices, 
restoration notices or legal proceedings.170 There are points worthy of note in respect of 
this project. The area of land identified by SLATS has reduced considerably from the 
61,000 hectares identified as justification for the 2003 legislative amendments. It would 
be impossible to clarify how much of the 12,500 hectares of unexplained clearing was 
actually illegal clearing: DERM were unable to make this clarification in respect of the
164 Queensland government. DERM. Annual Compliance Plan 2010-2011. Available at:
l i U n : / / \ \ \ \ \ \ . derm.old.gov.au/cn\ ironmcntal managcmcnt/compliancc/ndl7annual-compliancc-plan-2()IO-l I .pdf 
(viewed 6 February 2011).
165 Queensland government. DERM. Annual Compliance Plan 2010-2011 .n 164. 3.
166 Queensland government, DERM. Enforcement Guidelines, 2010. n 162.18.
’''’Queensland government, DERM. Annual Compliance Plan 2010-2011. Available at:
http: uuw.derm.cild.aov.au/env ironmental management/compliance/pdl/annual-compliancc-plan-2010-1 1 .ndf 
(viewed 6 February 2011). 18.
168 Queensland government. DERM, n 164. 18.
169 Queensland government. DERM, n 164. 18.
170 Queensland government. DERM, n 164. 18.
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earlier 61,000 hectares.171 What is significant is that this overall reduction in clearing 
indicates that Queensland is moving towards the objectives of vegetation clearing 
legislation. Equally there has been a significant shift in terminology from ‘potentially 
illegal clearing' references to a less antagonistic reference to ‘unexplained clearing'.172
Conclusion
This chapter shows that many of the difficulties inherent to environmental crime remain 
and that within Queensland there are additional complexities to the offence of illegal 
land clearing. These complexities include the specifics of this environmental crime in 
that conduct which was once legal and often a regulatory requirement is now illegal; 
and the activity of clearing is typically undertaken within a rural landholder’s home 
environment, inevitably invoking issues of property rights and resentment at regulatory 
intrusion. This chapter demonstrates that the illegal clearing of vegetation in 
Queensland does not take into account the different levels of environmental crime to 
encompass serious, middle range and technical breaches as occurs in NSW. This typical 
distinction, as established in He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR.173 differentiates 
between more serious crime requiring proof of a mental element or guilty mind; to 
offences of strict liability requiring proof of the act but not the state of mind; to offences 
of absolute liability in which no fault element is required to be proven by the 
prosecution. The illegal clearing of land in Queensland remains an absolute liability 
offence.
The legislative structure for vegetation clearing offences in Queensland was explored in 
this chapter and it is evident such offences are contained in a complex statutory scheme 
which requires both the VMA and the LA to be read in conjunction with the Sustainable 
Planning Act 2009 (Qld). Consistent with other chapters in this thesis, consideration is 
given to the Queensland parliamentary processes under which the amendments to the 
compliance and enforcement provisions of the vegetation management regulations were 
undertaken. These amendments followed a recurring pattern within the parliamentary 
process and manifest fundamental flaws in the typical law making practice of the 
Queensland Labor government, particularly when laws are controversial. The legislative
171 Queensland government, DERM, letter in response from the A/Director. Litigation Unit dated 4lh May 2011.
172 Queensland government, DERM, n 164. 18.
173 He Kaw Teh v The Queen, ( 1985) 157 CLR, 523. 533-534.
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system was complicated further by widespread amendments to the investigatory and 
prosecution powers of the regulators, for example, the reversal of the onus of proof in 
respect of regulatory evidence, such as mapping, requires a rural landholder to obtain 
contrary expert evidence in order to challenge the mapping. The costs of such evidence 
are prohibitive. The objects of vegetation management regulations might ultimately be 
achievable but the means by which they have been achieved must be questioned. The 
means by which such regulations are enforced is of equal importance and the question 
of how the regulators decide to prosecute was explored and regulatory claims of 
transparency were not evident. Even when the scales are tipped in favour of the 
regulatory prosecutors there remain inherent difficulties of successful prosecution of 
environmental crime as the following related chapter demonstrates.
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Chapter Seven: The litigation of land clearing cases
Introduction
The main focus of this chapter is to answer the following research question: how were 
the compliance and enforcement provisions o f the vegetation management regulations 
implemented? The chapter begins with a discussion of the practical difficulties of 
establishing a complete picture of illegal land clearing investigations and cases. 
Obtaining a detailed insight into the policy for regulatory compliance and enforcement 
within Queensland proved both a challenging and time consuming exercise. Despite the 
claim of regulatory transparency, it is not evident in practice. The vegetation clearing 
cases examined in this chapter were not identified by the list of finalized prosecutions 
ultimately provided by the regulators, as this list had removed the names of all relevant 
parties. Rather, the land clearing cases included here were identified from the rural 
media and during interviews with rural representatives. This in turn led to contact with 
investigated and prosecuted rural landholders and their lawyers.
It is apparent in the cases examined that the Queensland courts rely on statutory 
procedural guidelines in implementing the legislation and sentencing offenders. In this 
chapter, these guidelines are explored prior to an examination of the cases, as it is 
necessary to appreciate how sentences are arrived at and the significant limitations on 
the current financial penalty range. An in-depth analysis of some of the Queensland land 
clearing cases is provided; most of these cases have not been examined in the existing 
literature, particularly those cases heard in the Magistrates Courts.
The first case considered challenged the validity of the vegetation management laws. 
The courts present an important forum for testing the law and challenges to the 
legislation may potentially provide practical precedent as evidenced in this chapter. 
Negotiating a pathway through the justice system, however, requires competent legal 
representation; many perils await the injudicious litigant in person especially those 
litigants seeking advice and guidance from a non-legal agent. This chapter includes 
some such cases. Consideration is given to a withdrawn action by the regulators after 
prolonged court appearances; followed by an example of a compliance order being 
quashed by the courts, as it proved impossible for the landholder to comply with.
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Thereafter two groups of cases are examined: those in which the difficulties inherent in 
successful implementation and prosecution are readily apparent and those that proved 
more successful for the regulators. Finally, consideration is given to a further key 
question for this thesis: what wider issues did the compliance and enforcement 
provisions raise in terms ofprocedural fairness and access to justice? There are 
underlying and prevalent flaws in all criminal justice systems but some of the cases 
explored in this chapter draw attention to particular inequities that exist in land clearing 
litigation.
The complexities of compliance
Compliance and enforcement of vegetation management regulations and the attendant 
complexities involved have received some academic attention in Queensland. Bredhauer 
undertook a critique of the 2003 amendments to the vegetation management regulations 
shortly after the changes were made.1 In 2006, I undertook an analysis of the effect ot 
the 2004 vegetation management statutory amendments, which included reference to 
two highly publicized land clearing cases 2 involving Ashley McKay and Graham 
Acton, both prominent Central Queensland graziers. As their cases remain of interest, 
they will be considered further in this chapter. In 2007. McGrath referred to some land 
clearing cases and the 'numerous unsuccessful challenges to controls on vegetation 
clearing.. .based on constitutional issues'.3 In 2009 two legal practitioners provided an 
assessment of the amendments to the law in that year -  along with a commentary on 
three land clearing cases -  to the Queensland Environmental Law Association.4 In 2011 
Bell undertook an analysis of some land clearing legislation and argued for a less rigid 
regulatory regime; this article included reference to three of the cases considered in this 
chapter.5 None of these latter papers clarified why the arguments put forward by
' Bredhauer J, 'Can't See the Scrub for the Trees' (2004) 21 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 44.
2 Kehoe J,4 Land Clearing In Queensland" (2006) 23 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 155.
3 McGrath C, ‘End of broadscale land clearing in Queensland' (2007) 24 (1) Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 5.
4 Simmonds M, 'Recent Amendments to the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld)' (2009) and Devlin R. 
'Vegetation Clearing Offences under 1PA Integrated Planning Act 2009 (Qld)' (2009). Papers presented to the 
Queensland Environmental Law Association. Ralph Devlin has acted in some of the land clearing cases on behalf of 
the regulator. This paper was presented prior to the passing of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld). An analysis 
of enforcement and compliance of illegal land clearing has been undertaken in some states notably New South Wales, 
for example, Bartel R, ‘Compliance and Complicity: An Assessment ofthe success of land clearance legislation in 
New South Wales'(2003) 20 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 116-136.
5 Bell J. ‘Tree clearing, hunger strikes and Kyoto targets -  the need for a middle ground' (201 1) 28 Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 201.
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defendant landholders had proved unsuccessful.6 A detailed analysis of Queensland land 
clearing cases is therefore lacking and will be provided in this chapter.
The implementation of laws will necessarily be problematical if the laws are complex. 
Those rural landholders brought within the compliance regulatory framework might 
only account for a minority of the agricultural community, but it is apparent the 
statutory regulations are difficult to understand, not just by landholders but by those 
operating within the regulatory field. It was commonplace during illegal clearance 
hearings for magistrates to refer to the complexities of the legislation, and for 
magistrates and judges to remark upon the fact that for some statutory vegetation 
definitions ‘their complexity is evident’7 *and can become even more complex within the 
‘chains of nested definitions’/  The Queensland government invests finance into 
programs to assist landholders to understand the legislation.9 The regulators have 
sometimes undertaken prosecution when appropriate; but this chapter also includes 
cases that do not meet the regulatory compliance requirement of a ‘consistent and 
proportionate’ response."’
Establishing a list of land clearing cases
A completely accurate account of land clearing cases was difficult to establish. This is 
because vegetation clearing offences are summary offences initiated in the Magistrates 
Court. This court, unlike District and Supreme Courts, does not have a body of case 
law. Cases are not available on-line, it is necessary to purchase a transcript from the 
relevant court. This requires knowledge of the case name prior to purchase.
It might be expected that a detailed regulatory list, including names of the parties, would 
be available in the annual reports of the regulators. In March of 2009 two departments 
were merged to create the Department of Environment and Resource Management 
(DERM): the Department of Natural Resources and Waterand the Environmental
6 For example the cases of: Dore & Ors v Penny [2004] QDC 364 and Burns v State o f  Queensland [2006] QCA 235 
considered subsequently in this chapter.
7 For example magistrate Comack in Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no 
-  M -183067/05 (2) transcript of proceedings 37.
* For example Fryberg J in Witheyman v Simpson [2009] QCA 388. 23.
9 For example programs undertaken by Agforce and Queensland Farmers Federation as discussed in Chapter Three.
Queensland government. DERM, Compliance Strategy 2010-2014. 1. Available at: 
http://\Y\v\v.derm.qld. aov.au/cnvironmcntal manaaemcnt/compliancc/Ddf/compliancc-slrateav-2010- 14.pdf(viewed 
5 June 2011).
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Protection Agency (EPA). In the past the EPA had published reasonably detailed 
statistics on compliance. For example in the EPA 2007-2008 Annual Report, a 
comprehensive table of finalized prosecutions and restraint orders under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) was provided which included the names of 
the parties in the cases." Further information included prosecution and restraint orders 
commenced but not completed, and a detailed breakdown of infringement notices 
issued.12 In addition, the Queensland State of Environment Report (2007) included 
details of prosecutions under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) for the 
period 2003 to 2007 in the appendix. This incorporated the name of the defendant 
unless the charges were dismissed or no conviction was recorded.13 The former 
Department of Natural Resources and Water did not include such compliance statistics 
in their annual reports. It has proved impossible to locate such earlier reports despite a 
section in the DERM web site on ‘previous annual reports'.14
The initial annual report from the amalgamated DERM covered the period 2009-2010 
and followed the tradition of the old Department of Natural Resources and Water. The 
report simply included a short section on compliance.15 Reference was made to the fact 
that thirty prosecutions were finalized with a total sum of $1,054,100 meted out in fines, 
but there was no breakdown of the legislation under which the prosecutions were 
instigated.16 The only table of figures presented included a comparison of the total 
amounts of prosecution fines since the 2005-2006 Annual Report.17 Not surprisingly, the 
total amount of fines for the 2009-2010 year was substantially larger because of the 
amalgamation of two departments, but no mention was made of this. In the absence of 
detail as to the relevant legislation under which the fines were obtained, the table has 
little significance. There is no detailed breakdown of prosecutions such as those 
provided in the previous EPA Annual Reports.
11 Queensland government. Environmental Protection Agency. Annual Report 2007- 2008. 39-40. Available at: 
htlp:/A\\\n.derm.uld.aov.au/rcaistcr/p02720aa. pdf (viewed 5 June 2011).
"  Queensland government. Environmental Protection Agency, Annual Report 2007- 2008. 40.
13 Queensland government. State of Environment, 2007, Available at:
http:/A\ ww.dcrm.uld.gov.au/cnvironmcntal manaaemcnl/statc of the environment/state of the environment uuec 
nsland 2007/indc.\.html (viewed 5 June 2011).
14 Queensland government. DERM, see for example: Available at:
hllp://w\\w.dcrm■uld.aov.au/alxnit/comoratcdocs/previousreports.hlml (viewed 5 June 2011). There was only one 
past report included which covered the period from the time of amalgamation.
15 Queensland government. DERM, Annual Report. 2009-2010. Available at: 
http:/A\ w\\.derm.uld.aov.au/about/pdf aiunial-repoi1-09-10-pdf (viewed 5 June 201 I).
16 Queensland government, DERM, Annual Report. 2009-2010. n 15. 25.
17 Queensland government. DERM. Annual Report. 2009-2010. n 15, 25.
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In relation to vegetation clearing, the DERM 2009-2010 Annual Report notes that the 
largest fine o f $94,000 was imposed.14 Nothing further was said regarding prosecutions 
under the vegetation management regulations beyond:
The department refined its approach to vegetation management prosecutions this 
year to ensure that enforcement work better supports the policy objective of the 
legislation and helps to protect Queensland’s biodiversity.
The department’s lawyers have been able to demonstrate not only the impact of 
clearing on biodiversity values, but also the commercial benefits that flow from 
unlawful vegetation clearing. This has been reflected in the high penalties awarded 
by the courts. The department will continue to take this approach to deter further 
non-compliance.19
Thus the regulators remain the custodians of information about those who have been 
investigated and prosecuted, or indeed o f any other compliance measures undertaken. 
Bricknell has claimed, within Australia, that ‘most illegal acts are dealt with using lesser 
sanctioning options such as infringement notices’.20 In the absence o f a detailed 
breakdown o f compliance options taken by DERM, it is difficult to reach this 
conclusion about Queensland. The finalised prosecution list supplied to me by the 
regulators did not include those cases which were not finalised nor why they were not 
finalised.
The finalised prosecution list covers the period from 2001 to 2010. The accompanying 
regulatory letter cautioned:
Please note this spreadsheet is not a publicly available document. It has been 
prepared and provided for your information only. You are welcome to extract 
information from the spreadsheet for the purposes of your research; however, the 
spreadsheet is not to be published in its entirety in your PhD.21
In this spreadsheet, the names o f the parties, representing lawyers and magistrates were 
not included. DERM stated ‘the cases are identified by number rather than defendant 
name for privacy reasons’.22 This is an unusual claim and contrary to DERM ’s
18 Queensland government, DERM, Annual Report. 2009-2010, n 15, 25.
19 Queensland government, DERM. Annual Report, 2009-2010, n 15, 25.
20 Bricknell S, 'Environmental Crime in Australia ’ (2010) Australian Institute of Criminology xii.
21 Queensland government, DERM, letter in response from the A/Director, Litigation Unit dated 4 May 2011. A 
discussion on dealings with the regulators, including obtaining compliance information, is included in the section on 
research methodology in Chapter One of this thesis.
22 Queensland government, DERM, letter in response, n 21.
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transparency commitment.23 Such cases are in the public domain and have no in-camera 
requirements regarding hearings.
Some cases have several entries in the regulatory list supplied. For example, there are 
entries for each defendant as some cases included property owners, property managers, 
lessees and contractors. The practice of the regulators is also to have separate entries for 
each type of vegetation cleared. Bearing in mind the multiple entries for some cases, an 
attempt was made to quantify the cases into yearly periods to ascertain if any particular 
year or period proved more litigious. The results are set out in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Finalised prosecutions by the Department o f Environment and Resource 
Management
The graph shows that there was a peak in finalised prosecutions by DERM in 2002 and 
that the main period for prosecution was between the years 2002 to 2004. The regulators 
had a period with fewer prosecutions and apparently less success during 2005 to 2007. 
This is reflected in some of the cases examined in this chapter. In 2005, the Minister 
announced additional compliance staff would be employed to meet an increasing 
workload.24 The 2005 to 2007 period was not generally a successful time for the 
regulators, nonetheless a media release in 2005 claimed: ‘Queensland is recognised as a
23 Queensland government, DERM, Compliance Strategy 2010-2014. Available at:
http: uuu.derm.qld.upv.au environmental management compliance pdf compliancc-strateq\-20l0-l4.pdf (viewed 
10 July 2011).
24 Robertson S, 'Government strengthens NRM compliance capabilities’ ( Media release 23 May 2005) in which the 
Minister noted compliance staff would increase from 34 to 55 to meet the unit’s increasing workload. Available at:
http: statements.cabinet.uld.uov. ,au (viewed 10 July 2011).
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leading agency in Australia in terms of enforcement of natural resources compliance 
legislation’.25 From the information supplied in response my query, as to departmental 
structure and personnel in compliance and enforcement as at 2011, it was apparent 
compliance personnel had remained a large group.26 The number of prosecutions in the 
final period of 2008 to 2010 has remained relatively stable. The table may not provide a 
completely accurate account, but it does provide a general indication of prosecutions 
under the vegetation management legislation.
The list of finalised prosecutions supplied by DERM includes: the region in Queensland 
where the land clearing took place; the court and date of hearing; the result; the 
legislation; the vegetation status and the area cleared. Each of these is considered in 
more detail as the regions in Queensland are divided into: North; Central West; South 
East; and South West. All the cases listed are in the Magistrates Court within the 
relevant region. The list therefore is not a complete picture of the final outcome of each 
case. As this chapter shows, cases always begin in the Magistrates Court, but if they are 
appealed they work through the court hierarchy. Some cases may therefore appear as 
finalised when in fact they were subsequently finalised in a higher court.
In the results section of the regulatory list supplied, the clarity of information varied. 
Typically, the fine and amount is documented, and if the landholder had a conviction 
recorded that is also documented. Of the cases that included information on fines and 
convictions, by far the majority of landholders did not have a conviction recorded 
against them. As this chapter illustrates, it is unlikely that a conviction will be recorded 
following an illegal land clearing case. The decision on whether or not to record a 
conviction is governed in Queensland by the provisions of the Penalties and Sentences 
Act 1992 (Qld).27 This Act provides that the court may exercise a discretion having 
regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, the
2:1 Queensland government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, ‘Queensland compliance the envy o f other 
states’ (Media release 23 March 2005). Available at: http: \\ uw.nrm.uld.mn.au about .'media''mar 23.html (viewed 
20 July 2011).
26 The following information was supplied by DERM. ‘The department's compliance and investigations branch 
comprises the following teams: Investigations - about 40 specialist investigators based in Brisbane and regional 
centers, responsible for investigating major breaches o f DERM’s legislation including the VMA; Investigations 
support -  supports investigation through the development of policies and procedure and the provision of training; 
Strategy and planning -  responsible for developing the department’s proactive compliance policy, compliance 
strategy and annual compliance planning process; Major projects -  project manages significant proactive compliance 
projects. The litigation unit in Brisbane is made up o f 20 lawyers with responsibility for all the departmental 
prosecutions and other litigation and advice work associated with compliance and enforcement’. Queensland 
government, DERM, letter in response from the A/Director, Litigation Unit dated 4 May 2011.
27 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) si 2.
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offender’s character and age, and the impact of recording a conviction on the offender's 
economic or social well being. In the cases examined in this chapter the nature of the 
offence was never an issue considered by the court, nor submitted for consideration by 
those prosecuting. Indeed it was more common -  as for example in Dore 2,v and Winks 2'} 
-  not to record a conviction without specifying why that option had been taken. In the 
case of Draper, 3,1 the magistrate included reference to the Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) and concluded that a conviction should not be recorded because of the 
impact upon the defendant's economic and social wellbeing.
Many, but not all of the cases on the regulatory list, stated if the landholder had entered 
a plea of guilty. The majority did so. This is typical of proceedings at this level. Most 
criminal cases begin and end at the lowest rung of the court hierarchy in the Magistrates 
Court. Typically the defendant will enter a guilty plea and the case does not proceed to 
trial.31 At this lowest level of proceedings, fully contested trials are rare; but, as this 
chapter shows, cases may be prolonged considerably by appeals.
The category of vegetation cleared was generally recorded in the regulatory list, as was 
the amount of land cleared under each type of category. Within the regulatory list there 
was great variation in the land areas cleared and in the different types of vegetation 
cleared. It may be that 'punishing of environmental offences in Australia has been 
largely unsystematic’,32 but what is apparent from the regulatory list and some of the 
cases subsequently examined, is that the Queensland courts are becoming more 
structured in terms of fines imposed for illegal clearing in utilizing the legislative 
framework for sentencing.
"x Penny v Dore & Ors (2004) Tully Magistrates Court no -  00022131(6) transcript of proceedings. 13.
Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) Beaudesert Magistrates Court no -3009209 transcript of proceedings 4.
30 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) Rockhampton Magistrates Court no- M-00087418 
transcript of Proceedings 20.
31 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Criminal Courts. Australia 2008- 2009. Available at:
httn://\v\\A\.abs.uo\ .au/AUSS fA I S/abso .nst/l.atcstnroducls/6F5307C81;64B 1 l)64CA25761-A()00A01)At?onendocu 
mcnt (viewed 22 July 2011).
32 Brickncll S. ‘Environmental Crime in Australia ’ (2010) Australian Institute of Criminology xii.
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Sentencing of land clearing cases
Sentencing is a fundamental task of the court. This task is discretionary but the 
discretion is structured by ever increasing legislation.” Further structure has been 
introduced in some jurisdictions with sentencing databases. The issue of consistency in 
sentencing has, as noted by Preston C J, long been the subject of debate in 
Commonwealth common law jurisdictions, with the crux of debate focusing on whether 
the sentencing discretion should be ‘fettered, structured or simply replaced by 
mandatory penalties’.34 The need for consistency in sentencing prompted the first 
sentencing database in New South Wales, which ultimately included sentences from the 
Land and Environment Court.35 Queensland followed this model in 2007 with the 
Queensland Sentencing Information Service; a repository of information compiled to 
assist lawyers to provide ‘well-prepared and well-researched’ sentencing submissions to 
the courts.” Preston C J has advocated the utility of a sentencing database in promoting 
a general consistency of approach to sentencing.37
The legislative structure for sentencing in Queensland is provided by the procedural 
guidelines in the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The purposes of this Act 
include providing a range of sentences for appropriate punishment and rehabilitation to 
include, if appropriate, protection of the Queensland community as a paramount 
consideration.38 The Act’s purposes further include: promoting consistency; providing 
fair procedures for imposing sentences; and providing sentencing principles to be 
applied by the courts.” The sentencing principles are wide-ranging and reflect the 
common law sentencing purposes, they include: punishment in a way that is just; 
rehabilitation; individual and general deterrence; and community denunciation and
33 Preston B J.' Sentencing for Environmental Crime' (2006) 18 (6) Judicial Officers Bulletin 41: and see generally 
Preston B J, ‘Compliance and Enforcement: Toward More Effective Implementation of Environmental Law' (2006) 
a paper presented to the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Colloquium.
,4 Preston B J and Donnelly H, ‘Achieving consistency and transparency in sentencing for environmental offences' 
(2008) Monograph 32. Judicial Commission of New South Wales 5.
35 Preston B J and Donnelly H, n 34. 1. Prior to this information on sentencing in the Land and Environment Court of 
New South Wales had not been included in the Judicial Information Research System.
36 de Jersey C J. Launch of the Queensland Sentencing Infonnation Serv ice. Banco Court. March 2007. T his service 
includes statistics from all Queensland criminal jurisdictions, case law. Practice Directions, and Chief Magistrates 
Notes. The Queensland Sentencing Information Service was established by the Queensland government's Department 
of Justice and Attorney General, this service is available to legal practitioners if criminal law is a major area of 
practice. Available at: http://www.sentencing.justice.old.gov .au. (viewed 29 July 2011).
37 Preston B J, ‘A Judge’s perspective on using sentencing databases, Judicial Reasoning: Art or Science?' (2010) 9 
(4) The Judicial Review 421. republished in (2010) 3 Journal o f  Court Innovation 247.
’8 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 3 (a) and (b).
”  Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 3 (c) to (e).
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protection of the Queensland community.40 Reference to protection of the Queensland 
community in the sentencing principles and the purposes of the legislation envisages 
protection from the perpetrator of an ordinary crime rather than an environmental crime. 
The offence of illegal land clearing, however, invariably generates the degradation of 
land and the loss of biodiversity. The purposes of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 
(Qld) could be amended to encompass environmental crime with an additional clause to 
include, if appropriate, the protection of the environment on behalf of the community.
There are further principles under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) the court 
must have regard to that are of particular relevance to vegetation clearing offences, they 
include: the maximum and minimum penalty for the offence; and the nature and 
seriousness of the offence including harm to the victim.41 Once again the legislation 
envisages a human victim whereas the victim of the environmental crime of illegal land 
clearing will invariably be the environment and the community. The Act could be 
amended to add, if appropriate, any harm done to the environment. Inclusion of 
environmental harm in the sentencing legislation would be a factor the court would then 
have regard to in relation to the nature and seriousness of the offence.
Further related principles the court must have regard to include: the extent to which the 
offenders are blamed; the extent of damage or loss; the offender's character, age and 
mental capacity; mitigating circumstances; and the extent of assistance given to the 
regulator.42 In considering the character of the defendant, the court may consider 
previous convictions, any contributions to the community or other matter the court 
considers relevant.43 The court has discretion to record or not record a conviction.44 If the 
accused landholder has pleaded guilty, the timing of the guilty plea is important; a 
guilty plea must be taken into account and referred to in open court.45
411 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 (1) (a) to (f). The purposes of sentencing are further elucidated in: 
Preston B J, ‘Principled sentencing for env ironmental offences -  Part 1: Purposes of Sentencing' (2007) 31 Criminal 
Law Journal 91.92-99: and Bronitt S and McSherry B. Principles o f Criminal Law (Law Book Company. 2001) 19- 
23.
41 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 (2) (b) and (c).
42 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 (2) (d) to (i).
43 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 11.
44 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 12.
42 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(1) (a). (2) (a) and (3).
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For vegetation clearing offences, in addition to the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 
(Qld), an extra guide on penalty amounts is provided for the courts.46 This additional 
guide accompanied the compliance and enforcement amendments in 2003 and assists 
the court in arriving at a financial penalty. For each hectare of vegetation unlawfully 
cleared, penalty units are recommended and depend on the type of vegetation cleared. 
Thus illegally clearing an endangered regional ecosystem is 30 penalty units per 
hectare; an of concern regional ecosystem is 24 penalty units per hectare; a least 
concern regional ecosystem is 18 penalty units per hectare; and regulated regrovvth is 12 
penalty units per hectare.47 Once a figure is reached this may be reduced if there are 
mitigating circumstances. The cases in this chapter demonstrate that a plea in mitigation 
is not a difficult task for those representing rural landholders: at the very least 
defendants typically have no criminal record and have pleaded guilty, but most 
mitigating circumstances go beyond these fundamentals.
Allocating a number of penalty units to each hectare of land illegally cleared makes it 
possible to place a monetary value on each hectare cleared. Thus clearance of an 
endangered regional ecosystem would amount to $2,250 per hectare; an of concern 
regional ecosystem would amount to $1,800; a least concern regional ecosystem would 
amount to $1,350 and regulated regrowth $900 per hectare.
The maximum penalty for breach is currently 1665 penalty units or $124,875 for an 
individual.48 For a corporation, the maximum fine may be up to five times this maximum 
penalty or $624,375.4y Because of the existence of a maximum penalty, there is a point 
at which the legislative penalty guide is spent, for example an illegal land clearance of 
55.5 hectares of endangered regional ecosystem reaches the maximum penalty of 
$124,875. It is arguable that clearance of more than 55.5 hectares of endangered 
regional ecosystem refects an increase in culpability and more extensive environmental 
harm. Moreover, extensive clearing is likely to increase grazing pasture and improve 
land value. As there are potential benefits of extensive clearing to the landholder, it is 
imperative that financial penalties are an appropriate deterrent and not a business cost. 
The courts could be given discretion to impose a higher sentence than the current
46 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 60 B (1).
47 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 60 B (2) (a) to (d).
48 Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) s 578 (1), provides that a person must not carry out assessable development 
unless there is an effective development permit lor the development. The Penalties and Sentences Regulation 2005 
(Qld) s 2 A prescribes the monetary value for each penalty unit, which is currently $75.
411 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 181 B.
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maximum in instances of extensive clearing. This would require a legislative change. As 
the law stands, if the land cleared places the potential fine beyond the maximum 
penalty, then typically the maximum will be the starting point which will generally be 
reduced by a percentage, determined by the court, if there is mitigation.5"
Under the vegetation management regulations the only sanction available for unlawful 
clearing is a fine. To date, the only prison sentence imposed for clearing land in 
Queensland was under the Wet Tropics World Heritage Protection and Management 
Act 1993 (Qld).51 In a subsequent case under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld), 
the defendant narrowly avoided a custodial sentence.52
In New South Wales, the Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW) provides for a $1.1 million 
financial penalty for clearing without approval.53 Within that State, therefore, there is 
potential for a substantial fine. In 2003 Bartel argued such fines -  though initially too 
lenient and minimally enforced -  appeared to be increasing and moving beyond nominal 
levels, even if lagging behind other environmental sanctions.54
The foundations of a regulatory system lie in the sanctions that underlie it. Advice and 
incentives may be the initial and preferable way to encourage compliance.55 But the 
existence of sanctions and the attendant publicity of land clearing cases remind rural 
landholders of the existence of the vegetation management legislation and the authority 
of the regulators. Because of the widespread resentment against vegetation regulations,
50 See for example Leslie John Gerke v Bruce Henderson (2009) subsequently considered in this chapter.
51 ln R v Dempsey [2002] QCA 45 a 12-month custodial sentence was unsuccessfully appealed. Dempsey had pleaded 
guilty in the District Court to felling 25 trees in a world heritage listed rainforest. The trees were between 100 and 300 
years old. They were sold at auction for $45,000. It was noted by Davies .1 A that Dempsey did not plead guilty until 
the committal hearing which necessitated a lengthy and expensive investigation. Davies .1 A further stressed the 
importance of deterrence in sentencing.
In R v Vincent Thomas Boyle (2004) unreported. Queensland District Court. Boyle cleared 13 hectares of Main 
Ridge National Park, which adjoined his land. He was fined $50,000 together with compensation of $410.000. which 
was to be met by transferring 480 hectares of land to the Queensland government. In sentencing, Hoath DCJ noted 
that the defendant had admitted responsibility for clearing and cooperated with the regulators, he was moreover 76 
years of age with an established reputation as a leading grazier in the area. Despite these mitigating factors. Hoath 
DCJ stressed the significant environmental harm caused by the clearing, the seriousness of the offence and the 
importance of deterrence in cases of this nature.
53 Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW) s 12.
4 Bartel R. 'Compliance and Complicity: An Assessment of the success of land clearance legislation in New South 
Wales' (2003) 20 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 130-132: and Bartel R, 'Sentencing for Environmental 
Offences: An Australian Exploration' (2008) paper presented at the Sentencing Conference National Judicial College 
of Australia, ANU College of Law. 8. See also for example: the Director - General o f  the Department o f 
Environment and Climate Change v Hudson [2009] NSWLEC 4 in which the defendant was convicted of two 
offences under the Native I'egetation Act 2003 (NSW) and fined a total of $408,000 -  this hefty fine may in part be 
attributed to the lack of legal representation as discussed later in this Chapter.
55 Macrory R. Regulation. Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law (Hartford Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland. Oregon. 2010) 11.
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an early challenge to the validity of the law, as occurred in the case of Bone v 
Mothershow [2002] QCA 120, has provided a useful precedent. The existence and 
advantage of a precedent is that it clarifies the law and reduces the possibility of further 
litigation.56
Litigation challenges -  Bone v Mothershaw, a Queensland precedent
The case of Bone v Mothershaw considered the application and validity of a local law 
prohibiting the clearing of vegetation without a permit.57 Robert Bone, a freeholder and 
farmer, cleared protected vegetation and refused to rehabilitate the land. The defendant 
had legal representation throughout the case. He was convicted in the Magistrates Court 
and fined $20,000 together with costs. Bone appealed to the District Court and 
subsequently the Supreme Court, claiming the local laws were inconsistent with the 
VMA and the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld); he challenged the validity of laws to 
take an interest in land and not provide compensation. Both appeals were dismissed 
with costs. In the Supreme Court hearing, McPherson J A noted that the VMA made 
provision for local laws to impose vegetation clearing restrictions on landholders and 
that the Integrated Planning Act J997(Q\6) was not inconsistent with local laws.58
The Constitution o f Queensland 2001 (Qld) empowers the Queensland government ‘to 
make laws for the peace welfare and good government ...in all cases whatsoever'.5'7This 
law was relied on in the case, which also held there had been no acquisition of land but 
rather a valid statutory restriction and, whilst acknowledging the evidence submitted 
that the value of the land had been greatly reduced, McPherson J A concluded that 
Bone...
...retains unimpaired, for what it is worth, his estate in fee simple absolute in the 
land. He has been stripped of virtually all the powers which make ownership of 
land of any practical utility or value.. .But the law provides no remedy for this 
action or its consequences when it is the result of legislation validly passed under
56 Thus for example Property Rights Australia sought legal opinion on the validity of the Vegetation Management Act 
1999 (Qld) and the utility of mounting a challenge to the legislation in court. The advice, in light a t Bone v 
Mothershaw, was that such an action would be futile.
87 Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA. 120.
88 Bone v Mothershaw [2002J QCA 120 para [20-21] s7 of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 ( Qld) covers the 
application of the Act, s7(2) provides that the Act does not prevent a local law from imposing requirements on the 
clearing of vegetation in its local government area.
5y The Constitution o f Queensland 2001 (Qld) s 8 provides for the law-making power of the parliament as set down in 
Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) s 2.
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law-making authority that by its terms or nature authorises or permits such an 
outcome’.60
Following this decision, an application was made for special leave to appeal to the High 
Court. This application was denied and accordingly this Queensland precedent 
remains.61 The Bone case reaffirmed the law in holding that a landholder is not entitled 
to compensation following legislative restrictions and in reasserting the authority of the 
Queensland Parliament to make laws.
Litigation challenges -  a misguided journey
In the case of Dore & Ors v Penny [2004] QDC 364, the three Dore brothers initially 
pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to a vegetation clearing offence under the 
Integrated Planning Act 7997(Qld).62 The land cleared was approximately 30 hectares of 
remnant endangered regional ecosystem. Each brother was fined $15,000 for the 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) offence and $3000 for the LA offence. Convictions 
were not recorded against them. The brothers had legal counsel to represent them in the 
Magistrates Court but acted on their own behalf thereafter with assistance from David 
Walter, a non-legal agent. Their first appeal was to the District Court of Queensland.
In Dore & Ors v Penny [2005] QCA 150, the Dore brothers subsequently applied for 
leave to appeal which was refused by the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of 
Queensland. The brothers were directed to apply to a single judge in the Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, in the subsequent case of Dore & Ors v Penny [2006] QSC 125, an 
amended application was filed but was again unsuccessful. Jones J held: ‘... the 
applicants have acted upon advice by a person who has no legal qualifications but who 
holds views about land tenure and parliamentary sovereignty which are plainly 
misguided’.63
The Dore saga highlights a complex litigation process particularly for litigants in 
person. In the first application to the Supreme Court, the Dore action was thwarted
60 Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120 para [25].
61 Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120 at the end of this case is an editor's note which provides that the High Court 
refused special leave to appeal on the 25 June 2003.
62 Penny v Dore & Ors (2004) Tully Magistrates Court no -  00022131(6) transcript of proceedings.
63 Dore & Ors v Penny [2006] QSC 125 para [17],
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because Bradley DCJ, in the District Court, had applied the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) as 
the appropriate legislation for an appeal against conviction. It was noted by Williams J 
A, in the Supreme Court, that the appropriate avenue for an appeal, in a case of this 
nature, should have been pursuant to the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld).64 The 
implication of this for the Dore brothers was a further unsuccessful court hearing almost 
a year later. Ultimately the Dores offered to settle the matter and paid the initial fine 
together with the extensive costs that had accumulated.65
Negotiating a pathway through the justice system requires legal representation. The 
journey of the Dore brothers through the litigation maze should have ended after the 
hearing in the Magistrates Court in which they appear to have had competent legal 
representation. Their decision to pursue the matter as litigants in person and seek 
guidance from a non-lawyer placed them at a considerable and inequitable 
disadvantage.66 It was clear from Done v Mothershaw that the rights of landholders, 
however restricted, were held to be determined by validly enacted statutes; and 
moreover that judicial opinion would likely follow earlier precedent and hold:
... ‘it cannot be the duty of the court to examine (at the instance of any litigant) the 
legislative and administrative acts of the administration and to consider in every 
case whether they are in accordance with the view held by the court as to the 
requirements of natural justice’.67
Another misguided journey, embarked upon as part of a civil action, occurred in the 
case of Catherine Burns. She was the freehold owner of land and wished to clear native 
vegetation to increase the value of her land prior to sale. She accordingly applied for a 
development permit under the provisions of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld) and 
the VMA. The permit to clear was refused and there followed a series of cases in which 
Catherine Burns appealed against the refusal to obtain a clearing permit.68 In her initial
64 Dore & Ors v Penny [2005] QCA 150 para 3. An application under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) could also 
be made to a single judge in the Supreme Court sitting in Cairns, the Dore brothers had been obliged to travel to 
Brisbane and make an application to the Full Court of the Court of Appeal.
65 Personal communication with Gary Dore on the 2 July 2010.
66 In the personal communication noted above the question was asked: why the brothers decided to proceed after the 
Magistrates Court hearing? Gary Dore stressed strongly the humiliation of being labelled a criminal within his own 
community and accordingly he had sought advice from his local MP who had suggested the brothers sought guidance 
from the non-legal agent David Walter, a former police officer. In the hearing before the Full Bench of the Supreme 
Court, David Walter was denied the opportunity to speak on behalf of the brothers, which meant Gary Dore was 
obliged to address the Court. It was a stressful, expensive and futile exercise.
67 Jerusalem Jaffa District Governor v Suleiman Murra [1926] AC 321. per Viscount Cave LC at 328. quoted in 
Bone v Mothershaw [2002] QCA 120. para [25], by McPherson JA. The initial Magistrates Court case was included 
in the finalised prosecution list supplied by the regulators.
68 Burns v State o f Queensland [2004] QSC 434.
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appeal to the Supreme Court, Catherine Burns had representing counsel. This appeal 
was dismissed.
The case was further appealed to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court. Catherine Burns 
acted on her own behalf and was assisted by David Walter, the non-legal agent from the 
Dore case. It appears that the same written submissions were made. Jerrard JA 
reiterated salient points from earlier proceedings, in particular that the permit had been 
refused because the land was a known habitat for endangered species such as the 
mahogany glider and the cassowary. It was acknowledged that Catherine Burns was 
over 70 years of age, a widow whose land was her only significant asset and that the 
value of her land was considerably reduced by the legislative restrictions on clearing/’1 
Jerrard JA concluded by dismissing the appeal and supporting the earlier decision, 
noting that the application largely challenged the State's legislative power to impose 
restrictions and, as such, was...
...plainly untenable, because the sovereign law making power of the Queensland 
Parliament, considered in a somewhat similar context in the decision in Bone v 
Mothershaw, included the power to impose upon Mrs. Burns the requirement that 
she have a development permit prior to changing the complexion or presentation of 
her land by clearing it.7"
One of the more perverse effects of the implementation of vegetation clearing 
legislation has been a body of doomed litigation in which David Walter has sometimes 
represented, but more typically provided written submissions, on the same misguided 
argument relied on in the Dore and Burns appeals. This has occurred in at least ten 
cases.71 In this bundle of cases, the Queensland courts exercised considerable tolerance 
towards this particular non-lawyer, even dismissing an application by the regulators tor 
non-party costs.72 But in a similar New South Wales case, the landholder was subjected 
to a considerable fine and costs order.73 As noted in that case by Lloyd J, the accused
Burns v State o f  Queensland [2006] QCA 235 para [3] - [5], The provisions of the VMA have changed over the 
years. Catherine Bums was subject to the VMA as in force in August 2002.
70 Burns v State o f  Queensland [2006] QCA 235 para 118].
71 For example: Wilson v Raddatz (unreported. Queensland District Court. 2005): Wilson v Raddatz [2006] QCA 392: 
and Glasgow v Hall [2006] QDC 42. Glasgow v Hall [2007] QCA 19.
72 Burns v State o f  Queensland [2007] QCA 240 para [13] - [20],
73 Director-General o f  the Department o f  Environment and Climate Change v Hudson [2009] NSWLEC 4. The 
defendant was convicted of two offences under the Native Vegetation Act 2003 (NSW) and fined $400.000 for the 
first offence and $8.000 for the second offence. This was a NSW case but the landholder and his non-legal agent are 
both based in Queensland.
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landholder faced criminal proceedings with potentially serious consequences, but 
nonetheless chose to be represented, to his detriment, by a non-legal agent.74
The potential for David Walter to act for rural landholders in the future was brought to a 
head in January 2011. The Queensland Legal Services Commission received a 
complaint from a local authority asking the Commission to prosecute Walter for 
engaging in legal practice without the appropriate qualifications.75 The Commission 
instead sought and obtained an injunction in the Supreme Court restraining Walter from 
engaging in legal practice when not a legal practitioner.76 Daubney J noted:
It is one thing for the respondent himself to run these misconceived arguments in 
proceedings to which he personally is a party... It is quite another thing, however, 
for him to use other parties effectively as stalking horses to enable him to 
continually repeat these contentions.77
The injunction will protect any potential rural landholders seeking advice or 
representation since it restrains Walter from: providing legal advice; corresponding or 
communicating on behalf of litigants or potential litigants; drafting documents or 
appearing in court on behalf of litigants in proceedings.78
Litigation challenges -  a regulatory case withdrawn and a compliance 
order quashed
Much of the litigation process involves continual negotiation between both sides of a 
case. At some point in the proceedings it may become obvious to one side that the most 
prudent course of action is to withdraw the matter from the court. Negotiations will then 
turn to costs, which may be borne by the discontinuing party. In the matter of Bradley 
Coome v Christopher Holmes a complaint was made by the regulators in January 2009,
74 Director- General o f  the Department o f Environment and Climate Change v Hudson [2009] NSWLEC 4, per Lloyd 
J para [3].
7> The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) authorizes the Commission to receive and investigate complaints, s i 8(2) 
Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld) covers practice and procedure in the Magistrates Court including court appearances 
which should be in person or by lawyer or other person allowed by the court. If a person is not a lawyer they are not 
entitled to receive or recover, directly or indirectly, a sum of money or other remuneration for appearing or acting on 
behalf o f another person in court. The Commission did not believe David Walter had received remuneration and 
therefore sought an injunction.
76 Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132. The injunction was made under s 703 Legal Profession 
Act 2007 (Qld). David Walter did not attend the hearing and was not represented.
77 Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132.
78 Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132.
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in which it was alleged the landholder carried out an assessable development without a 
development permit contrary to the Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld).7'' In addition to 
the complaint the defendant was served with a compliance summary brief; a title search; 
maps and satellite images and a field inspection report.
The compliance summary brief is, in effect, a standard form prepared by the regulatory 
prosecutor and contains, along with an insight into how the case is prepared, the 
following information:
• Details of the defendant -  being Christopher Holmes a 47 year old grazier;
• Details of the land -  the defendant was described as an owner and occupier 
and the title owned a grazing homestead freeholding lease; this title would 
be treated under the legislation as if it was freehold;
• Details of the offence -  the land allegedly illegally cleared was 24.64 ha of 
endangered vegetation and 25.15 ha not of concern vegetation.x"
The facts relating to the case included the regulators' reliance on information regarding 
vegetation cover change from the Statewide Land Cover and Trees Study (SLATS) 
analysis of satellite imagery taken between May 2005 and July 2006.Xl A compliance 
officer had visited the property in June 2008 and, as the defendant was overseas, had 
utilised a warrant to enter the land. On the defendant's return in July 2008, a recorded 
interview took place at the property. It was not apparent if the landholder was aware the 
recording took place, but details of this interview were subsequently served on him.x: 
The interview elicited the following information: Christopher Holmes made the decision 
to clear the land believing it to be regrowth; he made no checks with the regulators but 
instructed a contractor to undertake the work; the purpose of the clearing had been to 
improve pasture for grazing; the defendant cooperated with the investigation.w
The compliance summary brief also included a sentence submission on behalf of the 
regulators. Within this, the case of Bone was relied on including the remarks of Robin J 
that The community now expects penalties that visit real pain upon offenders to be
1') The flic on the case of Christopher Holmes was kindly supplied, with his consent, by Gerald T Byrne counsel 
acting in the case.
x" Queensland government, Compliance Summary Brief, Complainant Bradley Coome v Christopher Holmes 1-3. 
M Queensland government. Compliance Summary Brief, n 80, 5. 
x" Queensland government. Compliance Summary Brief, n 80, 5.
10 Queensland government. Compliance Summary Brief, n 80. 5-6.
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meted out in respect of environmental-type offences.'84 It was requested by the 
regulators that the penalty range be between $15,000 and $20,000.85 This sum is much 
less than the financial penalty guide provided for in the legislation. There is provision in 
the summary brief to detail the maximum penalty. The regulators had completed this 
with regard to the endangered vegetation penalty, which would have been $54,000 for 
24 hectares. No mention was made of the land allegedly cleared that was not of concern 
vegetation; but 25 hectares equates to $33,750 making a total potential fine of $87,750.
There were no compliance or restoration notice requirements included within the 
summary brief; nor a request for a court order for a compliance notice or restitution 
costs, but it was clear investigation costs would be claimed.86 If the regulators sought to 
achieve the purposes of the legislation, as they claim in the sentencing submission, 
restoration of the land should be an integral part of sentencing.87
The defendant sought legal advice and was represented by a solicitor. There followed a 
series of mention hearings and adjournments in the Biloela Magistrates Court.88 Advice 
was sought from counsel who had defended in other land clearing cases.8'7 The advice 
was to plead guilty and this was indicated to the regulators who sought an adjournment 
to prepare for sentencing.'7" Between September and October 2009 the case had two 
more mention hearings in the Biloela Magistrates Court, the second hearing adjourned 
on the papers to the Rockhampton Magistrates Court.'71
At some point in the proceedings the regulators changed the penalty they intended to 
seek from the defendant.'72 This may have been because the initial amount suggested fell 
way below the statutory guide but in any event the initial $15,000 to $20,000 was
84 Queensland government. Compliance Summary Brief, n 80. 8.
87 Queensland government. Compliance Summary Brief, n 80. 8.
86 Queensland government. Compliance Summary Brief, n 80, 9.
87 In a personal communication with Christopher Holmes on the 21 July 2011. he confirmed the regulators have not 
served a restoration notice on his land since the case was withdrawn.
88 For example: Queensland Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Notice of Adjournment. File no: MAG-00014618/09( 1) notices 
covered the following dates: 10 March 2009; 5 May 2009: 9 June 2009; 7 July 2009: 28 September 2009; 26 October 
2009.
84 Counsel was Philip Sheridan who also acted in the cases of: Peter Robert Witheyman v Ekari Park Contracting Ltd 
and Nicholas Daniel Van Reit (2006), and Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) subsequently 
considered in this chapter.
Queensland Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Notice of Adjournment. File no: MAG-00014618/09 (1) dated 24 August 
2009.
71 Queensland Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Notice of Adjournment. File no: MAG-00014618/09 (1) hearings on 28 
September 2009 and 26 October 2009.
72 The file perused only covered the period from counsel acting solely. The increase in fine was indicated during the 
period the defendant was represented by a solicitor.
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replaced by a suggested minimum sum of $70,000. Before Christopher Holmes changed 
legal advisors, his lawyer told the regulators he intended to plead not guilty. The change 
in plea was prompted by the increase in the fine sought by the regulators.93 In response 
the regulators set out the potential costs of a fully contested hearing. A lawyer for the 
departmental compliance unit outlined the possible expenditure to include: further 
expert evidence to verify the regional ecosystem mapping costing in the range of $3,000 
to $7,000; further satellite imagery identifying the tracts of land cleared costing in the 
range of $5,000 to $10,000; further flora, fauna and biodiversity impact reports at a cost 
of $5,000 per report; and additional costs associated with preparing the case for 
contested trial.94 The inevitable preoccupation with the financial implications of 
litigation emerged between the lawyers for both sides. The primary focus of 
correspondence between the lawyers was the extensive costs involved in a potentially 
contested trial and who might end up paying them.
The defendant discontinued instructing his original solicitors and counsel and sought 
direct advice from a Rockhampton barrister.95 The advice was to obtain expert evidence. 
It was felt necessary to instruct three different consultants with particular expertise in 
vegetation and mapping. The significance of this expert evidence was that two of the 
reports were undertaken by consultants who had extensive former experience working 
for the regulators.96 Work undertaken by these two experts included a property 
inspection, the preparation of detailed property mapping, image interpretation and 
rectification and interpreting the regulator's information and data sets. The expert 
evidence, inter alia, took the regulatory ecosystem map and highlighted the 
discrepancies in the remnant and non-remnant boundaries. A comparison of the two 
maps shows a clear distinction between the boundaries of the land on the regulatory
93 Submission on Costs, prepared by Gerald T Byrne. Counsel acting for Christopher Holmes, 7 December 2009.
Also in the personal interview with Christopher Holmes, on the 20 July 2011. he indicated he felt he had no 
alternative but to change his plea to not guilty when the fine sought was increased. He was adamant he was not guilty 
but had pleaded such when his initial legal team had estimated he faced costs of defending the case of around $80,000 
for his own lawyers. There was always the potential to be liable for the regulatory costs too. Thus he reasoned if lie 
paid the $20,000 tine and the matter ended it would have been the easiest way to be rid of the matter. It was the 
opinion of Christopher Holmes that the regulators dealing with this compliance issue were inexperienced and lacked 
an understanding of rural land and vegetation.
94 Letter from a Litigation Unit Lawyer. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to instructing solicitors 
P & E Law dated 22 October 2009.
95 Within Queensland it is possible to instruct a barrister directly providing the work undertaken complies with the 
Bar Association of Queensland 2007 Barristers Rules and in particular Rule 77 which covers the work a barrister may 
undertake.
96 Of the three expert reports obtained, one was from Aurecon Australia Pty Ltd for a vegetation assessment at a cost 
of $6,297: the second report was undertaken by a former regulatory employee operating now as Rural Property 
Design, this involved a two and a halfday property visit and a report on each area of interest and amendments to the 
regulator} mapping in relation to vegetation mapped as remnant and non-remnant, the cost for this evidence was 
$2,653; the third expert report was likewise prepared by a former regulatory employee operating as Clear Solutions at 
a cost of $3,630. The total cost of expert reports was $12,580.
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map compared to the expert’s amended map. As has been mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the complexity o f this operation and the accompanying costs make such an 
exercise beyond the realms o f most accused landholders.
With regard to the regulatory evidence, in November 2009, the regulators requested a 
report on the regional ecosystem mapping o f Christopher Holmes's property from the 
Queensland Herbarium. An initial report was prepared and concluded:
The aerial photographs and imagery showed that all of the area of interest cleared 
between 2005 and 2006 had been previously cleared. The 1980 aerial photos 
clearly show very recent clearing in much of the area of interest and the 1986 
photos show that the remainder was cleared between 1980 and 1986. These areas 
are still obviously non-remnant in the 1994 photos and most of the area still 
appears to be non-remnant on the 2004 aerial photographs. 1 therefore conclude 
that all of the areas of interest cleared between 2005 and 2006 were non-remnant at 
the time of this clearing. The Queensland Herbarium mapping has been amended 
accordingly.97
In short, the area cleared by the defendant was mapped as remnant at the time the 
clearing took place but it should have been mapped as non-remnant and accordingly not 
invoked the legislation. For the accused landholder the costs already outlaid to reach 
this point had mounted.98
Without prejudice negotiations between the lawyers for each side continued as to costs. 
The regulators made an offer to withdraw the charge if the defendant would be willing 
to agree that no costs order be made.99 The defence did not agree and counsel responded 
with a submission on costs. This noted that the defendant had been prepared to plead 
guilty, but had been obliged to change to a not guilty plea when the regulators also 
changed tack and increased the penalty sought.100 The submission on costs relied on the
97 Queensland government, Queensland Herbarium, DERM, Brushe J, "Initial Report on the Regional Ecosystem 
mapping associated with L.ot 14 on Plan DW51. Eocality of Camboon. Banana Shire.’ November 2009. It is clear 
from the defendant's fde that a phone call took place between counsel for the defendant and the regulators' lawyer 
around the 5 November 2009 indicating the contrary' expert evidence to be provided by the defence. The Queensland 
Herbarium report is dated November but does not include a specific date. In the opinion of Christopher Holmes, in 
the interview on the 21 July 2011. the Queensland Herbarium report was presented after being notified the defence 
had contrary expert evidence.
98 In addition to the $12,580 for expert evidence the previous solicitor's bill was $10,995 and the later counsel’s bill 
was $1,817, costs therefore equalled $25,392.
99 Letter from a Litigation Unit Lawyer, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to instructing counsel 
dated 1 December 2009.
100 Submission on Costs, prepared by Gerald T Byrne, Counsel acting for Christopher Holmes, 7 December 2009. 4.
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Justices Act 1886 (Qld), which makes provision for an award of costs against a public 
officer taking into account the circumstances relevant to the case.101 The circumstances 
relevant to a particular case include considering whether there was a failure to take 
appropriate steps to investigate a matter and whether the investigation was conducted in 
an appropriate way. Counsel for the defendant submitted, inter alia, that the regulators 
had failed to take appropriate steps to investigate, by failing to confirm the accuracy of 
their mapping and in failing to check the accuracy of the mapping from resources 
available within their own department, for example, Queensland Herbarium.102
Negotiations continued and ultimately a deed of arrangement was entered into in respect 
of costs. It is not possible to convey the contents of this deed, as settlement was 
conditional upon the arrangements remaining confidential. Costs on behalf of the 
defendant have been noted but considerable costs on the part of the regulators must have 
been incurred.
A further instance in which costs accumulated apparently unrestrained within the 
various levels of regulatory departmental bureaucracy was that of Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v 
Department o f Natural Resources.103 As noted in the last chapter, a statutory compliance 
or restoration notice may be issued against a landholder following court proceedings 
regardless of the outcome. Whyenbirra Pty Ltd had pleaded guilty to clearing remnant 
vegetation of various classifications. The case before the magistrates was an appeal 
against a compliance notice subsequently served on the defendant.104 The appeal sought 
an order for the compliance notice to be overturned and for costs against the 
regulators.105 The magistrate upheld the appeal and described the compliance notice as: 
...unreasonable and unjust as it is unclear, confusing, oppressive, uncertain, vague 
and impossible to comply with. 1 find that the appellant has demonstrated that the 
decision to give the notice was wrong at law and should be overturned and that an 
order as to costs should be made in favour of the appellant'. 106
The hearing continued as Whyenbirra Pty Ltd had also applied for an order declaring 
that the director-general of DERM was in contempt of court. The basis of this
101 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 158 A ( I) (a) to (i).
"L Submission on Costs, prepared by Gerald T Byrne, Counsel acting for Christopher Holmes, 7 December 2009. 4.
103 Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v Department o f  Matured Resources (2008) Brisbane Magistrates Court no -  03102008 
transcript of proceedings.
104 Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v Department o f  Natural Resources (2008) 2.
105 Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v Department o f  Natural Resources (2008) 3.
106 Whyenbirra Ptv Ltd v Department o f  Natural Resources (2008) 3-7.
209
application was that the appellant had previously obtained a stay on the compliance 
notices' operation prior to the appeal being considered; and, during the period the stay 
was in operation, the regulators had lodged a restoration notice on the land title at the 
Land Registry."17 Such a notice would be an encumbrance on the title and would clearly 
affect the value of the land and any potential sale insofar as it binds successors in title.108 
It was accepted by the magistrate that the director-general was in contempt but she felt 
it inappropriate to impose a fine or imprisonment.100 Instead the magistrate decided the 
director-general should apologise to the court and the defendant and pay the costs of 
both the appeal against the compliance notice and the contempt application."0 The 
director-general did not become involved in the subsequent publicity which followed 
from this matter, rather a regulatory spokesperson acknowledged that an apology for the 
contempt was made to the defendant and that the necessary amendments to the land title 
had been made.1"
The inherent difficulties of successful prosecution: the cases of Ashley 
McKay, Nicholas Daniel Van Reit, Richard Tudor Knights and Harvey 
Scott Simpson
It would seem crucial for a regulatory agency to be seen as acting fairly and to avoid at 
all costs The risk of public criticism of bullying or extravagance'."2 The cases against 
Christopher Holmes and Whyenbirra Pty Ltd. together with the following cases, do not 
reflect well on the regulators.
Ashley McKay, an Augathella grazier, was charged with destroying trees otherwise than 
in accordance with a tree clearing permit. Because of the protracted litigation and 
because McKay remains a prominent member of the agricultural community, the 
proceedings received much publicity."3 The relevant legislation was the LA and the 
Forestry Act 1959 (Qld), as the McKay land is held under two grazing homestead
107 Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v Department o f  Natural Resources (2008) 9.
108 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 55.
100 Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v Department o f  Natural Resources (2008) 32.
110 Whyenbirra Pty Ltd v Department o f  Natural Resources (2008) 32.
111 Giles D. 'Found in contempt: court orders director-general to apologise' The Sunday Mail (7 December 2008) 35.
112 Hawkins K, ‘Law as Last Resort' in Baldwin R, Scott C and Hood C, (ed) A Reader on Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 291.
113 Both local and rural press in Central Queensland have tended to cover the McKay case. For example: Editorial 
‘The pursuit of Ashley McKay' Queensland Country Life, (March 6 2003). In November 1999 a ‘60 Minutes' 
television program, aired shortly before the case started, this featured an interview with McKay and officers from 
DERM. In June 2010 McKay provided an update on his case to the Property Rights Australia Annual Conference. 
See: httn://wuw.propcrtvriahlsaustraha.or»/obiccti\es/pror>ertv-n»hts-austraha-inc-aamconferencc-2010-enKrald 
(viewed 12 August 2011).
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leases."4 The clearing occurred during April and November 1999. McKay had a permit 
to clear trees.
There were in effect two litigation paths in the McKay case. The first began in 
December 2000 when the matter was before the Magistrates Court in Charleville. The 
manner in which the regulatory prosecutor Bernard Doonan conducted this initial case 
was held to be oppressive, unjust and discriminatory and accordingly, the prosecution 
was stayed."5 From that decision the regulators appealed to the District Court."6 In this 
appeal, Forde DCJ accepted the appellant’s argument that the magistrate had erred in 
concluding there was any improper purpose or internal oppression associated with the 
prosecution. However Forde DCJ did conclude that the magistrate was justified in 
granting a stay of execution, because of the more favourable nature of tree clearing 
permits granted to two adjoining neighbours of Ashley McKay, he accordingly held: ‘to 
continue to investigate with a view to prosecuting when the permits are so 
discriminatory points immediately to an injustice which may allow the court to exercise 
its power and grant a stay’."7 The appeal was therefore dismissed with the regulators 
bearing the costs.
There followed a further application by the regulators seeking leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The appealed was allowed and heard by the Full Bench of the Supreme 
Court.118 Both de Jersey CJ and Mullins J agreed with the leading judgment of Williams 
JA. This time the regulators were successful: the appeal was allowed and the order 
granting a permanent stay of prosecution was set aside. Williams JA applied Walton v 
Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378. which considered the circumstances in which criminal 
proceedings should be permanently stayed and decided that the answer was to be 
reached by weighing factors such as The requirements of fairness to the accused, the 
legitimate public interest in the disposition of charges of serious offences and in the 
conviction of those guilty of crime, and the need to maintain public confidence in the 
administration of justice’."* 1’ On this basis Williams JA concluded that the provision of 
more favourable tree clearing permits to adjoining neighbours was not sufficient to
' 14 Forestry Act 1959 (Qld) s 53 (1) (b) provides a person must not destroy a tree, or get other forest products or 
quarry material on a Crown holding otherwise than in accordance with a permit, lease, licence, agreement or contract 
granted or made under this Act, or the Land Act 1962 (Qld).
115 Doonan v McKay [2002] QDC 209.
116 Doonan v McKay [2002] QDC 209.
117 Doonan v McKay [2002] QDC 209. 19.
1 lfi Doonan v McKay [2002] QCA 514.
119 Doonan v McKay [2002] QCA 514. 5.
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grant a stay of proceedings and the case was remitted back to the Charleville 
Magistrates Court. McKay bore the costs of the appeal including now those of the 
earlier appeal to the District Court.
The second litigation returned to the Magistrates Court. It was now August 2004.120 It is 
an offence under the Forestry Act 1959 (Qld) to destroy trees otherwise than in 
accordance with a permit. The wording of the permit is therefore critical to the 
determination of criminal responsibility. Questions of procedural justice were 
abandoned with the initial limb of litigation: the issue turned to statutory interpretation 
and particularly the construction of the tree clearing permits. Accordingly, the central 
issue was now whether the wording of clearing permits issued to McKay covered the 
clearing that actually took place. The magistrate held that the meaning of the clearing 
permits may have been better expressed but was nonetheless plain and that the actual 
clearing that occurred went beyond the authority of the permits.121 McKay was found 
guilty. He was fined $125,000, ordered to pay costs of $65,530 and compensation of 
$85,353; and, unusually, had a conviction recorded against him.122
McKay appealed to the District Court.123 The issue of construction of the clearing 
permits was argued further. In the Magistrates Court it had been submitted and rejected 
that McKay should have the benefit of any uncertainty and ambiguity in the permit 
wording. In the District Court, Wilson J held, inter alia, that where a statute interferes 
with the property rights of an individual it must be ‘strictly construed in favour of the 
property owner appellants’.124 Wilson J allowed the appeal and the financial penalties 
imposed previously were set aside. McKay had pleaded guilty to clearing on a road 
reserve and he was fined $10,000 in respect of this.
The matter however did not end with the appeal. McKay went on to refer regulatory 
personnel to the Crime and Misconduct Commission who, in turn, referred the case
120 Doonan v McKay [2004] Charleville Magistrate Court no -  M-0000042 l/00:M -00000422/00 transcripts of 
proceedings.
121 Doonan v McKay [2004] Charleville Magistrate Court no -  M-00000421/00:M -00000422/00 transcripts of 
proceedings.
122 Doonan v McKay [2004] Charleville Magistrate Court no -  M-00000421/00: M -00000422/00 transcripts of 
proceedings.
123 McKay v Doonan [2005] QDC 311 2005.
124 McKay v Doonan [2005] QDC 311 2005, 6 citing McMurdo P in Commonwealth DPP v Hart <H Ors [2003] QCA 
495.
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back to the regulators.125 In March 2007, the regulators announced that an independent 
investigator would be appointed to examine the four staff involved in the case.12'' McKay 
currently continues his case against the regulators.
In 2005 a regulatory investigator, Peter Witheyman, swore a complaint against Nicolas 
Daniel Van Reit. He was charged with carrying out an assessable development or 
clearing of native vegetation without the necessary development permit. In the initial 
Magistrates Court hearing the defendants sought determination of a preliminary point 
that the proceedings were instituted out of time.127 As previously noted, proceedings for 
an offence under the VMA are dealt with by summary trial and must start within a year 
after the commission of the offence, or within one year after the offence comes to the 
knowledge of the regulator and within five years after the offence has been 
committed.128 If a magistrate considers it just and equitable in the circumstances, they 
may extend these time periods.I2<; In the initial hearing the magistrate found for the 
defendants and agreed that the proceedings were out of time and was not persuaded that 
circumstances justified extending the time periods. Magistrate Costello had this to say: 
The complainant is armed not only with satellite technology; it also has all the 
necessary financial support along with the legislation that requires the defendants 
to submit to lengthy, and in some ways, repetitive interrogation. There seems such 
an imbalance in capacity but that is the legislation.13,1
There followed an appeal by the regulators to the Queensland District Court.151 The 
matter was heard towards the end of 2007. In dismissing the appeal, McGill DCJ 
considered the chronology of events in the case and the relevant legal authorities on 
statutory time periods. He concluded that the pursuit of the prosecution was subject to 
unreasonable delay and that the conduct of the regulators was ‘decidedly tardy’.132 A
127 Thomson M. ‘Trees: Govt in firing line' Queensland Country Life (1 March 2007) 3.
I2'’ Thomson M. ‘NRW probes tree-clearing case' Queensland Country Life (8 March 2007) 3. In May 2011 various 
attempts were made to interview Ashley McKay. It ultimately transpired that he would agree to talk to me only if I 
changed my written account of his case. There seemed little to be gained from an interview. The matter still 
continues but is not documented further here as it is impossible to verify any of the claims made by McKay in his 
speech to the 2010 Property Rights Australia Conference.
1-7 Peter Robert Witheyman v Ekari Park Contracting Ltd and Nicholas Daniel Van Reit (2006) Roma Magistrate 
Court no -00192264/05(7) transcript of proceedings.
128 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Old) s 68 (2) (a) & (b).
129Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Old) s 68 (4).
130 Peter Robert Witheyman v Ekari Park Contracting Ltd and Nicholas Daniel Van Reit (2006) Roma Magistrate 
Court no -00192264/05(7) transcript of proceedings 7.
131 Witheyman v Van Riet N Ors [2007] QDC 342 (21 December 2007).
132 Withevman v Van Riet & Ors [2007] QDC 342 (21 December 2007) 10.
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further appeal to the Supreme Court of Queensland followed in 2008.133 The Full Bench 
of the Court of Appeal concurred and, once again, dismissed the appeal. In the leading 
judgment, Fraser JA noted that statutory time limits necessarily mean that some 
prosecutions that might otherwise proceed are barred, but that in itself was not an 
injustice, set against the important public purpose requirements that limitation periods 
achieve.134 The regulators were ordered to pay the landholder's costs of the proceedings. 
The matter did not end there: Peter Witheyman subsequently served a compliance or 
restoration notice on Van Reit.135
In 2006 Richard Knights was charged with carrying out an assessable development or 
clearing vegetation on freehold land without a development permit.136 This matter was 
particularly complicated and took four days to be heard. The landholder had made an 
application in respect of 1,521 hectares, to extend grazing capacity but retain substantial 
areas of remnant vegetation. The charge arose from a regulatory inspection of the land 
as part of the application process. The application to clear had been made by consultants 
who analysed the existing mapping and highlighted a number of errors in the regional 
ecosystem maps: for example some areas of land had been declared as disturbed, but 
were naturally open grassland areas; and more than a thousand hectares had been 
wrongly classified as remnant when it had not attained sufficient regrowth to be 
reclassified as remnant.137
The regulators sought guidance from the Environmental Protection Agency, who 
advised that no remnant vegetation on the land should be cleared. Taking this advice, 
and because the landholder did not satisfy the regulators that he had an acceptable 
solution to protect the landscape from increased salinity and water-logging, the 
application was eventually refused. Departmental file notes tendered in evidence 
showed that similar applications on nearby properties in the same terrestrial bioregional 
corridor had been approved.
133 Witheyman v Van Riet & Ors [2008] QCA 168 (20 June 2008).
134 Witheyman v Van Riet & Ors [2008] QCA 168 (20 June 2008). 8.
135 Personal communication with Philip Sheridan counsel acting for Van Reit on 5 May 2010.
136 l 'ictor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M-183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings.
137 Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M -183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings 5.
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Presentation of the case by the regulators proved problematic. A compliance officer 
called by the prosecution had inspected the property on two occasions but was unable to 
say what he really did ‘as he didn’t take very good notes’.138 It was apparent however, to 
the compliance officer, that the regional ecosystem map then in force had errors that 
were addressed by the regulator and Queensland Herbarium: in particular land marked 
as remnant was in fact disturbed. Further exhibits of satellite imagery submitted in 
evidence by the prosecution were based on data that was out of date. The data was 
obtained in August 1997; any clearing between that period and when the Act was 
proclaimed in September 2000 would have been lawful. Moreover, the remote sensing 
officer who provided the satellite imagery confirmed in evidence that remotely sensed 
images can only provide evidence of a change in vegetation ‘whether the change occurs 
from natural factors, such as tire, drought, food storm or wind or some other act of God 
cannot be determined by comparison of remotely sensed images’.IW
The case for the prosecution was further compounded when their witnesses gave 
inconsistent evidence: they used different versions of the regional ecosystem map and 
the regulator and the expert witness used different scales of measurement.140 Magistrate 
Cornack was satisfied that clearing had occurred on the land but the regulators were 
unable to prove the exact location of the clearing or the type of eco-system that had 
been cleared. She accordingly found Richard Knight not guilty. Dismissal of the case 
paved the way for Richard Knight’s lawyer to take advantage of the Justices Act 1886 
(Qld). Under this legislation a magistrate may make an order for costs that are just and 
reasonable.141 But there is an element of discretion in relation to an award for costs in 
favour of a defendant against a public officer, if the magistrate is satisfied that it is 
proper that the order for costs should be made.142 In deciding whether it is proper to 
make the order for costs, the magistrate must take into account all relevant 
circumstances including, inter alia, whether the investigation into the offence was 
conducted in an appropriate way.143
138 Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M-183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings 7.
I3'* Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M-183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings 18.
140 Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M-183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings 20-28.
141 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 158 (1).
142 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 158 A (1).
143 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 158 A (2).
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Ordinarily a magistrate may award costs only under the scale of costs prescribed by 
regulation.144 However a higher amount for costs may be allowed if the magistrate is 
satisfied that this would be just and reasonable having regard to the special difficulty, 
complexity or importance of the case.14- On behalf of the defendant it was accordingly 
submitted to the court that this was a complex case in terms of the complicated 
scientific evidence submitted, the extensive number of prosecution witnesses called and 
the piecemeal disclosure of documentary evidence which continued until the second day 
of the hearing. Magistrate Cornack accepted the submission and stressed it had been a 
difficult case involving ‘complicated legislation’.146 As the costs were itemized, the 
magistrate ordered sometimes double and sometimes up to three times the statutory 
amount ordinarily granted. She concluded: 'No order that I can make today can properly 
compensate really Mr. Knights because he has been put to a huge expense in defending 
himself in these proceedings'.147 The regulators subsequently appealed to the District 
Court, prior to the hearing of this appeal however the regulators withdrew the case and 
the matter ended.I4X
The case against Harvey Simpson was lengthy and complicated and has yet to be 
finalised. The matter began in 2005, when the defendant was charged with three counts 
of unlawful clearing which represented three different categories of vegetation and 
included: 19.9 hectares of remnant endangered vegetation; 525.9 hectares of remnant of 
concern vegetation; and 76.4 hectares of remnant not of concern vegetation. The total 
area allegedly cleared therefore amounted to 622.2 hectares. In the initial Magistrates 
Court hearing Harvey Simpson was acquitted of all three counts of unlawful clearing.14'"
There existed many similarities between the Simpson case and that of Richard Knights: 
it was a matter heard in the Dalby Magistrates Court, once again before Magistrate 
Cornack and involved the same compliance officers: Peter Witheyman and Craig Elliot. 
The same defence lawyer followed a similar and successful line of attack: the officers 
were vague in their evidence and they used various versions of the regional ecosystem
144 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 158 B (1) (a) & (b).
145 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 158 B (2).
I4f> Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M -183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings. 37.
147 Victor Craig Elliot v Richard Tudor Knights (2006) Dalby Magistrate Court no -  M-183067/05 (2) transcript of 
proceedings, 37.
I4X Personal Communication with Philip Sheridan counsel acting for Richard Knights on 5 May 2010.
149 Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson (2005) Dalby Magistrates Court no -M-492/05 transcript of 
proceedings.
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maps -  for example, some regional ecosystem maps incorrectly showed naturally 
occurring open plains as areas that had been cleared and some maps did not show a 
large shed on the land.150 Moreover the Digital Cadastral Data Base (DCDB) evidence 
used by the regulators to determine property boundaries was moved, for the purposes of 
the prosecution, approximately 100 meters to the south-west for the purpose of 
assessing the area of alleged clearing.151
At the subsequent hearing on costs the magistrate introduced a degree of fairness 
towards the defendant, being satisfied that the case was a complicated one involving 
difficult legislation, scientific evidence and inadequate disclosure by the regulators prior 
to trial.152 The defendants' costs were therefore ordered to be paid by the regulator and 
again included some items that amounted to three times the statutory amount ordinarily 
granted. The regulators appealed to the District Court.153 Harvey Simpson was again 
successful and the appeal was dismissed with costs. The regulators made a further 
application for leave to appeal from this decision, the grounds of the appeal being that 
the District Court judge had ‘erred in his construction of the Integrated Planning Act 
1997 (Qld) and the VMA’.154 This application was successful.
An important aspect of the Simpson case was the defendant lawyer's claim that some of 
the clearing was undertaken at a time when this particular classification of vegetation 
had been removed from the VMA, and consequently such clearing could not amount to 
an offence. The initial VMA was passed in December 1999 but remained unproclaimed 
and therefore not legally in force until September 2000. In the September version of the 
Act one of the purposes of the legislation, which covered of concern regional 
ecosystems, had been deleted.155
The amendment to the legislation was explained by the then Minister R J Welford as 
being due to the reticence of the Commonwealth government to assist the Queensland
150 Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson (2005) Dalby Magistrates Court no -M-492/05 transcript of 
proceedings, 2-8.
151 Peter Robert IVitheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson (2005) Dalby Magistrates Court no -M-492/05 transcript of 
proceedings, 8.
152 Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson /2005) Dalby Magistrates Court no -M-492/05 transcript of 
proceedings Dalby Magistrates Court no -M-492/05. Decision on Costs, transcript of proceedings. 1.
153 Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson (2007) District Court No 3536.
154 Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson [2009] QCA 388. 3.
155 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (1) (a) (ii) which made provision for the protection of remnant of 
concern regional ecosystems was present in the initial December 1999 Act but removed from the September 2000 
Act.
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government in establishing a financial package for affected rural landholders. As 
explained by the Minister:
With no Commonwealth funding support, we regrettably have no choice but to 
remove mandatory protection for these areas before the Vegetation Management 
Act is proclaimed. This action honours a commitment the Premier made at a 
Community Cabinet meeting in Roma. This amendment means that on freehold 
land, we will protect ‘endangered’ regional ecosystems -  that is, those with 10% or 
less of their original vegetation remaining -  but rely upon the regional planning 
process and regional vegetation planning committees to voluntarily extend 
protection, through a local planning process, beyond this level.156
These sentiments were echoed in the Explanatory Notes tabled alongside the Bill and, 
accordingly, references to o f concern regional ecosystems were removed from the Act 
two days before it became law.157
Such was the Act in September 2000; by March 2004, this particular purpose was 
brought back into the legislation. This time the Minister was Stephen Robertson, and the 
amended legislation was explained as being in furtherance o f a pre-election 
commitment to end broadscale land clearing and protect o f concern regional ecosystems 
on freehold land, in line with the restrictions on clearing on leasehold land.15" Both the 
2000 and the 2004 Acts were correctly described by Queensland Labor as being to 
honour election commitments to the people o f Queensland.
It was alleged in the Simpson case that the defendant undertook an assessable 
development without a permit between January 2001 and April 2004. In both the 
Magistrates Court and the District Court, lawyers for the defendant successfully pleaded 
that removal o f the relevant purpose o f the Act meant that some o f the clearing was not 
unlawful at the time the clearing took place. The Full Bench o f the Supreme Court o f 
Queensland disagreed.159 In the leading judgment, Muir JA declared that it did not
156 Queensland government, Legislative Assembly. Debates, Vegetation Management Amendment Bill — Second 
Reading, 24 August 2000. 2784. Available at: Intp:/,'narlin lb.parliament.old.eo\ .auis\suucr\73c838al8-7953-9a09- 
ahd2-0ccl2cb546cd/l/docV000824ha.pdl#xmNitlp://Darlin ro.parliamcnt.ctld.gov.au/isvscKicrv/3e838alK-7953-4a04- 
abd2-0ecl2cb546cd/1 hililc (viewed 3 August 2011).
157 Queensland government, Explanatory Notes, Vegetation Management Amendment Bill 2000 (Qld). Available at: 
http://\\ ww.letzislation.old.aov.au/Bills/491*l)172000/VeaetationMamtAmdB001.xp.pdf (viewed 3 August 2011).
L' x Queensland. Legislative Assembly, Debates. Vegetation Management and Other Legislation Amendment Bill -  
Second Reading (18 March 2004) 63. Available at: http: Vparl in lb. parliament, cild.aov.au.'is\squcrv/6223hd0c-e5ae- 
43dd-8385-c2c5b69bccd0/4/doc/0403181 lA.PDI'ffxmlNmp://parlin to.parliament A|ld.aov .au/isvsc|iicrvV6223bd0c- 
c5ae-43dd-8385-c2c5b69bccd()/4/hilite/ (viewed 3 August 2011).
159 Peter Robert Witheymcm v Harvey Scott Simpson [2009] QCA 388. 11.
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appear to be the intention of the legislation, in removing that particular purpose, to 
affect the other unambiguous objectives which included the clearing of vegetation on 
freehold land and therefore had ‘general application to freehold land'.160 The case also 
involved a lengthy argument in favour of the defendant on statutory interpretation and 
construction of a statute, particularly as reliance had been made on extrinsic materials 
such as the Explanatory Notes, mentioned above, in which the policy reasons tor 
removal of the clause were reiterated. Muir JA concluded that the lower courts had 
erred in law in accepting the defendant's legal argument and that extrinsic material 
could not displace the clear meaning of the text.161 The defence lawyers applied tor 
special leave to appeal to the High Court.162 The application was unsuccessful, French 
CJ said the Court of Appeal had not made an error of law but ‘proceeded according to 
established principles of statutory interpretation’.163
The next stage in this matter would be to remit the case back to the Magistrates Court. 
The regulators have confirmed that this case has been remitted but a hearing date had 
not been set at the time of writing.164 A compliance officer and representative from 
Queensland Herbarium attended the Simpson property early in 2011 (the road to the 
property had recently opened following around five weeks of isolation due to extensive 
flooding). Unfortunately, an altercation ensued and it would appear likely that Harvey 
Simpson will face additional criminal charges in respect of this.165
Some success for the regulators: the cases of Graham Acton, Russell 
Winks, Bruce Henderson and Reginald Edward Draper
Some cases will prove easier to successfully prosecute. For example, cases in which the 
accused cooperates with the investigation, pleads guilty and does not challenge the 
regulatory evidence. A good example is the first two cases against Graham Acton. This 
rural landholder is the director of the Acton Land and Cattle Company, owners of more 
than a million hectares of land within Central Queensland. He has had three land
160 Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott Simpson [2009] QCA 388. 11.
161 Muir .1 A cited several authorities in support of this including a joint judgement of Hayne. I leydon. Crennan and 
Kiefel .1.1 in A Icon (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner o f  Territory Revenue (2009) 260 ALR 1 at 16-17.
162 Harvey Scott Simpson v Peter Robert Witheyman [2010] HCA Transcript 165. Appeals from State Courts ot 
Appeal require special leave to proceed under s 35 (2) Judiciary Act 1903 (C'th). In considering whether to grant an 
application for special leave to appeal the I Iigh Court may have regard to any matter that it considers relevant and 
particularly if the potential appeal involves a question of law that is of public importance s 35 A (a) (i) Judiciary Act 
1903 (Cth).
163 Harvey Scott Simpson v Peter Robert Witheyman [2010] HCA Transcript 165. 8.
164 Queensland government. DERM, letter in response from the A/Director. Litigation Unit dated 4 May 2011.
Uo Personal communication with the chairman of Property Rights Australia on 27 April 2011.
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clearing prosecutions against him. The first was in 2001 for the illegal clearance of 50 
hectares of vegetation following which he was fined $1500. The second case was in 
2004 and involved the largest area of land cleared since the vegetation regulations came 
into existence. The third case arose in 2011.166 In the 2004 case, Acton cleared 11,830 
hectares of which 5320 ha was remnant vegetation. The extent of land cleared in this 
case must have caused far-reaching harm to the environment. He was fined the largest 
penalty at the time: $100,000. There was no order for costs. The reasoning behind the 
regulatory leniency in respect of costs was attributed to the cooperative nature of 
apparently lengthy negotiations and the guilty plea.167
The Acton case is an example of the statutory financial penalty guide under the VMA 
failing to penalise and take account of large scale clearing. Although the $100,000 fine 
was deemed to be high in 2004,168 it is unlikely this penalty would have been more than 
a running cost to this particular landholder, and any stigma from the case was short­
lived.16'7 Graham Acton maintains a place as a prominent member of the agricultural 
community: he is called upon as a spokesperson for the cattle industry, particularly by 
the rural media. A photograph of him astride a horse at his cattle station Paradise 
Lagoons outside Rockhampton was featured on the front of the 2008/2009 Yellow 
Pages directory for Central Queensland with the caption 'Celebrating Australian 
Flavour'. There are significant individual and general deterrence factors in the 
sentencing of such a high profile rural landholder, which cannot be adequately utilized 
if statutory fines are limited to a specific amount.
In terms of area of land cleared there are cases at the other end of the scale from that of 
Graham Acton. The case against Russell Winks was one such case, which proved
166 The 2011 case was ultimately dropped by the regulators in 2012 after the period of research for this thesis. This 
however would have been a good example of yet another case DERM had difficulty in prosecuting. The facts are: the 
regulators initially brought six charges - against Graham Acton and his brother, their company Acton Land and Cattle 
Co Ltd. and in their capacity as directors of the company. The sixth charge was against their station manager. The 
solicitor acting for the Acton's, made a submission of no case to answer on the basis of s 67A Vegetation 
Management Act 1999 (Qld) which provides that responsibility for unauthorised clearing of vegetation is taken to 
have been carried out by an occupier of the land, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In this instance evidence 
to the contrary was that the clearing had been undertaken by the station manager who pleaded guilty and received a 
fine of around $80,000. E-mail correspondence in reply from Roger Baker. Senior Partner at Rees Jones solicitors, 
Rockhampton, dated 26lh March 2013.
167 The defendant’s solicitor, Roger Baker, kindly supplied information on the case heard in the Rockhampton 
Magistrates Court, on 15 July 2005.
168 ABC, Rural news, 'Line for illegal clearing in Queensland'. 12 October 2004. Available at: 
http:/Avww.abc.net.au/rural/news/stories/s 1218301 .htm .(viewed 24 August 2011).
I6<; The Acton family is frequently listed in the top 20 of Queensland's top 100 rich list, see for example 
‘Queensland's Top 100 Richlist’ 2010. Available at: http://richli.st. indcv.com.au/rcad-fcalurc/27/Acton- 
Lamily(viewed 24 August 2011).
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relatively easy for the regulators to prosecute.170 The defendant had cleared, without a 
development permit, 8.6 hectares of remnant native vegetation, most of which was 
endangered regional ecosystem. The magistrate calculated the applicable penalty as 
$18,585.171 Mitigation on the part of Russell Winks included an exemplary past, a guilty 
plea, the fact the offence had been committed more than five years previously and the 
land had been sold on.172 There was acknowledgment by the magistrate of the 
environmental significance of the clearing: he noted ‘it is important to take into account 
the high value to the community of the vegetation that has been lost'.171 Mitigating 
factors accordingly reduced the fine by a third: the fine was therefore $12,390 together 
with the regulators investigatory costs of $1700.174 The fact that the land value may well 
have increased by this clearing was not an issue taken up by the magistrate. In keeping 
with most illegal clearing cases, a conviction was not recorded.
The case against Bruce Henderson was equally straightforward. In this case, a total of 
274 hectares of remnant vegetation was illegally cleared, including just over 53.7 
hectares of endangered vegetation, 3 hectares of concern and 246.3 hectares not of 
concern.175 Legal representatives for both sides agreed expert evidence on the impact on 
biodiversity in the area need not be obtained; nor was a valuation report deemed 
necessary as it was likewise agreed the valuation of the land would have improved after 
clearing.176 As there was no mention of mapping during the hearing; the defence must 
have accepted the regulatory evidence on this. The appropriate fine for this amount of 
clearing would have been $458,730 following the statutory guidelines; it was 
accordingly submitted by the prosecution that the maximum fine of $124,875 should 
apply.177 Taking account of the plea in mitigation (the defendant was of good character, 
pleaded guilty and cooperated with the investigation) the magistrate reduced the fine to 
$90,000.17x There was no costs order or conviction recorded. As this was a case in North 
Queensland it does not appear that a restoration order was made.170
17" Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) Beaudesert Magistrates Court no -3009209 transcript o f  proceedings.
171 Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) 1: utilising s 60 B Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld).
172 Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) 2.
171 Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) 2.
174 Grant Takken v Russell Winks (2009) 3.
177 Leslie John Gerke v Bruce Douglas Henderson (2009) Cairns Magistrates Court no -10112009 transcript o f  
proceedings.
176 Leslie John Gerke v Bruce Douglas Henderson (2009).
177 Leslie John Gerke v Bruce Douglas Henderson (2009).
'™ Leslie John Gerke v Bruce Douglas Henderson (2009).
170 See breakdown o f statutory notices in Chapter Six.
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In 2010 Reginald Edward Draper pleaded guilty to unlawful clearing of native 
vegetation on freehold land.* 1*" Draper, a grazier, cleared a total of 255 hectares: 226 
hectares of endangered regional ecosystem, 3 hectares of concern regional ecosystem 
and 26 hectares of least concern regional ecosystem. Donald Edmistone, a contractor 
employed by Draper, undertook the clearing. Edmistone cleared the land between April 
and July 2009; the regulators issued a compliance notice to stop the clearing in August 
of the same year.1*1 Edmistones' dealings with the regulators and the Magistrates Court 
were relatively brief. As he cooperated with the investigation and admitted liability he 
was fined $20,000. He had been paid $73,000 for the work undertaken. Draper had 
assured Edmistone he had a permit to clear but he had not verified this with the 
regulators prior to undertaking the work.1*2
The Draper case was not as straightforward as that of Edmistone. He exercised his right 
not to be interviewed by the regulators. It did not help Draper’s case that he had made 
an application to clear 1,135 hectares under the 2004 ballot which had been denied, nor 
that in 2007 he was paid the sum of $35,000 by the Queensland Rural Adjustment 
Authority because of the adverse effect the VMA had on his ability to clear.1*3 In this 
case, expert evidence was submitted by DERM and accepted by the court. The evidence 
held that prior to clearing the area had been one of the largest patches of endangered 
remnant vegetation left in Queensland. The report submitted that:
The clearing has had a significant adverse impact on regional ecosystems in the 
area and on flora values associated with the property at the bioregional, sub 
regional and local levels. Further the unlawful clearing occurs in the Isaac/ Comet 
Downs sub region, which is the eleventh most cleared of Queensland's 119 sub 
regions with 78 per cent of the sub region cleared. Further the unlawful clearing 
adds to the issues of continued clearing in these areas, such as habitat 
fragmentation, habitat loss, weed invasion, soil loss, loss of nutrient cycling and 
increased greenhouse gases.1*4
The same lawyer acted in Draper as had previously acted for the defendants in the cases 
of Van Reit and Knight. He followed a similar line of argument: the confusion 
surrounding the VMA, the many amendments and the difficulty of interpreting the
1X11 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (29 September. 2010) Rockhampton Magistrates Court no -  M- 
00087418 Transcript of Proceedings.
1X1 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 4.
1X2 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 4.
1X3 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 6.
1 x4 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 4-8.
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regulatory maps.185 Prior to the hearing, the defence lawyer challenged the original 
regulatory map and assessment of the area of land illegally cleared. The initial total area 
of alleged illegal clearing had been 726 hectares, but following the defence challenge 
the regulators had reduced this to 255 hectares and amended the complaint.18f> The issue 
of regulatory mapping therefore remains problematic. The potential inequity from the 
reversal of the burden of proof in respect of regulatory evidence, considered in the 
previous chapter, is equally evident in this case. Draper's lawyer gave evidence during 
the sentencing hearing of his client's dismal financial circumstances -  to instruct an 
expert on mapping was clearly beyond his means.
The matter was adjourned following lengthy submissions made by the prosecution and 
defence, and the defendant was subsequently sentenced at a later date.187 The case for 
the prosecution was generally better prepared than in Van Reit and Knight. Accordingly 
in sentencing, Magistrate McGrath accepted not only the evidence, but also most of the 
legal argument submitted by the prosecution.
In sentencing Draper, Magistrate McGrath relied on the statutory framework and the 
sentencing precedent provided by Dore. Insofar as sentencing principles were 
concerned, the offence was regarded as serious with a far reaching and deleterious effect 
on the environment, particularly as most of the cleared land fell into the category of 
endangered regional ecosystem.188 The defendant's culpability was accepted by the 
magistrate because of his prior dealings with DERM and dishonest assurance to the 
contractor that a tree-clearing permit had been obtained.181' Magistrate McGrath did not 
accept that the defendant could have erred in his interpretation of the maps.1'7" The 
magistrate further noted Draper had not cooperated with the regulators and had 
benefited from the clearing in having more grazing land available.1'71
In arriving at a fine for this offence, the additional guidance provided by the Penalties 
and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) meant it was necessary to take into account, as far as
185 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 18 and personal communication with counsel Philip 
Sheridan on 5 May 2010.
186 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 18.
187 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) Rockhampton Magistrates Court no -  M-00087418 
Transcript of Proceedings - Sentence.
188 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 2-4.
I8'’ Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 5.
90 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 6.
191 Robert James Black v Reginald Edward Draper (2010) 10.
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practicable, the financial circumstances of the offender and the nature of the burden that 
the payment of a fine would be on him.192 Counsel for the defendant produced evidence 
of the defendant’s dire financial circumstances. Two recent Queensland District Court 
cases provided further interpretive authority on the governing principles following the 
courts imposition of a fine: Kumar v Garvey (2010) QDC 249 and Engwarda v O Brien 
(2010) QDC 357. Both cases follow the traditional route of authorities such as the 
Queen v Hoad (1989) 42 ACR 312 which established that a penalty must be appropriate 
to the offender and the offence. This was the line of legal reasoning accepted and 
applied by the magistrate. The Draper case involved extensive clearing of endangered 
regional ecosystem, being a total of 226 hectares. Once again the penalty guide was 
exceeded and the court started with the maximum fine that was reduced by mitigation to 
$110,000. In keeping with other land clearing cases, a conviction was not recorded.
Procedural fairness in land clearing cases
Once a landholder is accused of unlawful clearing of land they are brought within the 
criminal justice system for a considerable amount of time. As the cases in this chapter 
illustrate, litigation may last many years. At the very least rural landholders accused of 
illegal clearing should face a process that is fair. This prompted the following research 
question: what wider issues did the compliance and enforcement provisions raise in 
terms o f procedural fairness and access to justice? The reality remains that there are 
limitations on procedural fairness inherent to all criminal justice systems. Some of the 
illegal clearing cases considered in this chapter serve to highlight specific intrinsic 
inequities of criminal justice particularly within the realms of the adversarial system, 
and two of the basic tenets of access to justice being the right to legal representation and 
the system of appeals.
Within the adversarial system, there is an inherent imbalance of power. This imbalance 
typically has in-built mechanisms as to procedural fairness -  such as the underlying 
duty on those who prosecute to act fairly and impartially -  but there remain other 
customary safeguards which (as this and the previous chapter has shown) are somewhat 
eroded under the vegetation management regulations.193 As prosecutor, the regulator has
192 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 48.
193 The duty on prosecutors to be fair is set down in: Queensland government, Department of Justice and Attorney- 
General. Director's Guidelines, 1. Available at:
httir/Avww.iustice.old.gov.au/ data/assets/ndf fde/0015/1670l/l)ircctors-i»uidelines.ndf(viewed 25 August 2011).
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complete control over a case.194 It is the prosecutor who: makes the decision to 
prosecute; to submit or not submit evidence; to decide on legal arguments to present to 
the court; and, to withdraw from a case. Essentially the prosecution must prove its case 
according to the relevant court rules of procedure and the rules of evidence. The 
prosecution typically carries the burden of proving every element of the alleged illegal 
clearing beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidential burden of the regulators under the 
vegetation management regulations, however, is lessened by the legislation -  
particularly the 2003 amendments.
Innate difficulties of successful prosecution remain within the adversarial system, 
despite a reduced evidential burden on the part of the regulators. Cases may fail because 
of evidential deficiencies rather than a blameless defendant.195 As some of the land 
clearing cases have shown in this chapter, arguments may center on legal technicalities 
and process such as: failing to proceed within statutory procedural time limits as in Van 
Reit; the correct legislation to apply following an appeal after a guilty plea as in Dore; 
and statutory interpretation and the use of extrinsic materials as in McKay and Simpson. 
The legal and practical difficulties experienced by regulatory agencies in prosecuting 
environmental crime have been noted in the pastl% and were evident in some of the land 
clearing cases examined. It would appear, however, that the perverse effects of legal 
contest are set to continue as ‘adversaries exhaust their energies in legal battles and the 
basic goals of the regulatory process remain unattended'.197 This chapter illustrates that 
this problem still remains: the fundamental objects of the vegetation management 
legislation often seem far removed from the preoccupations of litigation and the 
precincts of the court.
Competent legal representation is the underlying crux of procedural fairness within the 
criminal justice system. Landholders accused of illegal clearing are unlikely to be au fait 
with the criminal litigation process. The reality for most accused individuals is that the
194 A perspective on the inadequacies o f the adversarial system is provided by a retired judge o f the Australian 
Federal Court: Fox R W, ‘Justice in the Twenty-First Century' (Cavendish Publishing, 2000) 9-18. he does however 
conclude: ‘Despite all these impediments, it is probably correct to say that the decision-maker mostly manages to 
make correct factual findings on the central issue or issues'. 16.
195 A discussion o f the difficulties o f successful prosecution from the regulators stance is contained in: McCotter R. 
'The role o f the environment consultant in pollution prosecutions' (1992) Eleventh National Environmental Law 
Conference. 20.
196 Molino S. ‘Practical difficulties in prosecuting environmental offenders' (1993) and Bingham R and Woodward I, 
‘Tasmanian Approaches to Environmental OffencesT1993) published in Cunningham N. Norberry .1 & McKillop S 
(eds) Environmental Crime: Proceedings o f a Conference. September 1995, Australian Institute o f  Criminology.
197 Bardach E & Kagan R A. Going by the Book; the Problem o f Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982) Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press.
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potential costs of litigation are beyond their means. Of the rural landholders who are 
charged, most choose to plead guilty, either because they are guilty, or taking on a 
government regulatory body presents too great a challenge. Vegetation clearing 
offences do not fall within the financial assistance provisions of legal aid. To engage in 
litigation therefore requires substantial individual financial resources, or support such as 
that provided by Property Rights Australia, and a steadfast determination for a 
considerable period.
Rural landholders with legal representation fare better than those without representation. 
Those with experienced legal representation may be able to challenge the evidence and 
avoid litigation as happened in Holmes. Litigants in person are poorly equipped to act in 
a procedure that systematically places them at a disadvantage. 198 They remain peripheral 
participants in an unintelligible legal process where those in the know perpetuate the 
familiar. Rural landholders assisted by a non-legal agent, as in Dore and Burns, have 
been equally if not more disadvantaged. Reliance on such an agent reflects the financial 
inaccessibility of law and an underlying mistrust and alienation from lawyers and the 
legal system.
Some of the cases examined in this chapter exemplify the protracted nature of litigation 
when cases are appealed. If the landholder is successful but the regulator appeals, the 
only option for the landholder is to continue. In Van Reit, litigation was prolonged 
because the regulators continually appealed; lack of success in the Magistrates Court did 
not prevent subsequent unsuccessful appeals to the District Court, the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal. In Simpson the regulators similarly appealed and achieved 
success ultimately in the Supreme Court. This time the landholder applied for special 
leave to appeal to the High Court, which was refused. Simpson, however, was a case in 
which Property Rights Australia had a vested interest: Harvey Simpson was given 
financial and undoubtedly emotional support. In McKay the landholder is a member of 
Property Rights Australia and has received some financial assistance from the 
organisation. He has also incurred considerable individual expense and appears to
198 There are initiatives to address the difficulties for litigants in person in some jurisdictions, for example the 
Judiciary of England and Wales has produced and released at the beginning of 2013: A Guide for self-represented 
litigants in Interim Applications in the Oueen 's Bench Division o f the High Court. Available at: 
http://\v\v\v.iudiciarv.gov.ukd<csourccs/JC'()/l)ocuments/Guidancc/sii cibd.ndf. (viewed 15 March 2013).The need 
for such guidance is increasing and apparent at all levels of litigation.
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maintain complete control of his litigation: Ashley McKay has successfully appealed 
against his conviction and has continued an independent crusade against the regulators.
The cases reveal the realities of litigation; the system of appeals is complex. Appeals 
invariably entail delay and increased costs. Rights of appeal are typically set down in 
the establishing and amending statutes for a given court. Thus, practice and procedure 
for the Magistrates Court is set down in the Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld). The 
District Court o f Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) covers the District Court and ensures 
adherence to the court hierarchy in not allowing appeals from the Magistrates Court 
directly to the Supreme Court.199 Observance of other statutes such as the Justices Act 
1886 (Qld) and the Criminal Practice Rules 1999 (Qld) is likewise necessary.
Appeals are time consuming and require legal expertise in drafting, preparing and filing 
the requisite court documents. Rights to appeal are limited and may require a potential 
appellant to obtain leave to appeal. Limitations on the rights of appeal also exist in 
terms of strict time periods that vary depending on the court; and, though it may be 
possible for an appeal to be allowed out of time, this again requires an application to the 
court to be determined. In Queensland a right of appeal without leave lies from the 
Magistrates Court directly to the District Court and should be made within one month of 
the Magistrates’ decision.200 Generally in an appeal case the court may dismiss the 
appeal and uphold the original decision as happened in Knight; or allow the appeal and 
remit the matter back to the lower court as happened in the Simpson and McKay cases. 
Remitting is the more typical outcome; it is rare for an appeal case to rehear the original 
matter or for an appeal court to be able to make the necessary findings to resolve a 
case.201
As illegal clearing cases begin in the Magistrates Court, appeals to the District Court 
necessarily entail legal representation from both senior and junior counsel in addition to 
an instructing solicitor. This level of legal representation continues to be necessary if a 
case is further appealed. The extensive costs involved in prolonged appellant litigation 
are inevitably beyond the realms of most litigants: in Van Reit, Simpson and Knight the
199 District Court o f  Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 112.
200 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222 ( I).
201 This limitation of the appeal system was discussed by Fryberg J in Peter Robert Witheyman v Harvey Scott 
Simpson [2009] QCA 388. 23.
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defendants had some financial assistance and continued support from Property Rights 
Australia.
Conclusion
A key focus of this chapter was to answer a subsidiary research question of this thesis, 
which asked: how were the vegetation management enforcement and compliance 
provisions implemented? An initial problem encountered was in establishing a complete 
and accurate list of all illegal clearing investigations and prosecutions. This was 
exacerbated by the regulator’s reluctance to provide comprehensive details either within 
their annual reports or in response to a request for information. An open and transparent 
approach to the implementation of vegetation management regulations might have been 
more forthcoming had the compliance and enforcement record of the regulators 
achieved more success. That being said, as the administrative agency, DERM (the 
former Department of Natural Resources and Water) has not embraced transparency in 
the same manner as the previous Environmental Protection Agency.
One aspect of the implementation of regulatory compliance and enforcement, which 
proved to be consistent in all cases considered, was the use of the statutory sentencing 
guidelines provided by both the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) and the VMA.
It is the latter legislation which authorises the courts to arrive at a pecuniary penalty 
dependent upon the category of vegetation and amount of acreage cleared. As this 
financial penalty is capped, there is a point at which illegal clearing is not penalised.
The example provided within this chapter is that of illegally clearing 55.5 hectares of 
endangered regional ecosystem. Illegal clearing beyond this amount is not sanctioned 
and yet is arguably more environmentally damaging. Such extensive clearing would 
increase cattle carrying capacity and, in turn, land value. It is imperative that financial 
penalties are not merely a business cost; and that the significant deterrence implications 
of sentencing high profile members of the rural community, such as Graham Acton, are 
utilized.
The implementation of vegetation management compliance and enforcement regulations 
was tested in the courts. This early challenge to the validity of the VMA in Bone v 
Mothershaw settled vegetation management law within Queensland: even if the court
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might sympathise with the landholder that the law was unfair, legislative restrictions 
bring no entitlement to compensation. The absence of legal training, which would have 
acknowledged the precedent provided by Bone, prompted a non-legal agent to embark 
upon a series of misguided litigation on behalf of several rural landholders.
It is imperative for a regulatory agency to be seen as acting fairly in the implementation 
of laws, yet many of the cases considered in this chapter do not reflect well on the 
regulators. In Holmes, the landholder obtained contrary expert mapping evidence, which 
prompted a withdrawal of proceedings after protracted negotiations and numerous court 
applications. In Whyenbirra, a compliance notice proved impossible to comply with 
and, as it had been lodged as an encumbrance on the land title, the director-general of 
DERM was obliged to rectify the title and apologise for contempt of court. Other cases 
examined highlight the intrinsic difficulties of successful prosecution in environmental 
crime. The case of McKay traversed the court hierarchy for many years, ultimately the 
defendant was primarily successful, but regulatory personnel were referred to the Crime 
and Misconduct Commission and subject to independent investigation. In Van Reit and 
Knights, both landholders succeeded in their cases. In these matters the regulators 
unsuccessfully appealed and, in the course of settling costs, both landholders received 
up to three times the statutory amount ordinarily granted for some items. Addressing the 
balance in costs awarded reflects a degree of fairness on the part of the courts. Cases 
such as Acton, Winks and Henderson -  in which the accused cooperated with the 
investigation, pleaded guilty and did not challenge the regulatory evidence -  proved 
inevitably easier for the regulators to prosecute.
Laws, particularly when enforced, will inevitably be pervasive and especially so for 
those whose livelihoods operate within their ambit. Queensland may now be on a path 
towards reaching the objects of vegetation management legislation; but there have been 
casualties en route and, in some sectors, irreparable damage to the regulatory 
relationship. The situation has at times been exacerbated by the deep-seated problem of 
access to justice and impelled a further research question: what wider issues did the 
compliance and enforcement provisions raise in terms o f procedural fairness and 
access to justice? This problem may be familiar to all criminal justice systems but this 
chapter serves to highlight the imbalance in procedural fairness within land clearing
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litigation, particularly in the areas of the right to legal representation and the system of 
appeals.
Some of the cases examined in this chapter exemplify the protracted nature of litigation 
when cases are appealed. Yet the ability to successfully defend an appeal all too 
frequently hinges on the ability to engage legal representation. In Dore, assistance by a 
non-legal agent unnecessarily prolonged litigation in a matter which should have ended 
in the first Magistrates Court hearing. In McKay, Vau Reit, Simpson and Knights the 
defendants had some financial assistance and continued support from Property Rights 
Australia. If the landholder is successful but the regulator appeals, the only option for 
the landholder is to continue as evidenced in Van Reit, Knight and Simpson. Of these 
four Property Rights Australia cases, McKay was the only landholder to be convicted 
and that conviction was overturned. The matter of Simpson remains outstanding. 
Property Rights Australia has played a significant role in enabling and supporting these 
cases and in facilitating a body of litigation that might not otherwise have existed.
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Chapter Eight: The making and implementation of the Rural
Leasehold Land Strategy
Introduction
At the beginning of 2000 in Queensland, a policy shift in leasehold tenure was 
inevitable, the vast expanse of State rural land had endured extensive and prolonged 
degradation and rural lease terms were about to expire. Part of the solution was to 
amend leasehold legislation to incorporate sustainable land management. This chapter 
examines the making and implementation of the amendments to the Land Act 1994 
(Qld) (LA). The following research question was explored: how were the LA and the 
Rural Leasehold Laud Strategy made aud implemented and what were the 
parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament within which the amendments 
were made?' In 2001, some years before these amendments were made; the Minister for 
Natural Resources introduced a discussion paper as the first phase of the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy. This was followed by a draft strategy in 2003. The essence ot 
the strategy was to establish a link between security of tenure and sustainable land 
management practices: additional lease periods would be granted on top ot the basic 30 
years as an incentive for environmental performance. This thesis has observed that the 
Labor period of government within Queensland was often characterised by a lack ot 
transparency and accountability. This is further evidenced in this chapter insofar as the 
regulators denied access to submissions made by interested parties following the 2001 
discussion paper and the 2003 draft strategy.
The making and implementation of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy never reached 
the same heights of controversy as the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA). 
This began with the language of the Minister: in sharp contrast to the introduction and 
amendments of the VMA, government rhetoric was founded on conciliation and 
collaboration rather than confrontation and blame for past land management practices. 
There was recognition by the government that the move to sustainable land management 
would be a long-term and mutual goal. Leaseholders were not overly concerned by the 
proposed change; there was no reason to expect anything other than the status quo to
1 Political processes have typically been considered with political context but Chapters Four. Five and Nine examine 
the political context for the period which includes the introduction and implementation o f the Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy.
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continue. The amendments were not contentious because leaseholders could obtain 
lease renewal at the very least for the same 30-year term -  even if their land was not in 
good condition. The law was made following appropriate parliamentary procedure and 
was unopposed, and even commended, by the opposition.
This chapter will examine how the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy has been put into 
practice. The strategy is commonly known as the Delbessie Agreement, having been 
launched at a cattle property of the same name. The Land and Other Legislation 
Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) provided the amendments to implement the strategy and a 
framework upon which lease renewal is now based. The main change is in the 
implementation of a new lease. The renewal process now includes a wide-ranging land 
condition assessment and, on the basis of this assessment, a complex and lengthy land 
management agreement. Such agreements are contractual and take effect once 
registered, along with the other title documents, at the Land Registry. A new lease must 
include general mandatory conditions and imposed conditions. Lease conditions are 
meant to be reviewed by the regulators every 10 years. If these reviews are conducted 
with any rigour, it will be a vast improvement on the situation noted in Chapter Two in 
which the historical lack of adaptive change in pastoral lease conditions was 
established. A potentially significant mandatory condition is the statutory duty of care 
which was clarified along with the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy amendments to the 
LA. In the future, landholders might practically show compliance with the duty of care 
provisions by demonstrating performance of their land management agreement. To date, 
however, there is nothing to show that the duty of care condition, initially introduced in 
1994, has had any significant and beneficial environmental impact on rural State land. 
As noted in Chapter Three, environmental laws should benefit the environment but it is 
impossible to make this conclusion definitively in the absence of evaluation and 
assessment, that is, if there is no means to measure whether any positive change has 
been made.
The regulators now have more extensive duties on lease renewal in respect of assessing 
the condition of the land and negotiating the terms of a new lease and land management 
agreement. They are assisted in this role by the Ministerial guidelines on what 
constitutes good condition of leased land and the Ministerial Advisory Committee. The 
length of a renewed lease will be determined by the condition of the land. Assessment
232
of condition is complex and extensive; it includes a desktop appraisal and a detailed 
field inspection. The regulated undergo a more protracted lease renewal process and 
ultimately have more onerous duties and obligations to meet the requirements ot their 
lease and land management agreement.
One of the purposes of the land management agreement is to establish a monitoring and 
reporting program. The long-term sustainability of leased land will depend on the 
regulators having adequate resources to maintain and develop this program. What is 
apparent in this chapter, is that lease renewal under the amended legislation is much 
more resource intensive for the regulators. It was explained in Chapter Two that lease 
conditions had remained dormant for many years; the automatic 20-year extension tor 
rural leases in 1986 would not have excessively challenged regulatory resources. The 
passage of time will determine if the Queensland government has sufficient will and 
resources to invest in a comprehensive and sustained implementation of the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy. If regulatory resources are channeled into the renewal stage it 
might mean that resources for education and communication, compliance and 
enforcement are negligible.
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy: initial discussion paper and draft 
strategy
In December 2001 the Minister for Natural Resources Stephen Robertson announced 
the introduction of a discussion paper as the initial stage of the Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy. The Minister noted:
The Beattie government is committed to achieving sustainable management ot all 
of our State's natural resources, including leasehold land. We also recognise that 
this is best done in partnership with an economically viable rural farming sector.
To this end. the government is committed to increasing certainty for stakeholders 
in the State's rural leasehold land, including indigenous and conservation interests, 
and to increasing accountability.2
2 Queensland government. Ministerial Statement. Rural Leasehold Land, December 2001. 4214 per Hon S Robertson. 
Available at:
l)ttn://w\\\\.narliament.cild.eo\.au/doeuments Ilansard/2001 '01 1205ha.ndf#xml littp:/A\\\\\.parliament.old.aov.au/in 
ternetseareh/isvsouerv/755fbeba-270d-4453-9b26-Sdae740881 It)/1 /hi 1 ite/ (viewed 10 December 2011).
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The discussion paper was timely: in the twenty-year period from 2001 to 2021 almost 
half of the pastoral holdings within the State, amounting to 42 million hectares, would 
be due for renewal.3 It was also judicious as rural land and environmental degradation 
were issues of concern. Approximately 1800 rural leases were affected, covering 86.6 
million hectares or half of Queensland, environmentally this land is significant: 96.3 per 
cent of land affected by the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is mapped as remnant 
vegetation by the Queensland Herbarium.4
In 2003, the same Minister introduced the draft Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. 
Addressing the Queensland Parliament. Robertson said:
Certainty is the key word here. This approach provides leaseholders greater 
certainty in terms of their security of tenure. It ensures our land resources are better 
protected against further environmental decline by making conservation a 
condition of the lease...’5
The Minister stressed the linkage between security of tenure and sustainable land 
management practices: additional lease periods would be granted on top of the basic 30 
years as an incentive for environmental perfonnance. This change in policy direction is 
worthy of note. The last significant event in lease renewal was in 1986 when the Bjelke- 
Petersen government granted an automatic 20-year extension to most pastoral leases. At 
that time, both sides of parliament agreed that a 30-year lease had limitations and 
supported the security of tenure provided by an extended 50-year term. In 2003 the 
Queensland Labor government, unopposed by the opposition, reverted to the 30-year 
lease period and held out the possibility of an extended 40-year term as a reward for 
good land condition and an inducement for sustainable land management practices.
Both the 2001 discussion document and the 2003 draft strategy refer to extensive 
consultation taking place between interested parties. Following the initial discussion 
paper, deliberations occurred with relevant public sector groups including the 
Departments of Premier and Cabinet, Treasury, State Development and Primary
3 Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources and Mines. Managing State Rural Leasehold Land; A 
discussion paper. 2001,2.
4 Queensland government, DERM. Delbessie Agreement. State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. Guidelines for 
determining lease land condition. April 2011. 2. Available at:
htlD:/7\\\v\v.derm.c|ld.go\ .au/land/state/rural leasehold ndf'delbessie guidelines v2.pdf(viewed 10 December 201 1).
5 Queensland government. Ministerial Statement. Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. 26 March 2003, 791, per Hon S 
Robertson. Available at:
http://\v\v\v.parl iamcnUild.aov.au/documents/Hansard/2003/0303261I A. IM)l;#xml=htlp://\v\v\v.narl iament.uld.aov.au 
/internetsearch/isvsuuerv'96364c3b-cbcf-4291-98ce-ec64()4bbc4aa/ l/hilite/.(vie\ved 10 December 2011).
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Industries together with leaseholders and organisations such as Agforce, Landcare and 
the Queensland Conservation Council.6 Workshops were held for leaseholders to attend 
and 84 written submissions were made.7 After the 2003 draft strategy was released, the 
regulators noted that landholders had attended 19 regional workshops and a further 70 
written submissions were received.8 Neither the submissions nor transcripts of public 
hearings were available on the regulator's web site. Yet the objects of the Land Act 
1994 (Qld) include ‘open and accountable'9 *1administration and, on introducing the new 
strategy, the Minister committed to ‘increasing accountability'."’ A request to read the 
submissions and transcripts of the public hearings engendered this reply:
...copies of written submissions are kept on department files and I don’t know 
if transcripts of public hearings were made and/or were kept. To obtain copies of 
written submissions I suggest you apply through the ’right to information’ process 
available through www.rti.qld.uov.au.'1
This response was in keeping with other requests for information from the regulators.
Open and accountable administration, however, should mean a transparent process with 
ready access to the contributions of interested parties upon which the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy was apparently based. This is particularly pertinent, as the Queensland 
government continually stressed the extent and period of time during which consultation 
was undertaken. It proved impossible to clarify the number of rural landholders who 
attended the initial 2001 workshops. It was estimated by the regulators that more than 
1000 people attended the 2003 public hearings. It is arguable that many of these 
individuals were present because they were curious about the new regulatory regime 
and wished to provide some input. It remains unclear if transcripts of the public 
hearings exist. Responsible government requires transparency in administrative 
procedure. There has been a manifest regulatory failure on the part of the Department of 
Environment and Resource Management (DERM) to be open and accountable in
6 Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources and Mines. Draft State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy, 
2003. 1.
7 Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Draft State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy, 
2003, I.
s Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources and Water. State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy 
(undated) 1. This document and some of the original regulatory material is no longer available on the Queensland 
government's web site.
" s4 Land Act 1994 (Qld).
"’ Queensland government. Ministerial Statement. Rural Leasehold Land. 5 December 2001.4214. per Hon S 
Robertson. Available at:
liUD://\\\\\\ .parliament.(ild.uo\ .au/documents 1 lansard 2001 /01 1205 ha.ixlf#\ml=hltir/Avw\\. pari iament.iild.ttov.au/in 
tcrnetsearch/isvsoucrv/755f6cha-270d-4453-9h26-8dac740881 lO/l/hilitc/ (viewed 10 December 2011).
11 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, email correspondence in reply 
dated 9 January 2012 from the Principle Advisor, State Land Management.
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administrative processes and to adhere to the objects of the legislation they administer 
during the Labor period of government.12
The Land and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld)
The Laud and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) made the amendments to 
the Land Act 1994 (Qld) to implement the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. The 
amending legislation was introduced in March 2007 by Craig Wallace, the Minister at 
the time. It was passed in April of the same year. Unlike the introduction and many 
amendments of the VMA, debate on the proposed statute followed due parliamentary 
process. The Bill went through a First and Second Reading, during which members 
from both sides of the Legislative Assembly were given the opportunity to contribute to 
the debate. This moved on to a consideration in detail of all the amending clauses. The 
legislation was passed without any amendments, but the parliamentary dominance of the 
Queensland Labor Party continued in 2007.
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy provided for all new and renewed rural leases for 20 
years or over, and greater than 100 hectares in size, to be subject to a land management 
agreement. This agreement would be between the lessee and the Queensland 
government. According to the Minister, the strategy recognised the importance of 
security of tenure for successful grazing and agriculture and therefore rewarded 
sustainable management of land.13 The amendments were not controversial, in part 
because leaseholders could obtain lease renewal at the very least for the same term.
12 As the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is fundamental to this thesis I decided to pursue a Freedom of Information 
(FOI) application in January 2012. Initially an FOI officer from DERM advised I did not need to put in a formal 
application as the files would be located and they would contact me. There followed several emails and telephone 
conversations. During this period I had made contact with Des Boyland in his capacity as a member of the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy Ministerial Advisory Committee. Des Boyland spoke to the State Land Asset manager on 
my behalf. The manager contacted me, mentioned the FOI application and asked if 1 would attend a meeting with him 
and other senior policy officers at the DFRM office in Brisbane. 1 attended a meeting on 18 April 2012. Prior to the 
meeting, 1 had submitted, as agreed, a series of questions on the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. In many ways the 
meeting was futile as the DFRM officers talked very generally around my questions. I therefore suggested I reduce 
the questions and asked if they would supply written responses which seemed more reliable than my inteipreting their 
oral responses. The written replies were given by one of the senior policy officers on the 29 May 2012. 1 had assumed 
the written submissions might be made available to me at the meeting -  especially as the suggested meeting was after 
the change in State government, ft was apparent this was not to be the case and after the meeting the State Land Asset 
manager said in an email dated 24 April 2012 that the submissions would not be released since he believed the 
expectation, at the time the submission were made, was that they would not be publicly available. It was clearly open 
to me to pursue the original FOI application but I decided against this in light of the time and expense already 
incurred and the likelihood of further wasted time and expense.
13 Queensland government, Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Second reading, 15 March 2007, 1120, per 
Wallace C. Available at
htln:/AvAvw.parliament.old.uov.au/documents/l lansard/2007/2007 03 15 W LLK.I.Y.pdfWxml=http:/Avww parliamen 
t.qld.üQN .au/intemetscarch/isvs(.iuer\7c0beb077-f490-4h4b-8ac7-lc4b526bl59f/'2/hilite/(viewed 12 December 2011).
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Thus a 30-year lease could be renewed for 30 years. The new and extensive 
administrative processes might have challenged the expectations of leaseholders: a 
renewed lease was no longer a straightforward matter of filling in a form and paying a 
prescribed fee. But there was no widespread outcry prompted by the proposed change. 
There was no reason to expect leases would not be renewed as they had in the past.
This is the essence of the strategy:
• If the land was not deemed to be in good condition the lessee would be 
offered a lease term up to 30 years;
• Good condition was to be determined by the Ministerial Advisory 
Committee;
• Landholders who could demonstrate successful remediation of their land, 
within the first 10 years of their land management agreement, may apply 
for a 10 year extension to extend their lease to 40 years; and
• A further 10 years would be available, making the lease a 50 year term, if 
the land was in good condition and, if the Minister considered it 
appropriate, the lessee entered into a conservation agreement or a 
conservation covenant and/or an indigenous access agreement.14
The opposition supported the ‘overall intention' of the legislation but voiced concerns 
as to how the Act was to be administrated.15 Some members, typically those from the 
land, articulated similar concerns which included: doubts as to land inspections, and the 
ability of those undertaking them, to take into account variables such as the 
unprecedented drought which affected most of Queensland at that time;16 the lack of 
trust of leaseholders towards the regulators, declared to be in marked contrast to the
14 Queensland government. Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Second reading. 15 March 2007. 1120. per 
Wallace C. Available at:
http: www.parlianKmt.qld.uov.au/documents/llansard/2007/2007 05 15 W 1 LK.l.Y.pdlWxml hltp://www.parliamcn 
t.uld.uov.au/internetsearch/isvsuucrv/c()bcb077-r4t>0-4b4b-8ac7-1 e4b526bl59r/2/hilite/.(viewed 13 December 2011). 
The relevant legislative provisions became as follows: s 155 A (1) (b) Land Act 1994 (Qld) makes provision for a 40 
year extension; s 155 B (1) (b) Land Act 1994 (Qld) makes provision for a 50 year extension; s 155 BA (1) (b) 
provides for extensions up to 75 years and requires a conservation agreement, an indigenous land use agreement and 
all or part of the leased land being in an area of international conservation significance under the Cape York 
Peninsula Heritage Act 2007 (Qld)
15 Queensland government. Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Second reading. 15 March 2007. 1233, per 
Hopper.
I(' Queensland government. Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Second reading. 15 March 2007, 1304. per 
Johnson.
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former good working relationship with the Land Commissioners;17 and the need to 
rebuild trust between leaseholders and the regulators.IX It is probable that many of these 
concerns had been raised by rural constituents and would have been reflected in the 
submissions the regulators were reluctant to disclose. Had the proposed amendments 
been contentious, the opposition would not have supported the legislation. On the 
contrary, Jeff Seeney, member for the National Party's rural seat of Callide and the most 
vociferous and steadfast opponent of the VMA, commended the Minister for rewarding 
good land management practice and adhering to applicable legislative procedures with 
regard to drafting and parliamentary process.19
Contrary to parliamentary debates on the VMA, account was taken during the Second 
Reading discourse of the Alert Digest report prepared by the Scrutiny of Legislation 
Committee. The concerns of the Committee were taken up by the Shadow Minister, in 
particular the concern that leaseholders whose interest had been terminated were denied 
any entitlement to claim compensation and, in the absence of ministerial approval, such 
leaseholders were also prevented from removing any improvements if their holding was 
terminated.21’ The Minister replied that where a lease was revoked under the provisions 
of the LA no compensation would be payable for the extinguishment of this interest in 
land; but the Act did make provision for the lessee of a revoked lease to apply to 
remove improvements. As this provision was consistent with the legislation existing at 
the time -  and with previous Acts introduced and administered by conservative coalition 
governments -  the Minister was deemed to have responded to the satisfaction of the 
Committee.21
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy becomes the Delbessie Agreement
In December 2007 the Queensland government launched the Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy at the Delbessie cattle property in Hughenden. This property has been in the 
McNamara family since 1929. Greg McNamara was elected the northern chairman of
17 Queensland government. Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill. Second reading, for example 15 March 
2007. per Johnson 1247 and Menkens 1251.
ls Queensland government, Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill, Second reading, 15 March 2007, for 
example per Menkens 1251. Cunningham 1253. and Malone 1258. The loss of trust between the regulators and the 
regulated and the need to rebuild trust is discussed in Chapter Three.
19 Queensland government, Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2007, Second reading. 15 March 2007, 
1253, per Seeney.
20 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee, Alert Digest Report No 5 of 2007, 24.
21 Queensland Parliament, Scrutiny of Legislation Committee Alert Digest Report No 5 of 2007, 26. 24.
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Agforce in November 2007. At the end of his first week in office he was told his 
property had been chosen to host Premier Anna Bligh, Minister Craig Wallace, 
chairman of Agforce at the time Peter Kenny and president of the Australian Rainforest 
Conservation Society Aila Keto, together with assorted entourage and the press. These 
four parties signed what became known as the Delbessie Agreement. The failure to 
include an indigenous representative is noteworthy, particularly as the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy makes provision for indigenous land use and access agreements.22
The Australian Rainforest Conservation Society fulfilled the environmental role but it 
seemed odd that a body primarily concerned ‘to protect, repair and restore the 
rainforests of Australia and to maximise the protection of forest biodiversity'23 should be 
involved with Delbessie lands. The list of achievements of the Society does not include 
the Delbessie Agreement. As a skilled negotiator and renowned conservationist, Aila 
Keto has a considerable reputation amongst environmental groups and may have been 
one of the few individuals within the State capable of undertaking this role.24 The 
independence of the Society might have been compromised: they are supported by a 
grant from the department who administered the Agreement.25 Agforce are the largest 
rural organisation within the State and as such their negotiating role was a logical 
inclusion.2'1
22 See for example commentary in the Queensland South Native Title Service. State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. 
Discussion Paper. 2009. Available at: h llp :/A \w cisnts.com.au/''index.cfin?contcntlD= 18 (viewed 20 December 
2011) .
"3 Australian Rainforest Conservation Society. Achievements. Available at: http: www .rainlbrest.ore.au/arcsinIb.hlm 
(viewed 20 December 2011).
”4 Des Boyland, member of the Ministerial Advisory Committee and representative of the Wildlife Preservation 
Society of Queensland written replies in response to my questions dated 1 May 2012. Now retired Des Boy land is a 
scientist who began his career in the Queensland public service in 1959. He originally worked as a plant taxonomist 
and mapped vegetation and completed his working life as a senior executive responsible for the conservation of 
nature with the former State Environmental Protection Agency. In keeping with the research strategy and protocol 
employed for this thesis an email together with an explanatory' information sheet and consent form was sent to Aila 
Keto with a series of short questions in relation to the involvement of the Australian Rainforest Conservation Society 
(ARCS) in the Delbessie Agreement. As no reply was forthcoming a further email was sent some months later, which 
again elicited no response. Aila Keto founded the Rainforest Conservation Society of Queensland (now the ARCS) in 
1982. She is a well known authority on World Heritage matters and was primarily responsible for the groundwork 
behind three nominations being the Wet Tropics. Fraser Island and the Central Eastern Rainforest Reserves. She was 
instrumental in bringing an end to rainforest logging in Queensland and to the protection of more than 1.5 million 
hectares of rainforest. She has been the recipient of many environmental awards. In 2000 she was nominated as 
Queenslander of the Year: in 2001 she was awarded a centenary medal for service as an expert on wet tropics and as 
a leading conservationist and academic. See generally, Australian government. Australia Celebrating Australians. 
htlp:/A\\\w.itsanhonoui'.uov.au/honours/honour roll/scarch.cfm?aus award id=l 1 161 11&search type quick&showl 
nd' true (viewed 20 December 2011) and the ARCS site: http: ;uww.rain forcst.ora.au/nld meals.htm. (viewed 20 
December 2011).
Australian Rainforest Conservation Society, the Homepage of the Society notes “ARC’S is supported by a grant 
from the Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management": Available at: 
http:/Avw w,rain forest.oru.au/arcsin Ib.htin.tviewed 20 December 2011).
26 Nonetheless, as noted in Chapter Three, Agforce receives significant financial support from the Queensland 
government: their governmental funding and membership would outstrip that of the Australian Rainforest 
Conservation Society.
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The Delbessie Agreement was not binding legally; it was an information document that 
included the signatures o f the four parties on the initial page, or forward. The Agforce 
president assured landholders they had nothing to fear: the message from the Minister 
was conciliatory and appeared to envisage that the move to sustainable land 
management would be a long-term goal. Wallace noted:
1 don’t want people from my department going to a property that's been in a 10- 
year drought and declaring that it's not in a good condition -  that would be wrong.
1 make this commitment to the people of rural Queensland that my department will 
work cooperatively with them to come up with an arrangement that suits all parties 
and gets all properties up to 100 per cent in the future.27
In December 2007 all Queensland rural leaseholders received a letter from the Minister 
announcing the introduction o f the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy, and noting that it 
would be operational early in 2008. The Minister said:
The strategy recognises that it is not possible for leaseholders to conserve cultural 
heritage and protect the environment alone, nor is it reasonable to expect that they 
should. Clearly it will take a collaborative effort and mutual compromise for the 
strategy to work...2x
In August 2008 the Agforce president called for the Queensland government to finalise 
the details o f the strategy, implement the reforms and appoint the Ministerial Advisory 
Committee.29
The State Rural Leasehold Land Ministerial Advisory Committee
The Ministerial Advisory Committee was duly formed in August 2008. The function o f 
the committee was described as being ‘to provide scientific, technical and policy advice 
to the Minister on specific issues related to the state wide management and use o f rural 
leasehold land and the implementation of the Delbessie Agreement'.3" The LA was 
amended to make provision for the Committee to advise on the management and use o f
27 Cooper B, ‘Landcare criteria tor lease reform' Queensland Country’ Life (6 December 2007) 3.
2X Queensland government. Hon Craig Wallace MP. Minister for Natural Resources and Water, Standard letter sent to 
lessees of rural land together with a fact sheet on the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy dated 17 December 2007.
29 Kenny P, ‘Progress needed' Queensland Country Life (7 August 2008) 23.
3(1 Queensland government. Department of the Premier and Cabinet, State Rural Leasehold Land Ministerial Council. 
Available at: http://govvmmenthodics.premicrs.qld.aov.au/BodvDisplay.aspN7Paramctci-680 (viewed 2 January 
2012) .
240
rural leasehold land. 31 The legislation also allowed the Minister to establish regional 
committees to support the Advisory Committee. 32 The Minister could decide the 
functions or terms of reference of the Advisory Committee, its membership and how it 
was to operate. 33
An assessment of land condition is integral to the implementation of the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy. Good condition is not defined in the Act but there is statutory 
provision for Ministerial guidelines about what constitutes good condition of leased 
land. 34 Before making the guidelines the Minister must seek advice from the Ministerial 
Advisory Committee. 35 If the advice of the Committee is not given within a reasonable 
period the Minister may make the guidelines. 36 The role of the Committee is strictly 
advisory: equally, as the legislation notes, the Minister ‘may have regard to the 
guidelines' . 37
Under the terms of reference the functions of the Committee are, inter alia, to advise on:
• The sustainable management and use of rural land;
• Practice guidelines for natural resource condition assessment, including 
the assessment of good condition which takes regional variability into 
account;
• Policy initiatives in response to contemporary and emerging issues;
• The framework for land management agreements, covenants and use and 
access agreements;
• The effectiveness and appropriateness of frameworks for monitoring and 
evaluating natural resource conditions;
• Appropriate time frames for recovery of landscape condition;
• Research and development that is required to support the implementation 
of the strategy and recognise the diversity of landscapes and the impact of 
climate variability on land condition; and
31 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394.
32 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 (2) (a) (ii).
33 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 (2) (b) and (c).
34 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 A.
35 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 A (2).
36 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 A (3).
37 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 A (6).
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• Community and sectoral concerns related to the use and management of 
leasehold land.3x
At the time of writing, eleven of the twelve Committee members have retained office 
since the Committee was established.39 In August 2008. the Minister, Craig Wallace, 
announced the establishment of the committee and provided details of the members and 
their expertise which included: natural resource management, rural industry, agricultural 
and environmental science, public policy, native title and cultural heritage.4" There is 
one rural landholder on the Committee in the position of Chair and a technical advisor 
from Agforce.41 There are two conservationists on the Committee, one from the Wildlife 
Preservation Society of Queensland and one from the WWF Australia and an 
indigenous land management expert. There are also technical advisors on the 
Committee who hold senior positions in the regulatory bodies of DERM and the 
Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries. The technical advisors are non-voting 
members. By November 2008 the Minister had announced that the Committee was 
reviewing draft guidelines for assessing what amounted to good land condition.42 The 
guidelines were duly prepared and, in accordance with statutory requirements, 
publically available.43 The latest Guidelines were released in April 2011.44
Lease terms and conditions
The terms and conditions of a pastoral lease instrument need not comply with the 
required characteristics of a general lease, which require exclusive possession and a 
certain term.45 The LA makes provision for lease conditions and includes general 
mandatory conditions and imposed conditions. The mandatory conditions include the
3X Queensland government. Sate Rural Leasehold Land Ministerial Advisory Committee, Terms of Reference, cl 2.2.
39 Being February 2012: the committee's future in light of the outcome from the March State election is uncertain but 
their term has been extended for twelve months to 2013. Personal communication with Des Boyland 6 February 
2012, n 24.
40 Wallace C, ‘Queensland Rural Leasehold land Advisory Committee Appointed' (Media release, 21 August 2008).
41 The Chair is Kenneth Drysdale a former president of the United Graziers Association of Queensland and an 
Augathella grazier.
42 Queensland government. Questions Without Notice. Rural leasehold land, 11 November 2008. 3345. per Wallace 
C. Available at:
hilp://uww.parliament.itld.eov.au/docurnents/llansard 2008/2008 11 11 WLLK1 .Y.pdffixml http://wwu.r>arliamcn 
t.old.gov.au/inlernetsearch/isvsquery/dbe4fl7e-a079-47e2-ac50-fbb8a613419e/1/hilite/(viewed 6 January 2012).
43 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 394 A (4) & (5).
44 Queensland government. DERM. Delbessie Agreement, State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. Guidelines for 
Determining Lease Land Condition, April 2011, 2. Available at:
httr>://wwxv.derm.cild.eov.au/land/state/rural leasehold/pdf/delbessie euidelines v2.pdf (viewed 7 January 2012).
45 The Wik Peoples v The State o f  Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1. discussed in Chapter Two, held a pastoral lease 
was a creature of statute and need not grant a right to exclusive possession.
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statutory duty of care and use in accordance with the tenure's purpose, together with a 
land management agreement condition and an improvement condition.46 Imposed 
conditions are wide ranging and typically include development and care, sustainability 
and protection of the leased land.47 The lessee has a statutory obligation to perform the 
conditions of the lease.48 Failure to do so may lead to forfeiture4'7 but, as observed by 
Young, forfeiture has rarely been used in the past because of the political and 
administrative difficulties in implementation.5" Forfeiture is not an expectation of lease 
title holders in Queensland. According to the regulators, the lack ot forfeiture is because 
of the ‘range of administrative steps prior to that action and those steps resolve the 
issue’.51 There has been no forfeiture of leases under the Delbessie Agreement and in 
approximately 25 years prior to the strategy, there was only one forfeiture."7
For the environment, and for the parties to a lease, it is important to review lease 
conditions.53 Young advocated 10 to 15 year review periods.84 For rural leasehold land in 
Queensland, a review of imposed conditions must be made at the same time that the 
land management agreement is reviewed by the regulators, which is at least once every 
10 years.55 The Delbessie Agreement also provides for a self-assessment of the land 
management agreement every five years but does not provide any further information as 
to how this might be implemented.56 The 10-year timeframe to review lease conditions 
is an improvement for the environment, and also for both lessor and lessee. It provides 
the opportunity to assess what is working within the terms of the lease and if conditions 
need to be further adapted to the specific requirements of the land and the parties to the 
lease. It was observed in Chapter Two that lease conditions had been static for many 
years prior to the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy and that change was typically 
implemented through legislation. This provision to adapt the lease instrument marks a 
policy shift with potential benefits for the environment.
46 Land Act 1994 (Qld) ss 199, 199 A. 201 A and 202.
47 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 203.
48 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 213.
4" Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 234.
50 Young M D, ‘Pastoral Land Tenure Options in Australia' (1985) 7 (1) Rangeland Journal 45.
51 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management email correspondence in reply 
from a senior policy officer, State Lands Asset Management dated 4 February 2013.
"2 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management email correspondence in reply 
from a senior policy officer. State Lands Asset Management dated 4 February 2013.
53 Young M D, ‘Pastoral Land Tenure Options in Australia' (1985) 7 (1) Rangeland Journal 45. 45 and Holmes .1 H 
and Knight L D P .  ‘Pastoral Lease Tenure in Australia: Historical Relic or Useful Contemporary Tool?" (1994) 16 (1) 
Rangeland Journal 110.
54 Young M D. ‘Pastoral Land Tenure Options in Australia' (1985) 7 (1) Rangeland Journal 45.
55 Land Act 1994 (Qld) ss 211 ( I) and 176 X.
56 Queensland government. Department of Natural Resources and Water, State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. 7.
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Clarification of the statutory duty of care condition
A statutory duty of care for leasehold land was first introduced into Queensland in the 
LA -  this meant that all leases were 'subject to the condition that the lessee has 
responsibility for a duty of care for the land'.57 Duty of care was not defined in the 1994 
Act; clarification came with the 2007 amendments, along with the Rural Leasehold 
Land Strategy. The duty of care requirements oblige landholders with leases issued for 
agricultural, grazing or pastoral purposes to take all reasonable steps to:
• Avoid causing or contributing to land salinity that reduces the land’s 
productivity or damages other land;
• Conserve soil, water resources and biodiversity; maintain native grassland 
free of encroachment from woody vegetation;
• Protect riparian vegetation;
• Maintain pastures dominated by perennial and productive species; and
• Manage any declared pest.58
The amendments were introduced into Parliament by the Minister and were said to be 
‘articulated in a more comprehensive manner’.59 Beyond this brief introduction the 
additional duty of care obligations were not the subject of any protracted parliamentary 
discussion, they were supported by one other member of the Labor Party and remained 
unchallenged by the opposition. This was not a controversial amendment -  it might be 
argued that this was because the amendment affected leasehold tenure; it is unlikely 
such an amendment would have gone unchallenged had it affected freehold land.
At the Commonwealth level, the Industry Commission in their 1997 Inquiry into 
ecologically sustainable land management advocated a statutory duty of care. A key 
recommendation was for the regulation of natural resource management to be built 
around a general duty of care for the environment/’" The Industry Commission proposed 
extending the common law duty of care to environmental statutes, which ‘would require 
resource managers to take all “reasonable and practical” steps to prevent their actions
57 Land Act 1994 (QId) s 199.
58 Land Act 1994 (Qld) ss 199 (1) (2) (a) to (h).
59 Queensland government. Land and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2007. Second reading. 15 March 2007.1120. 
per Wallace C. Available at:
http:/Av\\\v.parliament.old.*’o\ .au/documents/l lansard/2007/2007 03 15 WLI■ KLY.pdtWxml-hltn:/Auvw.parliamcn 
t.cild.uov.au/,intcmetscareh/isvsquerv/4264e37c-5b4l-4d44-9d04-45t9dl3aa415/4/hilite/ (viewed 6 January 2012).
60 Industry Commission. A Full Repairing Lease: Inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land Management,
September 1997, 73.
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causing foreseeable harm to the environment'/’1 A further Commonwealth Report 
prepared for the re-named Productivity Commission in 2001, developed the earlier 
recommendations and concluded that a statutory duty of care was a significant ‘means 
to articulate environmental standards and positive measures for environmental 
management' but was not the only solution and would need to ‘be supported by 
complementary approaches, including encouragement of voluntary action, education 
and financial incentives'/’2 Complementary approaches in Queensland include 
additional lease periods and security of tenure for landholders who adopt sustainable 
land management practices and enter into a nature reserve or an indigenous land use 
agreement. Incentives therefore are not financial, although payments are made with 
some nature reserves. If leases are renewed for the same 30-year period in any event, it 
is questionable whether the possibility of an additional ten years is actually an incentive.
As noted by Holmes, a duty of care was ‘historically treated as an empty gesture' but he 
concluded that the inclusion of this provision is now evidence o f ‘considerable potential 
in providing a legal basis by which the lessee can be required to demonstrate that their 
management is sustainable’/ 3 The duty of care is now a standard part of all new leases 
and is described by the regulators as the most significant of conditions/’4 It is critical tor 
the environment that the duty of care condition is utilised to promote and develop 
sustainable management of rural land. The degree to which this will happen is open to 
question. In the past there has been little in the way of compliance and enforcement on 
leasehold land with the result that ‘lessees virtually had a free go'/- The long-term 
viability of this duty will depend on the extent of collaboration and the level of 
education regulators undertake with landholders, to promote recognition and 
understanding of the requirements of this lease condition. In the future, landholders 
might practically show sustainable land management practices by demonstrating 
compliance with their land management agreement. Again it remains an open question 
whether regulators will have sufficient resources to undertake collaboration and 
education, compliance and enforcement in addition to the renewal process.
4.1 Industry Commission. A Full Repairing Lease: Inquiry into Ecologieally Sustainable Land Management. 
September 1997. 70.
4.2 Bates G. A Duty o f Care fo r  the Protection o f  Biodiversity on Land (2001) Consultancy Report to the Productivity 
Commission, Auslnfo, Canberra, viii and 35.
4.3 Holmes J, Adapting leasehold tenures to meet emerging conservation needs in Hale P and Lamb D (ed) 
Conservation Outside Nature Reserves, Centre for Conservation Biology. The University of Queensland. 1997.
4.4 Queensland government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines (2001) 'Managing State Rural Leasehold 
Land: a discussion paper" 27.
4.5 Des Boyland, member of the Ministerial Advisory Committee and representative of the Wildlife Preservation 
Society of Queensland written replies in response to my questions dated 1 May 2012.
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The process of lease renewal under the Delbessie Agreement
The main change in lease renewal under the Delbessie Agreement is in the 
implementation of a new lease and the conditions of offer. The renewal process is 
guided by statute and now includes a land condition assessment and. on the basis of this 
assessment, a land management agreement. A lessee may apply to renew a lease once 
eighty per cent of the existing term has expired, unless the existing lease prohibits 
renewal, for example if it contains a reservation for a future conservation area; or 
unless, in the opinion of the Minister, special circumstances exist.66 Special 
circumstances are not defined in the Act but regulatory policy provides examples of 
such circumstances that might apply to rural leasehold land. They include: 
environmental circumstances such as an agreement to surrender land required for a 
national park or a nature refuge; indigenous circumstances such as an indigenous use 
and access agreement; or natural resource management in which the leaseholder has 
agreed to negotiate a statutory covenant or to remediate major land degradation.67 
Special circumstances might require a substantial undertaking on the part of the lessee.
The regulatory process for lease renewal before the lease has expired follows a similar 
pattern to renewal before the implementation of the Delbessie Agreement. Thus lease 
renewal follows a standard and staged procedure. Initial contact is made with the lessee 
two years from the date of lease expiry; if the landholder does not respond a reminder is 
sent 12 months from the expiry date; and, if this also elicits no response, a final notice 
to apply will be sent 6 months from the expiry date.6* Notices to landholders in the final 
12-month period of the lease remind the lessee, in the event of non-renewal, that the 
land must be vacated on the expiry date; these final notices are also sent to local 
government and any mortgagee or other party with an interest in the lease.69 If it appears 
a lease would expire before a renewal application is finalized, the Minister may extend 
the term of the lease for periods of no longer than a year until the application is 
finalised.70 Lease renewal still requires the completion of the necessary forms and the
66 Land Act 1994 (QId) s 158(1) to (3).
67 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Land Holdings: leases -  Early 
renewal and Conversion (Special Circumstance) Policy Document PUX/901/335, version 3. 4.
6X Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Managing Renewal of Leases 
Notification No. Policy Document PUX/952/108, version 2. 2008. 3.
69 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Managing Renewal of Leases 
Notification No. Policy Document PUX/952/108, version 2. 2008. 4 -5.
70 Land Act 1994 (Qld) si 64.
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payment of a fee. The initial form includes details of the applicant and the land tenure.71 
A second form deals with the renewal application and informs the leaseholder that upon 
renewal a land management agreement is to be entered into following an assessment of 
the condition of the land in consultation with the landholder.72 Following 
implementation of the Delbessie Agreement, the process is more protracted if the 
landholder intends to apply to renew the lease.
The additional responsibilities of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy will necessarily 
complicate and render the lease renewal process a more time consuming exercise. The 
application to renew a lease may be undertaken by a leaseholder with or without legal 
representation. Some lessees instruct a land consultant. A lease may only be renewed if 
the application is made in accordance with the legislation and the chief executive has 
made an offer of a new lease, including the conditions on which the offer is made.73 The 
lessee must fulfill the conditions of the offer to accept the lease.74 If the leaseholder is 
not offered a new lease, it is possible to appeal the chief executive's decision, but only if 
the refusal was because the lease conditions on the previous lease had not been 
fulfilled.75
There is an extensive list of issues the chief executive must consider before making an 
offer to renew a lease which incorporate the conditions of the offer and the conditions of 
the new lease. In summary they include:
• The interest of the lessee;
• Whether part of the lease should be declared a State forest under the 
Forestry Act 1959 (Qld);
• Whether the public interest could be adversely affected if the lease were 
renewed;
• Whether part of the land is needed for environmental or nature 
conservation purposes;
• The condition of the land;
71 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Application Form, Contact and 
Land details. Part A. Available at: http://uww.dcrm.uld.gov.au/land/state/ndl7rorm laOO.ndf (viewed 15 January 
2012) .
72 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management. Application for Renewal of 
Rural Lease, Part B. Available at: lnin://w\\ w,derm.uld.uuv.au land/state/ndf/form la25.pdf. (viewed 15 January 
2012) .
73 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 157 A and s 160 and s 161.
74 Land Act 1994 (QId) s 161.
75 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 160 (3).
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• The extent of or risk of land degradation;
• Whether the lessee has complied with the conditions of the lease and any 
land management agreement;
• Whether part of the lease has a more appropriate use or is needed for a 
public purpose;
• Whether a new lease is the most appropriate form of tenure;
• The lessee's record of compliance with the Act; and
• The natural environmental values of the land.76
The above list incorporates the 2007 amendments to the LA. These changes were far 
reaching, and indicative of the move towards sustainable management of the land. This 
is evidenced by including an assessment of the condition of the land, by consideration 
of the natural environmental values of the land and by additions to the land degradation 
clause.77
Land condition assessment
The length of a renewed lease will be determined by the condition of the land. The 
regulators will assess the condition of the land utilizing the Guidelines mentioned 
previously along with the relevant statutory provisions. Thus a term lease for rural 
leasehold land will be renewed for 30 years, or 40 years if the land is in good condition, 
or 50 years if the land is in good condition and the lessee enters into either conservation 
or indigenous access use agreement or both types of agreement.78
The Guidelines are 70 pages long; they were developed to support the implementation 
of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy. According to the regulators, they are for the use 
of their technical officers and ‘not intended to form the basis of a lessee monitoring 
program, but may be a useful reference tool for lessees seeking to maintain or improve 
the condition of their land in accordance with the requirements of a land management
76 Land Act 1994 (Qld)s 159(1).
77 Under Schedule 6. Land Act 1994 (Qld) degradation includes any of the following: soil erosion, salinity or 
scalding: destruction of soil structure, including, for example, the loss of fertility, organic matter or nutrients; decline 
in perennial pasture grasses, pasture composition and density: low ground cover: thickening in woody plants; stream 
bank instability and slumping; the presence if any declared pest: water logging; rising water tables; or a process that 
results in declining water quality.
78 Land Act 1994 (Qld) si 55 (3) (4) and (5).
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agreement’.7" The Guidelines were developed over a two-year period by a regulatory 
technical group of experts and subsequently evaluated and endorsed (but not determined 
as initially announced by the Minister) by the Ministerial Advisory Committee.8" 
According to the regulators they are based on nationally and internationally accepted 
principles and methods of assessing biodiversity and land management. 81
The land condition assessment process is twofold and includes a desktop assessment 
and a field inspection. The purpose of the desktop assessment is to “collate and analyse 
all relevant documents and data pertaining to the lease and to prepare and plan for the 
field inspection;' and the purpose of the field inspection is to ‘assess the condition of all 
accessible parts of the lease land in terms of the land condition attributes' . 82 The land 
condition attributes are described as a ‘subset of the duty of care principles' and include: 
pasture; soil; biodiversity; declared pests; salinity; riparian vegetation and natural water 
resources. 82 The first three attributes -  pasture, soil and biodiversity -  are described as 
being the primary determinants of lease land condition in that they are said to reflect 
land management practices. 84 The remaining attributes -  declared pests, salinity, riparian 
vegetation and natural water resources -  are noted to be critical for long-term stability. 85 
The land management agreement should address any matters of concern once attributes 
are assessed and their condition recorded and provided to the landholder.
7' Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011. 2.
811 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011. vi.
81 Hassett R. Peart P. Bourne G. Cannon M and Barber D, ‘Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition -  
Queensland's Delbessie Agreement (State Rural Leasehold Land Strategy)' in Eldridge D .1 and Waters C. 
Proceedings o f  the 16lh BienniaI Conference o f the Australian Rangeland Society, Bourke (Australian Rangeland 
Society. 2010) 3. The Hassett R. et al. paper is written by regulatory officers from different areas of the Department 
of Environment and Resource Management and makes note of the Guidelines reliance on ‘concepts, metrics and 
indicators adapted or abridged' from other works which included: Eyre T J. Kelly A L and Neldner V .1. (2006) 
BioCondition: a terrestrial vegetation condition assessment tool for biodiversity in Queensland. Eield assessment 
manual. Version 1.6. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Queensland government. Hassett R. 
Carter .1. Henry B. (2006) Rapid Mobile Data Collection -  A technique to monitor rangeland condition and provide 
quantitative and interpretive information for a range of applications. Proceedings o f  the Australian Rangeland Society 
Conference. Renmark. Australia. Tongway D. (1994) Rangeland soil condition assessment manual, CS1RO.
Australia, long way D. and Hindley N. (1995) Assessment o f Soil Condition o f  Tropical Grasslands. CS1RO Division 
of Wildlife and Ecology. Canberra. McDonald RC, Isbell R F, Speight JG, Walker J & Hopkins MS (ed) (1990) 
Australian soil and land survey -field handbook. 2nd ed.. Department of Primary Industries and Energy and CSIRO. 
Canberra. Australia.
8'  Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011.4.
Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011. 4.
Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011. 4.
Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011.4.
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The land condition attributes are measured by the regulatory Guidelines by means of 
indicators; there are a total of twenty-three indicators.86 In order to demonstrate the 
degree to which each indicator is accessed, the indicator for soil surface condition will 
be examined. For each of the indicators a question is presented, the question for soil 
condition is: are there signs of soil surface erosion or soil movement across the site? 
The indicators are rated from one to four with one being the best condition. The 
following ratings for soil surface condition are:
• Rating one -  there is very little evidence of soil erosion or soil disturbance 
across the site;
• Rating two -  the site has minor soil erosion or soil disturbance, evident in 
a list of nine descriptors that include soil surface compaction and minor 
soil deposition;
• Rating three -  the site has moderate soil erosion, evident in a list of eight 
descriptors that include some exposure of roots and subsoils;
• Rating four -  the site has severe soil erosion, evident in a list of eleven 
descriptors that include root exposure and vegetated areas isolated in 
moulds or depressions.87
A glossary of definitions is provided for each indicator. For soil, the definitions of: site, 
rills, gully, and terracettes is provided.88
What is apparent from these definitions and the descriptors generally is the complexity 
and degree of assessment undertaken for each of the twenty-three indicators. For 
example, the relevant indicators for the leased land must be assessed and given a 
‘calibrated threshold score' that is 70 for each of the three main attributes of pasture, 
soil and biodiversity.8,7 An adjusted score, which does not include some indicators, is 
used for biodiversity. According to the regulator, this ensures the lessee is not penalised 
for previously lawful past land management practices, such as tree clearing.
86 The indicators include, inter alia: proportion and distribution o f preferred species, health of preferred and 
intennediate species: soil surface condition; ground cover: declared pest plants and animals: proportion and density o f  
native ground layer species; large trees: shrub layer: woody debris and litter: non-native species: size o f patch; 
salinity; riparian area disturbance: bank instability and potential soil erosion.
87 Queensland government. Department o f Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease Land Condition, version 2.0. 2011, 23-24.
88 The Guidelines define the following terms; site -  a 100 m x 100 m assessment area, identified by the ‘initial ‘site 
coordinates or the ‘centre’ site coordinates; rills -  any discontinuous erosion channel up to 30 cm deep or wide; gully 
-  a channel more than 30 cm deep, often with short precipitous sides and a moderately to very gently inclined floor or 
a small stream channel and terracetes -  an erosion step caused by sheet erosion.
8V Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) Guidelines for Determining Lease L.and Condition, version 2.0. 2011.40.
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Landholders may well be overwhelmed by the extent of assessment undertaken even if, 
as mentioned above, this information is simply there as a reference tool. The Guidelines 
indicate that leaseholders will be invited to participate in field inspections of their land 
and the fact that they are readily available is indicative of a transparent, albeit complex, 
process. The regulators were asked if leaseholders were taking an active part in the lease 
renewal process. The response was:
Yes. Lessees are encouraged to attend the land condition assessment. Feedback 
from our regional teams indicate, conservatively 90% attend to some extent (e.g. 
one or two sites to a day) to see the process. Approximately 10% attend for the 
entire inspection. The lessee is directly engaged through all stages of the process -  
desktop assessment/planning; land condition assessment; and negotiation of land 
management agreements.90
There is therefore evidence of some engagement between leaseholders and the 
regulators.
If landholders do not agree with the regulatory assessment of the condition of their land 
they may apply for a review. The review is internal and follows the regulatory internal 
review policy for rural leasehold land.1'1 The policy may be summarized as follows:
• Lessees will be notified by the regulator that they are eligible to apply for 
an internal review if they are within 10 points for each of the three 
attributes of the calibrated threshold for good condition. Leases not within 
this boundary must rely on the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld);
• The application must be within 20 days and on the approved template, 
including reasons why the lessee considers the decision should be 
reviewed based on the assessment process contained in the Guidelines;
• If the application is properly submitted, a senior regulatory official will 
review the issues in dispute;
• There should be ongoing dialogue between the parties during the review, 
which may be upheld or substituted; and
• If the lessee disagrees with the review decision and the parties are unable 
to resolve the dispute, mediation will be instigated.92
Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, written replies from a senior 
policy officer dated 29 May 2012 to further questions submitted following the meeting on the 18 April 2012.
91 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Internal Review’ of Rural 
Leasehold Land Decisions Notification No. Policy Document PUX/952/112. version I. 2009.
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In addition to the Guidelines, a regulatory fact sheet exists to assist landholders on land 
condition assessments. There is nothing in the fact sheet to inform the landholders that 
they may apply to review a land condition assessment.1'3 Assuming a leaseholder could 
locate the relevant policy and template for application, it is arguable that technical 
expertise would be required for a comprehensive review submission to be properly 
submitted. Equally the possibility of review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) 
would call for expert representation. The costs of both types of review might be 
prohibitive for many landholders. The regulators were accordingly asked if any 
landholders had applied for review and if so, if a lawyer or land consultant had 
represented them. The reply stated:
Regionally: South West - 5 lessee requests for review of land condition assessment 
determination (3 represented by a consultant); Central West - no reviews requested;
North - 2 reviews requested (no solicitors or consultants engaged). Total - 7 
requests for review from 257 (as at 30 April, 2012) land condition assessments.1'4
Only a relatively small proportion of landholders have applied for review. This could 
indicate that most are satisfied with the process; but it remains open to question that 
some landholders might not have applied because of the cost and complications 
involved in the process.
Development of a land management agreement
Following an assessment of land condition, a land management agreement is developed. 
This agreement is the mechanism by which rural leaseholders might demonstrate 
compliance with the statutory duty of care provisions. The purposes of a land 
management agreement are described in the LA as being, inter alia, to;
• Identify and describe the natural and physical attributes of the land;
• Record the condition of the land at a particular point in time;
• Improve or maintain land condition so that it is or will be at least, in good 
condition;
• Identify any land degradation issues relating to the land;
92 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Internal Review of Rural 
Leasehold Land Decisions Notification No. Policy Document PUX/952/112, version 1, 2009. 4.
93 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement -  land 
condition assessments. Available at: hltp://www'.derm.old.aov.au/faclsheets/pdf/land/l201 .ndf.tviewed 19 January 
2012) .
94 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, e-mail in reply from a senior 
policy officer dated 29 May 2012 to further questions submitted following the meeting on the 18 April 2012.
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• Establish the agreed management outcomes for the identified land 
degradation issues and the associated management strategies to address 
them;
• Establish a monitoring and reporting program;
• Establish a process to verify the performance of the lessee in relation to the 
outcomes; and
• Establish a dispute resolution process and a review process to maintain the 
relevance and effectiveness of the agreement.1’5
The regulatory emphasis on working in partnership with leaseholders in the preparation 
of a land management agreement is apparent in the information contained in the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy, and is emphasised by the regulators.99 Regional officers 
undertake this process. Information on the regulatory web site to assist landholders 
includes; a guide to developing a land management agreement; a land management 
agreement template; and a publication on managing grazing lands in Queensland. The 
regulatory guide is 19 pages long; it reiterates the statutory requirements and procedural 
steps of such agreements.1’7 For the first time, leaseholders are cautioned that the 
agreement is a legal document and, as such, legal advice is recommended. Landholders 
are informed that, to assist them, a generic template of standard terms has been 
developed which will be adapted to each landholder's particular circumstances. The 
template is 45 pages long and sets down the general obligations of the parties, followed 
by the specific details of the leased land including, inter alia, the condition and values of 
the land, management outcomes and strategies, monitoring and reporting and. if 
applicable, any indigenous cultural heritage or future conservation areas."
In the regulatory guide on land management agreements, landholders are advised of the 
internal review process in the event an agreement cannot be settled. Regulatory policy
95 Land Ad 1994 (Qld) s 176 V (a) to (j).
96 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Delbessie Agreement, (State 
Rural Leasehold land Strategy) 2007, 7. Available at
hltn:/Av\\\v.nrmAild.aov.au/land/state/rural leaschold/strateav.hlml (viewed 15 April 2013).’! his point was stressed 
by one of the senior policy officers during my meeting with the regulators on 18 April 2012: part of his role is to 
coordinate the regional officers who undertake this process.
1,7 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Guide to Developing a Land 
Management Agreement. Available at:
hltp://w\\w'.dermAild.aov.au/land/state/rural lcaschold/pdEland management aureement auide.pdf (viewed 15 
January 2012).
9X Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Land Management Agreement 
template Version 2.0. 2011. Available at:
hltp://www.dermAild.!>o\.aii/land/state/rural lcaschold/pdf/land management agreement template v2.pd f. (viewed 
15 January 2012).
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on the review process informs landholders that Agforce provides an advisory service for 
any rural lessee but if the parties are unable to resolve the dispute, mediation is set in 
process.1'9 If mediation on the land management agreement is unable to solve the 
dispute, the offer of the lease is deemed to have lapsed;100 ultimately, therefore, a 
leaseholder who cannot settle on a land management agreement risks losing the leased 
land. The regulators were asked if leaseholders took an active part in negotiating their 
land management agreement. The response noted: ‘Yes. The land management 
agreement is negotiated between the lessee and the inspecting officer. 100% have taken 
part'.101 A further question asked if any landholders had applied for a review of the land 
management agreement and, if they had been represented by a lawyer or land 
consultant. The answer was:
No. There has been no activation of the dispute resolution process to date. Land 
management agreements are negotiated in a fair and practical manner between the 
lessee and the inspecting officer.102
Prima facie this appears to be the case. The Delbessie Agreement provides for land 
management agreements to be self-assessed every five years and reviewed every 10 
years or earlier at the request of either party.103
Land management agreements are to be an integral part of the conveyancing transaction 
on transfer of a lease, and therefore have the potential to ensure continuity for 
sustainable land management. The agreement forms part of the conditions of offer for a 
new lease, and will take effect once registered at the Land Registry.104 A request was 
made to the regulators to see a completed agreement. An agreement was supplied but 
with this caveat:
This LMA was developed under the Guidelines V1.1. There have been some 
changes to Attributes and Indicators assessed under the new Guidelines V2.0 but 
the themes and scope around managing identified issues remain the same. These 
are primarily contained in Schedule 4. Also of note is that the relevant actions are 
suggested and/or agreed by both parties. Often the lessee offers specific detail
w Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Internal Review of Rural 
Leasehold land Decisions Notification No. PUX/952/112. version 1.2009. 5.
100 Land Act 1994(QId) s 442.
101 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, written replies from a senior 
policy officer dated 29 May 2012 to further questions submitted following the meeting on 18 April 2012.
102 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, written replies from a senior 
policy officer dated 29 May 2012 to further questions submitted following the meeting on 18 April 2012.
103 Queensland government. Delbessie Agreement (State Rural leasehold Land Strategy) 7.
104 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 176 U and s 279.
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around management practices that we record in the LMA. Therefore it should not 
be misunderstood that the specifics are not things that the Department specifically 
requires - each LMA is negotiated and is tailor made for each lease.1"5
The agreement supplied followed the template. Together with annexures it was lengthy 
and no doubt a more extensive document than the lease under which the land had been 
granted. The agreement will bind successors in title, and a new lessee will be required to 
lodge, with the transfer document, a statutory declaration as to awareness of land 
condition and the level of compliance with lease conditions and any land management 
agreement.10" At best, this check at the time of transfer puts a purchaser on notice of 
lease requirements and land condition. Prospective purchasers, and those who finance 
them, might be deterred by land which falls short of lease conditions and the 
requirements of a land management agreement. However, if a lease were to be granted 
for 30 years regardless of land condition, the statutory declaration is not a real deterrent; 
and 30 years exceeds the time period of most mortgages. It would be beneficial for the 
long-term sustainability of the land if, as suggested by Gunningham and Grabosky, 
financial institutions were ‘concerned about the environmental risks posed by any assets 
which they might hold as security for a loan'.107 They would only have such concerns if 
there was a genuine risk of lease forfeiture for failing to comply with lease conditions 
and a land management agreement. If forfeiture was a real possibility at the time of a 
lease transfer supported by finance, an expert environmental assessment of compliance 
with lease conditions and the land management agreement would need to be undertaken 
to ascertain if the proposed purchase presented any risk.
Failure to comply with a land management agreement is dealt with by means of a 
remedial action notice. Prior to giving a remedial action notice, the minister must give a 
warning notice to the landholder, who in turn may make written submissions as to why 
the notice should not be made. The statutory provision for such notices provides that the 
minister may give a lessee a remedial action notice if the lessee is breaching a condition 
of the lease, using the land in breach of the statutory duty of care or in a way that is 
likely to cause or has caused land degradation; or is in breach of a lease condition.108 A
Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, email correspondence in reply 
from a senior policy officer, dated 14 May 2012.
106 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 322 (4) (b) (i) and (ii).
107 Gunningham N, Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, (Clarendon 
Press. Oxford. 1998) 115.
108 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 214 (1) (2) (a) (i) and (ii).
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lessee may appeal against a decision to give a remedial action notice.109 Non-compliance 
with a remedial action notice potentially has considerable implications for a lessee. 
Ultimately this may lead to forfeiture of the lease."'* 1 It is likely, however, that forfeiture 
will remain an untapped solution. The legislation makes non-compliance with a 
remedial order an offence, in the absence of a reasonable excuse."1 In the event a 
leaseholder is convicted of an offence, the court may impose a penalty and order that the 
whole or part of the remedial action notice is complied with."2
Conservation agreements and conservation covenants
The Delbessie Agreement provides a means by which leaseholders are encouraged to 
enter into a conservation agreement or covenant; the incentive to do so is an additional 
10 years to the lease term. As a field inspection of the leased land will be undertaken as 
part of the implementation of the Delbessie Agreement, presumably the regulators 
would identify areas of land that might be suitable for conservation. A conservation 
agreement is likely to be a Nature Refuge which is provided for by the Nature 
Conservation Act 1992 (Qld)."3 Environmentally, the long-term advantage of a 
conservation agreement is that it may run in perpetuity and bind the original and 
subsequent landowners. From 2007 Agforce have actively promoted the Nature Refuge 
program; in 2010 they received $8.5 million from the Queensland government to 
support landholders to establish and manage refuges, and the number of agreements 
entered into has increased."4 The Nature Assist scheme utilises a competitive tender 
process and funding is provided to landholders who submit a successful tender. 
According to the regulators for a tender to be successful it must ‘offer the best 
conservation outcome for the least overall cost’."5 Since 2007 there have been two 
rounds of funding, one for $1.7 million and a second for $4 million."6
109 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 214 B.
110 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 234 (0-
111 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 214 D (1) the maximum penalty is 400 penalty points.
112 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 214 D (2).
113 Nature Conservation Act 1992 s 4 (Qld).
114 Agforee and the Nature Refuge Program. Available at:
hUD:/Avw\\.auforceqld.on>.au/inde\.php?tgtPagg=policics&pa}>e id=%. (viewed 25 January 2012).
1"  Queensland government. Department of Environment and Heritage Protection. Nature Refuges. Nature Assist.
Available at: http:/Avww.derm.qld.aov.auAvildlife-
ceosvstems/nature refuaes/natureassist/indcx.html#how does it work, (viewed 25 January 2012).
116 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Heritage Protection. Nature Refuges. Nature Assist.
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The Nature Assist program replaced the Vegetation Incentives Program (VIP). As noted 
in Chapter Four, research into the VIP concluded that one of the main problems with the 
program was uncertainty by landholders in the tender process."7 With the VIP, 
landholders were assisted by Greening Australia who could advise on land condition but 
not on the financial amount to include in the tender.118 This process continues in the 
Nature Assist program; landholders are advised:
Nature refuge officers are available to help you develop your tender. Although they 
are not permitted to provide advice on the financial component of your tender, they 
can provide specialist advice on management activities best suited to protecting the 
conservation values of your property.119
Calculating a financial sum is arguably the most difficult aspect of the tender process: it 
was clearly apparent in the initial VIP -  in the first round of tenders the bids were too 
high and not accepted by the regulators.12"
The management principles for a nature refuge require the owner to conserve the 
significant cultural and natural resources of the area, provide for their controlled use, 
and for the interests of landholders to be taken into account.121 It is necessary for the 
minister and the landholder to agree that the designated area of land should be a 
protected area; and also to agree on the management intent for the land and terms of the 
conservation agreement.122 Under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) the 
agreement may include any of the following terms: a requirement for the government to 
provide financial or other assistance, technical advice or to carry out specified 
activities.122 Terms may allow or require a landholder to: carry out specific activities, 
prohibit a specified use or restrict the use or management of the land; refrain from or not 
permit or carry out specified activities; or permit or restrict access.122 If the landholder is 
provided with financial assistance under the agreement, this must be repaid in the event 
of contravention.125 The conservation agreement may contain terms that are binding on
117 An analysis of the vegetation incentives program and attendant research is included in Chapter Four.
118 Kehoe J, ‘Land Clearing in Queensland' (2006) 23 Environmental and Planning Law Journal. 148. 152.
119 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Heritage Protection. Nature Assist information sheet.
120 Kehoe J, ‘Land Clearing in Queensland' (2006) 23 Environmental and Planning Law Journal. 148. 153.
121 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) s 22 (a) to (c).
122 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) s 45 (1) (a) to (d). Under s 43 a protected area for these purposes means a
nature refuge, or a coordinated conservation area or a wilderness area.
122 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) s 45 (5) (a) to (c).
124 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) s 45(5) (d) to (i).
128 Nature Conseiwation Act 1992 (Qld) s 45 (5) (k).
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the landholder and successors in title; 126 in which case the agreement should be lodged at 
the Land Registry. 127
The possibility of additional security of tenure also applies to a conservation or statutory 
covenant. These types of covenant differ from a conservation agreement in that they are 
made under the LA and may cover a wider range of matters in addition to conservation. 
Under a statutory covenant, preservation may include a building or be aimed directly at 
preserving a native plant or a natural or physical feature of the land.l2x The statutory 
covenant is registered at the Land Registry and thus binding on successors in title. 127 
Registration is a significant aspect of continuity for sustainable land management 
practices. As an integral part of any future conveyancing transaction, new leaseholders 
will purchase land in full knowledge of the terms of agreement or covenant and their 
responsibilities. The Delbessie Agreement has potential to encourage greater use of 
conservation agreements and statutory covenants. 13,1 Agforce and the National Farmers 
Federation promote utilisation of this type of agreement, and voluntary agreements have 
increased because of this. What is questionable is how far landholders would regard the 
additional lease term as a real incentive. As discussed in Chapter Five, there remains 
skepticism around conservation agreements when even those executed in perpetuity are 
not protected from the impact of mining and mineral corporations.
Indigenous access and use agreements
Under the LA, an indigenous access and use agreement means an indigenous land use 
agreement under Commonwealth legislation; 131 or a contractual arrangement between a 
lessee and Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people that allows an activity (such as 
camping, fishing, gathering or hunting; performing rites or ceremonies or visiting sites 
of significance) to be carried out for traditional purposes. 132 Aside from this statutory 
definition there is no further guidance within the Act as to the content and form of such
126 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) s 45 (4).
127 A registrable conservation agreement means a conservation agreement expressed to be binding on successors in 
title and registered in accordance with the requirements of s 134 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld).
I2X Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 373 A (4) (a) and (b).
I2y Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 373 A (5) (b).
130 Previous research has been undertaken on voluntary agreements entered into by rural landholders in Queensland: 
this research considered four voluntary schemes, including nature refuges, at the time of writing all schemes w'ere 
under-utilised. Kehoe J, ‘Voluntary agreements in Queensland Australia: contributing factors and current incentive 
schemes', in S Wilkes (ed) Seeking Environmental Justice, (Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York, 2008).
131 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 253 under which such agreements are noted in the register of Indigenous Land Use 
Agreements.
132 Land Act 1994 (Qld) Schedule 6.
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agreements. Regulatory advice however includes a 38-page pastoral indigenous land use 
agreement template.1” Alongside the template is a user guide.114 Both the guide and 
template are the result of negotiations facilitated by the National Native Title Tribunal 
between DERM, Agforce, the Queensland South Native Title Services and North 
Queensland Land Council.1” The guide explains that the template is but one of three 
tools available for making access and use agreements and, that the remaining two 
templates for use under the Delbessie Agreement will be made available at a future date. 
At the time of writing these templates were not available, nor had any indigenous 
agreements under the Delbessie Agreement been made.
Negotiation of this type of agreement at Commonwealth level has proved to be a 
complicated process; it is time consuming and therefore expensive. The pastoral 
indigenous land use agreement template provides that each party bears its own costs in 
relation to the preparation, signing and review of the agreement. The onus to facilitate 
and. potentially, to assume responsibility of payment for insurance is very much on the 
lessee.I3(' Each side of the agreement would need expert representation and advice. Some 
bodies, such as the Queensland Native Title Service, assist traditional owners in 
negotiating and resolving indigenous land use agreements. For landholders, Agforce -  
having been part of the negotiations for the template and guidelines -  promote their use 
and provide assistance through their native title officer. The incentive under the 
Delbessie Agreement is the possibility of a 50-year term; it is questionable if the 
inherent requirements of such agreements will be prohibitive to their adoption. It 
appears to be the aim of the Queensland government to utilise indigenous land use
111 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Pastoral II.UA template, 
November 2011. Available at: http:/Av\v\\■derm.uld.eov.au/nativetitle/ndl/slam pastoral ilua tcmplate.pdf (viewed 
25 Februar) 2012).
114 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Guide to the Pastoral II.UA 
template. November 2011. Available at:
http://www.dcrm .old. go\ .au/nativetitle/pdf slam pastoral ilua t’uidclinc.pdf.fviewed 25 February 2012).
Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Indigenous Land Use 
Agreements. Available at http:/ \\\\\\,derm .old,go\,au/'nativclitie/dealinus/agrecmcnts.html.(viewed 25 February 
2012) .
L1r’ Clause 18.1 of the pastoral indigenous land use agreement template provides: Subject to clause 18.3 the Lessee 
and Native Title Party will at all times each maintain a public liability insurance policy in relation to the Agreement:
18.2 requires: the policies must each be for an amount of not less than $10 million for any single event up to the total 
aggregate liability stipulated in the policy of insurance: 18.3 states: the Native Title Party will only be required to 
obtain and maintain a public liability insurance policy n relation to the Agreement if the Lessee: a) identities an 
insurer willing to provide such insurance to the Native Title Party; b) gives reasonable written notice to the Native 
Title Party that it requires the Native Title Party to obtain such insurance: c) advises in the written notice that the 
Lessee will meet the cost of obtaining such insurance: and d) pays the cost of obtaining such insurance upon receipt 
of the insurers tax invoice.
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agreements as a means to resolve native title matters over land subject to a native title 
claim. 137
Future conservation areas
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy amendments to the LA made provision for future 
conservation areas.131* Three circumstances are set down for the government to require 
land for conservation purposes:
• Prior to lease expiration -  in which the government will negotiate with the 
leaseholder to purchase the whole or part of the leased land and pay the 
market value of the land and lawful improvements;
• At lease renewal -  a new lease will be offered for a period consistent with 
the legislation but on expiry of that lease a further lease will not be offered 
over the land reserved for future conservation, again market value for the 
land and lawful improvements will be paid;
• During the term of the lease -  with agreement with the landholder the 
government may acquire land at any time with the purchase price being 
guided by the residual value of the expiring lease and lawful 
improvements. 139
The government has acknowledged that removing land ‘at the time of renewal may have 
an adverse impact on the grazing or agricultural enterprise concerned’.14" Regulatory 
policy appears to favour negotiation and the imposition of a future reservation condition 
only if the landholder does not wish to sell or cannot reach an agreement. 141
If, on renewal, a future conservation area is included in the leased land, the landholder 
must comply with statutory land management principles. The principles for future 
conservation areas are: that any use of natural resources for agriculture or grazing must
137 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Guide to the Pastoral 1LUA 
template, November 2011, 5. Available at:
htlp://w\\ WAlerm.old.aov.au/nativetitle/pd 1/slam pastoral ilua guideline.pdf (viewed 25 February 2012).
138 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 198 A and s 198 B.
139 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement, (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) 2007, 10.
1411 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Delbessie Agreement. (State 
Rural Leasehold Land Strategy) 2007, 10.
141 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Delbessie Agreement. 
Acquisition of rural leasehold land dedicated as protected under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) Notification 
Policy Document PUX. 953/117/2012, version 1, 6.
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be ecologically sustainable, maintained predominantly in their natural condition and 
with their significant cultural and natural resources protected.142 For the purposes of this 
part of the legislation, cultural resources includes places or objects that have 
anthropological, archaeological, historical, scientific, spiritual or sociological 
significance or value.143 Ecologically sustainable means the use is within the area's 
capacity to sustain natural processes while maintaining the life support systems of 
nature and ensuring the benefit of use to present generations does not diminish the 
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.144 Natural resources 
mean the natural and physical features of the area, including wildlife, soil, water, 
minerals and air.145 The implications of failing to comply with the land management 
principles for a future conservation area are far reaching: if a lease contains such a 
reservation, the landholder must not act or omit to act, or allow anyone else to act or 
omit to act, in a manner inconsistent with the land management provisions.146 Failure to 
comply is an offence under the legislation and carries a maximum penalty of 1665 
penalty units in addition to the prospect of forfeiture for the whole lease in the event of 
conviction for such an offence.147
In 2010 the Queensland Labor Government announced a commitment to expand the 
total protected estate in Queensland from 10.3 million hectares to 20 million hectares by 
2020.148 Protected areas include national and conservation parks and nature refuges on 
private land.141' The Delbessie Agreement is part of this general shift towards terrestrial 
biodiversity conservation. It would, therefore, assist landholders if the government had a 
search mechanism so that current and prospective leaseholders could locate and identify 
areas of proposed future conservation. This would enable leaseholders to plan 
appropriately. The additional land management provisions, if a new lease contains a 
future conservation reservation, are an added burden for leaseholders and may deter 
otherwise interested purchasers. Equally, if a proposed future conservation area formed 
a significant proportion of the leased land it is arguable this may adversely impact upon 
land valuation and may have implications for mortgaged properties. A lease containing
142 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 198 A (1) (a) to (c).
143 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 198 A (2).
144 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 198 A (2).
145 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 198 A (2).
146 Land Act /994(Q ld)s 198 B.
147 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 234 (e) (ii).
I4S Queensland government. Biodiversity Integration Unit. Department of Environment and Resource Management. 
Protected Areas for the Future : Cornerstones for Terrestrial Biodiversity Conservation, 2010. 1.
I4'’ Queensland government. Biodiversity Integration Unit. Department of Environment and Resource Management. 
Protected Areas for the Future: Cornerstones for Terrestrial Biodiversity Conservation. 2010. 46.
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a future conservation area reservation is potentially problematic: land management 
responsibilities are more onerous and. as the lease nears expiry, environmental value in 
the reserved land should have increased but the monetary value of the land may well 
diminish. It will be interesting to see if leaseholders will be prepared to take a lease 
containing a future conservation area reservation.
Initial renewals under the Delbessie Agreement
Craig’s Pocket was the first lease to be renewed under the Delbessie Agreement. The 
renewal received publicity in the rural press. Tenure was for 40 years as the land 
assessed was deemed to be in good condition. On signing the lease, the lessees were 
joined by the then Minister Stephen Robertson and the president of Agforce who 
described the event as ‘a landmark moment which recognised the value of lessees as 
land managers’.150 It is significant that the prime rural organisation in Queensland now 
promotes lessees as managers of land. As noted in Chapter Two, following the Payne 
Commission, leaseholders were encouraged to be and regarded as land owners. Agforce 
made mention of a Nature Refuge on the land in a media release. Under the provisions 
of the legislation a Nature Refuge could have extended the lease term to 50 years. The 
regulatory annual report noted:
Craig’s Pocket contains significant conservation values and the lessees voluntarily 
agreed to protect 3565 hectares as a nature refuge. The management practices for 
the nature refuge are included within the land management agreement and remain 
for the renewed term of the lease even if the lease is sold.151
The nature refuge on this lease is not in perpetuity, but runs for the lease term. It was 
not apparent why the refuge was incorporated into the land management agreement and 
not as a separate perpetual agreement and a 50-year lease term. The regulators were 
questioned on this and responded: ‘Craig's Pocket had an existing Nature Refuge 
agreement. It was noted in the land management agreement in accordance with the land 
management template’.152 It might have proved more of an incentive to other 
landholders if Craig’s Pocket had been granted for 50 years.
150 Agforce, 'First Delbessie Signing a Landmark Moment' (Media release, 8 October 2009).
151 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2009-20. 
Available at: http:/Avvv\v.derm.qld.gov.au/about/pdf/annual-report-09-10.pdf (viewed 1 February 2013).
I >2 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management - e  mail correspondence in reply 
from a senior policy officer, State Lands Asset Management dated 14 January 2013.
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Some implementation statistics on the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy are included in 
the regulatory Annual Reports. From the start of the strategy there have been three 
reports.153 A minimal amount of information is supplied in the first of these reports: the 
Delbessie Agreement is cited by the Director-General and described as a highlight for 
the 2009 to 2010 period.154 Only three leases had been renewed during this period and 
56 land condition assessments completed.155 By the second reporting period, a further 41 
leases had been renewed and 86 land condition assessments completed.156 In this second 
report, implementation of the Delbessie Agreement by the land assessment teams was 
noted as being the recipient of a 2011 DERM Excellence Award for Engaging and 
Servicing Communities.157 In the third Annual Report no mention is made of the 
Delbessie Agreement, nor are there any implementation statistics.158 In an attempt to 
establish some insight into implementation a request was made to the regulators for a 
more complete set of figures.159
Further and better regulatory implementation figures were eventually supplied and 
collated into a series of graphs generally depicting three annual periods up to the 30 
June for each year. Figure 8.1 depicts trends in land condition assessments. In each 
period the majority of land condition assessments have evaluated land in good 
condition. By the final 2012 period 96% of land was appraised as good. A total of 253 
assessments have been undertaken to June 2012. Of this total, 87% were deemed to be 
in good condition, 13% not in good condition and 0.4% accounting for an inaccessible
153 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management. Annual Report 2009-2010, 
2010-2011, 2011-2012. Available at: httn: u\v\v.denn.iild.L>o\.au about pdf annual-report (viewed 1 February 2013).
154 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2009-2010, land 
3. Available at: httn: u \v\\.derm.qld.uov.an about, pdf annual-report (viewed 1 February 2013).
155 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2009-2010, 40- 
41. Available at: httn: www, derm, old, uov.au about pdf annual-report (viewed 1 February 2013).
156 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2010-2011, 54. 
Available at: .http: uww.derm.old.»o\ .au about, pdf annual-report (viewed 1 February 2013).
157 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2010-2011, 75. 
Available at: http: u \\\\.derm.uld.mn.au about pdf annual-report(viewed 1 February 2013).
I>8 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2011-2012. 
Available at: http: w w\\ ,dcrm.uld.»o\ .au about pdf annual-report, (viewed 1 February' 2013).
This Annual Report covers the end of the Labor period of government and the beginning of the LNP administration. 
There has been some change in land policy with the new government which will be documented in the concluding 
Chapter Nine.
159 The initial request had been included in the list of questions presented at the meeting with the State Land Asset 
Management team on the 18 April 2012, noted earlier in this chapter. Some information was provided in the written 
response from a senior policy officer on 29 May 2012 but it was not sufficient to compute any meaningful graphs. 
Further email correspondence ensued and ultimately the senior policy officer provided implementation statistics for 
progress as at 30 June 2010, 2011 and 2012 on 16 and 17 January 2013. It is from these figures that the graphs 
included in this chapter are compiled. Statistics to December 2012 were supplied but these were not included: this is 
because they go beyond the research period and because three comparable time periods presents a more accurate 
^.depiction. It is acknowledged that the regulatory reporting period in 2012 goes beyond the research period by three 
months but these figures provided the best available option.
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lease. According to a scientific member of the Ministerial Advisory Committee, these 
results were surprising.
The rating of most of the various holdings in the different biogeographic regions as 
good is higher than I would have expected based on extensive experience in 
Western Queensland. Of course landholders cannot be penalised for buffel grass 
pastures and other exotic grasses that have been sown with the required approvals 
or advice from government...160
It is impossible to comment on the accuracy of these assessments in the absence of 
empirical data on the condition of State rural land. However, the ratings are, prima 
facie, evidence of a conciliatory approach on the part of the Labor government.
Figure 8.1: Land condition assessments
The regulatory division of land includes the North, Central West and South West regions.Figure 
8.2 shows over time and region the number of assessments that have taken place within each 
area. The bulk of assessments have taken place in the Northern region which would occupy 
more pastoral land, for example a total of 120 land condition assessments have been undertaken 
in the Northern region, compared to 47 in the South West.
160 Des Boyland, member of the Ministerial Advisory Committee and representative of the Wildlife Preservation 
Society of Queensland written replies in response to my questions dated 1 May 2012.
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Figure 8.2: Regional breakdown o f land condition assessments
Figure 8.3 provides a further breakdown of the condition of land over time in each of 
these regions. What is striking is the one incidence -  in the South West region in 2010 -  
in which the majority of land (67% ) was deemed not to be in good condition. In 2011, 
this area still had a higher proportion of land determined not to be in good condition. 
The South West region is dominated by the Mulga Lands, a terrain with a problematic 
history. Initial evaluation of this area generated concern that assesment of ‘the most 
naturally unstable bioregion in Queensland, was too harsh’ and moreover ‘policies of 
past governments in subdividing various holdings based on inappropriate data has lead 
in certain circumstances to poor outcomes from a management perspective’.161 The 
Mulga Lands were also a site of considerable controversy during the implementation of 
the vegetation management regulations. This area had a much higher clearing rate than 
other regions. The intensity of clearing has been rationalized in the past because of 
prolonged drought, during which Mulga is an essential feedstock for cattle.162 Again it is 
difficult to challenge these assessments of land, but it is noteworthy that by 2012 all 
regions had a significant majority of land in good condition. Indeed, all land in the 
Northern region was assessed as good in this later period. The regulators have insisted 
on and continually adopted the terms ‘good condition’ and ‘not in good condition’ as
161 Des Boyland, member of the Ministerial Advisory Committee and representative of the Wildlife Preservation 
Society of Queensland, written replies in response to my questions dated 1 May 2012.
162 Discussed in Kehoe J,‘ Land Clearing In Queensland' (2006) 23 Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 154.
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preferable to describing land as in “bad condition,’163 which is further evidence of their 
conciliatory stance.
50
40
1
*  land in good condition 
'  Land no: in good condition
Figure 8.3: Regional breakdown o f  land in good or not in good condition
Having established the condition of the land, the regulators go on to negotiate a land 
management agreement with landholders. Figure 8.4 illustrates developments in 
finalised agreements. It was not impossible, from the regulatory statistics supplied, to 
compare negotiated agreements with those finalised over the three annual periods. 
However the cumulative number as at June 2012 was 219, of which 133 (61%) had been 
finalised and 86 (39%) were under negotiation. It was noted by the regulator that the 
renewal process has different timing processes. For example fieldwork is seasonal and, 
as such, teams undertake land conditions assessments during the dry season and 
negotiate land management agreements during the wet season.164
163 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management email correspondence in reply 
from a senior policy officer, State Lands Asset Management dated 16 January 2013.
164 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management -  email correspondence in reply 
from a senior policy officer, State Lands Asset Management dated 14 January 2013.
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Figure 8.4: Finalised land management agreements
The number of leases renewed is depicted in Figure 8.5 and shows a steady increase in 
the final year, with the initial 2010 period being lower and reflecting the implementation 
process. Leases are renewed in accordance with the provisions of the LA. This means 
leaseholders can apply early to renew. As at June 2012 there were 316 active lease 
applications with expiry dates up to 2033 -  the regulators give priority to those leases 
due to expire in the next five years.165
Figure 8.5: Number o f leases renewed
165 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Implementation Progress (as at 
30 June 2012) paper supplied by a senior policy officer on 16 January 2013.
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Figure 8.6 demonstrates the terms granted for renewed leases. As the initial period 
included less than five renewed leases, two periods 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, were 
collated. Only two leases have been granted for a 50-year term. According to the 
regulator, neither of these leases required an indigenous land use agreement as native 
title had been extinguished, nor did the minister require a nature refuge.166 No further 
explanation was given as to why the terms were therefore 50 years. The number of 
leases granted for 40 years and less than 40 years in each of the periods provided were 
relatively consistent. It might be expected that there would have been more variance. 
However, leases granted for less than 40 years amounted to 21 (48%) between 2010 and 
2011 and 23 (52%) between 2011 and 2012. Those granted for 40 years amounted to 22 
(47%) between 2010 and 2011 and 25 (53%) between 2011 and 2012. By far the 
majority of the leases granted for less than 40 years were granted for a 30-year term.167 
Collectively as at the end of June 2012, 94 leases had been renewed, this included one 
conversion to a perpetual lease, the two (2%) 50-year leases, 44 (47%) leases for less 
than 40 years and 47 (50%) 40-year terms.
Figure 8.6: Terms granted for renewed leases
On the basis of these figures, the lease renewal process -  in terms of desktop and field 
inspections, land condition assessments and land management agreement negotiations -  
is resource intensive and time consuming. If regulatory resources are invested at the
166 Queensland government, Implementation Progress (as at 30 June 2012) paper supplied by a senior policy officer 
on 14 January 2013.
167 The amount includes a small number of leases (< 5) with terms of 34, 31 and 21 years, on seeking clarification of 
this the senior policy officer said there were various reasons for this such as a sub-division in the past, in any event 
none of the reasons given related to the condition of the land.
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front-end into lease renewal, there might be a shortfall for education and 
communication, compliance and enforcement.
The possibility of partnership
The Labor government and regulators continually stressed their commitment to working 
in partnership with the rural sector on lease renewal. A partnership arrangement might 
work more readily with leasehold as opposed to freehold tenure. Holmes has contended 
the leasehold negotiating framework
is advantageous where rights and duties need to be tailored to the circumstances 
existing at the level of individual titles. The most relevant context is in the pastoral 
zone, where individual landholdings may embrace an area greater than some 
coastal local government areas.16*
The nature and effect of the basic conveyancing transaction for each of the tenures is 
different, a lease requires negotiation of terms and conditions and there remains a 
continuing connection between lessor and lessee. The lease instrument is an 
individualised and long-term document drafted to incorporate the terms and conditions 
under which the leaseholder agrees to take the land. Typically rural leases, such as 
pastoral leases, will contain standard conditions but the agreement is specific to an 
individual landholder and the land.
A partnership implies a joint venture, but there is an unequal bargaining position 
inherent to negotiations for a State lease. It is unlike a commercial lease in which the 
parties are more likely to be in comparable negotiating positions. It would be difficult to 
envisage a leaseholder challenging or suggesting an adjustment, substitution or removal 
of a lease condition in the absence of legal or other representation. 169 The regulators
|6S Holmes J, ‘The Policy relevance of the State's Proprietary Power: lease tenures in Queensland' (1996) 3 
Australian Journal o f  Environmental Management 244.
I6) There might be an argument that the LA relies on voluntarism on the part o f the leaseholder. The basic meaning of 
voluntary would be an individual acting or doing something without compulsion or obligation. Voluntarism has 
discipline specific meanings and the best definition, for the purposes of this research, is that of Gunningham et al in 
which they note: ‘voluntarism is based on the individual... undertaking to do the right thing unilaterally, without any 
basis in coercion... voluntary agreements between governments and individual businesses taking the form of non­
mandatory contracts between equal partners one of which is the government in which incentives for action arise from 
mutual interest rather than from sanction". Gunningham N. Grabosky P and Sinclair D, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy’ .1998,56. There is some degree of choice in a landholder deciding to take on a lease initially 
but once the lease is running, to remain a viable business, and possibly meet the requirements of a supporting 
financial institution, the lease must be renewed and it is renewed on the State's terms: there is limited negotiation and 
no choice. Land management agreements are mandatory, their conditions determined bv the regulator and both the
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confirmed that well over 90% of leaseholders do not instruct a lawyer or land consultant 
in lease renewal negotiations.17" At best the partnership is indicative of a joint interest, 
but the responsibility and obligation to meet the statutory duty of care and the 
requirements of a land management agreement fall squarely on the landholder. If, as 
promised by the Labor government, the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is to be a 
collaborative venture, it is not yet clear how this collaboration will operate once the 
renewal process is complete. Regulatory resources and concentration has necessarily 
had to focus on the process of lease renewal.
Conclusion
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is part of a general shift towards terrestrial 
biodiversity conservation on State rural land within Queensland. The Land and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) made provision for all new and renewed rural 
leases for 20 years or over and greater than 100 hectares in size, to be subject to a land 
management agreement alongside their lease. The additional requirements of the 
strategy will necessarily complicate and render the lease renewal process a more time 
consuming exercise. The expectations of leaseholders might have been challenged by 
the extent of assessment under the new processes, but the backlash that accompanied the 
introduction and amendment of the VMA was not repeated with the LA. There was no 
reason to expect leases would not be renewed as they had in the past.
The crux of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy was to align security of tenure with 
sustainable land management. If leases are renewed for the same 30 year period in any 
event, it is questionable whether the possibility of an additional ten years is a realistic 
incentive. The same could be said of the additional 10 year term for a conservation 
covenant or indigenous land use agreement. The complexity surrounding indigenous 
agreements was noted and likely accounts for their absence. There is also a dearth of 
conservation agreements aligned to the strategy -  only two lease terms of 50 years have 
been granted to date and neither had a nature refuge agreement. Of the leases renewed 
by the end of June 2012, half have been assessed as in good condition and granted 40- 
year terms. This chapter has considered the changes in lease renewal brought about by
lease and agreement have the potential to invoke sanctions in the event of breach. There may not be compulsion to 
enter into a new lease but there is obligation.
1711 Meeting with DERM senior policy representatives on April 18 2012.
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the implementation of the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy but, as the following final 
chapter concludes, land policy and law are set for further change with the shift to a 
Liberal National Party government.
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion
Introduction
This thesis has examined the making and implementation of statutory land management 
practices on privately held rural land in Queensland. The purpose of the research has 
been to advance understanding of natural resource legislation and to contribute to the 
body of knowledge on State environmental laws. Two laws were examined: the 
Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (VMA), which marked the first regulatory 
controls for vegetation management on freehold land; and the Land Act 1994 (Qld)
(LA), which introduced a new management regime for leasehold land. Both Acts were 
devised to counter the environmental effects of unsustainable use of agricultural land. 
Ultimately the VMA was a key driver in the phasing out of broadscale land clearing: 
this was the environmental significance of the Act. Moreover the legislation represents 
reparation for the past and an affirmation of the move towards biodiversity conservation 
on privately held rural land. This environmental gain came at a cost -  for vegetation 
management regulations, law and politics did not simply meet, but collided for more 
than a decade, often amid a context of chaos and contention. The environmental 
significance of amendments to the LA has yet to be determined. It represents a move 
towards biodiversity conservation and has far reaching potential for rural State land, but 
the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy is resource intensive and. as established in this 
chapter, unlikely to be adopted in its present form, by the recently elected and 
financially constrained Liberal National Party (LNP) government.
This chapter will revisit the research questions, add a further question and consolidate 
the main findings of the thesis. Recommendations for changes in policy and law are 
included and followed by suggestions for further research. The additional research 
question enables the two Acts to converge further in this concluding chapter. Both 
environmental laws aimed to rectify the degradation of rural land caused by 
unsustainable policy and law. Yet. despite this common environmental endeavour, the 
statutes differed. A final question will accordingly be addressed: why was the making 
and implementation o f the VMA more controversial and complicated than that o f the 
LA? The argument advanced encompasses a range of reasons, each elicited at various 
stages of this study. Land tenure and the title held by a rural landholder lie at the core of
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the differences between each Act. Legislative restrictions for leasehold tenure can be 
imposed with little contention or demands for compensation, and with far less disorder 
and disruption to the balance between public and private rights. The VMA was 
characterised by a lack of genuine consultation over a realistic period of time and, 
unlike the LA, became an electoral asset exploited as required by the Queensland Labor 
government. There were moreover practical distinctions which manifested considerable 
disparity in the pace and timing of change brought by each statute. In exploring this 
final question, it is the aim of this thesis to establish that the public environmental good 
and long-term sustainability of rural land can be more readily achieved with leasehold 
title. The concern, as elucidated in this chapter, is that leasehold tenure might be facing 
its own expiry in Queensland.
Research questions consolidated
The making and ensuing amendments of the VMA witnessed a deep-rooted 
parliamentary system and an authoritarian one party government -  characteristics of a 
unicameral Queensland Parliament regardless of which political party holds power. 
Chapter Four examined the following question: how was the VMA made, implemented 
and amended from the introduction o f the legislation in 1999 to 2008? The VMA was 
typified by urgent and guillotined debate and pre-emptive consultation with interested 
parties. The more controversial a law, the less likelihood there was of scrutiny, the more 
haste in parliamentary procedure and the more likelihood there was of amendments, 
especially retrospective amendments.1 This prompted a further research question: what 
were the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland Parliament and the political 
context under which the VMA was made and implemented?
Contentious laws go beyond routine implementation; they reveal the political context 
and reality of parliamentary process. As noted in Chapter Four, comparable 
governmental systems have similar failings, but the legislative role and mechanisms for 
statutory scrutiny are all the more critical in a unicameral parliament. During the 
research period, the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC) typically discharged its 
role with competence and raised concerns appropriate to its statutory authority. But 
scrutiny often ended with the Alert Digest report: the machinery of parliament rarely
1 This argument is developed from the one put forward by Riddell P. Parliament under Pressure (Victor Gollancz, 
London. 1998) 29. quoted and referred to in Chapter Four.
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stopped to address concerns. Queensland Labor had a propensity to display contempt 
for proper parliamentary process. A recurring theme has emerged in this thesis: that of a 
lack of accountability during the Labor period of administration.
The making and implementation of the VMA during the 2009 State election year 
followed the pattern described in this research for a controversial piece of legislation. 
Chapter Five was devoted to asking: how the VMA was made and implemented in 2009 
and what were the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament and the 
political context within which the amendments were made? After re-election in 2009, 
the vegetation management regrowth amendments were announced by the Labor 
government two weeks before the first parliamentary session. When parliament sat, 
normal business was suspended and a further retrospective law made. The first 
legislation to be addressed in the new parliament was the VMA. The statutory 
amendments had been made in this instance following negotiations with a minority 
political group. The potential for such groups to affect and shape the law prompted the 
following question: which groups influenced the political processes and the law that 
was ultimately made?
Many rural landholders were cognisant that these amendments were the product of a 
preference deal with the Queensland Green Party; they were further incensed by 
Premier Beattie who had consistently promised regrowth vegetation would not be 
regulated. Tensions abounded and the gulf between the regulators and the rural 
community widened. For Queensland Labor, a further and final term of office was 
secured at the 2009 State election. This return to power was aided in part by the pre­
election deal for preferences. An additional one million hectares of regrowth vegetation 
gained protection. This was a positive step towards the conservation of biodiversity on 
private land but a relatively small area in a State with 141 million hectares of 
agricultural land.
The thesis then examined compliance and enforcement under the VMA. Common 
themes abound within the literature on environmental crime, such as the difficulties of 
applying general principles of criminal law to environmental law. It was apparent that 
these difficulties remain and, within Queensland, there were additional complexities to 
the offence of illegal land clearing. For Chapter Six, the following question was central:
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how were the enforcement and compliance provisions o f the VMA made and what were 
the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland parliament within which the 
amendments were made? 2 The relationship between the regulators and regulated, 
particularly those investigated and prosecuted, was often characterised by tension, 
distrust and volatility. The statutory scheme was complex and complicated further by 
widespread amendments to the investigatory and prosecution powers of the regulators. 
These amendments followed a recurring pattern within the Queensland parliamentary 
process for a controversial law. The following question was accordingly explored: how 
did the regulators decide to prosecute?
Analysis of the regulatory decision to prosecute covered the compliance strategy and 
enforcement guidelines available within the public domain, including consideration of 
the enforcement pyramid devised by Ayres and Braithwaite. Within this model, 
prosecution is an option of last resort and research into regulatory enforcement 
strategies has consistently concluded this to be the norm. At times however, the 
proportionate and consistent approach to prosecution, advocated and allegedly adhered 
to by the Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM), was not 
evident in practice. It is contended that prosecution policy was influenced by the 
political values and affinities of the governing administration. Within Queensland 
conservative administrations have traditionally used prosecution as a measure of last 
resort; the latest Labor period of administration conversely undertook periods of 
forceful prosecution.
Regulatory claims to transparency were not evident in practice and this became even 
more evident in Chapter Seven, which examined the following question: how were the 
compliance and enforcement provisions o f the vegetation management regulations 
implemented? The cases included in this chapter were elicited from rural media and 
interviews with organisations such as Property Rights Australia (PRA). This facilitated 
contact with investigated and prosecuted rural landholders and their lawyers. Such 
context provided a socio-legal aspect to this research and facilitated an insight into what 
was happening in practice. Traditional doctrinal research would pay no heed to the 
lower courts. Yet it is within this setting the much of the land clearing litigation was 
undertaken. Rudimentary flaws were apparent, as they are in all criminal justice
' Political processes have typically been considered together with political context in this thesis but this was 
examined in Chapter Four.
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systems, but some of the cases examined revealed particular inequities of land clearing 
litigation in Queensland. This gave rise to a further question: what wider issues did the 
compliance and enforcement provisions raise in terms ofprocedural fairness and 
access to justice ?
It is fundamental for a regulatory agency to be seen as acting fairly in the 
implementation of laws, yet some of the investigations and cases considered do not 
reflect well on the regulators. What is more they reveal a lack of procedural fairness 
within our criminal justice and adversarial systems, not least in two of the basic 
principles of access to justice: the right to legal representation and the system of 
appeals. Litigation in this chapter includes cases in which the parties demonstrate 
disillusion with the legal profession and the justice system. Dissatisfaction may be the 
norm, but justice systems evolve, they are not static and, as such, it is imperative they 
are continually and critically evaluated.
The thesis then moved in Chapter Eight to address the same question of the LA that has 
been asked of the VMA: how were the LA and the Rural Leasehold Land Strategy made 
and implemented and what were the parliamentary processes o f the Queensland 
parliament within which the amendments were made? A lack of regulatory 
transparency, identified in Chapters Six and Seven, was again evident. Submissions 
made by interested parties, and upon which the strategy was held to be based, were not 
made available by the regulators, though regulatory implementation statistics were 
provided. For the most part this was not a controversial law; the expectations of 
leaseholders were not challenged. Even if land was not in good condition, pastoral 
leases would be renewed for the same 30 year term. The law was made following 
statutory and parliamentary guidelines and supported by the opposition. Implementation 
of the renewal process witnessed a detailed and wide-ranging land condition assessment 
and. on the basis of this assessment, a complex and lengthy land management 
agreement and a renewed lease term. Rural leaseholders might in future demonstrate 
observance of the statutory duty of care by adhering to the requirements of their land 
management agreement. The agreements set up a monitoring and reporting program.
The long-term sustainability of State land will depend on the regulators having adequate 
resources to maintain and develop this program.
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A further and final research question
Both the VMA and the LA are legislative responses to rural land degradation and signal 
the move towards the conservation of biodiversity on private land. For all that they have 
in common there is much divergence between each statute. The concluding part of this 
thesis brings both pieces of legislation together and asks: why was the waking, and 
implementation o f the VMA more controversial and complicated than that o f the LA?
There are wide-ranging reasons for the differences in these two environmental laws.
The pace and timing of change differed between the two statues. When the LA was 
introduced in 1994, it had been more than thirty years since the legislation had changed. 
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy was undertaken in one amending Act in 2007. The 
VMA was marked by more hurried, recurrent and often retrospective change over a 
prolonged period of time. The timing of change on rural landholders likewise diverged. 
The effect of the VMA was abrupt and sometimes retrospective. The effect ot the LA 
was piecemeal: leaseholders would be impacted as their lease neared expiry. In short, 
the VMA affected a large group of landholders immediately; the LA affected individual 
landholders gradually and with a long lead time for adjustment.
As the first regulatory control for the management of vegetation on rural freehold land, 
controversy preceded and accompanied the introduction and many amendments of the 
VMA. Legislative restrictions on freehold tenure are inherently problematic: it is less 
contentious to make and implement environmental legislation on leasehold land. As the 
law grants limited property rights to lease tenure, and the State government retains a 
considerable degree of control, legislative restrictions generate less resistance. It is from 
leasehold tenure, and ultimately the lease instrument, that rights are clarified, restricted 
and denied and, as such, ‘it is politically and administratively easier to withhold 
property rights than it is to regulate or recapture rights.’3
The contentious issue of compensation further contrasts both Acts. For freeholders, 
there was an expectation of and pressure for compensation following the VMA; 
leaseholders made no demands for compensation following amendments to the LA. The 
vegetation management regulations were set apart and exacerbated by delay: it took the
3 Holmes J II and Knight L D P .  ‘Pastoral lease tenure in Australia: historical relic or useful contemporary 
tool?'( 1994) 16(1) Rangeland Journal. 119.
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Queensland Labor government almost five years to produce a fiscal package for 
affected landholders. The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy was giving rather than taking: 
additional lease terms would be granted as an incentive for land assessed as in good 
condition. Of the number of leases renewed at the end of June 2012, half had been 
granted an additional ten years. How genuine an incentive often years is, remains open 
to debate -  but the additional lease period is an extended term. Legislative vegetation 
management restrictions were perceived by many with freehold title to be a property 
right taken back by the government.
Rural landholders granted an additional ten years have benefitted from the Rural 
Leasehold Land Strategy; but the public environmental good will be enhanced if the 
strategy is effectively implemented. Environmental legislation, such as the VMA and 
the LA, generally give precedence to public over private rights and interests. Achieving 
and maintaining a balance between such rights and interests can generate tension and 
controversy, as evidenced by the VMA. However misguided, freehold title is all too 
frequently regarded by those who hold it as absolute ownership with unfettered rights. 
Public restrictions are deemed an imposition and a public environmental gain perceived 
to be borne at a private cost. Because the rights that attach to leasehold tenure are more 
restricted, the public and private balance is more readily accomplished, as evidenced by 
the LA.
The VMA was controversial because it affected those rural landholders who had 
demonstrated sustainable land management practices by retaining native vegetation. 
Landholders who had cleared extensively and retained little or no native vegetation or 
protected regrowth have remained unaffected by the legislation; whereas rural 
leaseholders who had exercised sustainable land management were rewarded under the 
LA.
Consultation with interested individuals and rural organisations differed with each Act. 
For the VMA, consultation did little to promote a good working relationship between 
the regulators and regulated. Prior to the introduction of the VMA, consensus or 
anything approaching a meeting of minds was problematic: the Vegetation Management 
Advisory Committee became overwhelmed by division and was disbanded in an 
untimely fashion. The former chairman provided insight into the work of the committee,
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not the regulators. This breakdown in the consultation process was aggravated by the 
2004 VMA amendments in which the Labor government failed to heed the extensive 
work undertaken over a prolonged period by regional vegetation management groups. 
Consultation with the LA adopted a more measured policy pace; like the VMA, it was 
characterised by a lack of transparency, but both government and regulators appeared to 
be listening to those affected by the legislation.
In marked contrast to the introduction and amendments of the VMA, government 
rhetoric accompanying the LA was founded on conciliation and collaboration rather 
than confrontation and blame for past land management practices. Divisive and derisory 
language was familiar to both sides of the VMA debate. For many people on the land, 
the regulators were known as the tree police, the government described some 
landholders as cowboys.4
The change for leaseholders was facilitated on an individual level: lease renewal meant 
one-to-one negotiation with DERM. The change for landholders following the VMA 
was often hasty, frequently confusing and typically without negotiation or compromise. 
The more established rural organisations such as Agforce and QFF helped to facilitate 
the transition to regulation; but the VMA generated the formation of Property Rights 
Australia (PRA), a rural body reacting to dissatisfaction with the regulatory 
environment and determined to protect property rights.
The Rural Leasehold Land Strategy was not utilised by Queensland Labor as part of an 
election campaign or pre-election horse trading for preferences. The VMA conversely 
was politicised and, as an electoral asset, predisposed to emerge in the public arena 
around election times. In the decade from 1999 until 2009 the VMA was amended many 
times.5 The most significant amendments typically coincided with a State election when 
pre-election commitments became post-election laws. For example the elections in:
4 Reference to the tree police is made in Kehoe J, ‘Land Clearing in Queensland' Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal. (2006) 23. 156. The opposition typically referred to the regulators as tree police, see for example: 
Queensland. Legislative Assembly. Debates (24 May 2005) 1521-1522. in which Seency .1 described a meeting with 
600 landholders in his constituency of Callide. Equally, as noted in Chapter Six. Peter Beattie had a tendency to refer 
to rural landholders as cowboys. For example: Hon P Beattie, Premier, Beattie flags tough new measures to stop 
illegal clearing (Media release. 22 January 2003) Available at:
httm/Vw u u  .cabinet.old. uov.au/MMS/Slalcmcnl Displays in» le.asp.\?id- 17844 (viewed ).
5 As noted in Chapter Three there have been 17 reprints, 23 amending Acts and 497 amendments of which 179 have 
been retrospective.
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1999 -  in which the VM A was introduced; 2004 -  which marked the beginning of the 
end of broadscale land clearing; and 2009 -  which brought in a controversial 
moratorium and regrowth provisions/’
Recommendations for changes in policy and law
Adoption of a transparent and accountable public administration is required for 
Queensland. There is no provision for this in the VMA but the objects of the LA include 
‘efficient, open and accountable administration/6 7 Equally, as noted in Chapter Five, the 
Integrity Act 2009 (Qld) was brought in by the Bligh Labor government and declared to 
be the beginning of integrity and accountability reforms within Queensland/ As 
documented in this thesis, the Labor period of government and the VMA and LA were 
generally characterised by a lack of transparency and accountability. Submissions made 
during the course of policy formulation should have been available online, in common 
with the practice of other governments such as the Commonwealth. Equally, 
compliance and enforcement warrants a comprehensive and detailed insight into 
regulatory statistics. In keeping with the practice of the former Queensland 
Environmental Protection Agency, as discussed in Chapter Seven, this could be a 
representative summary in the regulatory annual reports including a more detailed 
breakdown of the statistics on each piece of legislation administered.
Policy change could be initiated to provide additional support in the initial transitional 
stages of regulatory change and to make available incentives to adopt sustainable land 
management. In the past, landholders were given tax incentives to clear land; in the 
future, they could be given tax incentives to conserve biodiversity. An education and 
communication role is undertaken competently by bodies such as Agforce and the 
Queensland Farmer’s Federation (QFF) but these organisations do not represent all 
landholders. Reliance on these bodies is in part indicative of tensions in the regulatory
6 The environment did not feature significantly in the 2006 Queensland state election. In the campaign prior to the 
2012 election the Queensland Labor Party was at its lowest ebb. In an attempt to secure Green votes and preferences 
the Premier at the time, Anna Bligh. announced that a green corridor spanning 2.200 kilometres would be established 
from the ‘border to the beach* to protect biodiversity. The plan was said to involve the creation o f ‘new national parks 
and voluntary conservation agreements with landholders to ensure good management of the corridor*. Labor for 
Queenslanders policy, Bligh A, 'Border to the beach* (1 March 2012). Available
at:hltn://w w w. queens land labor,or^TO 12/03/01 /border-to-lhe-heach/ ( viewed 10 January 2013) and ABC News, 
‘Bligh vow's green belt from border to beach* (2 March 2012). Available at: htto:/7w ww.abc.net.au/news/2012-03- 
01 /blmh-vow's-to-create-ureen-corridor/3862278 (viewed 10 January 2013).
7 Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 4.
s The Integrity Act 1999 (Qld) was passed on the 25 November 2009. See also. The State of Queensland (Department 
of the Premier and Cabinet) Response to Integritv and Accountability in Queensland. November 2009.
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relationship, particularly during the Labor period of administration. The State 
government should endeavour to repair this relationship and work collaboratively with 
those on the land. Working in partnership was a stated aim of the Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy, but this aim should also extend to rural landholders with freehold title.
As for recommended changes in the law, it has been noted that the purposes of both the 
VMA and the LA indicate a move towards better environmental management on rural 
land in Queensland.9 However, sustainable land management practices are not static nor 
do they operate in isolation: their aim must be to foster the conservation of biodiversity 
on private land. Conservation is not defined in the VMA and yet the purpose of the Act 
is to conserve remnant vegetation and vegetation in declared areas. 10 A useful definition 
of conservation in relation to biodiversity is The protection, maintenance, management, 
sustainable use, restoration and improvement of the natural environment. . . ' * 11 The VMA 
lacks these factors, which together promote the conservation of biodiversity. One of the 
purposes of the VMA is to prevent the loss of biodiversity. 12 The purposes of the Act 
should be amended to include the conservation of biodiversity. 13 Such an amendment 
would align more closely with the LA which includes this provision as part of the duty 
of care condition. 14 This and the following recommendation would ensure consistency 
across rural land tenures.
It was noted in Chapter Three that leasehold, but not freehold titleholders in Queensland 
are subject to a statutory duty of care for their land. Following an Inquiry into 
ecologically sustainable land management, the Industry Commission recommended that 
a statutory duty of care for the environment should be included for landholders who 
own or manage their land regardless of legal title. 15 It would potentially be better for the
’ As documented in Chapter Three the purposes o f the VMA under s 3( I) (a) to (g) Vegetation Management Act 1999 
(Qld) is to regulate the clearing o f vegetation in such a way that: conserves remnant vegetation that is: an endangered 
regional ecosystem or an o f concern regional ecosystem or a least concern regional ecosystem and conserves 
vegetation in declared areas; and ensures the clearing does not cause land degradation; and prevents loss o f  
biodiversity; and maintains ecological processes; and manages the environmental effects o f the clearing to achieve all 
these matters and. finally, reduces greenhouse gas emissions. The concepts o f sustainability and protection were 
introduced as statutory ob jects under s 4 Land Act 1994 (Qld). Sustainability is defined as: 'sustainable resource use 
and development to ensure existing needs are met and the state's resources are conserved for the benefit o f future 
generations' and protection as the 'protection o f environmentally and culturally valuable and sensitive areas and 
features’.
10 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (1) (a) to (b).
11 Native Vegetation Framework Review Task Group 2009. 62. Australia's Native Vegetation Framework, 
Consultation Draft. Australian government. Department o f the Environment. Water. Heritage and the Arts. Canberra.
12 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (1) (d).
13 For example the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 3 (1) (e).
14 The Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 199 (2) (h).
15 Industry Commission. A Full Repairing Lease; inquiry into Ecologically Sustainable Land Management.
September 1997, 72.
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environment if all tenures were subject to this duty. This is particularly relevant in 
Queensland where rural freehold land is more likely to cover more productive and 
scarce arable land, compared to the marginal and more arid leasehold regions. To 
include a statutory duty of care for freehold land would require a change to the Land 
Title Act 1994 (Qld). As noted in Chapter Eight, the long term significance of this duty 
will depend on the regulators having sufficient resources to undertake collaboration and 
education, not only at the time of negotiating a new lease and land management 
agreement but also in the future when land condition is assessed. It is when this 
assessment occurs that landholders might required to show practical compliance with 
the duty of care provisions, by demonstrating performance of their land management 
agreement. How the regulators will enforce this duty, and if there will be a willingness 
to enforce, is open to question: in the past there has been little in the way of compliance 
and enforcement on leasehold land in Queensland. The environmental efficacy of the 
statutory duty of care condition is at best a potential mechanism to develop recognition 
of and adherence to the duty, which is currently lacking for freehold title.
The extensive amendments to compliance and enforcement of vegetation management 
regulations were explored in Chapter Six. This chapter documented that broadscale land 
clearing has reduced significantly under the VMA. This evident behavioural change on 
the part of rural landholders should be reflected in a more collaborative and cooperative 
regulatory scheme. Such an approach would not undermine the significant 
environmental gain achieved by the phasing out of broadscale land clearing; rather it 
would indicate a willingness to work in partnership in the future. It is recommended that 
the government review and amend the compliance and enforcement provisions of the 
VMA. Particularly the provision that instruments, equipment and evidence of remotely 
sensed imagery are taken to be accurate and precise in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary.16 The ability of rural landholders to provide contrary expert evidence requires 
considerable financial resources and the tenacity to defend a case.
Sentencing of land clearing cases was examined in Chapter Seven in which it was 
established that the purposes of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) include 
providing a sufficient range of sentences and ensuring the protection of the Queensland 
community.17 Reference is also made to the protection of the Queensland community in
16 Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) s 66 A.
17Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 3 (b).
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the sentencing principles of this Act.'x This legislation envisages protection from the 
perpetrator of an ordinary crime rather than an environmental crime. The offence of 
illegal land clearing however invariably generates the degradation of land and the loss 
of biodiversity. Both the purposes and principles of the Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) could be amended to encompass environmental crime with an additional 
clause to include, if appropriate to the offence, the protection of the environment on 
behalf of the community.
There are further principles under the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) the court 
must have regard to and which are of particular relevance to vegetation clearing 
offences. They include: the maximum and minimum penalty for the offence; and the 
nature and seriousness of the offence including harm to the victim.19 Once again the 
legislation envisages a human victim whereas the victim of an illegal land clearing 
crime will invariably be the environment and the community. The Act could be 
amended to add, if appropriate, any harm done to the environment. A general 
environmental duty to prevent or minimize environmental harm is provided for in the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) but this encompasses harm caused by 
pollution not land degradation. To include environmental harm in the Penalties and 
Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) would be a factor the court would then have regard to in 
relation to the nature and seriousness of the offence at the time of sentencing. As noted 
by Preston CJ: ‘Even where harm is not an element of the crime, the objective 
harmfulness of the offender's actions is relevant to determining the seriousness of the 
crime'.21
Variation in the extent and type of land clearing was apparent in the cases considered in 
Chapter Seven. This distinction should be reflected in the VMA in relation to penalty 
amounts, for example:
• The difference between small and large scale clearing should be reflected 
in the financial penalties imposed. The law should be changed to 
accommodate large-scale clearing beyond, for example, 55.5 ha of 
endangered vegetation.
Ix Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 (e).
19 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9 (2) (b) and (c).
20 Preston B J. ‘Principled sentencing for environmental offences -  Part 2: Sentencing considerations and options’ 
(2007)31 Criminal Law Journal. 142. 145.
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• In a similar vein to the Protection o f the Environment Operations Act 
1997 (NSW), the vegetation management regulations could be amended 
to encompass different levels of offence. Following the example set by 
the NSW Act; the more serious offences would require a mental element 
and proof of fault and carry larger fines than the current maximum.
• Clearing on a lesser scale should be a crime of strict and not absolute 
liability in keeping with other comparable environmental crimes.
• The possibility of treating clearing on a lesser scale with civil penalties 
could be explored. Alternative dispute resolution, particularly mediation, 
lends itself to continual working relationships such as that between the 
regulator and rural landholder. Mediation could be facilitated to include 
working with the landholder to restore the land.
Areas for further research
Future research could follow and compare the VMA and the LA under a conservative 
Liberal National Party (LNP) government. Changes in the legislative process were 
introduced by the Bligh government in 2011. They included revision to the committee 
system and the introduction of a regulatory assessment statement for new legislation.21 
These changes have been adopted, with some amendments, by the LNP. The committee 
system amendments brought in the Environment, Agriculture, Resources and Energy 
Committee to replace the Scrutiny of Legislation Committee (SLC) for matters 
including land and vegetation management. In keeping with the operation of the former 
SLC, this committee examines, amongst other things, the application of fundamental 
legislative principles in accordance with the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld). The 
law which governs the functions of this latest committee remains the same but the focus 
has become more specialised. Before the changes were implemented, a regulatory 
assessment statement was only required for significant subordinate legislation if 
proposed new laws imposed appreciable costs on the community or part of the 
community. In future all significant regulatory proposals for both primary and
21 For example: Queensland government. Protecting Queensland's strategic cropping land; regulatory assessment 
statement. Department of Environment and Resource Management, 2011. Available at: 
http://\v\vvv.r>arl iamcnt.qld.aov.au/doeumcnts/Committees/HAREC72011 /SC 'E/7.u/<>20rcgulatorv--assessment- 
statement. Ddt%xml=http://Yv\v\y .parliament. uld.aov.au/intemetsearch/isvsquery/f6999bd5-7ad6-4481-bbae- 
ce3551'5c8345/ 1 /hi 1 itc (viewed 12 January 2013).
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subordinate legislation will require a regulatory assessment statement. Further research 
could assess these changes in the legislative process under a conservative government.
The end of the long period of Labor government in Queensland marks the end of the 
general time frame for this thesis. A newly formed and electorally ascendant LNP 
government took office in March 2012, with 78 seats in the parliament. The Labor Party 
retained only 7 seats. This was an unprecedented parliamentary majority for 
Queensland. In his first ministerial release, and before the first parliamentary session, 
Andrew Cripps, Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, announced a review of 
investigation and enforcement processes under the VMA and in particular a review of 
penalty processes.22 The review was set to last from six to eight weeks during which 
time investigations were put on hold and an existing unnamed appeal withdrawn. In 
September of the same year the Minister addressed the Agforce conference and 
announced a strategy to streamline vegetation management.23 As at February 2013 the 
necessary amendments to the law were yet to be made, but according to the Minister 
will be passed within the first quarter of the year.24 The VMA will not be repealed nor 
are there calls for this from Agforce or other rural organisations. But the Newman 
government has promised to restore balance and fairness to the administration of the 
Act and, according to the Minister, develop "vegetation management policies that 
recognise and encourage sustainable agricultural production rather than being fixated on 
vilifying landowners, as was previously the case'.25
Further research could be undertaken to monitor statutory amendments and the 
implementation of compliance and enforcement under the LNP government. Grabosky 
and Braithwaite's research was considered in Chapter Six: they found that regulatory 
prosecution was rare in 1980s Queensland. Their period of research marked a pinnacle 
of conservative rule under the Bjelke-Petersen administration. An area of further study 
could investigate whether the latest LNP government will adopt a similar approach of
22 Cripps A, 'Minister Orders Review of Vegetation Clearing Enforcement Processes' (Media release, 19 April 2012). 
Available at: http: statements.cabinet.old.go\ au MMS/StatcmcntI)ispla\ Single.aspx'.’id 79000 (viewed I February 
2013).
23 Cripps A. 'State government restores balance to vegetation management laws' (Media release, 20 September 
2012). Available at: http://slatcmcnts.qld.gov.au/Statemcnt. 2012 9/10/statc-govcmmcnt-rcstorcs-balance-to- 
vegetal ion-management-lawsfviewed I February 2013). Minister Cripps received a standing ovation at the Agforce 
conference.
24 Cripps S, ‘Rural groups push veg management wish list' Queensland Country Life (24 January 2013) 9.
2" Queensland government. Legislative Assembly. Ministerial Statement. Vegetation Management. 2361-2362. per 
Cripps A. available at: hltn:/Avw\v.pariiamcnt.uld.gov.au/documcnts/hansard/2012/2012 11 01 WEEKLY, pdf 
(viewed 1 February 2013).
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appeasement towards those on the land. Gaining an insight into compliance and 
enforcement may prove problematic: the first and latest annual report of the LNP 
government contains no reference to investigations or prosecutions under any of the 
Acts administered.26 If this is because there has been no enforcement activity, it could 
indicate a return to earlier conservative policy.
Moves are afoot for changes in land tenure within the State. An inquiry, described as 
being into the future and continued relevance of government land tenure across 
Queensland, was referred to the State Development, Infrastructure and Industry 
Committee in June 2012.27 The terms of reference required the committee to report back 
to the Legislative Assembly by the end of November 2012. This was subsequently 
changed and an interim report was tabled in November 2012 with the final report now 
due by the end of March 2013. Submissions were invited and public hearings were held 
in Brisbane and six regional areas. A public briefing was undertaken in the Legislative 
Assembly Chamber of the Queensland Parliament. A total of 103 submissions were 
made, all submission are available on the inquiry web page together with a transcript of 
the public briefing. Transparency, at least in this area, is in marked contrast to the Labor 
period of government.
The impetus for this inquiry originated from the Deputy Premier Jeff Seeney, mentioned 
earlier in this thesis as the most determined and resolute opponent of the VMA whilst in 
opposition. Seeney is a landholder and represents the rural seat of Callide. He 
announced the inquiry in June 2012 and noted:
In some cases leasehold land may need to be transitioned to freehold title, and if 
that’s necessary this inquiry will indicate how we make that transition in a way that 
is fair to the people of Queensland and is fair to those willing to invest in 
development.* 2*
Government rhetoric is reminiscent of the mid 1950s and the Payne Commission 
considered in Chapter Two. Back then a conservative government took office following 
prolonged Labor rule and embarked on considerable change for land policy and law.
26 Queensland government, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2011-2012. 
Available at: http:/Av\v\v.derm.tild.üov.au/ahouldxlf7annual-rcporl. (viewed 1 February 2013).
27 Queensland government. Inquiry into the future and continued relevance of government land tenure across 
Queensland. Available at: http://www,pariiament,u 1 d.s»o v.au/vvork-oI-
conmiitlees,Aonmdttees/SDll(7inauiiies/currcnt-intiiiiries/01-Government-land-tenure'.’actionld-^-Jf viewed 1 February 
2013).
2* Phelps M. ‘Seeney orders Queensland land tenure review’ Oueensltmd Country Life (21 June 2012) 7.
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The Delbessie Agreement is now referred to as the State Rural Leasehold Land 
Strategy, and one of the proposed initiatives included in the latest annual report of the 
LNP government is to simplify the operation of the strategy ‘for sustainable and 
productive use of rural leasehold land for agribusiness’.29 Future research could analyse, 
in relation to the land tenure inquiry, the submissions made and transcript of the public 
hearing; together with amendments to the LA and how those changes were made and 
implemented.
A further area of future study could encompass quantitative research to survey a 
representative sample of rural leaseholders that have completed their lease renewal 
process. It would be instructive to ask leaseholders if they read their lease conditions, 
understood their implications, and what attempt was made by the regulators to explain 
their practical meaning. This might be a longitudinal study which would revisit the same 
leaseholders following their five-year self-assessment and the regulatory ten-year 
assessment. It would be interesting to see if the changed process has impacted on day- 
to-day land management practices. It could be with relief that leaseholders, having 
undergone an unfamiliar and protracted renewal process, place their land management 
agreement alongside their other title documents only to be revisited when renewal next 
comes around.
Queensland politics in 2012
As evidenced in this research, fundamental change in land policy and law has 
accompanied each State administration. Of the two environmental laws explored, 
neither Act is destined to be repealed but will certainly be amended to reflect 
conservative ideology and values. The latest conservative administration addressed 
contentious aspects of the VMA soon after taking office in March 2012. As for the LA, 
the evolution of tenure appears set to continue. There will be a degree of recurrence in 
policy and law with the current LNP government and the last long-standing 
conservative period of government examined in Chapter Two. Times however have 
changed and the State is now heavily reliant on the resources industry. Describing its 
achievements in the 2011-2012 annual report, the LNP noted the first objective for the
J> Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management. Annual Report 2011-2012. 
Available at: http:'Av»n.derm.old.ao\ .au about/pdf annual-rcnoil. (viewed I February 2013).
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community was: ka globally competitive mining, petroleum and gas industry’ . 30 This 
resource dependence has far reaching implications for the environment and climate 
change, and for privately held rural land as keeper of those resources. The political and 
ideological association between the LNP government and rural landholders is evident. 
Deputy Premier Seeney might, following the tenure inquiry, appease rural leaseholders 
with greater security of tenure. But conservative support and promotion of the resources 
sector has generated unexpected political alliances and signals tensions to come. 31
Conclusion
The scope of this thesis was undertaken primarily during the latest Labor period of 
administration in Queensland. The aim of the research has been to advance 
understanding of natural resource legislation and contribute to the body of knowledge 
on State environmental laws. This is a detailed account, over a long time span that 
encompasses the emergence of policy, the making of legislation and the variable 
implementation of enforcement of vegetation management regulation on both freehold 
and leasehold tenure. The research tracks the shifting fortunes of Queensland Labor 
from dominance to decline. This ebb and flow of political power generated instability 
and prompted repeated amendments to vegetation management laws. The effectiveness 
of this Labor regime is examined: the VMA did not bring certainty to rural landholders 
as habitually promised by the government. But it did ultimately play a part in protecting 
the unique biodiversity of the State. As such, both the VMA and the LA formed part of 
an extensive suite of environmental laws enacted during Labor’s reign, in an attempt to 
make reparation for past policy and law and promote the conservation of biodiversity on 
rural land.
By utilising socio-legal research this thesis has adopted a broader approach than purely 
doctrinal study. Such a research strategy is not without challenges: the Queensland 
Labor government’s commitment to accountability and transparency was not always 
evident in practice; and a significant amount of land clearing litigation is undertaken at 
the lower end of the court hierarchy, where the realities of legal practice are rarely seen
30 Queensland government. Department of Environment and Resource Management, Annual Report 2011-2012. 
Available at: http://www.derm.uld.gov.au/aboul/pdf/annual-reDOrt 6 (viewed 1 February 2013).
31 Environmental campaigner Drew Hutton, former leader of the Queensland Greens and founder o f ‘Lock the gate,’ 
faced charges under s 805 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) in the Dalby Magistrates Court 
in December 2011. The Act provides that a person must not obstruct without reasonable excuse an authorised officer; 
in this case the obstruction was of a coal seam gas company. Hutton was found guilty and fined $2000. Leader of 
Katter’s Australia Party, Bob Katter attended the hearing and supported Hutton. The irony of this odd alliance was 
not lost on Katter who declared ‘things must be crook in Talarook."
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and much less written about. The traditional and typical focus on orthodox legal 
sources, such as reported judgements, might inform on the law but socio-legal research 
sheds light with a different focus on a very important arena where environmental laws 
are played out.
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Appendix Two: Research protocol -  2009/607
INFORMATION SHEET 
PhD Research Project
My research examines the effect of two pieces of legislation on rural landholders in 
Queensland. The Acts are the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) and the Land Act 
1994 (Qld), each Act covers different tenures (freehold and leasehold) at different 
periods. 1 currently undertake this research in a sole capacity. My supervisors are 
Professor Tim Bonyhady, Director of the Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 
ANU College of Law and Professor John Rolfe, Director of the Centre for 
Environmental Management, CQU.
I have been allocated a Research Training Scheme place at the ANU to undertake my 
thesis.
Why am I carrying out this research?
My research addresses law and policy changes in the past two decades in Queensland 
relating to vegetation management and the introduction of clearing restrictions for 
vegetation on agricultural land. There is little other academic attention in this area.
The management of vegetation on private rural land in Queensland is a major policy 
issue. Vegetation management has implications for biodiversity, carbon sinks and 
impacts in some areas on water quality emissions into the Great Barrier Reef. This 
thesis will contribute to discourse within Queensland on questions of accountability of 
government; and the effectiveness of environmental laws. The thesis will show that 
what has happened on the land has been dominated and fashioned by the political cycles 
and political systems of successive governments; and, moreover, that much of the angst 
with statutory regulation for rural landholders has been generated by the politicisation of 
the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld).
What does the research involve?
In order to place these laws within a social context a modified case study research 
strategy will be employed in this thesis. The case study is an area of research familiar 
within the social sciences, but less so in law which has a long-established adherence to 
doctrinal legal research. Such insights provide a realistic perspective on what is actually 
happening and may be usefully employed to complement and expand upon the 
traditional doctrinal use of case law and legislation. This type of analysis is imperative 
to understanding the political realties of how laws are made within Queensland, how 
they operate and, importantly, how they impact upon those most affected by them.
I have sought your feedback on these laws either:
• by virtue of your role in a Queensland Government department;
• because of your official role in a representative body of rural landholders;
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• because you are a rural landholder;
• because you are a Member of Parliament within Queensland;
• because of your role as a spokesperson for a political party or conservation 
group;
• by virtue of your role as lawyer acting for a rural land holder; or
• because of your academic expertise within this area.
Participation in the project is purely voluntary, and there will be no adverse 
consequences if you decide not to participate. If you agree to participate in this research 
project I would ask you to discuss with me your views on the legislation or particular 
aspects of the legislation which is envisaged to last no more than one hour.
The interview will be unstructured and can be at a mutually convenient time on the 
telephone, by e-mail or at a place which is convenient for you. The discussion will not 
be audio-taped.
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time, and you do not need to
provide any reason. If you decide to withdraw from the project I will not use any
of the information you have provided. The results of this study will form the basis of my 
thesis and may be published in academic journals or books. However, the names of 
individuals will not be reported in connection with any of the information obtained in 
discussions without written consent of the individual(s) concerned. You will have the 
opportunity to request a copy of the research results when published.
Are there any risks if I participate?
I do not intend to seek any information in discussions which is particularly sensitive
or confidential. It is possible that others may be able to guess the source of information 
provided in discussions, even if it is not attributed to any person. Accordingly, it is 
important that you do not tell me information which is of confidential status, or which is 
sensitive or defamatory.
Contacts.
If you have any questions or complaints about this research please feel free to contact: 
Jo Kehoe
Central Queensland University, FABIE, Rockhampton,
Tel: 07 4930 9213 
Email: j.kehoe@cqu.edu.au
If you have concerns regarding the way the research was conducted you can also 
Contact:
ANU Human Research Ethics Committee:
Human Ethics Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Australian National 
University. Tel: 6125 7945.
Email: H u m a n. Et h i e s. O f 11 c e r  (a  anu.edu.au
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